The Brazilian workers movement on the eve of its second general strike
The world's most indebted country, Brazil, accepted the IMF's to vote for one of the austerity decree laws issued by General conditions in early September for the extension of new credits. Figueiredo's government.
The Brazilian government's economic policy will not put an the government's plans.
end to the spiral of debt, which is a result of the country's Last but not least the response to these measures among the
But it does mean measures masses of working people has been a new upsurge of mobilizaare in the works that will drastically reduce the workers stan- tion and radicalization.
Several decree laws that go in that direction have tions against poverty last spring in Sao Paulo and to the July 21 already been adopted by General Figueiredo's government. The growing exasperation of the working people
However, this orientation is encountering opposition among is a crucial factor in the present situation, and has conditioned the bourgeois opposition parties, the attitude of the bourgeois forces to the government's policy.
dependence on imperialist capital.
This produced a majority opposed to
This led to the spontaneous demonstradard of living.
the capitalist bourgeoisie, well as among the working masses.
The climate within the regime is illustrated by the recent resignation of the chairperson
The ways to build and centralize the mobilizations against of the Brazilian central bank, Carlos Geraldo Langoni.
the economic policy of the government and the dictatorship are fused to sign the "Letter of Intent" committing the government also being widely debated in the workers movement to the IMF.
His argument was that the measures envisaged
Despite the divisionist maneuvers of "yellow" union leaders would
"generalized poverty for the Brazilian people."
mean
(International Herald Tribune, September 22, 1983).
Second Congress of the Working Classes (CONCLAT) was held
Parallel to this debate on relations with the IMF and the in late August and managed to make progress toward building country's debts, the bourgeois forces are also involved in disa single confederation of labor. (See the box below).
cussions around choosing a candidate to succeed General
Figueiredo as president.
The following article deals with all these questions, offering
The rejection of the government's economic policy has also a detailed study of the economic, social, and political changes been reflected in the refusal of the bourgeois opposition parties in the causes that produced the Apri re- prices. Previously, wage earners got full
SAO PAULO - Leaving Brazil after a laborious round of negotiations on new loans to the dictatorship, the chief of the
IMF delegation told the press:
uation in the country is unpredictable."
This is true in several respects.
Social tensions are growing rapidly.
They are reflected in big mobilizations, such as the general strike called for last
July 21 by 130 trade-union structures.
The economic crisis is deepening, and this is sharpening the contradictions in the ruling class. Thus, the dictatorship is among various candidates to succeed Figueiredo. (A new president is supposed to be chosen early in 1985).
And some rightist sectors that were involved in the 1964 coup d'etat are now in the opposition.
At the same time as the dictatorship's room for maneuver has been narrowing, the bourgeois opposition parties, which have governed seven states since the
November 1982 elections, have become more and more embroiled in a policy that combines violent repression and proposals for social pacts. (1)
However, the opposition parties have also raised louder alarms than the IMF retary for security in the Sao Paulo gov-
Movement Party has said that Brazil is
"on the brink of grave problems," and even raised the spectre of "blood baths."
His colleague, the secretary to the minister of labor, Almir Pazzionotto, has explained that "There has been no change general strike. as He reand the reformists bellions and the July general strike."
For his part, Dom Paolo Arns, bishop of the city, has said that "if it had not been for the solidarity among the families of the unemployed, Sao Paulo would lave already gone up in flames at least a world needs a radical revolution." (2)
The negotiations with the IMF were opened in January by a "Letter of Intent," in which the Brazilian government promised to reduce inflation and keep its commitments to the IMF.
However, the state financial presented by the Brazilian regime was rejected by the IMF. The measures already adopted do not correspond fully to what the creditors demanded. So, the nego tiations began in the summer of 1983 ar very important.
government's standpoint, these negotiations offered the prospect of a loan of 820 million dollars and access to 4.4 billion dollars in financing. the IMF this was the first test of the prospects for renegotiation debt. This is, in fact, inevitable in view of the situation the country is going through and the growing pressure of the Brazilian bourgeoisie for a moratorium on pay-
In this race against time, the government presented Decree-Law D.L. on July 14. This measure makes it clear what sort of economic program the government is drawing up. Wage increases are not to exceed 80% of the official rate of inflation, which is calculated on the basis of the national index of consumer of the Brazilian Communist Party, the compensation every six months for increases in this index.
Since this index has generally been rigged, it can be imagined how big a blow this change means for the workers. (3)
So, a rapid reduction of the real wages of the working people is the primary axis of the dictatorship's economic policy. The government moreover, tried to give a particular weight to this decree by having it approved by a special meeting of the National Security Council, a central institution of the military dictatorship, and presenting it to parliament as a question related to "national security." (4)
TOWARD MASSIVE UNEMPLOYMENT
The central objective of this policy is to generate a rapid growth of massive un-
See "The Workers Party and the Deepening Crisis in Brazil," by Daniel Jebrac, in International Viewpoint, No 36, August 1, 1983.
Folha do Sao Paulo, August 12, 1983. Moreover, according to le Monde of July 16, 1983, "there were two other measures that provide for virtual dismantling of the Brazilian system of cost-of-living increases. First, there will be adjustments only twice a year rather than four times a year, as has been the case up till now. Secondly, the index will exclude consumer price increases taken account of in calculating wage raises, as well as price increase resulting from natural calamities."
Despite this warning, the opposition. which has a majority in congress, rejected on September 21 a presidential decree la w wages, and everything indicates that it will do the same in mid-October in the vote on Decree Law 2 045, the keystone of the government's policy for wage controls and the base of the agreement made with the IMF.
employment. According to the data published by the powerful Sao Paulo State Federation of Industries (FIESP), over the last two years the local industrial concerns have fired 405,000 workers.
The labor force employed in industry has fallen back to the level of July 1973 But the IMF is demanding a much more aggressive policy. One of the targets for the coming months is to reduce the rate of inflation from the 170% previously projected to 150%, and next year to 50%
Product and three times the annual income from exports.
Cheap food production, one of the sources of financing for the Brazilian "miracle," is being threatened today by several factors. In 1983, a cycle of poor harvests began that will last until 1986 State subsidies were drastically cut in order to comply with the demands of the IMF. The area under cultivation shrunk by 15% in 1982-83. The disorganization of agricultural production and the result-
This "slow and gradual political opening" initiated by General Geisel under the patronage of General Golbery was soon shaken up by the evolution of the relation of forces among the classes.
Early in the process, the two-party system set up after the 1964 coup d'etat, with the Alliance for National Renewal (ARENA) as the official party and the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB)
or 60%.
Since the "dollarization" of the Brazilian economy has far from diminished,
AGORA value continues to be transferred from the industrial sector to the financial one ing shortages fueled inflation.
by high interest rates. This is thus inevitable; that any measure aimed at re- TEMOS ducing the inflation rate so rapidly would have enormous consequences for the level of employment.
The economic crisis the Brazilian regime faces now, however, is the result of contradictions that accumulated during the process of industrialization. Brazil's insertion into the international division of labor as a coffee exporting economy offered the possibility in the 1920s for an initial capital accumulation and a small measure of industrial development.
This development took the form of modernizing the consumer-goods industries, differentiating the industrial structure, and creating small cement and steel
On this basis, after the 1929 crash and throughout the prewar years, it was possible, taking advantage of the decline in international trade, to launch a more ambitious industrialization.
This period represents the heyday of Party, when there was a mirage of autonomous economic development and a vigorous independent capitalism. *Now we have a United Confederation of Workers (CUT)' (DR)
this industrial development took place in sectors with a low organic composition of capital, which were complementary to, and did not compete with, the international trusts. In fact, after 1964, the big imperialist concerns increased their penetration. They financed and controlled Brazil's economic expansion.
The most recent phase of economic expansion, the Brazilian "miracle," fits into the context of this growing dependence on imperialist capital. Between 1945 and 1980, the Gross Domestic Product increased by ten times, which represents an annual growth rate of 7%. A modern industry developed, marked by a high degree of concentration and internationalization of capital.
THE BILL FOR THE BRAZILIAN "MIRACLE"
All the contradictions generated by this industrialization process and dependence are coming to a head today in the accumulation of a staggering level of debt and in stagnation of agricultural production. Brazil's foreign debt has nearly reached the 100 billion dollar mark. It represents a third of the Gross Domestic
The recession that has set in is thus threatening to upset all the balances of the regime — the balance between the industrial and financial sectors, between the dictatorship and the bourgeois opposition, between capital and labor.
Over this period of industrialization, bourgeois domination took different political forms. Getulio Vargas, who was in power from 1930 to 1954; the postwar "Populist Republic"; and the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) were ideological representatives of this transition from agricultural-export economy to industrialization. The Consolidated Labour Laws (CLT), the body of laws establishing a corporativist trade-union structure under the Ministry of Labor, date from this period.
CRISIS OF THE DICTATORSHIP
The dictatorship established in 1964 after the overthrow of President Joao Goulart accelerated industrial development under the dominance of international monopoly The political loosening up of the regime after 1974 represented an attempt to control social discontent primarily secondarily through bourgeois oppositions.
in the opposition, revealed the growing isolation of the dictatorship in the electoral arena and opened up the way for reorganization of the opposition groups. The workers movement began to undergo a process of recomposition.
The second stage of this evolution involved the reorganization of the political parties. The two legal parties were dissolved by the Figueiredo government in December 1979. The official party reemerged under the name "The Social Democratic Party" (PDS). And the MDB became the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB).
However, the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB) also appeared. It was led by Getulio Vargas' daughter and former president Janio Quadros. General Golbery encouraged it with the aim of channeling the populist tradition.
In addition, the People's Party (PP) was founded. It was organized by high finance and the right wing of the MDB.
The most important event in this period, however, was the rise of the strike movement and the formation of the 5. See Reginaldo Moraes, Le Phoenix tropical, p. 52 ff.
21
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A CUT
Workers Party (PT), which organized the fight for political independence of the workers.
The third stage was marked by the elections of November 1982 (6), which resulted in a spectacular setback for the PDS and for the dictatorship. At the same time, parties like the PTB that were trying to contain the workers movement and negotiate with the dictatorship got nowhere.
THE BATTLE OVER SUCCESSION
This "transition," to use the term current in the Brazilian press, has now gone into a fourth phase. The dictatorship is preparing the way for a change of president, while the bourgeoisie is trying to achieve more unity in the face of the economic crises and the social struggles.
With the approach official congress, which is to designate a candidate to succeed Figueiredo, several candidates have already thrown their hats into the ring.
The former governor of Sao Paulo, Paulo Maluf, known for his corruption, is in a good position in the race. minister of the interior, Mario Andreazza, is the favorite of Figueiredo, who will have an important say in selecting the candidate, who will be finally elected by an electoral college where the PDS is guaranteed a majority. (7) Nonetheless, Andreazza is not very well regarded by
The present vice president, Aureliano Chaves, also has presidential ambitions. Finally, the governor of Minas Gerais, Tancredo Neves, elected on the PMDB ticket, is offering himself as a possible candidate to represent a broad national
The crisis of the dictatorship is reflectgovernor since the November 1982 elecproposes extending General Figueiredo's mandate for two years in for direct presidential elec-
It is not by chance that these conflicts are accelerating.
government's relations with the governments of the most populous and richest Brazilian states and the need for uniting the bourgeoisie against the threat of working-class mobilization, as well as the demands of administering the economic crisis, are forcing the central nucleus of political power to redefine its strategy. And up to now this position has been in the hands of military men.
A SWOLLEN STATE TORN BY CONFLICT
In fact, every political conflict is immediately reflected within the swollen state apparatus. In the first place, this is because of the large role of the state in the productive structure (the state accounted for 40% of the Gross Domestic Product in 1969-1978, as against 19.6% in 1947-57, and public enterprises are responsible for 40% of the foreign debt).
Secondly, political conflicts are fought out in the state apparatus because of the lack of means in the first phase of the dictatorship for representation and coordination of the various factions of the bourgeoisie. This resulted in a transfer of these functions to the center of the state apparatus itself.
A section of the hard right is raising an outcry now against the divisions within the military nucleus and demanding that the regime unite behind a single candidate. Its ideological representatives are, in particular, the two mass-circulation dailies, O Estado de Sao Paulo and spectrum, you find sectors that are calling for a more deepgoing democratiza. tion and pose this as the condition for a
The influential magazine Senhor for example said in an editorial on the negotiations with the IMF: government's glaring lack of representativity and legitimacy is weakening our bargaining position, particularly in the economic field."
This view is held especially by national capitalist sectors. Such companies are being strangled by problems of credit and dozen big companies have signed a document putting forward this view: Achieving full democracy is a great national project. The complete return of the country to constitutional rule requires the independence of the three branches of govern-
"It is essential that there be a free debate on an austerity program that can be understood and accepted, that can unite all Brazilians, one that can apportion the sacrifices and reestablish credibility....
"Our creditors and the governments of friendly countries have to understand that it would be risky to plunge the coun try into a recession for an indefinite period and with results contrary to the interests of Brazil.
"A prolonged restriction of productive activity will lead inevitably to the bankruptey of Brazilian private enterprise and could even lead to a challenge to the system of free enterprise in general....
"This is a complex country, high degree of urbanization and at the same time enormous masses of absolutely impoverished people. At the same time, it has an attitude of dynamic social mobility. It cannot live with the tensions created by unemployment and declining
This scenario is intolerable ed in the clash among these personal- Jornal da Tarde. ities. General Golbery, who was the regime's grey eminence until last year, is giving tactical support to the candidacy of Paulo Maluf, while holding out the possibility of backing Tancredo Neves as a second choice. He says forcefully: "Nobody is going to accept military men running the government any more, not even the armed forces themselves." (8)
The influence games and maneuvering are on the increase. Golbery is making statements to discredit the candidacy of Chaves, and he managed to throw a monkey wrench into the parliamentary agreement between the PTB and the PDS, so that the government party finds itself in a minority in the Chamber of Deputies, with 235 deputies as against 244 for the rest of the parties.
On the eve of the important discussion on Decree 2 045, Otavio Medeiros, chief of the political police (the SNI) speeded up the return to Brazil of Figueiredo, who had gone to the U.S. for medical reasons. His objective was to restrict the activity of Chaves, who had taken over for Figueiredo in his absence.
Finally, the most popular candidate for president, if there were direct elections, would be Leonel Brizola, Rio state 22
For example, in its August 14 issue, O Estado de Sao Paulo ran an editorial
"Today, with the satisfaction that comes from having done our duty but with a bitter feeling that the nation has gone backward in recent years, we think that we can offer our readers the missing pieces to prove that the March 1964 movement [that is, the coup that established the dictatorship] has been day in turn the Jornal da Tarde published an editorial under the eloquent headline "It's Later Than You Think, General." It said "the ball has been over for three years," con-
"General Figueiredo should not have any illusions. He no longer has the
The only backing he can offer is his personal preference. Twenty-eight days [the length of time Figueiredo was hospitalized in the U.S.] is very little in the life of a coun try. But it is more than enough time for an institution that is rapidly breaking This chain of newspapers remains notorious for the role it played in preparing
At the other extreme of the bourgeois for Brazilians, and it is not desirable for avoid a deliberate or unwitting break with the international financial community."
This lucid description of the situation the country is in came from a group of leading businessmen selected annually by the economic magazine Gazeta Mercantil In 1978 this same forum called for a widening of the "opening" initiated by
This time the documents were signed, others, by Erminio Moraes, a representative of the Votorantim trust (mines and construction, the main Brazilian private trust), representatives of the de Acucar, and the Bardella engineering industries.
These capitalists represent an important sector and are pushing a proposal 6. For the balance sheet of the November 1982 elections, see "Brazil Elections: Defeat of the Dictatorship," by Daniel Jebrac. Inter. natione new head of state is to be elected.
The new head of state is to be elected in January 1985 by an electoral college made up of the members of the federal parliament and the members of the state parliaments. Since the PDS has an absolute majority in this college, the nominee of the official party is certain to be elected. 8. Folha do Sao Paulo, August 8, 1983.
Militant Brazilian unionists
It calls for that is gaining acceptance.
negotiations and a moratorium on the foreign debt. Abilio Diniz, from the supermarket chain Pao de Acucar, defined he contradictions that exist today still
"A unilateral declaration found national labor confederation more sharply:
of a moratorium is the next worst road.
But it is better than the one we are following today - that is, an immobilism
The second Congress of the Working Class (CONCLAT) was held August 26-28 that is going to have us wake up one day with a moratorium that we did not con-
It was successful in terms of the urban and rural unions that were represented sciously prepare for."
The warning was
These bureaucrats had called for a different sort of CONCLAT in November in
This position is tending to prevail.
Praia Grande, one that would be based on the established national leaderships of
The chairman of Volvo-Brazil has already come out for it. Vice President Aureliano
The Sao Bernardo CONCLAT was attended by 5,059 delegates, representing
Chaves leaked information about a meet-
12 million organized workers (there were 5,036 delegates at the first CONCLAT).
Delegates came from 355 urban workers organizations and 310 rural workers ing he had with company heads who pronearly a hundred public posed a negotiated five-year moratorium.
unions, one confederation, and eight national trade-union coordinating commit-
The PMDB proposes a three-year negotees, to say nothing of about a hundred union organizing committees.
The New York Times devoted an edi-
Mexico, and the United States sent representatives.
torial to the question, headlined The
On the basis of this representativeness, the second CONCLAT founded the
It argued that the
United Confederation of Workers (CUT), adopted a plan of action for the new confederation, and chose a collective leadership for it to hold office until the sooner a moratorium was negotiated, the first congress of the CUT, which is projected for August 1984. The national better it would be for both parties.
of the CUT is comprised of 83 full members and 83 alternate memthis course requires a systematic effort to
There is a National Executive of 15 members and a National Coordinating gain more support for the regime in the
Committee of seven members, including the presidents of the engineering workat the possible price of accelerers organizations in Sao Bernardo do Campo and Diadema, Canoas, Joao Monated reforms and restricting the power of levade, Niteroi, the presidents of the petroleum workers organizations in Camthe military.
pinas and Paulinia and of the rural workers organization in Santarem, and of a leader of the rural workers organization in Victoria de Conquista.
A DEAL WITH THE DICTATORSHIP?
The CUT defines its aim of being "representative, democratic, independent of the state, the bosses, and the political parties."
have been projected for March to prepare for the August 1984 national congress.
The pressure for such a solution show-
The plan of action centers around the struggle against Decree 2 045, which calls clearly in the PMDB, the leading ed up for cutting back cost-of-living allowances.
opposition party, in the wake of the strike for the end of October against this decree,
November 1982 elections.
Gerais state governor, Tancredo Neves.
Some union representatives who took part in founding the CUT seem to became the advocate of "negotiations"
accept the present split created by the boycott of the "pelego" and reformist with the dictatorship. In other words, he
However, the fight for broader unity of the trade-union moveproposed himself as a candidate to sucment remains on the order of the day. As the Marxist journal Em Tempo noted ceed Figueiredo, as someone who would
"Through this understanding and initiatives by the CUT in struggles it would be possible to attract other sectors and block the be both acceptable to public opinion and path of the "pelegos" and reformists and keep them from carrying through their reliable in the eyes of the military.
splitting maneuver of founding a new confederation in November.
The representatives of the left wing of the PMDB, such as economist and senator
Gernando Enrique Cardoso, are proposing today that the party open up negotia-
The PMDB thus imposes obligations that chief of the president's military cabinet, come quite sharply into conflict with the
In this perspective, the PMDB has worked up an economic plan that profor broadening democratic liberties, for setting up a constituent assembly, a moratorium on the foreign debt negotiated with the imperialist powers, and direct elections to the presidency.
However, the timidity as regards dealing with the economic crisis led the vice president of the PMDB, Teotonio Vilela
- who supported the July 21 general strike against the governor of Sao Paulo, also a member of the PMDB - to say that this program reflects "the view and interests of the bankers and the Sao Paulo bosses and not the aspirations of Brazilian society."
THE DICTATORSHIP'S DEMANDS
Despite these contradictions, it is clear that the great majority of the PMDB inclines toward conciliation. Thus, on the eve of the July 21 general strike, the representatives of the dictatorship let the
Sao Paulo state government know that despite splitting maneuvers organizations,
Trade-union confederations from leadership bers.
action are exhausted.
in its 8 October 1983 issue:
wanted energetic measures. General Ruben Ludwig, said: strike does not seem to be part of the democratic process."
Still more explicitly, General Danilo Security Council, said: "Those who have the responsibility for keeping the situation from getting worse (i.e. the Sao Paulo state governor must not neglect
In fact, the PMDB government of Sao Paulo took its job seriously enough. Some 18,000 police clamped down tight control on the city. The troops of the order put on the alert. The "forces of Second Army Corps based in Sao Paulo barged into the churches. Trade-union leaders were arrested on the eve of the strike. Several union headquarters were taken over. Five union leaderships were suspended, including those of the largest unions in Brazil, such as the Sao Bernardo engineering workers union organization and the Sao Paulo bank work-
The "conciliation" advocated by the
"pelego" and reformist trade unionists.
workers unions, five national trade France, Spain, Holland, West Germany,
A series of regional meetings
It also provides for building a general after all the other forms of dynamic of mass mobilization. growth of industry in the country in recent years has in fact profondly changed the Brazilian working class. And these structural changes opened the way for major changes in the trade-union move-
In the recent period, the Brazilian industrial working class has grown considerably. In 1960, it included 2.9 million workers. Twenty years later, this number rose te 10.6 million workers. It has also undergone important internal changes. The number of working women, for example, has tripled in the last decade.
The leading companies in manufacturing have developed much more rapidly than the traditional sectors. Massive urbanization has gone hand in hand with an exodus from the rural areas and the growth of regional population centers.
The state of Sao Paulo by itself includes 50.2% of all the industrial workers employed in the country, the majority of them in plants with more than 500 workers. And 70% of this labor force is
concentrated in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area. This is the cradle of militant unionism and the proposals for working-class independence that are the driving force of workers struggles in the country.
THE RISE OF THE WORKERS MOVEMENT
The recent development of the workers movement has gone through four successive stages:
1) The first mobilizations following the end of the era of the Brazilian "miracle" occurred in the ABC (9) industrial finery went on strike against cutbacks in the workforce, the speedup, and the growth of on-the-job accidents over the last two years. and decided to go out on strike the next day in solidarity with the petroleum workers.
The other refineries also shut down and were occupied by the workers. On July 7, 60,000 out of 100,000 engineering workers in Sao Bernardo went on regional uneveness continues to weigh heavily. But the working class made a demonstration of strength in an action that its organizers described as opposed not just to the economic measures but to the dictatorship as such.
### CORPORATIVIST UNIONISM
The majority of the 4,712 union or ganizations in the country (2,397 urban workers organizations and 2,315 rural workers organizations) do not function on a representative basis. Most of them belt and in Sao Paulo itself. These were the first experiences in the reorganization of the workers movement. They made it possible to elect militant leader- CENTRAL ÚNICA S ships in the corporativist unions subordinated to the state apparatus and paved the way for the radicalization of these leaderships.
2) The cycle of strikes in 1978-79 marked a qualitative leap in the development of the workers movement. started in the Scania factory and in the engineering plants in the ABC belt, where 100,000 workers are concentrated in six neighboring factories.
The movement spread to other categories of workers. Several unions called strikes against the will of the established leaderships in the face of the threat of violent repression. It is out of this struggle that the Workers Party (PT) emerged. It brought together the most representative leaderships of the wave of strikes.
3) A new phase opened with the defeat of the May 1980 strike of the engineering workers in the ABC belt. The strike lasted forty days but was finally broken by repression, the suspension of the union leadership, and the jailing of some leaders.
The two distinctive features of this new situation were the shift to more dispersed and more defensive struggles and the first attempts to set up national crossunion coordinating structures.
### STEPS TOWARD
TRADE-UNION UNITY
Thus, the first Congress of the Work ing Class (CONCLAT) met in August 1981. It was attended by about 6,000 delegates from the cities and the countryside. (10) The militant current had the majority. But by organizational maneuvers it was put in a minority in the National Commission for a Single Labor Confederation, which was elected on this occasion.
4) The increase in unemployment, the drop in buying power, and the worsening of the economic crisis, combined with experience accumulated and the growth of working-class organization, prepared the way for a new upsurge of struggles.
In April 1983, the unemployed in the southern district of Sao Paulo clashed with police and sacked the supermarkets. On July 6, the big Paulinia petroleum re24 strike, along with 40,000 workers in other industries. There were giant demonstrations.
Three days later, the government shut down the headquarters of the unions responsible for the strike. leaders from all over the country then met, in response to an initiative from the militant trade-union current, but with the participation of the collaborationist bureaucracy.
at a meeting of of several unions, a bureaucrat admitted: "I think that we are going to have to support the general strike, otherwise they are going to expose
These are unusually frank statements in a trade-union movement where the leaders are still largely appointed by the Ministry of Labor.
The July 21, 1983, general strike mobilized nearly three million workers. This included, according to careful calculations, 80% of the workforce in Sao Paulo, and many sectors in Porto Alegre (the capital of Rio Grande do Sul) and its industrial belt.
In the other states, where there was no strike, there were nonetheless important expressions of solidarity. 60,000 people demonstrated in Rio and 10,000 in Belo Horizonte. clearly not a real nationwide strike. The are bureaucratic social-welfare agencies. The federal structure assures the predominance of the collaborationist bureaucracy most closely tied to the Ministry of
For example, in the election of the leadership of the engineering union, the Sao Paulo district, the biggest union organization in Latin America, had no more votes than a small union organization from a city in the interior.
In turn, the industrial unions elected the Confederation of Industrial Workers
In the elections for the leaderof the CNTI, there was a headon A minority backed the candi"Jozquimzao," the country's most notorious "pelego" (literally, "soft seat," a term for bureaucrat).
Joaquim Santos de Andrade is in himself the best symbol of the difficult history of the Brazilian trade-union movement. First, he was designated by the dictatorship as a trustee for the engi9. The ABC the belt of working class suburbs around Sao Paulo. There are concen trated 400,000 engineering workers employed by the multinational automotive companies Ford, Volkswagen, General Motors, Scania, etc. This area has been the beacon of the struggles since 1978. ABC stands for Santo Andre, Sao Bernardo, and Sao Caetano. 10 Nos. 109 and 111, September 8, 1981 and October 26, 1981, of Inprecor (IV's French-language sister publication).
neering workers union in Sao Paulo. He on the state governments headed by the head of the union by one election fraud a social pact.
then managed to keep himself at the after another.
After the start of the political open ing," he included the activists of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) in the union leadership reformed the method of funetioning in the union. He supported the July 21, 1983, general strike against the advice of Ari Campista, a representative of the bureaucracy most closely aligned with the Ministry of Labor, who was elected over him to the
The corporativist structure thus rests on two foundations. On the one side, there is the federal organization guarantees the predominance of agents of the state apparatus and obstructs coordination among different categories of work-
The other is the Ministry of Labor supervision of the functioning of bourgeois opposition parties, and achieve
This last objective explains the interest this bureacuratic current has in preventing the formation of a single workers
On the other side, is the militant bloc, which wants to create the CUT as an instrument for overturning the corporativist struggle and advancing the struggles, even at the risk of seeing the most representative union leaderships suspended, as happened at the time of the July
THE MILITANT CURRENT
This militant current is itself heter-
It is headed up by the unionists in the ABC belt, and, first of all by
"Lula," who is also the chairperson of the PT. But it also in-
Their argument was that the strike was a maneuver by the bureaucrats to channel
This decision to abstain came directly from their international
What actually happened was the exact opposite of what the Lambertist current warned against. The success of the July strike threw the "pelego"-reformist bloc into retreat, out of fear that the move ment would radicalize and spread. fact, 37 trade-union bodies are already calling for a new general strike before the end of the year. The majority of state union conferences, the ENCLATs, have also come out for building such a general
So, founding the CUT emerged as the fundamental task of the second CONCLAT, which met at the end of August
The creation of this body would be a major stimulus to national coordination of the workers movement.
It collects the "union tax," a cludes independent unionists who are compulsory dues deduction that serves in part to finance the unions. And it can freeze the accounts of a union and suspend elected union leaderships.
TWO CURRENTS CONTEND IN THE UNIONS
The rise of workers struggles, combined with the crisis of the dictatorship, led to the appearance of two distinct currents in the trade unions, beginning in
On the one hand, there is the "traditional" current, that is the old yellow bureaucracy. And the Stalinist current, the PCB and the PC do Brasil (pro-Albanians), remains linked to this wing. On the other hand, there is a militant current lined up behind the Sao Bernardo engineering workers union organization and the Sao Paulo bank workers.
The militant current made a decisive contribution to developing coordinated struggles and to starting up a trade-union coordinating committee to prepare for launching the United Confederation of Workers (CUT).
It was the first CONCLAT in August 1981 that decided to found in the following year a trade-union confederation would unite all the unions that agreed to join, as well as individual work-
Over the following year, the CUT Pre-
It was paralyzed by the conflict between the two opposing wings of the movement. Moreover, the dispersed and defensive nature of the struggles facilitated maneuvers by the bloc of union bureaucrats, such as Joaquim Andrade, and the reformists of the PCB. As a result, the second CONCLAT, and therefore the founding of the CUT
From this point, two conceptions and two political strategies were clearly coun-
On the one side were the "pelegos" and the reformists, who wanted to maintain the corporativists strucinge, negotiate over the political "openwith the dictatorship, put pressure not members of the PT. Some of them
"Prestistas" (that is, members of a CP splinter group led by the historic CP leader Carlos Prestes). them are Catholic trade unionists, who have considerable influence.
The Catholic unionists also get important material support from the European Social Democracy. They clearly follow a policy that favors division in the trade-union movement. Their influence is particularly strong among the rural trade
The confrontation between these two opposed currents in the union movement has now entered its crucial phase.
During the preparations for the July 1983 general strike, the "pelego"-reformist bloc split. Joaquim, president of the Sao Paulo engineering workers, supported
He recognized that Paulo today is a powderkeg that could explode at any moment, given the number of unemployed who no longer get any kind of compensation. The spark could be approval of Decree 2 045." "pelegos" resolutely opposed the strike.
The PCB itself divided on the question. The Central Committee issued a call opposing the strike, and one of the Correia, told the magazine Senhor that he full time against the But the Sao Paulo Committee of the PEB, under the pressure of the workers leadership in the city, found itself obliged to support "a strike without demonstrations or pickets." Its reasoning was clear enough: "We regret the fact that the national leadership is holding back from participating in the mass movements. this way, the CP is going to continue to lose strength."
It has to be noted also that another current abstained from the strike. It was the supporters of the paper O Trabalho, which reflects the positions of the Internationalist Socialist Organization, (OSI), linked to the international Lambertist current headed by the French International Communist Party.
However, in an attempt to pull their bloc back together and safeguard the corporatist union structure, the and reformist unionists preparations for the second CONCLAT. The pretext came over the rules on repreof delegations from unions whose leaderships did not want to participate in the CONCLAT
It was the Confederation of Agricultural Unions (CONTAG) that raised this objection. Its president, Jose Francisco, wanted to nail down total control of delegations elected by the ranks, because he feared the radicalization and growing influence of militant sectors among the rural unions.
The bloc of "pelego" and reformist unions thus proposed holding a founding congress of a confederation at a national meeting of unions that would take place in October. This confederation would be based on the leaderships of the present corporative structures.
its part, the bloc of militant unions continued to support the call for the second CONCLAT to meet at the end of August. Thus, a split in the union movement emerged at a time hardly favorable for the Brazilian workers.
It is true that it would be difficult for the two blocs of trade unionists to continue to live together for a long time in the same all-trades structure. of the militant bloc to build mobilizations and to bring together all categories of workers is aimed at destroying the collaborationist bureaucracy.
On the other hand, the maneuvers of the bureaucracy are designed to destroy the influence of the militant current in the workers movement in order to keep the movement from radicaliz
However, it is also clear that today a united front of the trade-union structures against Decree 2 045, against state intervention in the unions after the July strikes, and against unemployment would give a powerful impetus to mobilization. It would undermine the base of the reformist bureaucracy, as could already be seen in the case of the July 21 actions.
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