Basically, the PTB and the CP talked a similar language. Each in its own way impeded the development of the workers' political consciousness. In fact, there can be no change of policy nor any anticapitalist alternative without a determined fight to oust the Martens-Gol governfor a workers government based on a trade-union common front and put in by a general strike, the LRT was the only party that intervened in the strike with a clear answer to the concern felt by thousands of union members: "We're all for dumping Martens-Gol, but what will we put in its place? A coalition government with won't help anything."
The LRT's answer was not just propagandistic. It offered a way of building a campaign in the unions to put pressure on the big working class parties to sup demands of working people. We have never seen so many or such rich discussions about the alternative we offer. This will leave its mark.
Thousands of union members have gone through a powerful experience. They have come out of it disillusioned but certainly not defeated. A process of deepgoing reflection has started, focusing around a critical assessment of the policy of the traditional leaderships of the workers movement, especially the union lead-
These leaderships accept sacrifices, "on condition that they are shared equitably." This is why they refuse to put up a decisive fight, this is why they refused to dump Martens-Gol. So, the question of leadership in the workers movement is being posed. This problem now has to be seriously tackled, and this requires above all a correct political line.
It is this perspective of a long-term struggle points up the importance of strengthening the LRI, of building a new Socialist Workers Party. "You have good ideas, but what can your little party do?" we are often asked. The answer to this question can be seen from the balance sheet of the public workers strike.
11
Sandinistas fight for
Between 1978 and 1982, the infant relative cost of living in the various Central American countries. By way of comparison, a month's supply of 21 essential products for a family of six costs 36 dollars in Nicaragua. In neighboring Honduras - a prize specimen of Ronald Reagan's "free world" - the cost of this month's supply of staples is double.
an economy geared to the needs of the majority
All the other Central American countries have a cost of living far higher than Nicaragua. Despite all the difficulties Nicaragua has faced, it has suffered less of an economic decline than its neighbors.
The massive aid in dollars that has been showered on the most privileged layers in the other countries on the Cen-
Nicaragua is up against a very difficult situation today. The revolution is under direct attack from the U.S. imperialists.
Washington has sent its fleet to threaten the Nicaraguan coasts. It is organizing large-scale maneuvers on Honduran territory.
country by imposing a full-fledged blockade. (1)
This imperialist offensive is also being waged through the intermediary of the counterrevolutionary forces operating from Honduras and Costa Rica. In addition to the harm these gangs do by their acts of destruction and crimes, they are forcing the
Sandinista revolution to give its main attention to defending itself.
To complete the picture, within the country itself, the most concentrated sector of private industry is refusing to invest and consciously doing its bit to further disrupt the economy.
Jean-Claude BERNARD
All the overall economic indicators for
1982, which are the latest known, show growing difficulties for the revolution.
(2)
While in 1980 and 1981, the Gross National Product (GNP) grew by 10% and
6% respectively, in 1982, it declined by
1.4%.
Following the victory of the revolution in July 1979, the unemployment rate was reduced dramatically. In 1979, it stood at 36%. In 1980, it was cut to
13%. In 1981, it was still kept down to
16%. But in 1982, it had risen to 21%.
In 1982, moreover, consumption of products other than basic necessities dropped by 23%.
As against this, consumption of necessities dropped by only 4.7%.
While the rate of inflation was 25%, the drop in the buying power of the minimum-wage urban workers was only 14%
For rural working people, it is estimated that the decline in buying power was 19.6%.
Every revolution has experienced such difficulties in the beginning.
The imperialists do not accept defeat but mount harassing operations.
In the case of
Nicaragua, these problems were further aggravated in 1982 by catastrophic floods that interfered with agricultural production.
THE GAINS OF THE REVOLUTION
Nonetheless, the growing obstacles have not diverted the Sandinista leadership from its orientation of meeting the needs of the workers in the countryside and in the cities.
What should be pointed up first of all is the major efforts made to improve public health and education. In 1982, for the first time in the history of the country, there was not a single case of polio, which represents no small accomplishment.
12
Morever, it is trying to strangle the mortality rate fell by a quarter, dropping from 120 per 1,000 to 90 per 1,000. Medical care is free in the health centers, and these centers account for 60% of the visits to the doctor registered in 1982.
In the area of education, the reduction of the rate of illiteracy from 50% before the revolution to 12% today represents a real historic victory.
The number in school has tripled, rising from 500,000 in 1978 to 1,500,000 today. Some 73% of children between the ages of seven and twelve are now in gainers from these advances have been the immense majority of the population, the working people in the countryside and the cities, who were previously denied access to these social services.
This progress means little for the bourgeoisie and the well-to-do middle strata, who already had access to medical care and to education for their children.
This orientation of meeting the needs of the largest possible number is reflected also in the results obtained in the area of consumption. The year 1982 was certainly a difficult one. But the drop of 4.7% in the consumption of necessities was small by comparison with the drop of 23% in the consumption of other products. This is the effect of subsidies to stabilize the prices of staples such as maize, rice, and beans. the general decline in consumption noted in 1982 hides the significant fact that there has been a very large increase in consumption of the highest-protein foods.
This is a particularly impressive success since in 1979 the diet of the majority of the population suffered from protein deficiency. For example, per capita consumption between 1980 and 1982 and per capita consumption of eggs by nearly 25%.
There have been calculations of the tral American isthmus did not prevent a drop of 9.5% in the GNP in El Salvador, 5.9% in Costa Rica, and 1.6% in Honduras. For most of the people in those countries, living conditions are much more difficult.
THE GRIP OF THE PAST
All the steps taken by the national leadership of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) since July 19, 1979, have not, however, been able to immediately overcome the heritage of the past.
That is, Nicaragua is a small country that the former dictator Somoza assured would be dedicated mainly to growing coffee, cotton, and sugar cane, thereby increasing its dependence on the fluctuations on the imperialist-dominated world market.
In such a situation, it takes a long and complex process to eliminate the constraints imposed by ignorance, hunger, and poverty. You have to reorient the whole apparatus of production and exchange so as to give priority to meeting the needs of the greatest number.
This is what is involved in the objec tive and the work of building "people's power" undertaken by Managua. It involves organizing the power of the working class in alliance with the peasantry, that is, the overwhelming majority of the economically active population.
The direction of the process initiated on July 19, 1919, Is clearly toward an overall reorganization of the economy And this is going hand in hand with the emergence and consolidation of a mass movement representing the interests of the working people in the cities and in the countryside.
At every step, this process has met with fierce resistance by the counterrevolution both from within and from without. This is why, far from advancing at a constant and regular rate, this process has been marked by crises and stops and starts. But the outcome of all these crises 1. See "The Nicaraguan revolution under fire," International Viewpoint, No 36, Sep tember 19, 1983. 2. With the cited exception, all these figures come from official data included in the report of the Government Council to the Council of State dated May 4, 1983; from the speech by Sandinista commander Daniel Ortega on the anniversary of the Sandinista revolution on July 19, 1983; and from the report for 1982 by the National Statistics Institute (INEC, Managua).
is a further shift of the relationship of forces in favor of the workers and peasants.
Nonetheless, the bourgeoisie still controls an important part of the productive apparatus and which can exert ideological influence through its press and the Catholic hierarchy. And it has not yet given up hope that it can reverse the process.
IMPERIALIST ECONOMIC PRESSURE
This process is all the more complex because Nicaragua can only develop on the basis of There has been a steady reorientation of such exchanges since July 19, 1979.
In 1979, 78% of the credits came from international organizations, as against 22% from bilateral contracts negotiated with individual governments. this situation was totally reversed. Bilateral contracts accounted for 92% of the credits, as against 8% from international organizations. This is due in part to the boycott imposed by U.s. imperialism, which managed to block financial assistance from the international bodies that it largely controls. also a result of the policy adopted by the FSLN and the Government Council for National Reconstruction.
The Nicaraguan government is now better equipped to make bilateral agreements, even with the governments of the capitalist European countries, that meet the priorities it has set for development. For the entire period running from July 1979 to May 1983, cooperative aid from capitalist countries represented 78% of the total, whereas that coming from the "Eastern countries" and Cuba amounted to only 22%. (3)
This pronounced dependence on the capitalist countries can be seen also when you examine the results of foreign trade for 1982. Exports to the "Eastern counand Cuba represent 6.3% of the total, while imports from these countries
Revolutionary banner in Nicaraguan shanty town (DR) add up to 11% of the total imports. These facts far from support the stereotype promoted by the international press of Nicaragua becoming a "Soviet-Cuban"
Latin America (including the Central American Common Market) accounts for 45% of imports and 16% of exports. The Central American Common Market alone accounts for 18% of imports and 13% of exports.
The U.S. itself still accounted for 19% of Nicaragua's imports and 22% of its exports in 1982. The steps taken by the Reagan administration in the spring of 1982 to block Nicaraguan sugar exports to the U.S. will reduce this.
The still relatively of trade with the U.S. indicates how much any stepup of the American blockade could disrupt the Nicaraguan economy.
Trade with West Europe has been growing over the most recent period. Exports to the Common Market countries, which account for 24.5% of the total of Nicaraguan exports, are four times greater than those to Eastern Europe. Imports from the EEC - 14% of the total - are double those from East Europe.
So, the overall reorientation of international exchanges is marked by two features. On the one hand, there is a growth in trade with the East European countries. On the other, there is a realignment of trading relationships among the capitalist countries - with the West European countries (Germany, France, and Italy) and the Latin American coun tries (mainly Mexico) assuming a larger
The importance of trade with Mexico is still more crucial because today it is Nicaragua's major oil supplier. Up to the end of 1982, the 15,000 barrels a day Nicaragua needs were supplied equally by Venezuela and Mexico.
At the beginning of 1983, Venezuela stopped deliveries because of Nicaragua's inability to meet its debts on time. This has to be seen as a direct result of U.S pressure on a country like Venezuela, which is also deeply in debt.
Since early this year, the 13,000 barrels arriving daily in Nicaragua have come from Mexico alone. And the U.S. has been increasing the squeeze on Mexico, as the New York Times has indicated. (4)
So, reorienting Nicaragua's international exchanges is closely related to the diplomatic and economic pressures that can be brought to bear on the country and which represent obstacles in the Sandinista revolutionary process.
This relationship makes the question of the foreign debt and the negotiations on repayment particularly acute. In 1982, repayment of the foreign debt absorbed 45% of the total income from ex•ports. This points up one of the means the imperialists might use to try to strangle the revolution.
The pressure of this debt forced the FSLN national leadership and the govern3. Figures provided by the International Fund for Reconstruction (FIR), Managua. 4. Information provided by the weekly bulletin of the Nueva Nicaragua news agency, Managua, August 1983.
13
ment council to reduce imports in 1982 by 25.5% by comparison with the preceding year. The fact they were able to limit the drop in GNP to 1.4% is actually a testimony to the resources of a system that is beginning to reorient the economy toward putting the needs of the majority of the population first.
Like the escalation of the military threats, the increased economic problems, essentially blockade and the counterrevolution, are sharpening the social polarization in the
Up to now, it is the bourgeoisie and the middle classes in Managua who have directly affected by economic restrictions, which have mainly been put on the importing of luxuries. So, the result of the economic difficulties has been the deepening of the revolutionary process that can be seen today in Nicaragua. It is reflected in the continuation and acceleration of the agrarian reform, as well as in the transformations that are shifting the balance of the mixed
THE AGRARIAN REFORM
In a country where more than 60% of the economically active population is made up of peasants and workers, where 75% of exports are agricultural products, and where agriculture represents half of total production, question of agrarian reform is clearly a
Before July 19, 1979, a couple of thousand landowners held land, while 120,000 peasants held only
This richest layer of landowners have been hardest hit by the transformations in progress. Under the impact of the expropriation of the holdings of Somoza and his direct associates immediately after July 19, 1979, the percentage of the land held by this top layer of landowners fell from 50% to 13%.
At present the land is divided up as
23% is held directly by the state, 20% belongs to small peasants organized in cooperatives, 13% remains in the hands of the big landowners, and the rest - 44% - belongs to the middle
The agrarian reform decreed in August 1981 set the maximum individual holding at 350 hectares on the Pacific coast (the most densely populated area and 700 hectares on the Atlantic coast. A lot of agrarian reforms in other Latin American countries might look more radical on pa-
But unlike most of them, the Sandinista agrarian reform has actually been put into practice.
What is more, cultivating land effec-tively has been made a condition for keeping it. In accordance with the dynamic of the revolution, it has been the mass peasant organizations — the National Union of Farmers and Stock Raisers (UNAG) and the Association of Rural Workers (ATC) - that have made sure that this condition is observed.
Unlike in the big industrial plants, 14 forms of monitoring are not necessary in agricultural operations. The peasants organized in their mass organizations can easily find out whether land has been left to lie fallow, or is being underused with respect to the average produc-
Thus, the agrarian reform puts all privately held land under peasant control. It provides for turning the expropriated land over to individual peasants or cooperatives. These titles can be inherited, but they cannot be sold. tion is to keep big landed estates from re-
A particularly significant element in the present dynamic of the revolution is that the agrarian reform decree has not only served to institutionalize the situation created by the mass land occupations that came in the wake of July 19, 1979, when Somoza and his cronies left a lot of land abandoned. It also started a movement that, far from running out of steam, is continuing to accelerate. Twice the amount of land was distributed between June 1982 and March 1983 as between October 1981 and June 1982. (5)
Thus, between September 1981 and July 1983, titles have been distributed for 210,000 hectares, with 166,000 going to and 44,000 to individual This process is speeding In fact in July, at the time of the 70,000 hectares were distributed, which represents more than half the amount distributed since the start of the year.
20,000 peasant families have gotten land through the agrarian reform. In fact, a larger number of peasants have been affected by the ongoing transformations, since it is estimated that about 60,000 are involved in the cooperative
The two mainstays around which the agrarian reform is organized are the lands nationalized "in the domain of people's property" and the lands cultivated by the burgeoning cooperatives. The target is an allotment of 50% to the poor peasants, 25% to the state sector, and 25% to a private sector of market farmers. The share still held by big landowners and middle peasants, more than half the total, indicates how far the Sandinistas still are from their goal.
### AGRICULTURE HARNESSED
TO SOCIAL NEED
The change in tempo in recent months does not mean that the goal is already
What it signifies is that to meet the demands of the revolution's social base in the countryside and to orient agricultural production in accordance with the national priorities it was necessary to step up the pace.
To appreciate the sort of alliance that has been formed between the peasants and the revolution, it is important to note that the targets of agricultural production are not being determined by the interests of the peasants alone. The first task the FSLN national leadership set for agriculture was to assure an adequate supply of the staples of the national diet
This goal is in the interests of the peasants, to be sure, but also of the urban workers. It was not set to suit economic interests of one or another layer of the
It was adopted to meet the demands of a policy designed to achieve a planned development of the country in the interests of the majority of the work-
This political choice has already led to tangible results. While the overall level of agricultural production in 1982 was 10% lower than in 1977, the trend was the opposite for the food-staple crops. tween 1977 and 1982, rice production doubled, the bean crop increased by 15%, and the supply of pasturized milk rose by
At the same time, production of maize, the basis for the main national staple - the tortilla - remained constant.
On the other hand, there was a marked drop in cotton production in 1982, while the coffee and sugar cane harvests stayed at the old level.
THE ROLE OF THE BIG LANDOWNERS AND STATE
The reason for the fall off in cotton is that this crop is cultivated mainly on the big private plantations or state farms. And in the case of the state farms, the administrative teams appointed Somoza are often still there, since there is a shortage of technically qualified personnel to replace them. These two factors combined to produce poor results, in contrast with the cooperative sector in which the poor peasants have combined, and in the most advanced cases cultivate the land collectively.
In the cooperative sector the social mobilization is much more active than on the private plantations and big state
It should also be noted that the cotton and sugar cane crops have been the targets of criminal arson by the "con-
So, the agrarian reform underway can only be analyzed as a process that is still far from being completed. Active participation by the agricultural workers and the poor peasants is the key in this area, as it is for the revolutionary process as a whole. The advance of the agrarian reform cannot, in fact, be analyzed separately from the measures taken with respect to other sectors of the economy, in particular foreign trade and distribution within the country.
HOLES IN THE STATE DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
The state holds a monopoly of foreign trade and wholesale trade in agricultural products has been nationalized Thus, the peasants in principle do not have direct access to the market. The trend is rather toward nationalized con5. The magazine Envio, Managua, August 1983.
in a position to buy for resale at sub- flight figures reflected in the balance of trol of distribution of produce, whether it comes from the private, cooperative, or public sector. Thus, the revolutionary government is tending to acquire the means for allotting agricultural surpluses to those sectors to which it gives priority.
In this area also, even though a clear target has been set, the present situation remains very uneven. Two distribution networks continue to exist side by side, from wholesalers to retailers.
Products subsidized from the state budget are sold only through the public network. In fact, because of these subsidies peasants can buy beans and maize at lower prices in the stores than the price they got for selling the same products.
But many sections of the peasantry continue to sell their crops through private circuits, thereby deliberately causing shortages of the products sold at subsidized prices in the 2,600 public stores.
For example, the "Eastern Market" in Managua, the city's oldest market left standing after the 1972 earthquake, is a den of speculators. In August 1983, they were selling rice and beans at double the prices in the public stores. chicken was 80% higher. (6)
The daily press that supports the revo-
Barricada, the organ of the FSLN, and Nuevo Diario have been waging an intense campaign against these speculators, who can profit from the systematically created in the public distribution network. the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS, the neighborhood organizations) in combating speculation should be noted in
The weight of the past and the complexity of the problems to be solved becomes clear when you see that on many levels private distribution networks have been able to tap the public ones.
Nationalized farms growing maize, for example, contribute to speculation by selling their crops to private wholesalers at prices higher than the official ones. Often it is managers left over from So-
In fact, the question of supplying the needs of the majority of the population, especially in the cities, has been the focus of a lot of recrimination. This is a real
However, the FSLN is by no means trying to put a bureaucratic damper on this discontent. To the contrary, it is trying to use it to get a mass struggle going against the speculators and the enemies of the revolution and to deepen the revolutionary process. The revolution is not something that stands still, or that has already set for all time the level of socialization in the economy.
WHAT FUTURE FOR THE "MIXED ECONOMY"?
The same observation holds for the industrial sector, which is also under a mixed economy system. In Nicaragua, industry accounts for only about 30%
Gross Domestic Product. very dispersed. On February 31, 1982, there were no more than 96 plants with
100 workers, and no more than 97 with between 50 and 100 work-
But these less than 200 plants by themselves accounted for 85% of the country's industrial production in terms
In 1982, it was estimated that the private sector accounted for 60% of industrial production and the public sector for 40%. But this figure is not very significant in itself because it combines small craft production and capitalist production in the full sense of the term.
To assess the dynamic of the present situation, it is more fruitful to look at in-
The main fact that comes out here is that private investment represents no more than 23% of the total, including all sectors of the economy.
The role played in reality by private investment was analyzed as follows in an economic survey by Barricada focused on payments indicate that the private sec tor is 'decapitalizing' (7) instead of investing.
"Likewise, the demand for long-term credits by the private sector to the national financial system dropped in 1982 If we add to this that the private sector does not get foreign loans, since its economic activities are 100 percent financed by the national financial system, we see a negative orientation on the part of big private capital. It is showing a lack of interest in the effort to achieve national capital accumulation.
"In recent years, the surpluses gener ated by big private capital have been directed toward non-productive uses. This includes not only consumption but speculation and capital flight." (8)
To deal with this "negative" attitude on the part of big private capital, the revolutionary government is not just making denunciations. It is expropriating or intervening in plants where the bosses are not respecting the terms of the contract made - that is, to produce in accordance with the national priorities and to try to meet the most urgent needs of the population. This means putting a watch on the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie from above. But its behavior is also being monitored from below on the initiative of the workers.
THE SANDINISTA GOVERNMENT,
A "SANDINISTA" BOSS, AND THE WORKERS
The example of the "labor conflict" that occurred in Managua in early August in the biggest bakery in the city illustrates the sort of initiatives the work-
This bakery employs 85 workers and the state holds the majority (51%). The manager, who holds the rest of the stock, was a Costa Rican citizen, Chavez Ovarez. liberation, he supported the FSLN and moza's time who are responsible for
Moreover, at all levels of the public playing much less of a role in the investdistribution network, private traders are investment in 1979-82.
"Private fixed investment declined,
Moreover, the capital
"The people of Sandino are a victorious army' (DR)
EL PUEBLO DE SAIDINO was rumored to be linked to the "Group of the Twelve" (a group of prominent exiles who lined up with the FSLN).
So, this manager had ties to current leading circles and was guaranteed a supply of flour, even in the event of short-
This did not keep him, however, from being an aggressive boss. In particular, he refused to accept the setting up of a local of the Sandinista Workers Confederation (CST) in "his" business. He went so far as to fire a militia member who was mobilized to defend the revolution.
On Sunday, July 31, 1983, the bakery workers hung a banner across the front of
ES UN EJERCITO VICTORIOSO their workplace with a hastily written slogan, "Stop the violations of the work-
In response to growing discontent among the workers, the manager decided 6. Nuevo Diario, Managua, August 3, 1983. 7. "Decapitalization" is a jargon term coined to cover the two-sided policy of the bourgeoisie of refusing to make investments and taking their capital out of the country (capital flight). 8. Barricada, Managua, August 15, 1983.
15
to close "his" business, claiming that he was having problems with flour shipments. He put up a sign saying "Closed
August 4," giving any notice to the workers concerned or to the responsible administrative authorities.
workers responded quickly and decisively. They appealed to the Ministry of Labor to remove the manager. Within four days they got satisfaction. manager was ousted, although he kept his
He was replaced by a new administrator whose nomination was approved
A local of the CST was finally set up in the bakery, and working hours were readjusted. This conflict is particularly significant because it was not between an avowed supporter of the Somocistas and the workers but between the workers and a boss formerly linked to leading circles in the FSLN. The Ministry of Labor rapidly settled. the dispute in favor
Thus, the "mixed economy" that prevails today in Nicaragua has not established a fixed line of demarcation between the private and public sectors. It represents a transitional economy. The rate at which it evolves depends on the class conflicts that are continuing to develop between a working class that is building up its strength and capacity for organization and a bourgeoisie disputing every inch of ground to defend the economic positions it still holds after having been ousted from political power.
The private sector is obliged to respect the targets set by the national plan, under threat of expropriation. And expropriations are in fact carried out. This constraint gives rise to real differentiations within the bourgeoisie, since certain sec. tors have an immediate interest in working within a system that guarantees their ample, for a section of commercial farmers.
Nonetheless, the general tendency is toward a direct takeover of production by the government that came out of the revolution. Most of the big investment projects are being carried through by mobilizing public resources alone. This goes for the schemes to achieve self-sufficiency in energy, as well as to develop transport and food processing
THE WORKING PEOPLE TAKE CENTER STAGE
What is most important is that, even if they have not yet been able to institute developed forms of workers control, the working people of the cities and in the countryside are strong enough through their mass organizations to keep a watch on all the private producers. this way, social polarization sharpens as of the workers. This case is a clear in- prices and markets. This is true, for ex-
Celebrating the sixth anniversary of the women's organisations (DR)
16 the revolution advances.
The transitional form represented today by the mixed economy is possible only because there is a revolutionary government in Nicaragua that has not reformed regime's instruments of coercion.
In a book published in July 1983, Jaime Wheelock, one of the nine members of the national leadership of the FSLN, wrote: to being the dominant force ideologically, culturally, and socially. And now it is not dominating things. Now it is the workers and peasants, the student leaders, the ATC, the CST, the Sandinista Front that are doing the talking and pointing out the path to follow. And none of these represents the bourgeoisie."
All the potential contradictions that lie in the mixed economy system being followed today were in fact pointed up by Jaime Wheelock when he wrote: has to be tested whether the bourgeoisie can produce without power, whether as a social class it can limit itself to playing a productive role, that is, limit itself to exploiting the means of production that it holds and using them to live and not as an instrument of power and oppression."
The whole question is, in fact, whether a social class that is being offered the material possibility to maintain itself as a class can long resign itself not to using its material means as an instrument of political power.
The events that have unfolded since July 19, 1979, show that the ranks of the counterrevolution have been swelled by one bourgeois faction after another which has preferred to break national unity rather than accept its own defeat.
This is proof that the revolution has not stopped its advance despite the growing threats from U.S. imperialism nor yielded to the pressures of the bourgeoisie.
The example of steadfastness that the Nicaraguan revolution gives every day cannot help but inspire the internationa movement in defense of the Sandinista revolution to show a similar determination.