No honour among thieves but they stick together state and the legitimacy of the institutions of bourgeois democracy play an essential role. To replace these institutions with European ones ("gimmicks, to paraphrase de Gaulle) takes time, a lot of time. There is a marked desynchronization between the tempo of the internationalization of the productive forces,
Since the onset of the twentieth century, the productive forces developed by capitalism have periodically rebelled against the nation-state, as well as against the private ownership of the means of production. Twice, the bourgeoisie has sought to resolve this conflict in a violent way, through the world wars that began in 1914 and 1939. The objective purpose of these wars was to try to create room for one dominant imperialist power
(British, German or American) to unite under its sway a much broader sphere than that of the market represented by any nation-state, a united domain in which capital could be invested and draw profits unhindered.
These two attempts failed.
The European Economic Community
(EEC) set up in 1958 after the signing of the Treaty of Rome is the first attempt by the imperialist bourgeoisie in Europe to achieve the same end without wars, essentially by collaboration on the basis of negotiations.
Ernest MANDEL
The historic cause of this change in method is the growth in the sector of the world wrested away from capitalist domination in the aftermath of the second world war. The antagonism between the capitalist countries and the workers states became too deep, the risk of additional vital parts of the globe falling out of the sphere of capitalist domination too great, to permit the new interimperialist wars that Stalin in his last days was
"inevitable."
Interstill proclaiming imperialist competition continues to operate but within what has proved to be a lasting alliance against all the non- capitalist forces throughout the world.
However, the contradiction between the extent of development of the produc-
"national" realm of tive forces and the each imperialist power is more acute than ever. What can no longer be settled by war must, therefore, be resolved if not by consensus, at least by constant bargaining. This led to the attempt to build the
Common Market. It was, moreover, only a first experiment in the context of a general tendency. As long as capitalism sur vives, this experimentation may be ex• tended to other continents.
Japanese imperialism, unable to hold
"East
Asian Co-Prosperity its onto
Sphere" (that is, its new colonial empire)
after the second world war, is now seeking to create a kind of common market including South Korea and Taiwan, or even the ASEAN countries.
Within
American imperialism, some groups aim
- at least historically — to create a common market embracing Canada and
Mexico.
This in no way means the realization of Karl Kautsky's dream of a "superimperialism" organizing the world market pe these To the markets went one of these designed essentially for trade warfare, for
6
The gang of thieves assembled (DR) sharpened competition with all the others. In the longer run, they would prepare the way for a war against the workers states to reconquer the space that capitalism has lost in these countries.
All that such common markets mean is an attempt to make a group of bourgeois states into a basis for interimperialist competition, rather than each one of them continuing to try to compete on its own.
The main obstacle to carrying out such schemes is social and political in character (and ideological, as well). What a common market really means is a new federation of old states, that is, a new supranational federal state. However, the bourgeois state is not just a means for upholding the economic interests of a ruling class. It is also an instrument of social and political power, a means for upholding and reproducing the domination of capital over the workers.
In order for the bourgeois state to play this role effectively, simple violence the emergence of supranational institutions of the European Common Market type, and the rate at which broad popular layers - including bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements, as well as the less conscious sections of the working class -are coming to identify with these institu-
The bourgeoisie is not ready to give up a relatively effective instrument of power in exchange for a new one that has yet to be tested. This is the main reason for the slowness in setting up the machinery of European unity on the political level.
However, there are other factors. There is not only the desynchronization between economics and politics. There is also a desynchronization between the trend toward internationalization of the productive forces and the organizational forms of capital, of the capitalist firms
In every member country of the Common Market, as in the US and Japan, moreover, the bourgeoisie is not homogeneous. It takes the form, rather, of a conglomerate of four elements:
- Multinational corporations producing surplus value in several coun tries. These are more and more predominant. But this is a relatively recent development. They nowhere hold absolute sway.
- National trusts (monopolies) producing surplus value still essentially in one country
- Small and medium-sized non-
International Viewpoint 23 April 1984
If the simple correlation between de- all sharpening competition on the world
ECU is issued for internal usage to the countries that signed the December
1978 currency accord that gave rise to the EMS.
banks of the nine countries concerned (the Ten, minus Greece) are issued to them in return for their depositing 20% of their gold and dollar reserves in the accounts of the European Fund for Monetary Cooperation.
monopoly corporations. While these are only junior partners of the monopolies, they still control a not unimportant part of the production of surplus value. They dominate at the two ends of the industrial chain, in the technologically backward sectors, and in the advanced technology sector. In the latter sector, where the risks remain great, the monopolies commit themselves only after the little people have blazed the trail, and often lost their scalps in the process.
The nationalized sector, the top pression stepped-up competition were all there was to it, the Common Market would have already disappeared, as a lot of people in fact predicted it would. But it has survived, even if it has become prey to numerous ills. The fact is that the effects of the crisis on the European capitalists considerably more complex than they might seem at the crisis is sharpening the competition within Europe and thereby market. And on the world market, the American and Japanese multinationals can rely on states and economic spheres of operation" with a far greater weight than that represented by any of the European imperialist powers taken separ
Thus, maintaining and reinforcing the becomes an essential material condition for the big European firms, including some "national" ones, to hold their own against increased Amer-
- levels of which are being integrated into the bourgeoisie, if they were not recruiteconomic integration, it is also and above over, when the multinationals, both ed from it at the start.
Of these four components, only the multinationals have everything to economically and nothing to lose from of European ican and Japanese competition.
More-
Short Lexicon of the European Economic Community (EEC)
the emergence of supranational states.
sector of the bourgeoisie
Every other runs the risk of losing the benefits of protection and subsidies.
They are hesitatcountries that founded the Common Market - West Germany.
ing to enter into the stepped-up compe-
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg tition that flows inevitably from the widening of the market.
Since this risk is compounded by the political and social risk that the ruling class as a whole has to run, including the
The Six
The Ten
The Six plus Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Greece.
multinationals, and since the relationship of forces within each bourgeoisie is con-
The Institutions of the EEC stantly changing without any one of the
The European Council of Ministers, the meeting of heads of government four components being able to bring the which holds the real power in the Common Market. Since de Gaulle, the rule of this lack of economic unanimity has been applied, on which now Britain in particular relies.
homogeneity within the European bour-
The European Commission, which is called up to manage "EE affairs"
geoisie is another major obstacle to making the qualitative leap forward to
The European Parliament, a purely consultative body. The only power it political integration of b)
independently of the Council.
has is to vote on the EEC budget proper.
When the capitalist economy is expanding, every partner in a capitalist business can get a part of the cake.
The
Levies imposed in the framework of the Common Agricultural Policy same is true for every faction of a "na-
1 percent of the income from the Value Added Tax in every member tional" bourgeoisie.
It is also true for country. This provides about 16% of the total budget.
"international"
in every partner an bourgeois enterprise.
Aid to farmers (about 75% of spending).
Aid to disadvantaged regions and sectors.
Fighting for survival
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
Of course, even in a period of expan-
There are unified prices for agricultural products in the Common Market.
sion competition continues.
Countries that import such products from "third countries" at lower prices have to morc than others. Some grow stronger at pay the difference into the EEC, which distributes this money as subsidies to the expense of others.
But in general everything is rosy for all of this charming
This protectionist policy has led to the piling up of enormous unsaleable sursociety as long as capitalist property prepluses, which are sometimes stockpiled and sometimes destroyed (dairy products,
Thus, the golden age of the Common Market was its first decade, 1958-
Now production ceilings are being set in some spheres, with penalties for coun
The period 1968-73 represented ries and Sectors in which small farmers pre threaten to tch as Ireland in the first the period of transition.
instance (with regard to dairy production) and cattle raising in the second.
When the economic crisis erupted, and especially when it took the form of a
The European Monetary System (EMS)
depression, competition became fierce.
For many capitalist firms,
The fluctuation of exchange rates is limited to a 2.5% shift in either direction by the crisis has posed the question of life means of central bank intervention and even reciprocal loans (Britain does not applies both to the multinationals and the
The first, still hesitant step toward creating a common currency for the Com-
"national" trusts, as well as the small and mon Market, the ECU (European Currency Unit), was introduced in 1979, replacing the UCE (Unite de compte europeenne - European Accounting Unit), which
The ECU is still only an accounting unit and not a real self" is more and more becoming the rule.
The EEC has neither a central bank nor currency reserves of its own.
What goes for capitalist firms also goes for "national" bourgeois classes and their
This is why for the Common the long economic depression means a long phase of crisis and chal-
International Viewpoint 23 April 1984
The BEC Budget a) Revenues
-
Administrative expenses.
- farmers.
tries and businesses that exceed them.
participate).
was instituted in 1975.
curreney.
The ın particular on cour
The ECUs held by the central
European and extra-European, are on the rise and the relative strength of the workers movement has not been broken by the depression, the individual "national" imperialist states seem singularly ill-equipped to play their allotted role of cushioning the shock of the crisis. This is in contrast to their performance on the eve and in the aftermath of the second world war, when they fulfilled this function under the most diverse political forms.
In view of the gravity of the economic crisis, the European bourgeoisies need a more effective anticrisis instrument. There is no objective possibility for getting anything else, at least in the medium term, in Europe than a European bour-
The idea of a "world state" is only an empty dream.
For all these reasons, the impact of the crisis on the Common Market has not led to its breakup, to its disappearance pure
The result rather is that it has been "blocked" at an intermediary stage between a mere free-trade zone and a new supranational federal state. This in fact is exactly what we predicted. Nothing in the events of recent months offers a basis for reassessing this forecast. Balance sheet of the EEC
To understand the reasons why the Common Market has become "blocked" halfway on the road to real economic and political integration of capitalist Europe, the analysis has to be carried further. We have to look at the nature of the changes that have taken place within the European bourgeoisies over the past quarter of a century.
In other words, we have to draw a balance sheet of the projects that have been accomplished and of the hopes that have come to nothing, the hopes aroused in the bourgeoisie and among its ideologues by the birth of the Common Market. This accounting has to center around what is fundamental for the bourgeoisie,
"Italian" heavy weapons. All such arms are produced in common. In a nutshell, this is a drastic change by comparison with the situation in 1939 and 1945, to say nothing of 1914.
In the sphere of industry, there has widespread disappointment. The hope that the Common Market would stimulate the interpenetration of capital, giving rise to more and more
Dunlop-Pirelli and FIAThas to a large extent failed to firms of this Grundig recently. But this is far from being the predominant trend.
Moreover, there are also as many examples of associations between European firms and American or Japanese multi-
"European" firms
As regards so-called North-South relations, the EEC has emerged as a neocolonialist force (the Lome Accords, Lebanon, etc.)
Finally, in the field of agriculture, integration has run into a total impasse.
has a North American type agribusiness emerged, with a sphere of activity (production) extending across the territory of several "national" states. European capitalist agriculture remains confined to relatively small surfaces, even if landholding continues to become more concentrated.
Today the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) no longer looks like a transitional institution geared to opening up the way for real concentration in capitalist agriculture. It seems rather to have become a durable system serving to protect an uncompetititve agriculture on the world market. As a consequence, it has become the Achilles Heel of European capitalist integration, the occasion of a succession of crises.
Now all the conflicting forces in the picture have to be labelled as "national," "sectoral" or "political special interests."
In the case of West German imperialism, over the past 25 years capital accumulation has become much more dependent on foreign markets. The share of exports in the Gross National Product has grown from 15 to 33%. And the Common Market represents West Germany's main outlet. Therefore, it is determined to maintain it at any cost and is ready to pay the bill. It is the main source of financing for the EEC which in reality has become a disguised form of subsidizing West Germany's big export industries. Which countries benefit?
Likewise, the Benelux countries and Italy have seen the importance of the Common Market grow greatly as the main outlet for their exports. Some 70% of Benelux exports go to the EEC. Since they are much less competitive than the West German ones on "third markets, they cherish the EEC as the apple of their eye. For these countries, the collapse of the Common Market would be a real economic catastrophe.
British imperialist interests are deeply divided in their attitude to the Common Market, which explains moreover why Britain joined so late, only in 1973. Those sectors of the economy traditionally oriented toward former British colonial possessions and the Commonwealth, as well as those most closely associated with the US, were the most reticent.
The most modern sectors of industry were the most favorable to the Common Market. Today, this division continues to run deep both in the bourgeoisie either non-Americans or Americans deposited in non-American banks in Europe.
that is, its ownership of the means of pro- CFDT (France) contingent on European-wide 35-hour week march (DR) duction (in the economic and not just the legal sense of the term) and the power to decide on employing the machinery and labor that this involves.
In the sphere of finance capital, there has been genuine success. Substantial progress has been made in integrating the banking systems of the Six (and to a lesser extent, the Ten). The financial market has been Europeanized, as evidenced by the role of Luxembourg as a center for issuing European loans. The market for
Euro-Dollars has lost all "national" character. (1) "Common" opposition to American and Japanese finance capital has increased, with the Swiss and Canadians occupying an intermediate position. SELBE PROBLEME | SELBER
On the military level, integration has made spectacular advances. There is no longer any "national" arms industry, except for small arms. That is, the production of airplanes, tanks and artillery has been internationalized in Europe. There are no longer any essentially "German," "British," "French" or 8
International Viewpoint 23 April 1984
Conservative Nonetheless, one Mrs "yes," Europe.
There imperialism.
Then under Valery and, subse-
Today, it is more
The failure of the European Council meeting in Athens last December and then of the meeting in Brussels in March were above all the result of fighting over relative pennies. (2) Because of its massive agricultural imports from "third countries" outside the EEC, Great Britain is obliged to pay large contributions to the EEC budget. It demands reimbursal of about three fourths every
The principle of the rebate is accepted, as is its approximate size. difference remains. Margaret Thatcher is
£750 million around a billion dollars), and her partners are prepared to pay £600 right away.
Behind this wrangle over megapennies, there is a question of principle. Margaret Thatcher would like to block any progress by the Common Market institutions toward more advanced economic, financial and political integration. She would like to consolidate the principle of a right of veto over EEC decisions and the rule of unanimity. In that respect, she is the heir of de Gaulle's policy, just as Britain today stands in the position of the "weakest great power" that was formerly occupied in the EEC by France. (4) She would like eventually to get rid of the Common Agricultural Policy. is already coming into conflict more with International Viewpoint 23 April 1984 in a weak
Its partners know duced to the with the EEC.
Margaret
"third countries."
That was an open
Her
Table 1
Share of the World Market for Electrical and Electronic Equipment (%)
1978
1981
Japan
22.9
26.8
US
22.6
23.9
EEC
29.8
22.9
1981
1981
(Annual production
(Number of in number of units)
robots installed)
Japan
5,231
11,000
US
2,129
8,130
EEC
1,459
4,017
(four main countries)
nology.
finance a financial, and scientific advanced techFor the technology the of Britain" city saved the This is a joint her popularity at "Iron Lady."
Thus, 2. tion,
For the year 1982, Britain demanded a rebate of 10.2 billion francs on the 13.6 billion franc British contribution to the EEC budget. The nine other partners in the Common Market agreed to reimburse 5.1 billion. The final agreement, after bargaining, was around 7 bil francs, or about half the British contribution to the EEC.
It was France that pushed through the so-called Luxembourg compromise in 1966. This is a precedent that a member state of the EEC can demand that a decision can be taken only by unanimous vote when it involves a vital interest for the state concerned. In March, the Irish minister of agriculture, Austin Deasy. resorted to this procedure to negotiatite a special status for his country during the discus sion on dairy production quotas.
9
SPANISH STATE.
In recent months, mainly as a result of a change in the attitude of France, the outlook for Spanish membership in the EEC has brightened, after many years of negotiations, stalling moves and obstacles of all sorts. This shift at the moment has a political significance,