A look back at the Portuguese revolution
Now Marshal Spinola — he was promoted from general which he tried to destroy by force of arms. Paraa few years ago — has been named chairperson of the doxes?
Organizing Committee for the Tenth Anniversary of
There has been no lack of paradoxes in the last ten the coup of April 25, 1974, that overthrew the dicta-
He is a man who fought We have a Socialist premier, Mario Soares, who declares that socialism is going on the side of the Nazi armies, was an outstanding
We have a minister of education who is a free-
He was the governor of mason and has given the Catholic church facilities in
PORTUGAL torship of Marcelo Caetano.
officer in the colonial wars.
years.
balls.
to be put in moth
Guinea-Bissau in 1968, and was responsible for the public education that even Salazar could not agree to.
murder of the Guinean nationalist leader Amilcar
The panorama of the revolution is rich in such anec
Cabral. He was also the first president of Portugal dotes. The corps of parliamentary politicians in Porafter the fall of the dictatorship and responsible for tugal was built up in haste. From them you cannot the two failed coups d'etat of September 28, 1974, expect the sort of discretion and unflappable front and March 11, 1975. After going into exile, in the that you might from their counterparts in the "Westwake of these coup attempts, he organized a terrorist force, the Portuguese Democratic Liberation Move-
In fact, it is not easy to explain how the revolution ment (MDLP), which carried out numberous outrages unfolded and what sort of heritage it has left.
At the time, the journalist Gunter and murders.
article will take up the peculiarities of this prerevo-
Walraff managed to lead this old general into a trap in interviews with him, getting him to reveal his plans for lutionary crisis, the concrete application of the policy to overthrow the post-April 25 of the working-class parties and in particular the struggle armed an
Now, having returned to the country, he is
"exceptional" character of the Portuguese Cr, and regime.
organizing the commemoration of a revolution in tinally some questions that now arise for the Euro.
which he did not participate, which he opposed and
Francisco LOUCA
On September 9, 1973, when 136 officers met to discuss professional quesern democracies.
pean revolution.
This tions, the most radical measures they suggested to win their demands were a strike and a demonstration. Two months
MARINHEIROS A later preparations were already underway for a coup. Initially, the pretext was
LADO DO POVO EM ambiguous at best.
The professional officers wanted to prevent the applica-
LUTA PELA PAZ E PELA tion of a measure the government adopted to meet the problem of a shortage of
REVOUÇÃO DEMOCRAofficers caused by the continuation of the colonial war, namely that any man with
TICAL POPULAR a university education, after six months training, would get the same status and
VI A RFAC.
salary as officers who had slowly climbed the hierarchical ladder.
However, these meetings, given impetus by more radical officers, were suf-
HADN
Soldiers and sailors demonstrate for peace on first May Day march (DR) ficient to set in motion a broad movement bringing together professional demands, the desire to end the colonial war as soon as possible (in terms of money and lives, it cost proportionately twice what the Vietnam war did), and the desire to reestablish the democratic freedoms that had been suppressed by the oldest dictatorship in capitalist Europe. Rightist, and even extreme rightist, officers participated in meetings alongside members of the Communist Party and far-left groups.
This is why the dictatorship's enormous police apparatus (the PIDE had 22,000 agents at the time and 200,000 paid informers, approximately one for 18 every forty persons in Portugal) was unable to block the movement, of which it was aware. This movement was a deep-seated reaction by an essential part of the officer corps, the officers that directly commanded troops. Moreover, the fact that a coup was being prepared was an open secret. Caetano himself tried to forestall the consequences by organizing an orderly transfer of power into the hands of those generals who could serve as a bridge to the malcontents. They were Generals Costa Gomes and Spinola, who at the time were the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the Armed Forces General Staff.
After these attempts failed, the regime tried to establish a position of strength. Spinola and Costa Gomes were forced to resign, and the other generals were to pledge their loyalty to Caetano. That was on March 14. Two days later, the Caldas da Rainha regiment set out for Lisbon with 200 men and armored cars. It did not get the counterorder in time that postponed the military action planned for that day.
Despite the failure of this coup, in which the rebels did not manage to fire a shot, the regime was unable to organize an effective repression and to break up the Movimento das Forcas Armadas
International Viewpoint 7 May 1984
(MFA). The conspirators calmly went do with the coup — which was partially back to their work, and on the night of April 25, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho organized his command post in the Pontinha barracks. The majority of the military units obeyed his orders. One after the other, the radio and TV stations, the and the ministeries were
In this operation, three facts have to be highlighted, since they had a considerable influence on subsequent events.
To begin with, the military coup was aimed first of all at getting control of the mass media. Once this was achieved, the rebels were able rapidly to create a favorable political relationship of forces. The population was alerted to what was came into the streets, making it next to impossible for the soldiers loyal to the regime were demoralized by uncontradicted reports, often exaggerated, that the MFA was in control of the situation. logically decisive. between ministers, showing and confusion. political prisoners). Thus, the masses tried to avoid confrontation. tional incapacity was surprising. Caetano, the premier and the regime, did not execute the emergency plan and go to the well equipped Monsanto base. Instead he rushed to take refuge in the Carmo barracks, remaining isolated in the center of Lisbon. barracks were then surrounded by MFA soldiers and masses of people. He gave no orders to his ministers, who fled, every
The president of the republic, Americo Tomas, stayed at home all day. No one thought about him.
The only initiative took was designed to assure that Spinola succeeded him. He summoned the general, who swore that he had nothing to International Viewpoint 7 May 1984 true - to ask him to take power before it "falls into the street." Spinola asked for, and got, the MFA's mandate to carry out the transfer of The revolution was still respecting the rules.
the dictatorship ended, after 48
The dictatorship's last act was to transfer power to Spinola, who quickly formed a Junta de Salvacao Nacional (Council of National Salvation) so that it could formally designate him president. In this way, the captains movement was
Its favorite was Costa Gomes officers in the Junta did not represent the MFA. But the compromise was accepted government, Palma Carlos as premier and one of the general's acolytes, Firmino Miguel, as Council of State including civilian figures (16 officers, 5 civilians).
In this context, the first confrontation developed that was to determine the course of the revolution. Spinola in fact represented the only way of controlling the crisis opened by the coup and to reestablish a power center quickly. His strong links to big finance capital assured him the support of the bourgeoisie. top military officers, at least those with the agility to jump to the winning side during the coup and thereby remain in their commands, were with him. played his card. He sought to reinforce his power by postponing the elections for the Constituent Assembly and getting himself confirmed as president by a plebiscite. In this way, he pushed aside the officers of the MFA, which he wanted to dissolve. Such a strong government was the precondition for achieving two objectives - controlling the mass movement and preventing decolonialization. Spinola's objective for the Portuguese empire was to achieve a neocolonial solution in association with the stronger imperialisms.
These two objectives represented the limits of the readjustment the bourgeoisie was prepared to make. The new regime was to keep democracy outside the factory gates and above all let it go no furthan the Portuguese These were the conditions the bourgeoisie considered essential for the defense of its
Spinola, consulted about the draft of the MFA program, declared his support for restricting freedoms, especially for releasing only selected political prisoners, for limiting the right of political association, and above all, for refusing the self-determination" colonial peoples. See the documents in Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho's book Alvorada em Abril, Lisbon, and 478). In his first speech in the name of the Junta, Spinola said that his "primary task" "to guarantee the survival of the sovereign nation in its multicontinental form.
The first question was immediately settled by the events. The political releases.
The headbegan of the the
The govern-
The Junta
It should be later, that and money
Party (PPD) and his struggle for
The first
First Provisional
Finally, there
It phrase, them."
Spinola loses control
In fact, the hope for maintaining the direct continuity of the regime, with only a little external face lifting, depended on the possibility of maintaining intact the conditions for exploiting in Portugal and in the colonies.
dependence of the colonies, which was forced through on the spot by the fraternization of the opposing armed forces, despite the dreams of the military hierarchy in the Terreiro do Paco about rebuilding the Multicontinental Portuguese
Community, coincided with a vast mobilization of the workers in Portugal itself.
The combined power of these the big bourgeoisie's ments shattered schemes for maintaining the essential continuity of its system.
point that we see members of the family of Mello and Champalimaud reduced to being luckless pistoleros in the Spinolista gangs and forced to flee in their general's two helicopters.
Their holdings were nationalized after March 11. Marcelo
Caetano lost his last bet.
This fuiiure has to • be seen in all its magnitude. It left the bourgeoisie without an immediate alternative for running the country. As the dictator Caetano put it cynically but with considerable accuracy, "the Portuguese bourgeoisie enjoyed a climate of peace for almost half a century under the protection of police organizations that shielded it. It had no fighting spirit and did not know how to act to defend the principles that it professed." (Marcelo Caetano, Depoimento, Rio de Janeiro, Ed. Record, 1975, p. 93.)
This situation of political disarmament had a lot to do with the characteristies of a long-lived dictatorship. Unlike the European fascist regimes that were built on the basis of the rise of a mass party, the dictatorship in Portugal was established before its party was created. At no point, except in the crucial years bourgeoisie comparable to the Nazi movements. Catholic and provincial,
"fascism" had the adroitness to follow a political course balancing off the interests of the various bourgeois
None of them produced an alternative, and anybody who was unhappy ended up in exile, in prison or six
The only bourgeois current that differentiated itself from the regime in the last years was the one that came to form the PPD, later the PSD. But it became compromised by its association with Spinola and his strategy for reforming the regime from within. (Its leaders, in particular Sa Carneiro, had been deputies for Salazar's Uniao Nacional). Crisis of bourgeois rule
In this context, the crisis of bourgeois rule assumed extraordinary proportions. Its focus was in the armed forces, which for long years had been the Praetorian Guard of the regime, and from there it was transmitted to all components of the state apparatus the repressive bodies, the courts, the schools, the media. And no bourgeois force had the political strength to steer a course through this crisis.
A specific feature of the Portuguese prerevolutionary crisis continued through the 14 months of its duration. There was a desynchronization between the crisis of the state apparatus and the development of centralized bodies of alternative power. This, indeed, is understandable considering the long way the workers movement had to go. It only began to regain an identity of its own and to accumulate experience after 1969, under a dictatorship and in the atmosphere of a colonial war.
This feature misled a lot of observers. Alfredo Margarido maintains that "what occurred constantly in Portugal was a struggle between the various cliques in the new corps of politicians to take over the state apparatus, and at no time was the state structure put in quesion." ("68/78: um fantasma perigoso," Raiz 20 e Utopia, No 5/6, p. 73.) For his part, Pierre Navilla has stressed that the military had not given up any portion of the and went no further than creating a fictitious democratization.
Thus, the existence of an overall crisis of the state, as well as the specific dialectic this generated, has been rather little understood. The mass movement trated into the breaches opened by the paralysis of the repressive apparatus. spread direct democracy. It accelerated the breakdown of the army. It undermined the successive governments. political radicalization that could be seen was the result of this process. of the state apparatus smoothed the way for the effensive of the mass movement, which in turn influenced the relationship of forces inside the MFA.
In fact, this set of contradictions had tip of the iceberg of power. Following the defeat of the generals, it represented the organizational structure of the captains. That was where the center of pow-
When the offensive was launched that would prepare the way for the coup, the group of nine (Melo Antunes, Vasco Lourenco, etc.) put it quite clearly. "Without clarifying the question of power in the MFA, it is not possible to seriously take up the question of the state organization and prevent its complete ruin...It is necessary to energetically repel the anarchism and populism that are dissolution of the state in a stage of the which, without the state, no conceivable plan can be
(Jornal Novo, August 7, 1975.) At least the actors in the play know the role they have to play.
The MFA was subjected to a variety of centrifugal pulls. 1975, it broke up under the pressures to which it was subjected. On the one side, it faced an offensive by its right wing and center, which laid the groundwork for the coup and revitalized the traditional structures of the military hierarchy. On the other, it faced an offensive by the involving the spread of selforganization and the development of autonomous initiatives, the most advanced example being the soldiers' move-
The latter gave rise to a massive movement for democratic and other concrete demands, the SUV (Soldados Unidos Vencerao — Soldiers United Will Win).
The demonstrations built in September by the SUV in Lisbon and Oporto were the first indication of the possibility of a qualitative advance in the political situation and the creation of dual power. They attracted large sections of Socialist Party supporters, escaped the control of the CP, and were recognized by the Workers Commissions as a fighting vanguard. In pushing the generals aside, the
International Viewpoint 7 May 1984
captains helped to open up a prerevolutionary crisis. When the soldiers chalthe power of the captains, it meant that the revolution was beginning.
The enormous political authority that the MFA won among the masses in 1974 and which it maintained for a considerable part of 1975 gave it a great capacity for absorbing social tensions. who see this process as simply a series of populist maneuvers by the military arm
The MFA broke up precisely because it was not such an inaffected by the pressure of the masses in a situation in which there were no solid bourgeois alternatives and the relationship of forces was evolving favorably the MFA was, in fact, bound up with the course of events and the crisis of bourgeois rule over society. This is the fundamental reason why in the future Portuguese revolution, expecting another MFA will be like waiting for Godot in Beckett's pa During 1975, the MFA tried to balance off the various pressures within it. It moved forward progressively, with its left wing growing stronger. (The forces close to the CP predominated in the MFA Assembly in the early months of 1975, but the forces linked to Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and to far-left groups controlled the main operational commands in Lis-
As a reflection of the military institution, the MFA always sought to guarantee its role as the center of political power. (Thus the internal discussions were kept secret, and all decisions were presented as if they were unanimous.) On this, all currents within it agreed. Defining itself as a "national liberation movement" (a small belated triumph of the African nationalist armies over the it declared that it is the MFA through its revolutionary organs — the Comissao Coordenadora do Programa, the Conselho Superior and the Assembleia - that must lead the ongoing revolutionary process." (Boletim do MFA, No 8, January 14, 1975.) Later the "Guide Document for the Alliance between the People and the MFA" set the objective of creating a "state apparatus with a popular base"
"promote the potential of the initiatives of the local people's orbut guaranteeing the role of the Conselho da Revolucao as the "supreme organ of national sovereignty. The MFA divided
On the political level these slips rethe MFA leadership and the government. On July 16, a triumvirate was established,
Otelo, Costa president of the republic) and Vasco Goncalves (premier). It was called the "Directorio." failure led to new attempts at remodeling nine negotiated with Otelo to replace Vasco Goncalves as premier. International Viewpoint 7 May 1984 point, the CP was already in a minority in the Assembly of the MFA. real reason that led the CP leadership to take part in the FUR (1). It was trying to make alliances that could neutralize the far left and its influence in the MFA to open up the way for an alliance with the center. It was able to carry through this November 25 military actions, when the CP managed to demobilize the units that were trying to resist the coup. Costa Gomes, Sobre Portugal, Lisbon, 1977, p. 89.)
The class polarization in the society as a whole finally broke up this center of political power, which had been growing government of Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, which had the confidence of the SP and the group of nine, went on strike for fear of being shut up again in the government palace by workers' demonstrations is a good illustration of the relationship
The message was clear. Only a crackdown could reverse the relationship of forces. Preparations for the coup were November 25, 1975
Clearing away the smokescreen that was built up around the coup, comes evident what really happened. It is true that some far-left parties, especially sections of the group that was then dominant, the Movement of the Socialist Left (MES), believed that a semi-palace coup could be effective. (2) In reality, what this would amount to would be another demonstration of force that would make possible a recomposition of the relationship of forces within the MFA. In fact, the MES's strategy fitted in with this perspective. Its view was that you don't take power but you occupy it, and to accomplish that an alliance with the MFA left and the CP was sufficient. The military relationship of forces whelmingly in favor of the left. In Lisbon, the country's main center (it was different in the other regions), the COPCON (3) commanded 11,400 soldiers, including 7,000 with commando training and equipment (sharpshooters, paratroopers, etc.), and the right controlled commandos, who were under the command of Jaime Neves.
But the fundamental thing was that neither the left of the MFA nor the CP wanted to take such an initiative. COPCON commanders turned themselves in at the presidential palace in the predawn hours and remained prisoner there. All that was necessary to get this result was a telephone call. These commanders not prepared to break with the the military institution. continued to obey the orders of superic s until the latter expelled them from opposed the SUV and the soldiers movepolitical struggle in This is the reason for their
The political strength and the initiative, however, was on the side of the right wing of the MFA. In fact, there was a broad coalition between an extreme right the paratroop officers and the air force command), a right (Eanes), and a center (Melo Antunes and the group of nine, who went on TV a few days after the coup invoking Gramsci to justify this "historic bloc"). And with it were the bourgeois parties, the Socialist Party, and the whole civilian far right, which were working to create the conditions in society for the success of the coup.
The military actions launched were very revealing. The whole initiative in the coup was taken by 100 commandos and 100 soldiers with 25 amored cars (that is, distinctly less than the military column that tried and failed to carry out a coup on March 14, 1974). This force occupied various strategic points, in particular some bases and barracks, and atcluded 2,000 soldiers. Militarily, this attack was a failure. fired, but the response forced them to retreat with seven dead. tary Police surrendered because its commanders went immediately to turn themselves in to President Costa Gomes, who supported the coup.
The declaration of the state of siege, the confusion and passivity of the workers movement, the breakup of the military left brought the prerevolutionary crisis to a close. Order again reigned in
The CP's behavior during the prerevolutionary crisis, as well as its subse-
Frente da Unidade Revolucionaria, a bloc of the far left groups formed on the basis of the which also included the ComFor the program of the August Press, September 15 and 22, 1975.
It opposed the CP from the left in the the special security command headed by General de Carvalho. It was created after the fall of could co-opt any unit he considered necessary. Generally, he was careful to include the radical
asked themselves this question.) Could Third International. It was ultraleftist,
Government refuses to permit a demon- March 26 stration in Lisbon in support of the MPLA; Vasco Goncalves remains premier.
ministers from the SP, PCP and PPD.
quent growth and consolidation, created illusions in a lot of activists and commentators. In fact, the Portuguese CP today represents an exception in capitalist Europe. It is the only party loyal to Moscow (Cunhal was the first CP leader to visit Jaruzelski's "normalized" Poland) that has a major mass base 200,000 members), electoral following about 20%) and trade-union support (it leads the country's major union confederation). It has served as an example for the pro-Soviet dissidents in the Catalan affiliate of the Spanish CP in particular, who have recently formed a new pro-Moscow CP. The role of the Portuguese CP posed a number of questions. Could an apparently more combative line bring greater electoral success than moderate Eurocomsuch an orthodox Stalinist party be "revolutionary"? (A lot of Portuguese far-left activists asked themselves this question, and more than a few answered it in the affirmative.) The Communist Party
The historical peculiarities of the PCP are linked to the history of a workers movement in which no other party was able under the dictatorship to maintain organizational continuity. (The Socialist Party, in contrast, was formed in West Germany in 1973.) Moreover, it enjoyed an unusually favorable relationship of forces relative to the weak bourgeois liberal oppositions. Its political line followed all the zigzags of the Stalinized popular frontist; it supported the NaziSoviet Pact, then it was pro-British; it swallowed everything. Within the tradition of the Portuguese left, marked by the ideological influence of the republicans of the 1920s, the PCP was also a profoundly procolonialist party. It always followed the strategy of "national democratic revolution," which meant that it oriented toward a national uprising that would lead to the big monopolists and agriculturalists ending the vestiges of feudalism.
The PCP's pursuit of this policy, however, was marked by two peculiarities. In the first place, it faced no significant competition from any other working-class force. (In fact, it was quite well aware of dangers of competition. That munism?
(Certainly some CP leaders
Chronology 1974-1975
1974
- Signing of the Guinean treaty of independence.
April 23
- In the Eduardo VII Park in the center of
Lisbon, Otelo gives out the instructions to th dependence.
MFA leaders.
- Spinola calls for a demonstration of the
- At 10:00 p.m. the MFA operational cen-
April 24
"Silent Majority."
ter in the Pontinha barracks starts functioning.
- At 12:14 a.m. the song Grandola, Vila
- The
April 25 nationalized (i.e., the BP, BNU and BA).
Morena is broadcast over Radio Renascenca.
This is the signal for starting the coup.
- Attempted strongarm operation by Spincenter of Lisbon, the radio ola with the support of the militarized police and TV facilities, are occupied; at 4:00 a.m.
(GNR) and paratroopers.
the airport; at 4:20 a.m. the first MFA combarricades. The coup fails.
munique is broadcast over the radio. At 6:00 a.m. the ministries begin to be occupied.
- Spinola resigns. Costa Gomes replaces
Catano surrenders and hands him.
over power to Spinola.
The first occupations of houses; they
April 29
- Special congress of the PCP, the dictator start in Monsanto.
ship of the proletariat removed from the party program.
May 1
- Gigantic mass demonstrations.
- Land occupations begin
May 11
- The occupations of houses in Chelas are recognized by the Junta de Salvacao Nacional.
May 15
- Spinola is named president.
— The polemies around "trade-union unity"
law. The Council of the Twenty (the MFA's
May 16
- The First Provisional Government takes
Program Commission, Otelo and the other office.
military leaders) approves the law unanimous-
May 27
- A national minimum wage ly. The government ratifies it. The SP opescudos a month [at the time about 140 US dollars] is established.
- The Alvor Accords for a "transition" in
Troops are sent to replace
May 28
Postal strike.
Angola are signed with the strikers.
Two officers refuse to obey orand the MPLA.
ders and are jailed.
- The MFA Assembly decides to "institu-
Demonstration organized by the PCP and
June 1 tionalize" the movement.
Intersindical against "strikes for the sake of striking."
July 10-17
- Power play by Spinola. Failing to get the and firings takes place.
increased powers he seeks, Palma Carlos redespite the opposition of the PCP.
Spinola tries to form a government signs.
headed by Firmino Miguel.
- Spinolista attempted coup.
attack Ralis.
The MFA forces the naming of Vasco
July 18 to Spain.
Goncalves as premier.
Spinola recognizes
July 27 tionalizations.
termination for the colonies.
August 15 one person killed.
22
August 26
September 5
September 10
September 13
September 28
September 30
October 20
November
January 14-20 of
3,300
January 15
February 6
February 7
March 11
March 14
- the right of self-de-
Signing of the Mozambican treaty of inthree currency-issuing banks are
The masses build
1975 the FNLA, UNITA
Prohibited demonstration against Nato
It draws 5,000 people
Paratroopers
The attempt fails. Spinola flees
Council of the Revolution formed. Na-
The Fourth Provisional Government.
Includes
International Viewpoint 7 May 1984
is why it reacted so violently against the stan shows.
- Crisis in the MFA. The Goncalves faction is put in a minority and leaves the Council of November 25 operation, is named Chief of the Revolution. The Fifth Government resigns. Staff of the Armed Forces.
split of the pro-Peking members of its Central Committee in 1963, denouncing them to Salazar's political police.) The only other force in the field was a weak bourgeois liberal opposition. Thus, the PCP always kept a strong organizational control over the electoral fronts it created to run in the phoney legislative elections Salazar held to mollify the "Western World." Its cadres were educated in this tradition - a reformist policy aimed at achieving the best possible relationship of forces for the CP. As Krushchev said, "in order to sup with the devil, you have to have a longer spoon than he does." Thus, also the Kremlin follows a coherent international orientation, not missing opportunities to fight for improvements
So, April 25 was a magnificent opportunity for the PCP. It controlled the trade-union movement. It predominated in the factories. It had a strong influence in the MFA. The PCP saw the realization of one of the objectives of its "national democratic revolution" in a contex that went beyond the simple organization of a normal bourgeois democratic
There was growing, active participation of the masses in political life. But it is often forgotten that there were two phases to the PCP's application of this policy.
Initially, the PCP put its money on
Its ministers in the government loyally fought tooth and nail against strikes and occupations.
of the day. It was just that events started to move rapidly. Spinola fell, there was "crisis at the top," and "struggle at the base," and they came together to produce the prerevolutionary crisis. The PCP changed its orientation then and began to try to win positions of strength in the state apparatus. The fact that the PCP operated within the framework of maintaining the state apparatus is shown both by the practice of the Vasco Goncalves government and by the concrete attitude the PCP took during the events of November 25-26. For the PCP also, these months demonstrated a real danger, the threat of a generalized situation of dual power, the threat that its own members would be radicalized and that it would lose control, the threat that it in the relationship of forces, as Afghani- solidate the state" was the watchword
- The first demonstration of the SUV in
- Nationalizations of the banks, insurance
April-May
Oporto.
companies, transport, railroads, petroleum, air transport, cement, shipbuilding, tobacco and heavy machinery industries. The September 19 land occupations increase.
Government
Four SP ministers, 2 PPD ministers, 1 PCP minister.
- The Constituent Assembly elected.
April 25
SP gets 38%, the PPD 26%, the PCP 13%, the
- The SUV demonstrates in Lisbon.
MDP 4% and the far left 4%.
The PCP prevents Mario Soares from September 29
- The radio and TV occupied by troops
May 1 loyal to the Fifth Government.
speaking to the demonstrators.
- The "Republica Affair" begins.
- A demonstration takes back control of
May 19
Radio Renascenca.
workers fire the directors.
- Radio Renascenca is occupied by the November 7
- The paratroopers blow up the Radio
May 27
Renascenca transmitters on orders from the
Workers Commission.
government.
Issuance of the "Guide Document for the
July 8
People-MF A Alliance."
hierarchy because of the orders they got.
- The SP leaves the Fourth Government.
the meantime 123 paratroop officers begin to
July 9 prepare a coup, with the support of the mili-
- The PCP headquarters in Rio Maior is
July 13 tary commands of the Northern Region, the destroyed.
Similar attacks
Air Force and the Commandos (Jaime Neves).
localities, including against other parties (the
MDP, LCI, MES, UDP).
November 12-13 — Building workers surround ment palace and trap the premier and the
July 21 deputies.
Gomes,
Otelo.
ure of the third attempt to reach an accord
Jaime Neves is purged by the Amadora
August 6 between Otelo and Melo Antunes commandos. Otelo reinstates him.
- The Council of the Revolution removes
Otelo from the post of commander of the Lis
The "Document of the Nine" is pub-
August 7 bon Military Region.
lished.
They reject a demobilization order.
August 8 ernmentunder Vasco Goncalverovisional GoV
The Commandos reoccupy Monsanto.
surrenders to Costa Gomes,
August 11
The nine are suspended from the Council state of siege and bans publication of the of the Revolution.
newspapers.
August 13
- Issuance of the COPCON Document.
- The Commandos surround the Military
Police.
and one on the side of the Military Police.
- The PCP, MDP, LUAR, FSP, MES, PRP
August 25 and LCI form the FUR
The Military Police commanders surrender.
- The Va Division is occupied by the
August 27
- The Commandos surround COPCON and commandos.
seize its Staff Headquarters.
August 28
- The Directory breaks up.
solved.
September 4-6
International Viewpoint 7 May 1984
September 10 electricity,
The
September 25
The October 22
November 9 occur in other
November 18
-
November 20
November 25
-
November 26
November 27
December 6
- would be unable to control the moveof the Sixth Provisional
Formation under
Pinheiro de
Azevedo.
The revolt against the paratroopers the govern-
The government "goes on strike." Fail.
The paratroopers rebel.
Paratroopers occupy four Air Force bases
Otelo declares a who
Seven dead on the Commando side
COPCON is disthe military commander of the
Banes,
23
MFA, the unions, and the Workers Com-
The split in the MFA and the onset of a decline in its authority over the mass movement, now propelled by the soldiers movement and by new advances of the Workers Commissions, was a sign for the PCP, as well as the right, that the movement had to be stopped.
The offensive of the right, for which the PCP had no direct responsibility and was in fact one of the main victims of the repression in the armed forces, enabled the party to maintain the image of an aggressive current identified with the "gains of April." And since it was the center of gravity for most organized it quickly gained strength in the unions, which became decisive with the ebb of the Workers Commissions in the factories. This explains the growth of the party. The Socialist Party
The contradicitions, nonetheless, are
The identification with April gains leaves open the question of orientation. It can be summed up as follows: Is the present situation the result of the "national democratic revolution"? avoid this problem, the PCP assures us that "the revolution is continuing." But this question has been central in all the party congresses that have taken place since November 25. The PCP's triumphalism conceals two realities: first, that the "democratic revolution" handed the power to the bourgeoisie and that it is now firmly in control; and that the PCP can no longer hope to intluence sections of the state apparatus as it did during the 14 months of the prerevolutionary crisis. Its latest attempt to do this has been directed at the current that looks to the incumbent president, General Eanes, the commander of the November 25 opera-
The PCP has sought to convince him to form a party in the hope that thereby it can get a deepgoing restructuring of the party system, weaken the SP, and in general regain the positions that it
Only one factor is delaying the explosion of these contradictions - the SP. The structure and policy of the SP are still the best cards Cunhal has for defending his positions. In fact, if there is anything "peculiar" in the Portuguese political scene, it is this Socialist Party.
After spending a brief period in the PCP, in the 1950s and 1960s, Mario Soares participated in the republican discussion circles, and his activity remains in this tradition. Back when the dictatorship was in open crisis, Soares cautiously accepted the possibility of collaborating with Caetano's "I think that the great majority of people in the country are prepared to encourage the government [of Marcelo Caetano] in its efforts to liberalize, insofar as they are convinced that these efforts are sincere and are leading to genuine democratization of the national life." (Mario Soares,
Escritos Politicos, Third Edition, Lisbon, 1969, p. 117.) Just try to imagine Felipe Gonzalez saying something about Carrero Blanco or Arias Navarro! (4) This comparison is by no means out of place. In the same book, Soares points to the law that Fraga Iribarne (5) was responsible for at the start of the 1960s as a model for freedom of the press. The other side of these positions is a neocolonialist policy: "So, self-determination in no case means an abandonment [of the colonies] but rather solving a problem on the basis of a perspective essentially concerned with the future." (Ibid. p. 163.)
The SP leadership has been molded in
Before the fall of the dictatorship the party had no mass influence. However, by taking advantage of its international connections and its membership in the Second International and by identifying itself with the fight for democracy, it managed to channel the political activity of a large section of the workers in the post-April 25 period.
Like the PCP, the SP in the first phase adapted to the Spinolista government. But it did not take the lead in criticizing the strike mobilizations. It did not have the strength or authority to do that. It limited itself to supporting the govern-
One of the SP ministers, Raul Rego, who held the portfolio for communications, agreed to the fining of its own newspaper (Republica) for printing reports about the refusal of two officers to obey orders in repressing the postal workers strike. But in this period it was the PCP that proved most useful in the lenged even by the United States.
In the second stage, facing the growing crisis of the MFA and the upsurge of the masses, it was the SP that staffed the trenches to defend the state "anarcho-populism." it allied itself with all the forces of the right. Upholding the sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly was an aspect of the SP's policy but not the only one. agreed to a pact with the MFA in 1975 and then to a second determined the organization of the political power, the members of the Constituent Assembly had to approve about the government and the presidency, and later gave the presidency to the victor of November 25, General Eanes. In fact, Eanes was to play a political role quite independent of the
It was with the MFA that the SP hoped to be able to push the PCP to the sidelines and restore the authority of the without the support of Nevers' tanks that finally resolved the "question of the state," as Melo Antunes euphemistically termed it.
The SP played its most important role beginning after November 25. the words of Chico Buargque's song say, to "put everything back where it be-
But that's another story. It is enough to note that one of the present SP ministers, Eduardo Pereira, has declared proudly that "the SP is managing do not the sg as in en 1,d800)
(Expresso, October 1, 1983.)
For many people, the Portuguese revolution was a mirage of May 1968. Moreover, in defeat Spinola looked like a combination of Prince Lvov and a pitiful version of Kornilov. The soldiers with carnations in the barrels of their rifles also revived memories of the Russian revolution. All the gradualist theses were encouraged by the successes of 1974.
It appeared possible to occupy the power bit by bit without seizing it in a decisive move. A strange, progressive MFA led some people to mix up Portugal with Peru. In fact, there was no end of analogies - with the role of the army in Peru, with the dangers shown in Chile, with the workers movement in Spain, with the bourgeoisie in dependent coun
The Portuguese revolution has to be understood in the context of the special conditions created by the crisis of the dictatorship and of a colonial empire maintained by an industrialized structure, which was however subordinate to stronger imperialisms. This, to a certain extent, is what I was referring to
The Portuguese revolution was sort of a bridge between the French May 1968 and the African revolution. It had aspects of both, and a lot of aspects that were peculiar to it alone. There is no doubt that a national reality cannot be reduced to a "unique combination of factors operating internationally."
Most of all, the Portugal revolution stands in relation to an unknown factor -the European revolution. decades the center of gravity of the world for the revolution. second world war, the establishment of a state in Yugoslavia formation of the bureaucratically formed states in East Europe, there has been no concrete experience in Europe to bring us closer to the problems faced in taking power. There have been two prerevolutionary crises in which the tendency toward the development of dual-power organs exerted a pressure but did not come to fruition (France in 1968, Portu-
There have also been innumberable acute political crises that did not lead to an open struggle for power. Overall, these experiences seem to offer
At the time Felipe Gonzalez was still trya left face to a Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) that had not yet been legalized Franco's designated heir, who was assassinated
Carlos Arias Navarro, Franco's son-inof the state administration head of government on January 4, 1974.
Alianza Popular, as well pro-Franco formation has become the malor bourgeois party in Spain, following the collapse of former Premier Suarez's Democratic Center
International Viewpoint 7 May 1984
negative, rather than positive indications have mediations. The lack of this left the about the possibility of revolution in Europe.
The Portuguese revolution did little to help answer these questions. This is above all for one reason: It developed in the context of the crisis of a dictatorship and not out of the contradictions of a bourgeois democratic state, which has been the fundamental mechanism for wiping out previous revolutionary advances.
However, it is clear that the years of the Portuguese revolution posed two fundamental questions:
The Portuguese revolution confirmed once again that the natural form of spontaneous organization for the proletariat and its allies, in the context of an overall social crisis, is organs of direct democracy, which make it possible for the masses to participate concretely in decision making and to confront the ruling class effectively. In Portugal, they were called Workers Commissions. In the fall of 1975 this process broadened to include forms of coordination on the local level with unions and neighborhood committees. This tendency was evident from the first days, since the first days, since the giant demonstration of May 1, 1974. But it took long months to firmly establish itself and begin to create a national structure. At the same time, the development of class consciousness showed a great unevenness. So, it was essential to International Viewpoint 7 May 1984 way open for illusions in the MFA, the notion that the MFA would facilitate the advance of this movement without any great conflict for a period. And to prepare the ground for such mediations, what was needed was a previous experience, a "dress rehearsal." This was essential for forming a vanguard with a continuity of organization and tradition.
A national system of dual power was the decisive precondition for combining the uneven advances in class consciousness and challenging reformist hegemony. The Portuguese crisis got as far as this turn in the road. It can be said that if indeed power is harder to win but easier to hold in the "West," creating such a system of dual power is also more difficult. The relative facility with which this process proceeded in Portugal reflects the peculiar and exceptional character of our prerevolutionary crisis, in which the most advanced feature was precisely the crisis of the apparatus of rule.
To overcome the barriers to developing a system of dual power in the face of an integrated political, ideological and repressive apparatus is a challenge that the European revolution has not yet met.
The second question has to the conditions for forming a revolutionary vanguard. It became clear that while socialism was indeed on the agenda in Portugal in the summer of 1975 there were not the forces for launching a strike for power. The immediate task was still
Ralis soldiers join demonstration (DR) to develop the embryonic forms of workers power within bourgeois society. There was no coherent vanguard force. Neither the far left of the time, nor the left wing of the MFA, nor still less the PCP represented such a force. However, the existence of such a force before the social explosion was a precondition for such an upsurge to go forward. Obvious. ly, this does not mean a small organization but an already constituted party with an already established weight in the relationship of forces within the workers movement. If this feature had been present, it would have been possible to confront a situation in which the conditions for building a revolutionary party could go through rapid transformations thereby making possible qualitative leaps, which would of necessity have modified the form, structure and perspectives of the original nucleus.
It is hard to see how any party capable of leading a revolution can develop without going through such processes, a party capable of integrating into itself, and integrating itself into, the various forms of social and political radicalization that arise, such as currents in the unions, the reformist parties and the social movements. This also implies a revolutionary nucleus that can understand and carry out this task. All those who lived through the Portuguese crisis of 1974 1975 can easily understand the enormous possibilities that were revealed_then for an advance toward this goal.
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