After the failure of the campaign for direct elections noncommittal. In virtually all questions key to breaking with the heritage of the dictatorship, no radical reforms are proposed - no moratorium on payments to the IMF, only new negotiations; no agrarian reform; and no guarantees for meeting the most important workers' demands re-
SAO PAULO - While it remains an open question who will succeed General Figueiredo as president in March 1985, the late winter weeks here have shed light on the probable nature of the transition from the dictatorship to some form of bourgeois democracy.
Even though the mass movement for "Direct Elections Now!" failed to force a favorable vote from parliament on April 25 and then collapsed, it at least barred the way for a simple continuation of the dictatorship and facilitated a qualitative advance in the liberalization process that has been going on for many years now.
The PDS, the party of the military, has split; and the army command no longer acts as a united force. A reaction by the military, such as a new coup, seems impossible for a long period, even if, in a Latin American country, such an eventuality cannot be excluded.
Jakob STUDER
On June 27, the second attempt in parliament to win direct elections failed, since President Figueiredo simply rejected an opposition amendment to his proposal calling for introducing direct elections in
1988 that would have brought them in immediately.
The weekend of August 11-12 settled a number of previously open questions, around which confusion had reigned since
April 25. On the one hand, the big opposition party, the PMDB, finally gave up on direct elections now. And, at its con-
Tancredo Neves, governor of the state of Minas Gerais, was nominated as the party's candidate for the election to be held through the electoral college.
At the same time, at its congress, the government party the PDS, selected as its candidate the corrupt ex-governor of Sao
Paulo, Paulo Maluf. He was chosen by a resounding 60% vote over the somewhat less compromised minister of the interior,
These two candidates of the big parties will face each other in the infamous electoral college on January 15.
cedures for the actual vote are to be dis-
Tancredo is clearly a representative of the conservative bourgeoisie.
ing been minister of justice under the presidency of Getulio Vargas in 1950-
1954 and a minister in the government of
Jango Goulart, he has not linked himself to the military.
However, he has not burnt his bridges to them, either.
he has not hesitated to hail the accomplished by the military since the
1964 coup and to praise Figueiredo's
"democratic sense of responsibility."
As governor of Minas, Tancredo has followed a course consistent with this sort of position. For example, he has set police on demonstrators several times, direct elections, a demand that he also supported, although only as a way of gaining an opening for his candidacy.
The choice of Tancredo as the candidate of the PMDB went hand in hand with this party distancing itself from the left, which was accompanied by suceessive retreats of the left within the party. Having been first projected as a "unity candidate of all the opposition parties" for direct elections, Tancredo is now the candidate of the right center for indirect two bourgeois candidates
This was made possible by the split of the "liberal" wing of the PDS, the part that joined with the opposition in the demand for direct elections. maneuvering, including a vain attempt to get President Figueiredo's support, the leader of this wing, the incumbent vice president, Aureliano Chaves, opted for a pact with the PMDB and with Tancredo. This meant that he had to give up his own candidacy, but it left his chances intact for a later try.
At the same time, moves are afoot to transform this "liberal" wing of the PDS into an independent party. And it is unclear whether or not it is going to join with the right-wing sections of the PMDB to form a new big center party.
So, the pact between the PMDB and the breakaway group from the PDS has taken the form of an electoral alliance called the Alianca Democratica. credo's running mate is Sarney, who up was president of the PDS and a pillar of the dictatorship.
this nomination aroused some opposition in the "Direct Elections Only" group in the PMDB - an "indepenwing that continues to hold to the demand for direct elections. But in garding job creation, the introduction of unemployment insurance, and cost-of-living increases. Likewise, there is not a word in the program about repealing the "Security Law," the dictatorship's charter for repression.
Direct elections on all levels are promised. But no dates are set (according to Figueiredo's proposal, the presidential term will still be six years.) The program also promises the calling of a constituent assembly. But Tancredo is only talking about the possibility of conferring "constituent powers" on the parliament.
What distinguishes the two slates is not program but the different social forces that support them. Maluf represents the old oligarchy, linked to the dictatorship, which has worn out its credibility with the people. On the other hand, Tancredo represents the oppositionist bourgeoisie, and, moreover, is seeking the support of the middle class, the mass movements and the unions in order to achieve a broader base for Brazilian capitalism.
In this sense, Maluf is the candidate that represents continuity of the regime, although in the present period the protagonists of the dictatorship do not have any fascistic schemes. And Tancredo is the candidate of transition, a transition that does not mean a break from the dicand its apparatus, but rather is directed toward achieving "national reconciliation."
There is no doubt that important sec tions of banking and industrial capital today are pushing this scheme for national reconciliation, with the aim of achieving a maximum of social stability for a minimum of concessions and reforms. The detested Maluf is, therefore, not the sort of figure needed to carry out this scheme. (The polls give him 10% to 15%, as against 40% to 50% for Tancredo.) Indeed, even Figueiredo and the "modernist" sections of the military command are giving Maluf only half-hearted backing.
However, even though the support of the breakaway "Liberal Front" have given Tancredo a better chance for
Maluf cannot yet be counted The reason for this is to be found in the tradition of the Brazilian political
It is a tradition of local bosses, patronage and corruption, a tradition that has an inertia of its own and may conflict to a certain extent with the interests of
This is particularly of indirect elections through a body that was created precisely
International Viewpoint 1 October 1984
with the objective of maintaining contin
But what is the response of the workers movement to all this? I have already mentioned the Stalinists. PDT, Brizola's populist Social Democratic party - which cannot be definitely characterized as belonging to the workers movement — it has also accepted the indirect elections and will vote for Tancredo if its votes are necessary to block
In view of his own electoral ambitions for a later time, Brizola is trying to put some distance between himself and Tan-
He would like to see Tancredo's term in office limited to two years. is, he wants a caretaker presidency that will open the way for direct elections and a constituent assembly in 1986.
In a way, the PT, and along with it the CUT, have benefitted from the rightshift of Tancredo's candidacy. When he was proposed in May/June as the unity candidate of the entire opposition for direct elections, the PT leadership got caught up in the operation and came out for supporting him. This did not fail to provoke a reaction from large sections of the PT, who remained committed to working-class independence. Their slogans were, "Boycott the Electoral College; No Support for Tancredo - Not in Indirect or in Direct Elections; Run a Working-Class Candidate Pledged to a Minimum Program" (basically this meant the 10-point program already adopted by the PT, which calls for major social and democratic reforms). rightward lurch of Tancredo's candidacy strengthened these positions, leadership around Lula was forced to go
So, today the PT is relatively united and appears as the only force not implicated in the betrayal of the mass mobilization for "Direct Elec-
However, this does not mean that the PT is automatically going to revive the mobilization, or that the CUT is going to be able to launch the general strike that it has decided on. The PT is on the rise (as is shown by the fact that in the vote for prefect in the port city of Santos its vote rose from 10% to 20%, while that of the PDS fell to 3%).
Opposition slates that declared support for the CUT won the elections in some unions that have been dominated by pelegos [corrupt bureaucrats serving as a labor police for the state]. Nonetheless, the PT and the CUT remain minority forces. Moreover, the political weaknesses of both leaderships are proving very costly.
For example, during the mass mobilizations, the PT leadership operated only as the left wing of the broad opposition alliance, and did not attempt to build a real alternative to the liberal bourgeoisie through a workers' program and a unitedfront policy based on the workers moveas a whole and the various mass movements. Today, it is still playing this losing game. It is still acting like the left wing of an alliance for "Direct Elections International Viewpoint 1 October 1984
Now" that no longer exists.
Along with the pathetic remnants of this alliance - the PDT and the "Direct Elections Only" Group of the PMDB, which in fact have already fundamentally capitulated - the PT is trying, mainly in the parliamentary arena, to trip up the transition operation. It is obstructing the passage of the rule for the electoral college and trying to get a vote on a third pending proposal for introducing "direct elections now." So, it is in danger of being left isolated and once again coming under pressure to vote for Tancredo in order to block the greater evil, Maluf, and of getting caught up in the game in the electoral college.
The polls favoring Tancredo already show that millions of people who went onto the streets a few months ago for direct elections have, for lack of an alternative, been sucked into supporting the "lesser evil option." On the other hand, up to 25% do not want either Tancredo or Maluf. Tancredo and his democratic alliance are hesitating, and not without good reason, to call street meetings. Belo Horizonte, there were only 7,000
At the same time there was a detachment of police called in because of fear of the radical forces. The independent union movement
The CUT leadership has not taken any better advantage of the opportunity to put the workers movement in the lead of the fight for democracy than that of the PT. Before April 25, it hardly showed its face in the campaign. But then it decided to call a general strike to impose the demand It has tossed this hot potato around a lot taken no systematic practical prepara-
In particular, the CUT has not been able to establish a link between the wave of workers' struggles in the cities and in the countryside which arose in the opening created by the mass mobilization and are still continuing. It has not centralized these struggles and has not taken up their economic demands in order to integrate the political confrontation with the dictatorship. In fact, it is not enough just to keep shouting for "Direct Elections Now." The CUT held back too much, waiting for the entry of the CONCLAT (1), which now, of course, is fully committed to Tancredo's notion of national reconciliation.
In this situation, on August 24-26, exactly a year after its founding, the CUT held its first regular national congress in Sao Bernardo do Campo, in the so-called ABC industrial region outside the city of
Up to 5,000 delegates, representing million belong to established unions, showed that the CUT and combative elements in the Brazilian workers movement. The congress demonstrated, in fact, that the CUT represents a growing political force that can finally put an end to state-controlled unionism and break the power of the pelegos.
A special role was played by the agricultural workers delegations, some of which came from the most remote states. The CUT has become more aware of the importance of these forces.
The discussions were very open, and often delegates did not hesitate to make sharp criticisms. But that does not mean that everything has been going well. Indeed, the CUT Executive issued a self-criticism that would normally have been sufficient grounds for resignation. But it was reelected virtually unchanged, since there was no alternative and the class consciousness of the rank and file is not yet very developed. The determination of this leadership to block the advance of the revolutionary organizations was also quite clear.
The debates and decisions of the congress reflected and confirmed the "centrism" of the CUT, rather than drawing the conclusions of a correct analysis of the situation. A large number of resolutions were passed, some of which were contradictory, without any priorities being established. But this congress will give a new impetus to the work of building up the organizational basis of the
The following were the most impor-
- Because of lack of time, a critica. balance sheet was referred for further discussion to the incoming leadership.
More attention was given to the land question, and a program for a radical agrarian reform was adopted
The congress decided on a boycott of the electoral college and for reviving the "Direct Elections Now" campaign by a march on Brasilia.
The decision to call a general strike was upheld. It is supposed to take place before the presidential elections on January 15, 1985. But no concrete plan for building it was presented
A minimum program was adopted for uniting and politicizing the economic struggles, including cost-of-living increases unemployment benefits, a forty-hour week, a break with
But the demands for a constituent assembly and a workers government were explicitly rejected.
The statutes were not changed to CUT among the ranks of unions dominated by the pelegos. trade-union-like bodies can be members of the CUT. But in the pelego unions, rank-and-file groups (nucleuses) will be
A congress and new elections in the CUT every two years (the leadership had proposed that this be every three
The congress called for building a conference of Latin American trade-
The wing of the left unions, dominated by the Stalinist forces, that held back from joining the foundation of the CUT as an indepen dent union confederation. - IV.