What prospects for the transition to bourgeois democratic rule ?
On January 15, 1985, Tancredo Neves, candidate of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), was elected president of the country. He is to
Thus, a candidate presented by the opposielected by a majority of the electoral college set up by the dictatorship is going to assume the country's highest office. In a way, this means that Brazil is coming out of a cycle of more than twenty years of
But this "coming out" is merely a transition from military dictatorship to a system of bourgeois democracy, and one that will be much more tightly controlled than the previous governments in the history of the country.
In order to beat the candidate of the military's ruling party, the Democratic and Social Party (PDS), Tancredo Neves created a system of political alliances that constituted one of the broadest blocs of different sectors of the ruling classes ever seen in the history of Brazil.
in the end, Tancredo Neves managed to get the support for his candidacy of the leading personalities who came to prominence in the wake of the military coup of 1964. Indeed, he got more support from such figures than Paulo Maluf, the candidate of the military regime's party, the PDS.
BRAZILbe inaugurated on March 15. tion and military dictatorship. Joao MACHADO
All the state governments elected by the PDS in the 1982 elections supported Tancredo Neves. The only governor that formally backed Paulo Maluf was the governor of the state of Paraiba, Wilson Braga. Even he gave indirect support to the PMDB candidate. Braga's wife and the politicians closest to him, in fact, supported Tancredo Neves. Immediately after the January 15 elections, Braga announced that he was joining the Party of the Liberal Front, a formation created by the PDS dissidents who supported Tancredo Neves. confined himself to giving Paulo Maluf just enough support to comply with the
Aureliano Chaves, vice president in the incumbent government headed by General Figueredo and the main leader of the Party of the Liberal Front, as well as General Ernesto Geisler, former president, also supported Tancredo's candidacy, although Geisel did so more discreetly. Tancredo made an agreement with the incumbent minister of the army, General Walter Pires, granting the latter the right to name his successor in the incoming government.
Few ministers in the incumbent government supported the candidacy of Paulo Maluf. Most of them prefered to stay above the battle, which amounted to giving veiled support to Tancredo Neves. This applied also to the leader of the PDS in the Chamber of Deputies, Nelson Marchezan, who abstained in the vote in the electoral college. Finally, the incumbent president himself, Joao Figueiredo, adopted a similar attitude, letting it appear that he found Paulo International Viewpoint 11 March 1985
"democratic" Maluf a rather unattractive Tancredo Neves' vice president, Jose Sarney, only a few months ago was the national chairperson of the PDS.
All this made it possible for Tancredo to get 480 votes as against only 180 for the PDS candidate in the electoral college controlled by the PDS and which was set up to give the maximum possible endorsement to the official candi-
This state of affairs requires an explanation, which is not difficult to The decline of the Dictatorship
The decline of the military dictatorship did not start yesterday. Already in 1974, in the parliamentary elections, the Democratic Movement (MDB) got the majority of the votes, but it did not get the majority in the National Congress because of the trickery of the electoral
In the following years, the movement for democratic liberties grew, in particular with the struggle for a total general amnesty.
In 1979, a relatively broad although it was not total. Political prisoners became an exception in the country. Beginning in 1978, workers' movement came onto the scene in force, organizing the great strikes that gave impetus to a vast process of reor-
After 1974, presidents, Ernesto Geisel and Joao Figueiredo, undertook a slow process of self-reform of the dictatorship, which was designed to modify the form of the regime while maintaining total control.
done at first in "detente" by the regime and later in the form of a "liberalization.
In 1982, despite the various modificaof the electoral law, supposed to give the advantage to the government party, the bourgeois liberal and populist opposition elected governors in most of the country's major states, e.g., in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and
The economic crisis, well underway since 1981, the first year when the GNP dropped, sharpened in 1982 and in particular in 1983, when the government started to conclude agreements with the International Monetary (IMF). Subsequently, in 1984, the Brazilian economy experienced a slight up-
In the context of a greatly weakened dictatorship, the first months of 1984 were marked by the biggest mass mobilization in Brazil's history - the campaign for direct election of the president, that is, against the electoral college set up to endorse the government's candidates for the presidency. The campaign for direct elections was a means for the people to express their discontent with the general situation of the country, that is, with the military dictatorship policy of total
The fact that the people's discontent was demonstrated in this way showed both the power of the mass movement
Its strength was shown by the scope of the mobilizations. Nearly a million people demonstrated in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, and hundreds of thousands in other cities.
limitations were shown by the fact that the demand for "direct elections" on which the mobilization was focused was a limited one, stressing the form of election much more than the question of a program or the sort of government the
Moreover, the leadership of this mobilization remained tied to the bourgeois liberal opposition, to the PMDB and in particular to the state governors in opposition to the federal government.
The Workers Party (PT) undoubtedly gained a great success and increased its strength throughout the campaign. Luis
"Lula," was nearly always the speaker most applauded in the mass rallies. The reason for this is that the masses identified with the radical speeches. But, at no time did the PT try to challenge the bourgeois opposition for the leadership of the campaign. It did not even distinguish itself from the bourgeois opposition, which it could have done by running Lula as a candidate in the presidential elections on the basis of a clear program calling for social transformations.
Tancredo has already clearly let it be known that he would not make any sudden change in the policy of the preceding regime. There is no question, for example, of breaking with the IMF or declaring a moratorium on the foreign
Of course, it is obvious that Tancredo's government will not be a military dietatorship and that it will not represent the continuation of the preceding regime. Brazil is entering into a form of bourgeois democracy that is greatly restricted by the emergency measures that remain in force. It has the feature of combining the maximum of elements that represent a break from the previous regime. any case, the military dictatorship is destined to disappear because of the forces backing Tancredo and because his government maintain a very different sort of that in force under the military regime.
Certain questions are now dominating discussions, and will mark the entire first phase of Tancredo's government. In general, they turn around problems of economic policy and the process that should open the way for eliminating the institutions left by the dictatorship.
As I said above, Tancredo has already let it be known that there will not be any deepgoing change in economic policy.
country will have to stick to its agreements, in particular with the foreign banks and the IMF. The priority will be to try to regenerate economic expansion and limit unemployment, has already been said, it will not be possible to adjust wages to make up for the losses in buying power suffered over these
Tancredo has kept excellent relations with the dictatorship's economic team. And one of the names mentioned most often as a possibility for his minister of
Francisco Dorneles, credo's nephew, is in fact a member of
As regards the workers, Tancredo is concentrating his attention on the proposal of a "national pact" and a "truce." This pact so far offers nothing but efforts to increase employment. Tancredo hopes to gain the understanding of the workers, and he cites the Spanish Moncloa Pact as an example of what he wants to undertake. The Constituent Assembly
On the political level, the big question remains that of the constituent assembly. Naturally, there are
One is a free, sovereign and democratic constituent assembly that would put an end to all the special powers laws and grant freedom for all the political parties. tuent assembly whose role would be limessentially to according constitutional powers to a congress elected on the basis of the existing legislation and made up of representatives of the present par-
Tancredo has come out clearly for the second alternative, with only a few modifications with respect to the electoral laws and legislation on parties. These changes are intended to make it possible to form one or two new parties, not to open the way for the legalization of the PCB. On the latter question, Tancredo says that it should be discussed by the constituent assembly, and that, in any case, caution is required.
Nonetheless, legalization of the PCB and the other parties that are still illegal is inevitable. But if it is delayed, there will be a much more peaceful constituent assembly. This is Tancredo's reasoning.
However, to the contrary, for the workers' and people's movement, the alternative of a free and sovereign constituent assembly is the interesting one. It offers the means for widening the break with the military regime and eliminating this regime after Tancredo Neves is installed as president
Five political parties ran in the 1982 general elections: the PDS, the military's party; the PMDB, the heir of the old legal opposition; the MDB, which already included in its ranks many of the military regime's personalities; the PDT, the heir of the old populist current led by Leonel Brizola, which tried to present itself as a Social Democratic party; the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), which also claims the heritage of the old populism but stands further to the right than the PDT, as shown by the formal agreement it made with the PDS to support Figueiredo's government; and finally, the PT.
The Party of the Liberal Front is in the process of formation. It is the party of the PDS dissidents who backed Tancredo, and it includes, notably, all the governors the PDS elected in 1982. On the other hand, the fate of the PDS is uncertain. At the moment a battle is raging for the control of the leadership between the supporters and opponents of Maluf. This confrontation could lead to a new weakening of this party.
Moreover, the situation is very uncomfortable for the representatives of the "popular" sectors of the PMDB, as a result of the consolidation of the conservative predominance in Thus, a Progressive Front has been formed, uniting the most left sections of the PMDB, deputies leaving the PT - such as the former leader Airton Soares - and sections of the PDT which, like those represented by Roberto Saturnino, find themselves ill at ease with a leadership of their party that is dominated by the personality of Leonel Brizola.
International Viewpoint 11 March 1985
BELA LIDENIAÇAO DOS COMPANHEIRS TRESOS T
PELAS LIBERDADES DEMOCRATICA
This coordinating group would like to form something like a Socialist Party, but the figures involved are not sure that they have the forces for that. On the same ground, Brizola's PDT would also like to transform itself into an SP and, by means of such a name change, increase the number of its cadres.
To sum up: On the right, there is the PDS, whose evolution depends on the outcome of the battle that is being waged for the leadership. The Party of the Liberal Front would itself be sort of a party of liberal conservatives, but much more conservative than liberal. The PMDB, for its part, is consolidating as a more and more conservative party. But it still has a large popular base. There is also the PDT, which may transform itself into an SP. And maybe there will be a Socialist Party formed out of the Progressive Front.
The PCB, the PC do B and the MR-8 will probably not manage to get legalization immediately and will continue to participate in the PMDB. Finally, as the only anti-Tancredo party, there will be the PT.
The Brazilian political scene is thus Demonstration against the military dictatorship in 1977 (DR) very confused. The results of the mass mobilizations
The year 1984 was one of great mass mobilizations, first of all in the campaign for direct elections but also for continuing and strengthening the struggles for higher wages and for rights for workers in general. It had the highest number of strikes since 1979. In a general way, all categories of workers who entered into than those provided for by the law on wages. This law set wage adjustments below the official price index (INPC) for all those who earned more than three times the minimum wage.
The year 1985 has already begun with major struggles. At the start of January, the agricultural day laborers, the "boiasfrias, " literally the "cold lunches," of the Guariba region in Sao Paulo went on strike. They clashed very violently with the police of the state governor, Montoro, who is a member of the PMDB.
On the other hand, according to the opinion polls, Tancredo's election was supported by a majority of the Brazilian population. For example, more than 70% of the population hoped that he would win in the electoral college, as against less than 10% who favored Maluf, and less than 20% who maintained to the end their support for boycotting the electoral college and the indirect election.
In the final analysis, the PT participated in the campaign for direct elections as the left wing of the democratic bloc, and not as the driving force of a working-class and popular alternative opposed to the projects of the bourgeoisie.
The orientation of the campaign for direct elections was to put pressure on the deputies and senators to approve a amendment introducing International Viewpoint 11 March 1985 direct elections based on universal suf-
For that, the constitution imposed by the military required a two-thirds majority of the elected representatives. On April 25, 1984, an absolute majority was obtained for this proposal but not a two-thirds majority. So, the movement came to a crossroads. What should be
One possibility would have been to keep up the pressure by presenting constitutional amendments. This was difficult, both because of the time limits and because of juridical problems. the law forbids consideration of the same amendment several times during a session of the legislature. Attempts were made to put forward new amendments in June and August 1984, but they aroused little enthusiasm and were rapidly abandoned.
Thus, two main alternatives appeared. The first was to continue the struggle, giving it a more determined character by advancing the demand for a constituent assembly, the perspective for a break with the regime, and by working for more radical forms of struggle, such as a general strike. This meant in fact for a workers' and people's
The second option was to channel the struggle through the institutions of the dictatorship itself, which meant accepting the electoral college and trying to make it possible for an opposition candidate to the enemy's weapons to win," as some said, and to keep any more radical candidate from running.
The first alternative was backed by sections of the PT, in particular by the revolutionary Marxists and other revolutionary currents. But the PT as a whole did not come out for this perspective. For months, the PT leadership remained confused, discussing only the pros and cons of supporting Tancredo Neves's candidacy. When, finally, the PT chose to orient toward deepening the struggles, supporting the demand for a constituent assembly and so forth, many months had gone by, and there was no longer any possibility for successfully pursuing such an orientation.
On the other hand, sectors of the bourgeois liberal opposition were acting with determination to achieve a victory within the electoral college, channelling all the pressure created by the mobilization in the early months of 1984 behind that objective. For this purpose, they chose Tancredo Neves as a candidate. He was recognized as the oppositionist closest to the government and was accepted by the military as the champion of "negotiations" and of "entente" with the regime. The bourgeois liberals sought to gain support within the PDS.
So, the great campaign for "direct" elections produced a curious result. It helped to weaken the military dictatorship, to speed its erosion, and to make it inconceivable that the new president could represent a direct continuity of the military regime. (In any case, an option of this sort would have been very dangerous for the bourgeoisie because it would have led to a situation of extreme instability.) But instead of opening the way for direct elections immediately, this immense mobilization resulted finally in an acceptance and legitimization of the electoral college.
A key element in the strategy of the bourgeois opposition was dividing the • PDS, without which it would have been impossible to win in the electoral college. From the start of the wrangle over the choice of the candidate in the PDS convention, it was clear that this party was not going to come through the test intact.
In fact, the PDS could only maintain its unity as long as this was imposed by
5
the exceptional means in the hands of the president, in particular by the need of uniting around the chief. But for the presidential succession, matters were different as revealed, moreover, in a recent interview given by Figueiredo, in which he said: "I couldn't do any better because I didn't have AI-5." (1)
So, the PDS split into a multitude of groups fighting for their own interests. What is more, the PDS convention became an arena for political battles in which methods such as promising portfolios in the future government and even bribes played a decisive role. The result of all this was to open the way to the nomination for the candidate least able to unite the party behind him and carry through a transition, that is, Paul Maluf. Maluf was seen by everyone as corrupt and capable of resorting to the lowest methods. With Paulo Maluf as its candidate, the PDS, which was already divided, literally blew apart.
Most of the more lucid representatives of the bourgeoisie, down to the military chiefs themselves, concluded that in such a context Tancredo Neves was much preferable to Paulo Maluf. This is the fundamental reason for the big lead Tancredo Neves gained in the electoral college, well as for the formidable lineup of the ruling classes around him.
However, Tancredo's candidacy was given impetus not only by the support of various bourgeois sectors. It also got not insignificant backing from the popular masses. Despite the fact that Tancredo promised virtually nothing to the working people, despite his deals with practically all the personalities of the right, he was able to uphold a minimum that had an unquestionable appeal for the people. It was summed up in the formula, "I am not the military dictatorship; I am not Maluf."
Thus, while practically no one thought that Tancredo could offer a big hope for change, the general feeling was that nonetheless with his accession to the presidency something for the better in the situation. The prospects for a " Social Pact"
In this context, all the reformist currents in the workers' and people's movement gave their support to Tancredo. This included the greatly weakened and divided Brazilian Communist Party (PCB); the pro-Albanians of the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B); the October 8 Revolutionary Movement (MR-8), which once spoke in much more radical tones; and the popular sectors of the PMDB and of Lionel Brizola's Democratic Party of Labour (PDT).
The only ones who did not join the chorus of support for Tancredo were the members of the PT - although a large section of the party's deputies lined up behind his campaign - and some personalities in the PMDB, such as the Pernambuco deputy Jarbas Vasconcelos. 6
Thus, it was possible to mobilize a broad section of the popular masses around Tancredo, even if his rallies were a little pale by comparison with the mass meetings for direct elections.
What can be expected from Tancredo's government? It is clear that he is coming to the presidency without having made a break with the military regime. The numerous servants of this regime to be found in his entourage illustrate this fact. His government will be able to utilize many emergency powers left over from the dictatorship, should the need arise. There is the national security law, the law on the press, the law on the right to strike and so forth.
There is now a wait-and-see feeling among the population, created by the impression that with Tancredo something is going to change. But, on the other hand, the trend is not for social struggles to decline in intensity, quite the contrary. It is even possible that the struggles will sharpen, marking an acceleration of the trend that has been seen in recent months.
In this situation, it will be extremely difficult for the Tancredo government to maintain for long the favorable climate it now enjoys. Already the state governments led by members of the "opposition" parties have been carrying out antipopular policies, keeping the freeze on the wages of public employees, repressing strikes and so forth. They have already suffered defeats, as is the case notably of the governor of Sao Paulo state, Montoro, who has had to confront social mobilisations of a very large scale.
However, before now these state governors could minimize their responsibility by claiming that they were dependent on the federal government, and that it would only be possible to do something if it changed. Obviously, with a representative of the PMDB in the presidency, it is more difficult to use this kind of argument. Of course, they will find other explanations to justity their policy, such as, for example, the threat of a rightist coup, the existence of a conservative majority in the Congress, etc. But such arguments reveal a great weakness.
Tancredo's tactic, as can already by seen, will be to demand respites, explaining that it is not possible to restore in a few months what the dictatorship has spent twenty years pillaging, and that it will be necessary to create the conditions for improving the situation of the economy, and that belts will have to be kept a bit tight. In this regard, the question of a "social pact" or "political truce" is vital for the new government, because this is the only way it can keep the workers' and people's movemnt under control with a minimum of risk.
However, the potential is there for opposing such a policy. For example, the 70% of the population that approved the election of Tancredo Neves are not necessarily favorable to a "social pact" policy. Even the PCB is not openly defending this perspective. Its representatives have said that a "pact" like the Moncloa one could offer some benefits but for the moment the conditions have not been assembled for making such an agreement.
In order to make a real social pact, it would first be necessary for all the parties to be legalised, for trade-union liberty to be guaranteed. But for the moment, the minister of labor still holds the prerogative, established already in the time of the Getulio Vargas dictatorship (which was in power from 1930 to 1945 and from 1951 to 1954), to intervene in the functioning of the unions by naming trustees, and there are still unions that are being directly subjected to such measures.
It is only when these conditions of legality for the parties and freedom for the unions are met, the PCB representatives say, that the workers could negotiate a pact on a " basis of equality". It is clear that the PCB does not reject the possibilty of such a pact, but that it is not going to jump in blindly into advocating one. 1. Institutional Act No 5 (AI-5) was the main repressive decree of the dictatorship at its height. It granted emergency powers to the president. There were major mobilisations demanding its abrogation. This decree was suspended in 1979.
International Viewpoint 11 March 1985
It is in this context that the orien- tain its support for direct elections and tations defended and put into practice to negotiate with Tancredo to get a by the PT and the United Workers Confederation (CUT) will be a decisive element in the coming months. (2) They have real chances for success, despite the isolation in which they were confined at the time of the indirect vote in the electoral college to elect the president of the country.
Unlike other countries that have carried out controlled transitions from military dictatorships to bourgeois democratic regimes, such as the Spanish state in the past or Argentina just recently, in Brazil there is a class-struggle current in the workers' movement that has a mass influence, whose strength is even a bit greater than that of the reformist currents
"pelego" (yellow) sections that operate in the workers' movement along-
On this basis, the class struggle may follow a very different course in Brazil than it has elsewhere in generally similar situations.
The PT and the CUT have in a general way pursued a correct policy of workingindependence transition process. But this policy has undergone many variations, explains in part the control that the conservative sectors have held up to the present over the process of transition from the mildictatorship to a limited form of bourgeois democracy. The hesitations of the Workers Party
For a long time the PT, limited by its trade-unionist origins, had virtually no political orientation suited to the immediate situation. This began to change at the time of the campaign for direct elections. The PT took the initiative in calling the first public demonstration on program acceptable to the workers. Lula and the main leaders of the PT supported the position of "a single candidate", and a meeting of the party's National Bureau on this question ended in an impasse.
When it became clear that Tancredo was the candidate for president in of the indirect elections in electoral college, the PT leadership made another attempt to negotiate with
In a recent interview, Lula said: "Shortly after Tancredo agreed to stand in the electoral college, I had a meeting with many opposition personalities... deputies in the progressive wing of the Brazilian parliament. I wanted to disthe possibility of getting some concessions from Tancredo for the working class in exchange for our votes, which were about 80 to 100, since besides the PT members, we could count on some members of the PMDB and the PDT, as well as on the PCB and the PC do
According to Lula, if it proved impossible to form such a multiparty left bloc, it was because the Liberal Front was much more agile and intelligent. assembled the Tancredo needed to win the electoral college and went to negotiate with him well before the opposition formations. From there the Liberal Front went on to set the policy of the future government. It is well to note that while Lula was trying to negotiate with Tancredo Neves, th PT's official position was still for a boycott of the electoral college.
So, it was only when the Democratic Alliance (AD) was formed, based on the PMDB and the Liberal Front, and including an impressive number of representatives of the dictatorship, that the PT finally put forward its position clearly and tried to set up an alternative. But precious time had been lost.
dietatorship and denouncing the deser tion of the parties of the old bourgeois opposition at the time of the campaign for direct elections, the National Burea very * clearly characterized Tancredo's candidacy as bourgeois and pro-imperialist, based on the biggest bloc of the ruling classes ever formed in the entire history of the country. In the face of this, it affirmed the need for the mock ers to safeguard their class independenn and to conduct an independent policy Crossroads for the PT
The PT thus opposes the policy laid down for the future Tancredo govem ment, which means in particular rejectin a "social pact" and a "truce". Likewise it means reaffirming the basic demands of the workers, such as the demand for a break with the IMF and a suspension of payments on the foreign debt, a readjust ment of wages every three months, the end of the repressive legislation, agrarian reform under workers control, and so on The PT has even come to support the slogan of a free, sovereign and democratic constituent assembly, rejected for long years by the PT leadership, which had an economistic view of the situation.
One important element, however, has been missing in the orientations approved by the PT - the clear objective of building a workers' and people's alternative to the government of the Democratic Alliance, of uniting all the forces of the workers' people's movement against the projects of the bourgeoisie. contrary, the resolutions adopted by the PT talk about forming a democratic front uniting people's and democratic forces. As an example of this, they cite the committees to fight for direct elections. There is, of course, a confusion here. It was correct to build struggle committees for the direct elections campaign on a
November 15, 1983. Subsequently, in the big demonstrations in the early months of 1984, the participation of the PT was always essential. The PT appeared as the most consistent defender of in January 1985. In addition to confirmdirect elections and the workers' interests.
However, as I noted before, the PT cotting the electoral college because it was not able — it did not even try - to build an alternative leadership that could counter the bourgeois liberal domination of this mass movement. Instead of serving as the driving force of a workers' and people's alternative, the PT was content to play the role of a "left wing" of the democratic bloc.
However, the real problem posed by the position of the PT came to light after the Congress approved the constitutional amendment for direct elections on April 25, 1984 but with less than the two-thirds majority necessary to enact it. In the two following months, the PT remained confused and paralyzed, discussing support for a "single candidate of the oppositions", who would clearly be Tancredo, as everyone recognized already at the time. The PT harbored the illusion that it would be possible both to mainInternational Viewpoint 11 March 1985
It was only at a meeting of the National Bureau in October 1984 that the PT finally adopted a correct position, which was reaffirmed in a national conference ing the correctness of the position of boyan illegitimate institution of the
Convenções regionais em 16 estados
PT
Um partido diferente correndo em faixa própria purely democratic basis, bringing together parties such as the PMDB and the PDT. But it is quite another matter when it comes to the need to build a workers' alternative in opposition to the Tancredo government, an alternative that must serve exclusively the workers' struggle for power.
Thus, there is a certain ambiguity in the postion adopted by the PT, a certain lack of clarity. This a reflection of the still very pragmatic character of the PT leadership, which in general has adopted class-struggle positions but without systematizing this orientation. This explains why the PT finally took a largely correct position on the question of the "indirect" elections but only after a lot of hesitations on the part -of its leadership, which was virtually forced to adopt this solution by the turn to the right represented by the Tancredo candidacy.
On the CUT and the trade-union movement in Brazil, see International Viewpoint, No 50, April 9, 1984. 3. The interview was published in the danuary 16, 1985, issue of the Brazilizn mag azine Isto.
The fact that the resolutions adopted at the PT's national convention speak in several places about maintaining the political independence of the workers does not mean, however, that this point has been completely assimilated.
Another problem that the PT has to confront now is what position to take toward the eight federal deputies of the party who, violating the decision to boycott the "indirect" elections taken at the PT's national conference, voted for Tancredo Neves in the electoral college. At the time, these deputies defended their vote by arguing that it was necessary to stop Maluf, whom they considered a fascist. But they maintained their position, even when everyone already knew that Tancredo would get the majority.
The PT is not governed by democratic centralism. To the contrary, it is a party with extremely fluid relationships. Nonetheless, it has proved difficult to accept this vote by three deputies in the electoral college because they represented the PT. It was they moreover, who at the end of 1984 forced a new discussion of this question, letting it be perceived that whatever decision the party took, they were going to vote for Tancredo on January 15, 1985.
Failing to take any step against these deputies would amount to accepting once and for all that the PT cannot any longer make decisions as a party, and that every one of its members can do whatever they please at any time.
Among the ranks of the PT, there has been a vast movement demanding the disaffiliation from the party of members of parliament who sat in the electoral college. The argument put forward against this position was that the PT would appear to be a "closed" party, and there was a lot of talk about "Stalinism" Social struggles ahead
At the national conference in January 1985, it was decided to disaffiliate deputies who sat in the electoral college. This position was adopted over the opposition of the National Executive and of Lula himself. afterward an appeal was lodged against this decision, and the result of the appeal is not yet very clear.
Going back on the disaffiliation decision would magnify the weaknesses of the PT still more, and sticking to it could lead to the party losing the support of important sections of its membership, especially among intellectuals and other members of parliament. In any case, the three deputies who sat in the electoral college are already on their way out of the PT.
As for the CUT, it has in general adopted the positions of the PT. It is presently searching for a strategy to give impetus to struggles that clearly run 8 counter to the policy of the "social pact," struggles focusing around a few central objectives, such as wage readjustunemployment insurance agrarian reform.
Nonetheless, the CUT is still a quite fragile structure, which has been gaining strength only slowly. As a result, the decisive axis will be the wage campaigns of the most important unions, mainly the metal workers' unions in Sao Bernardo and Diadema, where a fight for higher wages is to start in March.
Politically speaking, the revolutionary Marxists, as well as the revolutionary currents working to build the PT, find themselves in a relatively favorable
In recent months, the PT's positions have in fact moved closer to those of the revolutionary Marxists. This has happened on a number of points, notably on the question of what position to take toward the Democratic Alliance and on defending class independence against the bourgeoisie's maneuvers in the process of transition to a more democratic system.
There has also been agreement on the analysis that in the first stage of the future Tancredo government democratic struggles against the emergency laws and for dismantling the dictatorship's repressive apparatus will play an important role. Likewise, there is a similarity of views on the central question of supporting the demand for a free, democratic and sovereign constituent assembly. This means that the revolutionary Marxists intend to deepen their analyses of the evolution of these struggles and that they say clearly that their objective is to form
AGORA
TEMOS
A CUT
C a workers' and people's bloc opposed to the Tancredo government, as well as to build a workers' and people's alternative The problem is to give more coherence to the present line of the PT and the CUT.
The coming months will be decisive. For the moment, Tancredo still has a certain credibility. But with the deals that he has made with every sector of big capital and the imperialists, he is going to have to follow a policy that will rapidly lead him to his downfall. If the PT and the CUT demonstrate some coherence in the present situation, if they manage to give impetus to major struggles, they will find themselves in an excellent position to focus the discontent with Tancredo that will emerge. This is a dangerous road, The revolutionary Marxists are aware of that. But the possibilities are real.
On the other hand, if Tancredo manages to attact major sections of the people's movement to his proposal of a "social pact," there may be a decline in mobilization and even a demoralization of the workers' and people's movement.
Despite the fact that the bourgeoisie has managed so far to keep the transition to a limited form of bourgeois democracy well under control, nothing is yet decided. There continue to be important possibilities for the growth of a class-struggle current. And it cannot be excluded that the perspective put forward by the Brazilian revolutionary Marxists - the formation of a workers' and people's alternative to the Tancredo government — can gain success.
Now we have a united union (DR) International Viewpoint 11 March 1985