The strike that changed ing against pit closure area by area has been shown to be ineffective unless backup by the threat of national action. Given the sacrifices that have already been made in the dispute the likelihood of the national union being able to mobilise even a majority of its members for natthe face of British politics ional strike action in the near future is
The union's casualties are heavy including two miners killed on the picket line, over 100 in prison, 710 miners sack. ed many of them leading rank and file militants), nearly 10,000 arrested with thousands still awaiting trial.
The NUM itself is weakened. Speaking
Meeting in London on Sunday March 3, a special delegate conference of the National Union of Mineworkers decided to end the longest and blood- at a rally in Rugely, Staffordshire, on iest strike in British labour movement history.
Miners' president, Arthur Scargill, said afterwards: "The strike is over but the dispute over pit closures and jobs goes on.' strike came as a direct result of the treachery of the leadership of the Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). Only if the lessons of that defeat are learnt will British workers prevent further blows being struck at the miners and the full weight of the government offensive being extended to the rest of the working class. Hundreds of thousands of men, women and youth participated in the miners struggle. It is this current which will be at the centre of the future fightback.
March 10, Arthur Scargill explained that even if all the £8½ million seized from the union by court orders were returned it would realise nothing since the money was originally borrowed. British trade unions have launched a fund to reconstruct the NUM's finances. a whole number of legal actions from the bosses and from scab miners continue to threaten the union.
The National Working Miners Committee, which has funded a whole number of legal actions in the past year against the union, has stated its intention to stay
The motion calling for a return to defiance of the employers and the governwork without a settlement and for an amnesty to be negotiated locally was moved by the South Wales area of the union and passed by 98 votes to 91 against. A Yorkshire motion, which was defeated by the same margin, said that the strike should continue until the future of the five pits named for closure was safeguarded and a general amnesty grantted to the 710 miners sacked. The union executive was divided equally on what recommendation to make to the con-
They advised the delegates that the status quo should be retained and that the strike should continue. After the conference reached its decision Arthur Scargill thanked miners and miners' wives 'from the bottom of my heart'.
He listed the strike's achievements as withdrawal of the threat to close five pits; the National Coal Board's failure to implement its 1984/85 closure programme and the mobilisation of the NUM. workers in this struggle have demonstrated to the working class that if they make a can prevent attempts to butcher their industry,' he said.
militancy of the miners was expressed two days later when most returned to Over 30,000 miners out of 180,000 did not return, mostly in protest against the refusal of the government and the National Coal the NCB chairperson, confirmed this stance on March 10 when he said that people are now discovering the price of insubordination and insurrection - and boy are we going to make it stick.'
In the Yorkshire area 50% of the workforce stayed out, in Scotland 56% and the Kent area remained on strike for the rest of the week.
The miners who did return to work made it a day of demonstration, marching behind their union banners shouting their
The demand for the reinstatement of those sacked was prominent throughout the coalfields. The overwhelming majority of the victimised workers were convicted in the courts on minor offences like scavenging for coal or obstruction on picket lines and then sacked by the Coal Board. Scotland and Kent are the areas worst affected. In Scotland NCB managers have refused to contemplate any of those victimised getting their jobs back.
There are also a large number of miners who are in prison for offences related to the dispute (see accompany-
A ballot of the NUM membership to be held later this month will propose to establish a levy of £95,000 per week to help the families of the victimised strikers. The ballot will be an important test of the loyalty of the membership to the Scargill leadership.
There is already evidence that loyalty remains intact. Six days after the strike been called off, Arthur Scargill addressed an audience of 5,000 miners' wives celebrating International Women's Day in Chesterfield.
A MORI opinion poll taken after the strike had finished showed that 68% of the miners interviewed would support the oppose pit closures on economic grounds
The poll also showed 57% of miners in favour of continuing the ban on overtime, despite the fact that the miners would not receive a pay rise until the ban was called off. The significance of the ban is that it keeps coal stocks at the lowest possible level in preparation for further industrial action. (see chronology)
this continued spirit of mil itancy there is no doubt that the miners' union has suffered a major defeat. Fightin existence after the strike.
This scabs committee has links not only with the government but with Thatcher herself. When formed, the committee's meetings were attended by David Hart, a former Thatcher press aide, who provided both funds and advice for the committee and acted as a link person between Tory leaders and the committee
The scabs have now declared their
La campaign for constitutional change in the union, again with the back-up of the capitalist courts The number one target in this campaign will be the Scargill leadership of the
The union also faces a split by almost one-fifth of its membership. The Nottinghamshire area of the union has distanced itself from the union by changing its local constitution so as not to be bound by the national union's rule 51, which deals with disciplinary matters. The area further broke with the union by recently calling off the overtime ban on the grounds of 'hardship'. smaller areas, Leicester and South Derbyshire are taking a similar course.
Some of the working miners' leaders have openly talked about creating a split-off organisation similar to the called 'Spencer union' which split the miners' union after their defeat in the general strike of 1926.
However, the national union leader ship will aim to exploit the unease which is felt by many Nottinghamshire miners with the manipulation of their local union by the shadowy figures behind the working miners committees. As matters stand at the moment, however, Notting hamshire will be expelled from the union if they persist in flouting the constitution and decisions of the national union.
these factors represent a serious weakening of the NUM and inhibit the
International Viewpoint 25 March 1985
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BRITAIN
possibilities of future struggle. defeat of the union means that Thatcher can use the sentiment expressed by many trade unionists after the strike. miners can't take on the government and win, then who can?"
This reticence will be reinforced by the fact that, even during the miners' strike, serious defeats took place, such as the collapse of the Austin-Rover strike after the unions concerned were taken to under the new anti-trade union Tory government cannot afford to gloat
However, what must be added to any assessment of the outcome of the strike is the extent to which the government itself has been damaged and internally weakened as a result of the strike.
The official line of the Conservatives has been to refuse to gloat over the calling off of the strike. The reason for this is nothing to do with concern for miners feelings, but because of the considerable unease felt about the government's handling of the dispute.
In an opinion poll taken just before the end of the strike, 60% of those questioned felt that Thatcher had handled the final stages of the strike badly. Only 34% of those questioned felt that she was doing a good job as prime minister, the lowest rating since before the Malvinas war.
Other opinion polls put the Tories only narrowly in front of the Labour Party, with the major part of the Tories' loss of popularity going to the Social Democratic/Liberal Alliance.
These shifts in political opinion are only the first implications of the tremendous changes brought about in British society by the miners' strike.
Halfway through the strike, Thatcher called the miners' union 'the enemy within', comparing Scargill to General Galtieri of Argentina. Finance minister Nigel Lawson said that the cost of the strike would be a justifiable investment in securing the defeat of the NUM.
The cost of that investment has exceeded that of the Malvinas war by over
Estimates put the cost of the strike in terms of extra fuel and policing at £3 billion, £140 for every working
The stockbrokers, Simon and Coates say that knock-on costs in the coal industry could add another £700 million to this total. They estimate the total loss to Gross National Product at 2%.
For many spokespersons of the liberal establishment the activities of the police and courts during the strike represented a move towards a strong state, a shift away from 'government by consent' to increasing 'government by coercion.'
In Britain the police are theoretically responsible to municipal authorities who fund them from local taxes. strike this notion of accountability was unceremoniously dumped by the creation of what amounted to a 10,000 strong International Viewpoint 25 March 1985 mobile national police force, accountable only to a 'National Reporting Centre.' This centre was set up after the 1972 miners' strike and first used against the revolt of the black youth in inner city
From its London base. the centre drafted police from all over the country to occupy mining areas, virtually replacing the local police forces. The scale of this policing and the use of riot techniques against miners and their communities gave the police a profile similar to that of an occupying force.
government chose not to use contain the strike, but instead gave the police a free hand to find crimes to fit
Concern over the increasing powers being arrogated by the central state (in stark contrast to the official propaganda of the government on the freedom of individuals from the incursions of the collectivist state) has provoked internal divisions in the Tory Party on another front - that of local government. In a drive to acheive cuts in social expenditure the government has proposed to limit the ability of local councils to raise taxes and
In addition the large metropolitan authorities, like the Greater London Council face abolition as a result of Tory opposition to the left wing policies promoted by such figures as GLC T.abour leader, Ken Livingstone.
The fall in the pound and the resulting rise in British interest rates has further exacerbated the crisis within the
Not only has the centre-piece of the government's policy this year - tax cuts been indefinitely postponed, but harsher credit restrictions threaten to choke off the promised economic re-
The revival of the economy and the reduction of the record level of unemploy-
(now standing at 13% even on official figures) is now vital to Thatcher's prospects of retaining power in the next general election scheduled for 1988.
Despite the fact that the elections are still three years away many Conservative Members of Parliament are becoming increasingly nervous about the prospects of losing their seats and their party losing
At the most senior level figures ex-premier Edward Heath, have spoken out, along with many other exministers, calling for a reversal in the economic policies of the government.
It is true that Thatcher planned this defeat of the union for a decade. Following the defeat of Edward Heath's Conservative government in 1974 at the hands of the miners, a secret report was prepared by a Conservative Party policy group which identified coal as 'the most likely battleground' for a future Thatcher government. They recommended a sixpoint plan which included: - establishment of a large mobile police force to prevent picketing - cutting off state benefits to strikers - building up of coal stocks, particularly
Chronology.
of the great strike
1983 September 1: Ian MacGregor takes over as chairperson of the National Coal Board, the coal employers. September 14: Strike over closure of Monktonhall pit in Scotland. October 21: The NUM begins an overtime ban against pit closures and a 5.2% pay offer by the Coal Board. The ban aims to run down coal stocks standing at a record 24 million tonnes. NUM says that 300,000 tonnes of production are lost in first week.
1984 March 5: Strike in Yorkshire over plans to close Cortonwood pit. March 6: The Coal Board announces plans to cut 4 million tonnes capacity with the loss of 20,000 jobs. All Yorkshire and Scottish miners called out on strike. March 8: The NUM executive sanctions Yorkshire and Scottish strikes and gives sanction in advance to any other area which wants to come out. March 12: Flying pickets from areas already on strike (Yorkshire, Scotland, Kent, Durham) close down other areas. March 14: Coal Board granted court order to stop Yorkshire miners picketing other areas. 8,000 police drafted into Nottingham coal field. March 15: David Jones, 24, dies at Ollerton colliery while picketing miners going into work. March 26: NUM tells the Trades Union Congress to keep out of the dispute. March 29: Leaders of rail, transport and steel unions agree to ban on coal movements. April 5: Nottinghamshire miners decide to work normally April 23: NUM special delegate conference reduces required majority for a national strike from 55% to a simple majority. May 12: First national miners' wives rally in Barnsley. 10,000 attend. May 23: First talks between Coal Board and NUM collapse. May 25: Flying pickets try to stop coke leaving Orgreave works to go to Scunthorpe steelworks. May 30: Arthur Scargill arrested at Orgreave. June 8-13: Coal Board and NUM talks resume then collapse.
7
This agreement, which concedes the the NUM into a ballot, Kinnock transfer-
- arrangements for importing coal - recruitment of non-union lorry drivers to move coal - introduction of dual coal/oil firing in power stations All these preparations were in place by the start of the strike and were used intensively. But the miners had made their own plans to confront Thatcher's battle plans.
Despite the blanket presence of police around the coalfields, mass picketing remained a permanent feature of the strike with tens of thousands of miners picketing on some occasions. When miners were arrested and subject to orders banning them from the picket lines in many cases their places were taken by their wives. The police action in the coalfield rather than inhibiting the strike increased the militancy and determination of the miners nad their communities.
While the reduction of state benefits to miners' families to first £15 and then £14, caused great suffering in the coalfields, a vast network of solidarity in Britain and overseas channelled millions of pounds to the miners' wives movement, who managed to supply families in the mining communities with the basics for survival.
However, the key to the strike was not merely these defensive measures, but, given the record coal stocks held at the beginning of the strike, the ability to implement a complete ban on the movement of coal and to stop the substitution of coal by other fuels. For this the miners were reliant on the support of the rest of the trade union movement.
That support was given on paper at the TUC Congress of September 1984, when the union leaderships were pressured by the strength of the miners' struggle and the feeling at their own base into voting to support the miners' dispute. But it became clear that the TUC leaders had no intention whatsoever of delivering the action by union members in the power stations that was forseen by the TUC resolution. Instead, the TUC leaders pursued a so-called twin-track policy: on the one hand providing the miners with enough financial support to keep the strike going, and on the other using that support to try and exert leverage on the union to settle the dispute through a sellout of their membership on the crucial question of pit closures.
The turning point in the dispute came at the end of September last year as the government saw that the TUC would not deliver the solidarity it had promised. The Tory cabinet refused to offer any concessions to the union, repeatedly sabotaging the negotiations with the coal board and the government arbitration
The final act of betrayal by the TUC was the attempt of Norman Willis, the TUC General Secretary, in February to try and impose an agreement negotiated between himself, Thatcher and the coal employers on the NUM.
8 vital principle that pits can be closed by the Coal Board on economic grounds, is today, the basis on which the government is demanding that the NUM capitulate This betrayal engineered by the TUC bureaucrats was ably assisted by Neil Kinnock, the leader of the Labour Party.
From the beginning of the strike, Kinnock made his opposition to the strike evident, comparing Arthur Scargill to Britain's First World War general who led their soldiers into battle without hope of victory. Kinnock not only ignored the fact that the strike was forced on the union by the government and coal board employers (see chronology), but also that the strike could have been won if the leadership had authority to secure the vital blockade on the movement of coal. Kinnock, throwing to one side the 'left' credentials which had won him the leadership battle of the Labour Party, instead swung his support behind the argument of the right wing of the miners' union executive for a national ballot as a precondition for strike action against the coal board's programme. Labour leader betrays
This demand was being trumpeted from every figure in the establishment including Margaret Thatcher. Its object was to slow down the response of the miners' union to the Coal Board's provocation and allow the media to start a poison campaign against the strike. If the ballot had been held and defeated it have effectively prevented local areas from striking against closures in their own areas, as it had in the previous
Instead the NUM leadership chose to try and spread the strike through rank and file picketing throughout the coalfield. The campaign was generally success-
Areas like South Wales, who originally decided not to join the strike, were brought out by pickets from Scotland, Yorkshire and Kent, and remained solid to the end of the strike. Areas like Nottinghamshire, originally joined the strike
But the right wing leadership in power for decades in the Nottingham area refused to give the order for their membership to join the picket lines. In doing so they created the Frankenstein monster of the 'back to work movement' of the National Working Miners Committee.
Neither was there any guarantee that areas which voted against the strike in a ballot would have accepted a national majority against them and joined the
In one pit in North Wales, Bersham, a ballot was held later in but the branch officials led the men back to work two days later irrespecThe decision to hold a ballot in the given circumstances would have merely given the opportunity for the right wing to veto strike action without any guarantee that they would accept a national decision.
Having failed in his campaign to force
June 15: Second Miner, Joe Green, killed on picket line at Ferrybridge power station, by a lorry. June 18: Heavy fighting at Orgreave. June 27: Railworkers stage 24-hour strike in London in support of miners. Steel union leaders say they will accept coal from any source to keep steel production going. July 5: New NUM-NCB talks start. July 9: National docks strike starts over local dispute arising from miners' strike. Talks make real progress. July 11: Special delegate conference of NUM passes rule changes on discip line in defiance of court order. Court subsequently decides rule changes null and void. July 18: NCB-NUM talks collapse with Scargill accusing the government of behind-the-scenes sabotage. July 21: Dockers call off strike. July 31: High Court fines South Wales NUM £50.000 for contempt over over picketing and orders seizure of all the area's funds. August 10: NUM special conference rejects new NCB proposals and changes rules to increase disciplinary powers. August 11: 30,000 miners wives demonstrate in London. August 23: Second national dock September 3: TUC Congress votes to support miners, but key unions such as electricians and power workers dis-
New talks between NCB and NUM take place and break September 18: Second dock strike September 28: NACODS, the safety without whom no work can be done in the pit, votes by majority to strike. High Court decides Derby NUM strike unlawful and Yorkshire NUM strike un-
October 1: Huge support for NUM at
Labour Party conference, but Kinnock denounces picket line violence. Contempt order served on Scargill and
NUM for declaring that Yorkshire strike official despite court ruling
October 10: NUM fined £200,000 for contempt in the first of a series of legal actions.
October 15: Talks held between the
NUM and the NCB and the government arbitration service, ACAS, fail.
October16: NACODS calls strike for
25 October meaning that all pits will close.
International Viewpoint 25 March 1985
red his campaign to the question of the violence on the picket line. senting the problem as the violence of both sides, he denounced the miners' violence as 'unBritish'. Party conference, despite an overwhelming vote by the delegates to condemn police violence as the problem, Kinnock evenhandedly condemned picket violence in the same measure as police violence. He went on to call for the party respect legality if it was to win the next
However, the facts of the dispute disstrike was an electoral liability for Labour. In the EEC election in June 1984, during the height of the bloody battles at the Orgreave coking plant, Labour made sweeping gains. These gains were most marked in those areas led by the left wing had openly identified with miners' struggle.
failure to support was not, of course, merely a miscalculation, he recognised and feared the forces that were coalescing around the miners' strike.
As Arthur Scargill explained at the last great demonstration of the dispute on 23 February in London: 'In this struggle we've seen the emergence of whole new dimensions in British politics. We've got literally hundreds of thousands of people involved both directly and indirectly in helping the National Union of Mineworkers. We've got support groups not only in this country, but throughout
A new phenomenon, the has inspired workers not only here but in every part of Europe. What the establishment have not yet grasped is that we've created our own resistance movement comparable to those that operated throughout the Second World
The idea of a new alliance of resistance in British society, led by industrial workers, is one that the NUM has tried to popularise throughout the dispute.
In the trade unions, the miners were the driving force behind the Triple Alliance, the bloc of rail, steel and coal unions formed against the rundown of their industries. While the alliance dissolved during the strike, due to the failure of the right wing leadership of the steel unions to place a blockade on coal, the alliance of the rail workers and the miners held firm, and became the foundation of a new alliance of the NUM and the transport unions. In the next period this alliance will again be crucial as Thatcher moves to take on the rail workers.
Outside the labour movement, miners have linked up with the anti-nuclear movement against the building of nuclear power stations and for unilateral disarmament. The miners' wives have opened their meetings to other women activists and have established a strong alliance with the Greenham Common Peace women. International Viewpoint 25 March 1985
The NUM has also increased its activity in the Labour Party, and miners' wives joining and consolidating contacts made in the strike where the rank and file of the Labour Party moved to initiate the majority of 400 plus strike support committees around the country.
Within the Labour Party itself, the NUM pursued a course within the left, major union to support the self-organisation of black people in the Labour Party, voting for the entireof the platform of the women's rights caucus, and supporting the demands of gays and lesbians.
The alliance of forces constructed by the NUM in the course of its struggle, with its political expression inside Labour Party, is the first approximation to a class struggle left wing in the British labour movement for 60 years, since the early British Communist Party established the National Minority Movement and the National Left Wing Movement inside
However, one of the major problems is the lack of consistent organisation of this current into a force which can do battle with the Tories, overcoming the obstruction of the Labour right wing.
The absence of such an organised current fighting for industrial action in the unions, before the start of the miners' strike, weakened the fight against the sabotage of the right wing and centre trade union leaders. Other less powerful sectors who do battle with the Tories in the next period will find that absence even more critical than did the miners.
Such a current also has to fight for leaderships of the Scargill type in the unions, in other words, leaderships that reject class collaboration and fight for mass action of the working class against
Such a struggle will also find its expression in the Labour Party. Kinnock's left credentials have been all but destroyed by his actions in the strike, the impulse towards unifying the Labour Party to fight the next election probably renders his position as leader unassailable. Neverthless, at every other level of the Labour Party there will be battles around the new line of divide created by the miners' strike.
moves towards organising left of the Labour Party and the trade unions are already under way. But while supporting such developments, Scargill has kept his distance from them as has Tony Benn. A strong unitary lead is needed if the huge left current movement built around the miners' strike is to be consolidated and not frittered away.
Such a move towards organising the left will not resolve the problems of leadership so graphically exposed by the British miners' But it is the next step towards the building of a real 'party of labour' which, unlike traitors such as
Willis, champions and every struggle of the working class as the route towards socialism.
October 19: Power workers in electricians union vote by 84% not to take action in support of the miners. October 24: NACODS call off strike in return for Coal Board formula which the NUM rejects. October 25: High Court orders the seizure of all NUM assets after the refusal of the union to pay its £200,000 fine. November 5: NCB offers Christmas bonus to miners who return to work. For some this means over £1,000. November 13: Employers claim that 5,000 return to work. November 28: TUC seeks talks with the government. November 30: Tory councillor appointed as receiver for the NUM's funds. December 3: NUM special delegate conference decides to boycott receiver. December 12: Nottinghamshire area votes a rule change as first step towards breaking away from the National union.
1985 January 7: NCB claims that 1,200 miners return to work. January 10: NUM leadership votes to suspend Nottinghamshire area if it continues to defy National decisions. January 21: After preliminary talks between the union and the employers the government vetoes further talks. January 27: Widespread industrial action by rail workers in defence of their colleagues victimised for refusing to move coal. January 29: NCB demands written assurance from the NUM that they will accept closure of uneconomic pits -the crux of the dispute. NUM refuses. February 19: TUC meets Thatcher, then negotiates deal with NCB. February 22: NUM special delegate conference unanimously rejects TUCNCB deal. February 24: 80,000 march in London in support of the miners. March 3: NUM national delegate conference votes 98-91 to return to work without a settlement. The dispute will continue. The minority, which is led by Scargill favours a continuation of the strike to secure an amnesty for miners sacked in the strike. March 5: Most areas return to work, but Scotland and Kent stay out to fight for amnesty, other pits join them. Both vote to return within the week.
Maebrate Internatidnal Women Day
in Chesterfield.