The political terrain
So, the pressure of resentment mounted, forcing Amal to join in the activity. And this also pushed the Islamic fundamentalist wing to begin activity against the Israeli forces.
When you speak about Islamic lio br fundamentalists, after the Israeli withdrawal are you talking about a definite organisation or a current?
A: At the beginning, the frontier between the fundamentalists and Amal was not clear. In fact, the whole Shiite fundamentalist movement came out of the ranks of Amal. Up until 1982, there were no other Shiite groups apart from
The flareup of communal war between Christians and Muslims in the in recent weeks and the Christian communalist rebellion
Sidon area against the country's Maronite president, Amin Gemayel, points up the continuing shifts and explosiveness in Lebanese politics.
interview describes the underlying political developments in Lebanon since the Israeli invasion in June 1982.
Paris at the end of March by Salah Jaber, a leader of the Lebanese section of the Fourth International.
Question: What is the political characdid it develop and what are the major political forces and organising centers within it?
Answer: There are some things about this that are very important to understand, because the international press has given a very distorted view of the resistance movement, and I think that it has done so for deliberate political motives.
Thus, the tendency of the Western press has been to portray the resistance movement as Shiite and Islamic fundamentalist in character.
It is true that a lot of Shiites are involved in the resistance. That is for obvious reasons, since the population of the occupied area is mainly Shiite. But the Western press tends to use this fact to make it appear that the resistance is sort of a local branch of Khomeinism. That is a distortion, and I think a deliberate one because it has the apparent effect of making the resistance look like something exotic and unattractive, something few people in the
West could sympathize with.
I do not mean to say that there is no
Islamic component in the resistance to the Israeli occupation. There is. But it is only one element. There is also a major
Lebanese left component, essentially the
Lebanese Communist Party, and a large
Palestinian involvement. The Palestinians, led by what is generally known in the
West as the dissident wing of the PLO, have adopted a low profile.
Among other things, that is because of the resentment that developed among the local people toward the old PLO with its displays of power. But everyone in Lebanon knows that they have been playing a big role.
Moreover, even in the Islamic component itself, you have to make a distinction between Amal, who place the resistance in a more nationalist context, and the purely Islamic, or Hezbollah component, which sees it as part of a historic struggle against Zionism, Judaism, the
West and the East [that is, the Soviet
Union and Communism.
Historically, the initiative for the
4
The following It was given to Gerry Foley in resistance came from the Lebanese left, specifically the communist forces, and more specifically still, the Communist Party and the militant wing of the Palestinian forces, that is the so-called dissident wing of Al Fatah, and other components of the left such as the Democratic Front and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
It was the Lebanese Communist Party that took the initiative of creating the National Resistance Front, which in the beginning took responsibility for the overwhelming majority of the operations that took place against the occupation and which still takes responsibility for a large part of these operations.
As for Amal, for a whole period of the occupation, it did not wage any armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. It even regarded the occupation as offering some immediate advantages, such as getting rid of the Palestinians. still opposes the return of the Palestinian armed forces to the places from which they were expelled. In fact, for a period Amal even tried to reach some sort of modus vivendi with the Israelis, some sort of peaceful coexistence. that the Israelis would not any more interfere in their affairs, and in exchange for that Amal would prevent the Palestinians from getting into the area and staging any more operations from southern Leb-
The initiative taken by the CP put strong pressure on resistance rapidly, owing to a growing resentment of the Israeli occupation. of the local population rose sharply against the Israelis because of the behaviour of the Zionist troops, their alliance with some Christian communalist antiMuslim forces, and the whole ive climate created by the Israeli occupation.
Actually, the Israeli repression was directed mainly against the left, but because of the extended-family patterns among the local population, it provoked very broad hostility. Whole families and villages identified with the people arrested.
Amal, so all these currents existed within
The first split in Amal was in the Bekaa valley in 1982. The people who led it accused Berri, the leader of Amal, of compromising with the Phalangists at the time he agreed to hold negotiations with Bashir Gemayel. After that, you had the formation of the Unity Government headed by Amin Gemayel, in which Berri himself was given a ministry. So other parts of the fundamentalist current within Amal began to act independently. They had existed before, but they began acting openly after that time. This also affected southern Lebanon, where they began to operate their own resistance movement, which they called the Islamic
The demonstration that the "Islamic Resistance" held in Sidon after the Israeli army withdrew from the city lustrates its political character. Its slogan was "Neither a Patriotic nor a Nationalist
- an Islamic Resistance." For the first time, a current that claims to be anti-Zionist and what we would call anti-imperialist rejected the terms "nationalist" and "patriotic". For them, nationalist means left. They are against the idea of nationalism. They are for "Islam". That's why they burnt the Lebanese flag and raised the Iranian flag and pictures of Khomeini. It was their way of saying that this is the government they recognise for the whole Islamic world. reject the concept of anti-imperialism as the left understands it. They explicitly oppose the concept of national-liberation
To this, they counterpose So, they see Islamic resistance as counterposed to the nationalist resistance. They mounted a strong propaganda campaign against the nationalist resistance.
Thus, there are two sides to these Islamic fundamentalists. They are anti-Zionist and anti-Western, but at the same time, they are also anti-Communist and anti-left. The Hezbollah [Party of God] is now the strongest fundamentalist Islamic current in Lebanon.
Q: But from what you are saying, it seems that the Hezbollah are capturing the new radicalisation. So, how can you be sure that this process will not go further? After all, the Shites are the largest community in Lebanon, and historically underprivileged.
A: The Hezbollah's problem is that it
International Viewpoint 8 April 1985
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LEBANON
office as a tool of the Phalangist Party, communities which would have to be has nothing concrete to offer by way of an answer to the present economie situation. All they can say is that once we have an Islamic society and economy, everything will be solved.
Q: But perhaps they don't need to say much about the concrete economic questions as long as people's attention is focused on fighting the Israeli forces?
A: Yes, but people's attention is not just focused on that nowadays. The
Israelis are withdrawing don't forget.
And the economic situation is now very bad. People's main concern now is how to live.
Q: On the other hand, although these communalist forces may have no program for solving the economic crisis, they have the advantage that they generally take care of their own people. They offer material help and solidarity for their members. Are the Hezbollah able to do
A: Yes, they are doing that with the help of the financial subsidies they get
With these resources, have offered some social assistance. But about the crisis of the economy they have nothing to say. They stay firmly within the capitalist framework. They are leading the radicalizing section of the masses
There are great dangers involved in the growth of the Hezbollah because it is up a very violent hatred of communism. Sooner or later, this will lead to clashes with the CP. The CP will never take the offensive against them. They are too afraid.
Q: How strong is the CP in the resistance in southern Lebanon today?
A: What is clear is that it is still one of the main organized forces in southern Lebanon. Its strength is comparable to that of Amal.
Q: That raises the question of how government is likely to survive.
A: What is going on now is a confirmation of the analysis we made a long time ago. For example, we made a distinction between the fascist wing of the Christian communalist movement represented by Bashir Gemayel and the Amin Gemayel wing as a representative of classical Gemayel succeeded his brother, he enjoyed a certain level of popular support reflecting the breadth of bourgeois support for him. He also had support from the capitalist powers, Israelis, for whom the assassination of Bashir was a big blow.
everything Amin Gemayel did after taking office has undermined the support he initially enjoyed. began by relying heavily of the Americans and on the West. He believed in the Multinational force, in the effectiveness of a US demonstration of strength.
Very soon, Gemayel began using his International Viewpoint 8 April 1985 giving preference to Phalangist worthies in certain nominations. So, he began to lose support even among the bourgeoisie. Then you had the fighting in the mountains and the re-emergence in Beirut itself of an armed counterforce, mainly the Shiites. He tried to crush this militarily but only succeeded in deepening the opposition to him and strengthening it. This operation not only led to defeat for him but forced the withdrawal of the Western forces. So, he found himself virtually suspended in mid air.
Amin Gemayel's initial mistake had been to sign the May 17 peace treaty with the Israelis, which alienated the Syrians
Why the Syrians held back their forces from clashing with Gemayel for a while, after he signed this treaty they departed from their wait-and-see attitude and played a key role in defeating him. Finally, with a green light from the Americans, he had to go to Damascus. From then on he has played the Syrian card. But in a certain sense, this was too
He could have played it when he was in a position of strength, then he could have used it as a basis of stability. But when he finally went to Damascus, it was clear to everyone that he was going there defeated.
Q: And the fact that he had to throw himself into the arms of the Syrians has set the stage for a revolt against Gemayel in the Christian camp itself.
A: Gemayel took advantage defeat of the Lebanese Forces in the mountains to begin intervening in the Lebanese Forces themselves. Then, after the death of his father, Sheikh Pierre, he became the leading figure in the Phalangist party. Through his control of the party, he began to spread his control to the other forces, the militias, the police force. The military forces that had followed his
Bashir were loyal to the party only in a very ambiguous way. would not openly oppose it, but many had their won political ideas that were much more radically rightist than those of the Phalangists.
After Bashir's death, the person put in the leadership of the Lebanese Forces was torn between the pressure of the Phalangist Party and that of the radical wing of the Lebanese Forces dominant in the military apparatus. Then, after he took party, Amin Gemayel managed to take control of the Lebanese Forces by imposing, through the party, his nephew as the new head of the Leb-
Forces against a figure who was considered a representative of the Bashir
So, Amin Gemayel managed to gain a grip on the Christian forces and hold it for a time. But in the most recent period, Gemayel has come under massive pressure from the Muslim opposition and the Syrians. Before the recent rebellion led by Geaga broke out, he was negotiating a nise on the political institutions of the state, a new balance between the representation of the various much more favourable to the Muslims.
Moreover, the problems this caused arose in the framework of the economic collapse. This opened up the way for Geagea's rebellion. The economic disaster created despair in the Christian population. That is why this rebellion could take place at this time and have the success it is having.
The rebellion was spurred also by Gemayel's authoritarian methods. He tried to deal with the Christian rebellion in the same heavy-handed way that he used before against the Muslims. He had Geagea expelled. This led to a rebellion that spread to the whole of the Lebanese Forces and gained quite a wide popularity in the Christian camp. And so Gemayel is placed in a perilous position.
The rebels want to install a sort of Christian parliament in the Christian area, but this will be perceived by the other communities as a partition state and a declaration of war.
Q: Is that Geagea's only program,
A: Yes, Bashir's fascistic notions have proved totally illusory, and now the only thing the Christian right can fight for is partition, and that is what they are doing. Already the Lebanese forces constitute a kind of state apparatus. Now, they want to round out this state structure through a parliament and other representative
They won't say at this stage openly that they are out for an independent state, because that would mean a declaration of war. But they will probably have to do it sooner or later. The objective dynamic has been going in this direction for a number of years now. And that means the collapse of Amin Gemayel.
Q: But since the Hezbollah are on the rise, as you say, do you think that they
Amin Gemayel (D.R.)
can eventually unite all the fundamentalists behind them?
AneNo. They cannot bridge the gap between the two main sects of Islam, the
Shiites and the Sunnis. • The Hezbollah have had little or no attraction for the
Sunni Muslims. * In Lebanon, there is also the large Druze community, and the
Druzes are a special sect considered heretics at best by the Sunnis and Shites.
Moreover, the Druzes separate the elect, or the truly religious, from the ordinary believers, and so it is hardly likely that fundamentalism could develop among them.
Q: Well, could the Hezbollah dominate the Shite community?
Even in the Shiite community,
Amal is still much stronger than the Hezbollah. But this radical minority exerts a constant pressure on Amal. This is some.
thing that Berri has to take account of, and it inhibits him from going as far as he could otherwise go in conciliation with the Phalangists and the Syrians.
Q: What sort of fundamentalist forces are there among the Sunni community?
A: There is a current very similar to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is called the Islamic Unification Movement. It is very weak in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon except for the north, the Tripoli area. In that zone, it fought alongside Arafat against the Palestinian opposition. It has basically the same ideas as the Hezbollah, except that it is not so pro-Iranian. Because of its Sunni character, it can have a relationship with Arafat and behind him with the Saudis. On the other hand, the Iranians are not satisfied with Arafat's leadership.
For Lebanon, both the Shiite and Sunni fundamentalists have the same programme. They both call for an Islamic republic; they both, in effect, say that the only solution for the country's crisis is for the Christians to become Muslim.
Q: But you say the fundamentalists, mainly the Shüte fundamentalists, have been growing What is the reason for this? Does it represent a kind of radicalization that could lead to other things?
The reason for the growth of fundamentalism is two sided, a sharpening of the crisis and a failure of the left. Since mid-January, the value of the Lebanese currency has plummeted. In six weeks, it has lost more than half its value against the dollar. This is an unprecedented economic disaster for Lebanon. And it has had an immediate impact on the masses, since a very high percentage of necessities and
Even before the was limited, and since the start of the hostilities it has been largely destroyed. So the fall in the value of the currency means an immediate and more comensurate increase in prices, which is bringing about a real social disaster.
This social disaster can only lead to a further radicalization of the masses, but
6 this radicalization is now being mainly captured by the fundamentalists in the Shiite community and by other types of communal fanaticism in other communities, as among the Christians.
Q: Does that mean that a major shift is taking place in the political relationship of forces in Lebanon?
The first major shift took place after 1982. It was from the CP to Amal in the Shiite community. In the first years of the period of wars in Lebanon, starting with the civil war in 1975, the main militant force in the Shiite community was the Communist Party.
Amal was built at first mainly as a counterforce to the CP, as a weapon against the spread of communism in the Shiite community, which is the largest one in Lebanon.
The policies of the Lebanese CP since the start of the war period, 1975 to 1982, were to bow to the Syrians and the PLO leadership and to follow a compromise line in Lebanese internal politics. This led to their becoming discredited. Amal was able to profit from this. Amal had stagnated in the first years of the war period, it began growing at the expense of the CP in the late 1970s. In 1982, before the Israeli invasion, it had managed to gain control of some key areas of Beirut that had been communist A young fighter of the Shite militia (D.R.)
The Israeli invasion itself was a big blow to the Communist forces and to all the left or nationalist forces. I should point out here that the Israelis chose to disarm what we might call the ideological parties, the CP, the Nasserites, and so forth. They left the communalist forces such as Amal or Jumblatt's Druze party almost untouched. This obviously gave Amal a big advantage.
By taking the lead in the resistance movement, on the other hand, the CP regained some of its lost popularity. In 1984, in fact, the CP seemed to reach a new peak in its strength and influence, compared to the low point that they reached in 1982. But after that came the compromise between Amin Gemayel and the Syrians after the defeat suffered by the Multinational Force in Lebanon.
Since the CP are very much linked to the Syrians, Moscow's main ally in the region, after this compromise, the CP could not continue to appear to be the radical force. The continuing radicalisation tended to bypass both the CP and Amal. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that there has been a fundamental shift in the relationship of forces, in the sense that the Hezbollah is stronger now than the CP. It is not, but it is growing, and it has an advantage that the CP does not, that is its closeness to Amal. Both stand on the same Shiite ground.
International Viewpoint 8 April 1985