The trajectory of the Alfonsin government
In the last two months, after being in office for more But at the start, things do not look so good for the since there was a demonstration of 50,000 steps against the military hierarchy responsible for the people demanding justice.
slaughter of tens of thousands of people under the The following articles
Alfonsin regime than a year, the bout they reAresent the first witenpleto ashes ee tray.
dictatorship that ruled from 1976 to 1982.
the new government retired ten generals and
March,
The new chint of stat is as Airfice of be andre ectory of the Alfonsin regime over a relatively long have maneuvered in a situation unprecedented in the
They point up the way the new government
The new chief of staff was an Airforce officer, appeared that Alfonsin had aligned himself with the
Airforce in the interservice rivalry that has recent periods of parliamentary rule in the country the conditions of ruin created by the dictatorship and tradition in the Argentine military.
nine commanders in the galloping de-industrialization of the of April, the trial began of the country, as well as the slow fading of Peronism. The chief who ran the country from 1976 to 1982.
second article talks about the outlines of a new policy
The first days the trial of the commanders of the Latin American bourgeoisies, represented by showed clearly that the tactic of their lawyers is to prolong the trial as much as possible.
such a tactic presupposes that the government is not
Both articles were published in November 1984 interested in pressing for punishment and, therefore,
The first is from the magazine Praxis, the second from the generals chance of getting off depends on wearing out public opinion and the human rights movement.
Horacio TARCUS
The government of Raul Alfonsin, which took office on December 10, 1983, after seven years of military dictatorship, succeeded in making itself the focus of the attention and hopes of broad sections of the masses. In the election campaign and at the start of its administration, the
Radical (1) team showed considerable
But it came under strong pressures on the one hand from the counteroffensive of the army, the
Church, the local big bourgeoisie, and the imperialists and on the growing resistance of the working class, the human rights movement, and all sectare reducing the
Radical government's margin formaneuver, dissipating reformist and democratic illusions, and rapidly eroding the popularity that the new government initially enjoyed.
The economic policy of what was called the Process of National Reconstruction
(1976-1983) was outlined in the Martinez de Hoz Plan (he was the minister of the drastic redistribution of income at the cost of a nosedive in the real wages of workers and for the benefit of the bourgeoisie as a whole. Within the bourgeoisie, there was also a redistribution of the surplus value extracted from the workers to the advantage of the financial sector.
The social effects of this policy made it possible to reduce the concentration of the working class, to create a massive industrial reserve army, to increase the number of people working on an individ-
The objective was to carry through a deepgoing restructuration of the social relationships of production,
International Viewpoint 6 May 1985 finally took some generals,
In mida long In the fourth week the crisis, Alfonsin. Nuevo Curso. striking at the material bases of the political and trade-union strength of the political level, the financial suboligarchy, which knows that it cannot attain political power through a democratic process, organized a system with the following features: a powerful financial market, an economy dominated by the foreign exchange foreign debt, and a superconcentration of capital in which the state lost control of all the variables in the economy.
these factors put economic policy in the hands of a small supermonopolistic group and the creditors of the imperialist banks.
On the ideological level, this plan aimed to liquidate the policy of consensus, of adjustments among the "social partners," of social pacts under state mediation, of discussion about strategies of development. It went hand in hand with propagating the ideology of the self-regulating free
The balance sheet of this "Process" at the time the new government took office was as follows: The foreign debt had gone from 8 billion dollars in 1975 to 45 billion dollars in 1983. In the same share of Gross Domestic Product represented by from 45% to 25%. Industrial disinvestment had brought production in 1983 down to the level of 1970. unemployment had gone over 10% with two million workers expelled from pro-
The national budget deficit amounted to 15% of the Gross Domestic Product, whereas what is considered the maximum acceptable level is about 3%. The annual inflation from revolutionary Marxist
Unutilized productive capacity had reached an average level of 40%. The amount of Argentine capital abroad was estimated at about 25 to 35 billio
The loss in production over the eight years amounted to a value of 120
It was in this context that Alfonsin launched his election campaign and took
"growth, higher real wages, and payment of the debt." After a year of the new government running the country, the reformist, or "distributist" illusions have evaporated. The only thing that has happened is that payment has started on the national debt.
After almost a year of the Radical government, the real wages of workers have dropped. There has not been any revival in industry because credit is scarce or expensive, and, moreover, there has been no increase in demand. The interest rate is not going down because savings are going into dollar accounts (via the black market). The government does not want to increase credit to enterprises, because the latter, instead of contributing to the "revival" that is so much talked about, buy dollars, or speculate by lending money at high rates.
Inflation is rising, to the detriment of those who hold money but not goods
The term 'Radical" in Argentina refers to the classic bourgeois left party. Its golden age was the reign of the liberal caudillo Hipolito rigoyen in the 1920g. He was overthrown b: • military coup on September 6, 1930, whic initiated the long agony of parliamentarism in Argentina. 'Radicalism" in Argentina is thus identified with petty-bourgeois liberalism and constitutional rule Peronism on the other hand is what is called a Caesaro-populist current
Latin America. Peron was a high military officer who built his machine on the basis of the urban poor. - International Viewpoint.
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ARGENTINA
bearer of democracy, in opposition to the in accordance with political allegiances
(mainly wage earners) opening the way for price increases that eat up every nominal raise in wages. The rise of the dollar on the black market has not been stemmed, which would be essential to get the exporters to change their currency on the official market. When the difference is significant, they use such techniques as over- or under-billing, or put their hard-currency earnings in foreign banks.
The policy of periodic wage adjustment has been abandoned by the government. One of the top functionaries in the regime, Raul Prebisch, has termed it "inflationary." The timid price control policy has been dropped, under pressure of the bourgeoisie, who made this a condition for the "social accord" the government is calling for.
The wide political leeway government gained through the elections, its room for making decisions on the economic level has been reduced, as it has been squeezed between the pressures of imperialism, the local big bourgeoisie, and the resistance of the workers.
The imperialists have brought pressure to bear through the IMF and the foriegn banks, relying on the enormous weight of foreign debt in the Argentine economy. The native big bourgeoisie has brought pressure to bear through the economic mechanisms already mentioned (speculation, scarcity of goods, currency flight, etc.).
Political pressure has been applied through the employers' organizations (criticism of the government for price control, conditions for "social accord," etc.). It is impossible to end the super-profits to which the monopolies, the land owning oligarchy, and financial capital have become accustomed in order to transter resources, as promised, to the productive sector and to wage earners in the political and social framework outlined by Alfonsin.
The hundreds of thousands of workers who have entered into conflicts for wage demands have shown that the government cannot control the only variable that remained in its hands, that is, the wage earners. That points up the importance of Alfonsin's policy toward the unions.
On the economic level, the government's formal power has proved impotent against the real power of the big bourgeoisie and the imperialists. Similarly, on the trade-union level, all that the new government achieved in terms of political consensus in the elections has run up against the fact that the working class continues to identify mainly with Peronism. And this is reflected in the large measure of economic and political power wielded by the Peronist union bureacracy. But while the government has not waged any battle against the power of finance capital, in recent months it has launched a major offensive against "trade-union power."
Alfonsin's offensive against the Peronist unions in reality flows from his election campaign. He adopted the skillful tactic of presenting himself as the standard20 special interests that were supposed to be the source of power of all authoritarian regimes, in particular the unions. cracy versus authoritarianism - that was the axis of the campaign that brought victory for the Radical candidate.
other counterpositions Radicalism versus Peronism, trade-union pluralism versus the Peronist unionists. But underneath this democratic window dressing, what was Alfonsin's real policy toward the unions?
The new president and a section of the bourgeoisie understood that the control of the workers by a bureaucracy that had concentrated great economic and political power in its hands and which supported the main opposition party - the Social
- could impose very high political costs on the Radical administAlfonsin's union policy
The Radicals' tactic was to try to breach the total domination of the Peronist union leadership by using the "labor statesman" wing (that is, the section of the Peronist bureaucracy most inclined to collaborate with the incumbent government). By this means, it sought to force the Peronist union leadership to negotiate on a basis favorable to it.
Demonstrating political initiative, the Radical team appeared as an alternative for the bourgeoisie as a whole, enabling it to win by political methods where the dictatorship had failed with repressive ones. It should be remembered that the dictatorship believed at the outset that it could settle accounts with the unions by physically liquidating the union activists and outlawing any single national trade-union organization.
Alfonsin's tactic, in which the bill he presented for "restoring order" in the union movement was only one aspect, called for assaults on three fronts:
- Trade-union unity. He sought to replace the traditional idea of a single national confederation of labor with the concept of "European-style" unionism, with several confederations, divided on a
So, new trade-union groups were formed around the new government outside of the leadership of the CGT (which is Peronist). The government claimed that they were "representative" and gave them a place at the negotiating table, along with the CGT, which was declared to be nonrepresentative.
- The economic power of the unions. A scheme was introduced for decentralization of the National Welfare Institute (INOS) and for state and employer interference into the welfare funds of the
- The political power of the unions. The government sought to speed up the depoliticization of the unions by a law making it illegal for them to engage in political activity. The contradiction between dividing up the union movement and depoliticizing the unions indicates that when the bourgeoisie bans political activity, in reality, it is imposing its own political monopoly.
The methods adopted by the Alfonsin team to mount its attacks on these three fronts were the following:
- With respect to wages, facing a proliferation of conflicts, the government decided to impose wage increases by decree and to freeze negotiations between the bosses and the unions. The bosses were dead set against this.
- With respect to the labor movement, it presented a trade-union bill, intervened in many unions, and promoted the formation of trade-union organizations that were under its thumb.
The Peronists resisted Alfonsin's policy for the trade unions from the start. On the other hand, they did not fight to defend wages or against the freeze on collective bargaining. Alfonsin's policy was based on the bourgeoisie's distrust of the Peronist union bureaucracy, which it is not prepared to accept as its labor lieutenant.
However, major sections of the bourgeoisie, as indicated in the editorials of the newspapers Clarin and La Nacion, while not abandoning their distrust of the Peronist bureaucracy, have expressed fears about "the new situation that could come out of the union elections, because in the absence of a unanimous view on all these problems the more radical sectors could exert pressures." (La Nacion, January 28, 1984.)
The denouement was, thus, predictable. The Peronists, supported by other political forces, managed to defeat the bill on restoring order in the unions. The rejection of this bill was followed by the fall of Mucci, the minister of labor, and by the slow death agony of the new trade-union groups (the National Movement for Trade Union Renewal, the Assembly of Argentine Industrial Unions, the National
With the political initiative it still held, the government made a 180 degree turn. It appointed a new minister of labor, Casella, who undertook negotiations with the Peronist bureaucracy, and together with it drew up a new trade-union bill, called the "Emergency Law," which left the levers of the electoral process in the unions in the hands of the bureaucracy.
The Alfonsin administration knows that today the Peronist union bureaucracy is playing an irreplacable role in the Argentine state apparatus and in the framework of political relations with labor. It is through negotiations between the CGT and the Argentine Union of Industrialists (the employers' association) and the employers as a whole that the government can hope to put the workers movement to sleep during the recession touched off by the negotiations with the
Given the extent of the economic crisis and the pressures brought to bear by the various social forces, it has been clear since May at least that the govern-
International Viewpoint 6 May 1985
ment wants to rally around itself the largest possible front of political and social forces in order to manage the crisis. From the end of May to the beginning of June, a lot of moves were made in pursuance of this aim.
Alfonsin seemed to be trying to build a bridge to the military command. He made an aggreement with the unions in the negotiations over the electoral code organized a political dialogue between the ruling Radical Party, the Social Justice Party, the Movement for Integration and Development of Arturo Frondizi (who was president of the country from 1958 to 1962), and other forces of lesser import-
It led to the signing of a memorandum of compromise between parties and the Radical Party. this memorandum had clear limits.
agreement with movement, the fundamental objective of move, was extremely fragile, given the crisis of the Social Justice Party's authority revealed by the referendum on the Beagle Canal Treaty. (2) other hand, the points of agreement were quite superficial, barely touching the big
The comparison that the government tried to make with the Moncloa Pacts in Spain was obviously ludicrous. In Spain, there was a concrete economic plan, with collaboration between the companies and the workers organiz-
Understanding the limitations of the agreement that was reached, the government launched an appeal for social accord state as soon as Alfonsin returned from his trip to Spain. But the government's road to "social harmony" was to prove a bumpy one. Pressures from the right and the left forced it to put off concluding such an accord. The union elections
To negotiate, the big bourgeoisie demanded "guarantees against wage demands," "lifting of price controls," a fight against inflation" (meaning wage cuts), and "the creation of conditions so that businessmen (sic) can find a framework and incentive for investment" (that is, maintaining the superprivileges of a parasitic bourgeoisie used to state subsidies, speculative credit, etc.). On top of these conditions, a section of the employers did not want to negotiate until it had seen the results of the union elections.
For its part, the union bureaucracy, while it had repeatedly proclaimed that its function was to negotiate, came under pressure from a considerable number of conflicts. Although these battles were for limited demands, they went as far as some very determined actions, such as factory occupations and big mobilizations. In the context of these conflicts and facing the union elections on top of this, no section of the bureaucracy could "negotiate" a wage freeze in the name of "sacrifice for the nation." International Viewpoint 6 May 1985
In the midst of these conflicts, CGT had the plenary meeting of leadership on August 29, in the course of which the confederation leaders beaten. The meeting forced them to call a general strike for September 3.
The general strike defined the limits of "social harmony." On the one hand, it was a protest of the wage earners as a whole against the bosses and the governtest of strength between the government and the union bureaucracy, although this remained in the framework of partnership." As for the workers' response to the strike call, a great deal could not have been expected, considering that after much hesitation the call was suddenly issued for a Monday without the action having been prepared for by mobilizations and rank-and-file assemblies. no instruments had been built for controlling the strike, such as strike pickets. Nonetheless, on the day the average rate of absenteeism in the country exceeded 50%, with the highest rates in the industrial belt of Greater Buenos Aires and in the main industrial centers in the interior, such as Cordoba and Mendoza.
The elections were finally set for the last week in September. period between the time it took office and that date, the government's credibility had been severely eroded. Its "hardline" wing, which had waged the first stage of the struggle against the Peronist bureaucracy, felt betrayed. In the tests taking place, the government could only offer an element of legitimacy to one section the Peronist bureaucracy in opposition to
The union bureaucracy itself went into the elections deeply divided, even though it was formally united in the same CGT. (3) On the one hand, there were the 62 Organizations, led by the metalworkers' union leader, Lorenzo Miguel, which had been linked to the far-right paramilitary groups under Isabel Peron's government and were implicated in the militarization of the state. On the other, there was the Group of the 25, representing the "tough" wing of the Peronist bureaucracy that had resisted the dictatorship
Besides these two currents, there were other groupings, including the one called "Management and Labor, " which represented the section of the bureaucracy that was for "negotiations" with the military. There was also the Group of Twenty, another wing of the Peronist bureaucracy that had collaborated with the military and been the last section of the bureaucracy to be integrated into the united
In addition, there were the "militant" dissident Peronists (Guillan, Alari, Baez, etc.); the Trade-Union Plenum led by Andres Framini, a veteran left bureaucrat bases himself on sections of the Peronist left. And, finally, there were the groupings linked to the government, in the National Movement Trade-Union Renewal (MNRS), which has some weight in tertiary sectors.
In this panorama, there was clearly a missing element - class-struggle tra unionism, which has a long tradition Argentina. It has to be remembered the workers vanguard was decapitate the process of repression that starte 1973-74 under the Peronist governm and reached its height under the re of terror that ruled after 1976. why rebuilding an antibureaucratic antiboss opposition is not seen as option by the working class in genera The state of the class-struggle forces
Nonetheless, the "third slates" (form ed on a class-struggle line) did offer, it not a clear promise of future victory, at least a road and a stimulus to struggle an organization for the workers, where the could be put forward despite the elector law, the bureaucracy's control and threa
For example, in the engineering un (SMATA), represented a coalition of militant class struggle forces, stood against the slates put forward by the bureaucrats - the Green Slate (the 25 Organizations) and the Blue and White Slate (the 62 Organ izations). In the energy workers feder ation, the Sky-blue Slate, supported by left Peronist and class-struggle forces opposed the Maroon Slate ("Managemen/ and Labor"), the Green Slate (militan Peronists, Radicals and Intransigent Rad icals), and other slates.
the printing industry, an anti-bureaucratic Green Slate, representing class-struggle forces and left Peronists, opposed the Blue Slate (the 62 Organizand the Violet Slate (the Organizations, the CP, and the MNRS). In the hospital workers union, the Orange Slate (class-struggle forces, left Peronists, etc.) went forward against the official Blue Slate (62 Organizations, etc.).
In other major sectors, however, such as the textile workers (AOT) or the metalworkers (UOM) there was no anti-bureaucratic opposition on the national level to the candidates of the 62 Organizations, Casildo Herreras for the textile workers and Lorenzo Miguel for the
All indications are that the elections underway will result in a relative decline for the 62 Organizations, a strengthening of the 25 Organizations, and that class-struggle antibureaucratic forces will make a showing in some industries and may even win in a few (hospitals and printing), thereby creating an underpinning for the
The Beagle Canal in the south of Tierra del Fuego has been the focus of a territorial dispute between Argentina and Chile since the last century. Called upon to be a mediator, Pope JohnPaul II gave his judgement on December 12, 1980. Immediately accepted by Chile, this opinion formed the basis of an agreement between the two countries that was signed on October 22, 1984 It was submitted to referendum on November 25. The official position of the Peronist party was for a boycott. but the result of the election was a real slap in the face for this party's leaders and a victory for Alfonsin. In fact, 70% of the voters took part, and the treaty was ratified by a vote of 81.13% for and 17.24% against.
During the period of military dictatorship. there were two rival CTs. - IV.
21
process of recomposition already underway in the Argentine workers movement.
We have pointed out above the underlying implications of the "democracy versus authoritarianism" theme that Alfonsin pushed in the election campaign. The Radical leader identified himself with basic human rights in opposition to the dictatorship that systematically violated them and the Peronists that appeared to be making deals with it. In this way, the Alfonsin team managed to create the feeling that it was the only possible choice capitalizing on the extensive struggle waged by the movement for human rights.
Alfonsin promised "the truth and justice," the punishment of those responsible for the slaughter, democratization of the armed forces. But after a year of the Radical administration, none of these modest pledges regarding human rights has been kept. The political prisoners have not yet all been released. The question of the "missing persons" has not yet been resolved. The new government has offered only some vague responses, such as "there are no clandestine prisons,' "there are no missing persons still alive. The kidnapped children have not been returned to their homes. The repressive apparatus has not been dismantled. The joint congressional investigating committee to look into the crimes of the military dictatorship called for by the human rights organizations has not been set up.
On the other hand, a lot of judges who served under the dictatorship have been reconfirmed in their posts. Officers implicated in the repression have been promoted. A reform of the military code has been approved that maintains. the military tibunals. And so on.
However, this record of broken pledges is not seen so clearly by the population as a whole, because at the same time the government has taken a series of steps enabling it to gain time and wear out the human rights movement. By decree, it created a National Commission on Missing Persons (CONADEP). This operation had two real objectives.
In the first place, the creation of CONADEP was a delaying maneuver to investigate "what has already been investigated" as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo said. (4)
Secondly, the creation of this body was an attempt to shift the center of gravity of the fight for human rights, to move it away from the representative organizations (which the government today claims are "interested parties" that therefore cannot be judges at the same time) to a group of "notables" (writers, journalists, scholarly figures) convoked by the executive branch of government. After making its report, CONADEP is to dissolve.
The government has designated one of its members to head the Secretariat of Human Rights under the Ministry of the Interior. This was the finishing touch to Alfonsin's strategy. The struggle is to be diverted away from a political movement for human rights to a "neutral" com22 mission appointed by the state, and will finally be taken over by the state itself.
Today, the movement for human rights has entered a deep crisis, which is manifested in the following ways:
- The clear enemy, the dictatorship has disappeared, making way for a constitutional government. Broad sections that yesterday mobilized against dietatorship see no reason to continue the
"under a democracy," or else they think that to demand "too much" could provoke the threat of a coup.
The mobilizations that reached 40,000 persons under the dictatorship are gradually declining.
- The movement for human rights is beginning to fragment. nent Assembly for Human Rights and the Ecumenical Movement have gone into the CONADEP, while the other organizations have refused to do so. The Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo did not participate in the march held to mark the submission of the CONADEP's report on September
- The same division has occurred on other occasions, such as at the September 13 march of 3,000 persons whose theme was "the fatherland of the financiers and the military - the same repression." Not taking part were the Mothers and Grandde Mayo, the Families of Those Imprisoned and "Missing" for Political Reasons, the Center for Legal and Social Studies, and the Service for Peace and Justice, named after Adolfo
Esquivel, a Nobel Peace Prize
Another diversion is the trial the government is setting up for members of the three military juntas that ruled the country which is supposed to try the "big responsible for the That is what the Argentine bourgeoisie's cynical judicial system calls crimes against
They are going to sacrifice a few big fish to keep inquiries and punishments from extending to the broad layer that organized the state terror under the cover of the so-called National Security
However, in accordance with reformed military code, primary jurisdiction for trying the chiefs of the three juntas remains in the hands of the military tribunals. Giving its answer to the 70,000 people who mobilized to back the CONADEP on September 20, and in an attempt to defuse the explosive character of the Sabato Report (named after the chairperson of the CONADEP), which went much further than government thought it would, the Sup-
Armed Forces declared that the officers tried were
Since then, the counteroffensive of the military, the far-right groups, and hackward sectors of the Church has continued unabated. In a mass at which the officers implicated in the repression gathered, the officiating priest called for a taking up of "material and spiritual arms against pornographic democracy."
The Council of Bishops has issued a
A workers' house on the outskirts of Buenos Aires (DR) document decrying the "advances of pornography" and what it considers miserly subsidies for the religious schools.
In the Rosarion courts, parapolice groups have stolen documents concerning the human rights movement. These same groups have seized arms and money and kidnapped political activists, threatening them and beating them up.
In the face of this counteroffensive, the human rights movement is caught in a certain impasse. It needs to restructure itself politically and reorganize in order to regain the initiative. Its crisis is not yet irremediable, and the bulk of its program remains to be realized. But in order to overcome this crisis, the movement has to rebuild its unity, rebuild a united front for struggle and mobilization, and politicize to the highest possible extent its program and methods of action.
movement has to present itself not just as a movement of mothers and relatives of people who disappeared under the dictatorship but as a force fighting for all human and democratic rights. It has to try to link itself to, and root itself in, all of civil society through initiatives like the September 13 march or by promoting bodies such as the new Workers Commission for Human Rights.
Consistent struggle by the masses for their democratic demands (punishment of those responsible for the crimes of the dictatorship, dismantling the repressive trade-union rights) and their anti-imperialist demands (non-payment of the foreign debt, a break with the IMF) comes every day into more open and concrete contradiction with the very bases of the bourgeois system, even of its more "modernist" and "democratic
Only independent struggle and organization by the proletariat and the exploited masses as a whole can fully consolidate such national democratic gains, and thereby it will open the stage of the socialist revolution.
The mothers of "missing persons" demonstrated regularly during the dictatorship by silent vigils in the Plaza de Mayo. IV.
International Viewpoint 6 May 1985