A French May 1968
"Khartoum has gotten its voice back, after the fall of a after the fall of another long-lived dictatorship that
16-year-old autocratic regime, brought down by the had become rotted pressure of the people in the streets and by the milit- toppled in April 1975.
ary hierarchy turning against its supreme commander. "Inside the University Staff Club are big banners,
"This is our May 1968, I was told by a Sudanese in the bulletin boards, and a loud speaker broadcasts frequemt
Staff Club of the University of Khartoum, which had announcements interspersed with music. The Club now been made the headquarters of the trade-union has become the center of the political effervescence in coordinating committee that precipitated Numeiri's the Sudanese capital. Its big garden is constantly filled with groups of Sudanese reflecting the human diversity
That is what Pierre Haski, special correspondent for of the biggest country in Africa - from Muslim north
Liberation, wrote from the Sudanese capital in the erners in turbans and flowing white robes to ebony-
April 15 issue of the Paris daily. His description of the Black southerners in Western suits.
femininet go ite sit lation at opened up in Portugal graphed bulletins that are proliferating. small groups, exchanging information and the mimeo-
SUDAN Gerry FOLEY
Haski went on to say: "In less than two weeks, the events in Sudan have accelerated at a dizzy pace. What is now being called 'the revolution' and not a coup d'etat caught everyone by surprise. Eight days after the change of government, trade-union and political structures are still being set up in the euphoria of freedom regained. Some 28 parties have already made their appearance."
In the April 23 Le Monde, this Paris daily's chief Middle East correspondent, Eric Rouleau, termed the political process opened up by the "creeping revolution."
"Freedom is also the disappearance of the informers who had haunted the streets and public places. people do not lower their voices to criticize one or another general in the transitional military council that took power on April 6 'in the name of the people.' Willingly or unwillingly, General Dahab's junta has dismantled the redoubtable 'security apparatuses' - the veritable parallel army maintained by Marshal Numeiri, and arrested all their officers, in all more than 400, about 3,000 operatives. The 30,000 to 40,000 police informers are no longer plying their
Rouleau noted another feature of the new situation, an atmosphere of order without repression based on a feeling of great hopes and solidarity people: "The most remarkable thing is that the vacuum of power is not giving rise to disturbances of anarchy ... The parties and which every day assemble 5,000 to 10,000, and sometimes 20,000 people, proceed without incident."
The same atmosphere was notable, for example, in the Catholic Northern Ireland after the rebellions of International Viewpoint 6 May 1985 on the Nile?
August 1960 and in Portugal after the fall of the dictatorship in 1975. There were also periods like that in the course of the Iranian revolution, but they were brief and tentative because of the effective control of the mass movement by the Shiite clergy led by Ayatollah Khomeini.
Islamic fundamentalists, in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, are also strong in the Sudan. In particular, they have the only strong and well-financed organization in the country now and could gain contro of a decisive section of the masses. But that is still far from a foregone conclusion. The political-religious forces in the Sudan are much more divided than they were in
The historical political-religious factions are the Ansars, whose origins are in
Shiite movement; and the Khatmia, who
For historical reasons, the Khatmia have been associated with Egypt, as a center of Muslim orthodoxy, and the Ansars, in reaction against this, have been Sudanese particularists.
The head of the new junta, General Sewar Ad-Dahab, is aligned with the Khatmia and apparently well regarded by the Egyptian government. The political expression of the Ansars in the Uma [Community of Believers] party and that of the Khatmia is the Democratic Unionist Party. Both groups are in the Front of National Forces for Civic Salvation, the main political center of the movement that ousted Numeiri.
The Muslim Brotherhood is a relatively new but powerful force in the Sudan. It stands on the orthodox Sunni side of Islam, with links to the Saudis. It is not in the Front. So far, the Muslim Brotherhood seems to have been able to enjoy the advantages both of being part of the establishment and part of the opposition.
In Liberation of April 17, Pierre Haski wrote: "The superiority of the Muslim Brothers over their rivals is not owing through before finally They discuss in just to the freedom of movement they gained under Numeiri, financial empire they established. Facing the University Club, the center of the alliance of parties and unions [i.e., the Front of National Forces] stands a building that seems a direct affront to
"secular' or modernist Muslims. It is the Faisal Islamic Bank founded in with 60% Saudi and Kuwaiti capital, and which functions in accordance with the Sharia [Islamic law], that is, without interest.
"Since its creation, the Faisal Bank, which has many branches in the country, has multiplied its assets tenfold. invested in insurance, import-export, and Islamic principles dear to the hearts of the Muslim Brothers, and which indirectly brings them comfortable dividends."
The ousted dictator turned to the Islamic fundamentalists in 1983, apparently as the last possible base of popular support for his regime. the Sharia and applied it in the most barbaric way, making mutilations and whipping common punishments. In fact, in so doing, he alienated the doctors union, which played a leading role in calling the April 3 general strike that struck the death knell of his regime. The doctors refused to carry out the amputations of hands and feet decreed under the authority of the Sharia.
The dictator claimed to have undergone a dramatic religious experience, a vision. In fact, his turn to religion coincided with a levitation into megalomania. He declared himself "Imam," and was not content only to be the supreme guide of the faithful. He also wanted to take over the training of Khartoum's El-Hilal football team, according to Der Spiegel of
The West German weekly mag. azine tried to build a case, indeed, that Washington and Cairo had had the wisdom
and foresight to plan a timely removal of a dictator who was starting to act very strangely indeed.
General Ad-Dahab does seem to have very desirable characteristics, from the standpoint of Washington and Cairo, to replace Numeiri. He is, by all accounts, a disciplined Western-trained professional officer and a friend of the Egyptian regime.
In an editorial in Liberation of April 8, Jean-Louis Peninou wrote that when US vice president Bush visited Khartoum on March 5-6, he gave Numeiri three orders: "(1) to turn the command of the army over to Ad-Dahab; (2) to fire his Muslim Brother advisers; (3) to eliminate the subsidies on essential foods, as demanded by the IMF."
On March 10, Numeiri denounced a Muslim Brother plot, and 150 members of the group were arrested, including Hassan El-Tourabi, who had been his minister of foreign affairs. On the other hand, the Muslim Brothers could be expected to be a difficult ally, as dramatic experience has impressed on the Egyptian regime, which also relied on them for a
According to Hassan El-Tourabi, who has reemerged as the main leader of the Muslim Brothers,
UAAC no rivals for spiritual authority.
However, the scenario of Washington and Cairo getting together to oust a dictator who was starting to look too wild in the eye is hardly credible. Madness is the professional disease of despots of all sorts, and Washington has lived a long time in apparent contentment with demented hangmen. It has only been when their madness has gone to the point that they thought they could doublecross the US that Washington has considered them non compos mentis, as in the case of the former Dominican dictator, Trujillo.
Numeiri's alienating of the southern non-Muslim population in 1983 by ending their autonomy, moreover, was not necessarily a sign of megalomania as such. This sort of thing is typical of a hardening dictatorship in nationally divided states. The populist regime in Iraq in the 1960s also turned against the Kurds as it moved rightward. The reason for this is that national autonomy is an obstacle to the imposition of an effective dictatorship.
In fact, the Numeiri regime was one of the pillars of US influence in the Middle East and in East Africa. Moreover, it was the first to be overthrown as a result of mass protests against the imposition of IMF dictatorships. This must certainly have come as a shock to Washington, after the revolts against IMF-dictated austerity in the Dominican Republic, Tunisia and Morocco.
The mass explosion in Khartoum is also the first time since the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions that a pro-Western dictatorship has been overthrown by the urban masses of an underdeveloped country. Moreover, unlike Iran, this was also an upsurge led by a trade-union movement in which there has been major Communist Party influence.
4
The Sudan is precisely the country in the Middle East where a Communist Party has played the biggest role. In fact, Numeiri originally came to power in alliance with the Communist Party, just as the present regime seems to be seeking the good will of the Communist Party, the Soviet Union, and Libya. Moreover, neither Washington nor Cairo seem unhappy with this. They undoubtedly know the new regime needs this support to stabilize itself, as Numeiri himself originally did. Once he got through the rough patch, he turned on his CP allies and slaughtered them.
Despite his Western training and sympathies, Ad-Dahab has had no difficulty adopting populist language. In an interview published in the April 22 Der Spiegel, he said: "I did not overthrow him [Numeiri]. The people did. When it became clear that the people could no longer live with Numeiri ... as a citizen as a commander of the 'Armed Forces of the People,' as our army is called, my highest duty was to respect the will of the Why the army moved
In fact, the sequence of events that led to the army dumping Numeiri is clear enough. On March 27-28 spontaneous protests broke out against the removal of
The repressive forces fired on the crowds, killing eight demonstrators. Many more were wounded. The doctors launched a protest against the illtreatment of victims in the hospitals. Then work stoppages began. Next the unions, led by the white collar ones such as the lawyers, doctors and professors, called for a strike.
On April 3, the general strike in Khartoum called by the unions was 80% effective, according to Liberation. On April 5, the government rescinded the price rises on basic foods. On April 6, the
In Liberation of April 15, Haski quoted a union leader who, he said, "admitted being relieved to learn of the coup," as saying, , "If the officers had not taken control, the population of Khartdetermined to go into streets on Saturday [April 6] to get rid of this regime, no matter what the cost."
The first reports of the situation inside the country since the revolution indicate that two political blocs have emerged, including both parties and unions. is the Front of National Forces for Civic Salvation, and the other is the Muslim Brotherhood and the unions it influences.
"Behind the formation of the initial transition government to be chosen, Haski wrote in the April 15 Liberation, "the dividing line is shaping up for the future political battles in the Sudan ... A few kilometers from the University Staff Club . is the headquarters of a trade-union coordinating group rival to the first (i.e., the Front of National Forces for
Civic Salvation, which sits in the Staff Club)."
The chairperson of this rival formation, the Group for Trade-Union Independence, Munir El-Hakim, according to Haski, described the Front of National Forces as "limited to a certain color, leftist and Communist."
Liberation's correspondent noted that 69 unions, including a very large peasant union, were affiliated to the bloc headed by El-Hakim, behind which "can be seen the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood."
On the question of the transitional government, Haski quoted El-Hakim as
"We have refused to nominate people for the government, but we will express our opinions about those chosen. We will not hesitate to say that this person is a leftist or linked to such and such
This position, Haski wrote, "follows the same lines as Hassan El Tourabi, who engages in dialogue with the military government but is careful to keep his distance from it, preferring no doubt to save himself for future battles."
The first battle the Muslim Brothers seem to be preparing for is over the Sharia. Tourabi has called for a "front in defense of the Sharia." This issue is a larger one than secular democratic rights in the Muslim areas. It was the "Islamization" of the state that was one of the main grievances leading the non-Muslim southerners to renew armed struggle against Khartoum. And there is a long experience to show, especially in recent years in Africa, that if the new government tries to continue the war to suppress a large national minority, it will very quickly turn to repression on all fronts.
The tactic of the Muslim Brotherhood may well be to let a weak bourgeois government under military tutelage discredit itself, while it uses its organization sses. The combination of a stance of intransigence plus building up a communalist base and organization has proved effective for Muslim fundamentalist forces in both Leban-
The stance of the Muslim Brothers makes still more clear the dangers that can arise if the Communist Party, still the major left force, again plays into the hands of bourgeois politicians and officers who remain fundamentally reactionary despite their professions of populism the disastrous situation now, no bourgeois populist government is going to do much either to increase the national independence of the Sudanese state or to alleviate
The political opening in the Sudan will, therefore, probably not last long before there is a decisive confrontation. The debate and experience on the left in this period, however, will be very important. Among other things, it is likely to influence the socialist and workers movement and the movements of national liberation in the Middle East, especially the Arabic-speaking countries, for a long time. •
International Viewpoint 6 May 1985