For many revolutionaries in Latin America, the mass movement is everything and the overall objectives, nothing. That is why we have committed so many errors. In the Dominican Republic, we too have known difficult times because we wanted to give into spontaneism and improvised solutions. We came to the conclusion that it was impossible to act politically on this basis. Of course this reflects a certain political maturity. But the most important thing is that we have succeeded in building an organisation of revolutionaries and in linking that through the umbilical cord of great tactical and strategic capacity to the workers and peasants movement and to the masses in general. The intermingling of the mass movement and the movement of the politically aware has brought about a strengthening of both the mass movement and the revolutionary movement itself, in such a way that it is now impossible for one to develop without the e other. This interrelationship has made it possible to achieve unity between the mass movement and the revolutionary movement..
The FID is not merely the sum of the political groups which form a part of it. Dozens and dozens of people who were not members of political organisations have joined the FID. That is why the FID cannot simply behave as if it were a grouping of different organisations any more.
Q. In April 1984, the Dominican Republic saw a huge wave of social unrest. The popular masses came out onto the streets to protest against the IMF plan being implemented by the government. What role did the FID play in the political direction of this movement of popular protest?
A. At that time the FID had not reached the degree of coordina tion and development that it has today. Nevertheless from January to March 1984, we were able to initiate broad mobilisations across the country. The denunciation of government policies and the mobilisations against the IME agreements created the basis for the people's reaction in April 1984. course this reaction was spontaneous but, it was origina organised and decided on by the tical leadership of the FID. At point the FID was not convinced this movement, which had begun the localities, would have a nation character. It is in this sense that can talk about a spontaneous movement, without negating the existence of a political leadership of that movement.
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views of its members into of dozens of our comrades in April
The two elements were both present.
During this "popular insurrection', fought with stones, the Dominican people did not fire one single shot. The Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) government, however ordered the repression which resulted in more than one hundred deaths, five hundred wounded and 5,000 in prison. For the government this did not appear to matter, since on April 26, 1984, the president congratulated the guard and the police on radio and television, for their 'exemplary' conduct.
The events of April 1984 created a new situation in the country. The relations between the classes were greatly changed. The people began to realise that they could not continue to live as they had been. This is what so totally changed the Dominican political scene. From now on was created what we called a pre-revolutionary situation.
The crisis of the regime is very acute and even conservative elements, like, for example, the Catholic Church, are searching for a solution which could social tensions. At the moment the Catholic Church is acting as a mediator between the different right wing organisations, so that in the 1986 elections, if they take place, the right can present a united candidature.
The other objective which the right and the Church are pursuing is the signing of a pact between the main union confederations, the government and the bosses. Their intentions certainly don't lead them to hide the reactionary nature of this pact. It is reactionary in the first place because the majority of the Dominican people are not included in it. Roughly 32% of the active population is unemployed with 58% either unemployed or underemployed. All these people are ignored by the right wing who are only interested in an agreement with the minority, to the detriment of the majority. So, even if they get a pact which means adjusting wage levels, that will not significantly alter the position in society of the vast mass of the Dominican people, and still less will it alter the economic situation. Moreover, no selfrespecting union confederation, which 14 takes the account could sign such an agreement. It is impossible to reach agreement between the bosses, the unions and the government today because the contradictions in society are too sharp. The forces of reaction are trying, therefore - not to prevent a social explosion, but postpone it, in order to use the extra time to pull off some other manoeuvre.
What were organisational lessons for the FID of the April 1984 events?
Our view is that the revolutionary movement was not, unfortunately ready for an insurrection, and that was painful for us. We came across thousands of people in the town quarters country areas who had decided to transform this protesta, which was originally organised to protest against hunger and would do away with the representatives imperialism and with the Creole reaction. But we were not sufficiently prepared and that is the main lesson we have to draw from this situation.
It is not a matter of complaining about this state of affairs but of being aware of the real problems posed. Up until then we had been talking about revolution as something abstract, as if it was just a simple theory. We did not realise in talking about revolution that the reality meant so much more than we had been able to speak about. And everything that we had said until then were merely absurdities or exaggerations in comparison with the responsibility with which we were faced. With all our faults we are the only ones who can take that responsibility. When we saw that the moment had come but that we were not ready to confront the situation, we realised then that this is the worst predicament that can ever present itself to a revolutionary.
Nevertheless, we were able to draw our experiences together. We knew how to pick ourselves up after the fall. We were able to go through that defeat, recover from it and go forward again. That is why we do not see the death
1984 as representing a defeat, but as an important political lesson. We realised that we could not cease to assume the historic responsibility which I mentioned before. That is why we were able to make progress as a result. There is no doubt that another spontaneous outbreak like that which coccured in April 1984, is impossible. But so that no one has any doubt about the new situation that we are helping to create; it will be one of massive confrontations!
The editor of the Santo Domingo newspaper Listin Diario, recently looked into the influence of revolutionaries in the protesta on February 11, He was speculating as to why big business in Santo Domingo and the rich property owners of the Conde Street, of Duarte Avenue, of March 30 Avenue, who certainly did supported such What happened, and what this gentleman cannot understand, is that this was a new situation and everyone wanted to get a look in, even the guards and the police. We are no longer merely the little group of young hotheads they used to being young, because we are all over 35 years old and politically, we have matured and that is the most crucial thing
The February 11, 1985 strike was the result of this development. We organised a general strike, prepared through partial, local, regional and sectoral strikes. Our immediate aim now is to prepare for a second general strike, of greater social scope. We don't want to organise another 24-hour strike, but a much longer strike. Our aim is to draw the protesta movement together at the national level in order to gradually convince the people that the future lies in their hands. From this point of view, the Dominican Republic is not like other countries in Latin America. For example, in Bolivia, we saw a general strike which lasted more than one week. If such a strike had taken place in the Dominican Republic the government could not have continued to hold on to power. No government could survive such a strike, because the Dominican people would not be content just to go on strike. They would be out in streets to settle accounts and get justice.
Q.- The establishment of the FID has had consequences for other political forces who exercised or are still exercising an influence among the popular masses. What orientation did the FID adopt in order to win over the popular masses who were still under the influence of these bourgeois formations?
A. We see an important role of the National Coordination of the masses which is in the process of being set up. With 300 organisations at the national level and an implantation in the ten main provinces in the country, this organisation will not simply group the left together.
International Viewpoint 29 July 1985
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Oligarchy or the IMF:, which is worst? In fact, the majority of people who make up the organisations of the Coordination are not left-wing. In the provinces where provincial coordinations are in existence there are Christian organisations or organisations influenced by the 'official current participating. (3) Such ideological influences still have a hold, but on the political level the masses feel increasingly represented by the FID. On the ideological level we are conducting a campaign amongst the population, in which we are trying to convince them that their future and their destiny is in their own hands.
Class differences have widened and this has provoked indignation among the people which is pushing them to act. I do not want to imply by this that all the masses are under FID influence. We are conducting a campaign to change the way people think and we hope we can win out in the short term.
Q. The mass mobilisations of January 1985 put the FID to the test. What balance sheet would you draw of these activities?
A. On this subject we published a text called "A balance sheet for action.' In fact, it is more than a balance sheet because it defines the political orientation we intend to follow in the future. The mobilisations at the beginning of 1985 were a success. They represented the response of the Dominican people to anti-working class policies.
On January 28, the partial work stoppages began. The government gave the order for repressive measures, International Viewpoint 29 July 1985 thinking that the events of April 1984 were about to repeat themselves. But we were not about to do anything foolhardy. Of course we wanted to lead the people to take power, but we were not going to do so on January 28.
We wanted to articulate our protesta, to strengthen our degree of organisation and build on a series of elements which existed to approach the decisive moment of the seizure of power. That is why, when the government sent into the streets, we replied through work stop. pages. The troops couldn't find anyone to fight because they had been sent to fight people who were not even in the streets. The work stoppages and mobilisations ended in a 24-hour strike on February 11. This was an important political event.
It is difficult to paralyse 90 to 95% of the economic activity of a country. But in Santo Domingo, trade and industry ceased to function. Even the tourists, who before the strike were ensconced in hotels, now deserted. The JanuaryFebruary mobilisations were a shot across the bows from the Dominican people, announcing the beginning of a long period of struggle against their oppressors
The first task now is to take forward the mass struggle against the IMF, and in order to conduct it successfully, we must have a precise orientation. The next goal is another national strike, much longer and more broad in scope than the previous one. This action should bring in new social layers who became involved in the recent strikes. Partial, even local,
For sectoral strikes can serve prepare the second national strike, so that it can be more widely taken up and can last longer.
At the level of demands, we need to expropriation or on state control of finance capital and not the of capital. Today that means nationalisation of the banking system and control of currency. All the popular should join the National Coordination of the masses. Organisations should be established at the base of this Coordination at municipal, regional and national level. Finally, we are aiming to take up this mobilisation within the framework of a process of accumulation
The radicalisation of the popular movements in the Dominican Republic is
But twice now you have described the pre-revolutionary character the current situation. Could tell us what aspects of the situation have led to this characterisation on the part of the FID?
There are several factors involved. The most important are those which we have insisted on throughout this interview, that is to say the progress that has been made in coordinating and organising the masses as well as the influence that the FID has gained. But there is also something else. The dominant groups, for example, the party in power, the PRD - have been deeply discredited in the eyes of the masses and the other upholders of the system are in an even more lamentable state. This is a political aspect of great significance and that is why the Church is intervening as mediator, without being able to get an agreement between the different political formations of the regime. They are hoping that we will be content with an electoral contest with the right. This is the trap that they think we will fall into. The FID has not yet diseussed this question. But we would prefer not to have to discuss it at all, our most cherished wish being that the final confrontation will take place before that date. But if this confrontation does not come and we are forced to discuss the election issue, we will do it later. For the moment, this discussion is not a priority for us.
The ecclesiastical hierarchy has reappeared on the political scene and this is the real proof of the weakness of the regime. Of course, the Church is an ideological power within the system but in general it prefers to keep a distance from politics in order to better deceive the people.
Moreover, the main structures of the regime, that is the chamber of deputies and the senate are going through a permanent crisis. Last year, two months went by when these bodies were unable to sit because they could not even get agreement on choosing a secretary. For a whole period there were even two presidents in each of the chambers. Since November 1984, a proposed budget has been before the chamber, but the elected representatives have not yet managed to get a quorum to discuss it.
The Dominican Republic is drifting, nobody has any confidence in its institutions and even those who defend the regime are getting worried by the situation. The level of corruption and decay that this regime has reached is unbelievable. It has no authority any more. In the town of Santiago, for example, the governor has not been fulfilling his functions for some time Also, the central bank has simply become an accounts office. It does not control the issuing of money. The ruling groups are coming up against another basic problem; that of a people rising up against an anti-national and antipopular agreement with the *IMF; and of a revolutionary movement with a real base amongst the masses. These are the objective factors which have created the new situation. That is why we say we are in a pre revoiutionary situation. Everyone agrees that the regime is on the verge of a total collapse. 3. The 'official' current consists of mass organisations which, like the General Union of Dominican Workers (UGTD) are linked to the official ruling party, the PRD.
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