Pinochet's regime
CHILE trying out the Kissinger strategy' in Chile. This involves the repayment of the debt through direct acquisition by the main world banks of the major wealth of the country. Thus the Chilean foreign debt would be paid off through American takeover of the Chilean copper mines. Such facing new crisis a takeover would be made possible through denationalisation copper industry which has still only partially been brought into force
Finally, Finance Minister Hernan
A NEW PHASE of political crisis is opening up today in Chile. This crisis is reflected in severe tensions within the regime; tensions with.
in the army; a relative separation between the judiciary and the military rulers; disagreements with the Church and tensions between the dictatorship and the employers' organisations.
Among the most recent examples of this crisis is the resignation of
General Mendoza, a member of the Junta and chief of police; the arrest of several police officers and the recent meeting, drawing together the whole spectrum of bourgeois opposition organised by the Church.
Despite the fact that the state of siege has been lifted, censorship has been lightened and Pinochet and the armed forces have been forced to retreat in the face of these internal tensions, nevertheless the chosen road of the dictatorship for dealing with the problems of
Chilean society remains one of repression and confrontation with the mass movement.
JAIR GIL
During the period of the state of siege from October 1984 to June
Lee impredand every week people more than 33,000 people one hundred people were expelled from the country.
extended to include the press and all meetings were banned. The regime also
CNI (National Information Centre
- political police)
groups, selective assassination attempts and killings are the rule as was shown in the case of the three Degollados.
Moreover, inhabitants of the popular quarters policy military-style occupation of these areas by the police and army.
However, just as the repression is a mark of the continuing dominance of the regime and shows that the relation of forces between the classes established by the 1973 coup d' etat has not been reversed so the struggle opened up movements of 1982-1983 shows that overall pattern the of resistance has not been interrupted by the state of siege and the repression.
The situation is not the same as it was. We are entering the phase of the death agony of the dictatorship
The Chilean crisis runs so deep that the regime is more and more cracking
International Viewpoint 28 October 1985 under the pressure of its own contrapressure of the
Chile is not at the centre of the world economic crisis but the situcountry is no for that. The country is falling deeper deeper into The rate of unemployment is 30% and remains so despite official statistics which attempt to show a decrease. The rate of inflation has been more in the last six months. The average wage is between 8,000 and 10,000 pesos [forty to fifty dollars] per month. (2) Inflation has impoverished whole sections of the working class and the petty bourgeoisie.
is increasing in all the countries of Latin America and in particular in Chile where a more and more marked dependence on imperialism is developing. It has gone from nine billion dollars in 1973 to twenty billion dollars in 1985. Also this year Chile has just into debt to the tune of 850 million opment Bank (BID) which exceed the 400 million dollar mark. Boys experiment, (3) imperialism is
Buchi's trips around the world have only one aim which is to open Chile up more to the world market. With this in view, the minister announced of customs duties from 30% from March 1, 1985, These are just some of the factors the backdrop to misery facing thousands upon thousands of Chileans today. This misery affects wide layers of the population.
unemployed and growing and the mere conditions of survival get worse every day. Those workers who are lucky' enough to have a job see their wages trailing right behind prices. Even certain layers of the petty bourgeoisie are getting poorer and are turning into a kind of sub-proletariat. All this has got much worse following the February 1985 earthquake which threw thousands of Chileans onto the streets, thus exacerbating an already very serious housing crisis. illustrates the cynicism of the Chilean rulers in pursuing their policies. For a long time now it has been the custom in Chile to give free milk to new-born babies in the hospitals where they are delivered. The minister of health has recently declared that water. However, scandal that developed around was so enormous and the emotions so intense himself had to intervene so that babies could be given their milk back.
Three leaders of the Communist Party of Chile were Ridnapped and had their throats slit in February 1985. Four. teen police officers were found guilty of these murders on August 1. Following these findings, General Mendoza, a member of the junta, and other police officers resigned Latin America
Regional Reports' (Southern Cone), RS-84-0, London, June 29, 1984.
3. Supporters of the 'Chicago school' of whom the founder is the American economist, Milton Friedman. This school links together fluctuations in economic activity with the money supply rather than with investment and it has developed a monetarist theory of ultra-liberalism in economics, challenging state intervention in the mechanisms of the capitalist economy.
11
up of the regime whatever form that might take (for example a coup within a coup, whereby Pinochet is overthrown by a section of the armed forces), and then towards the overthrow of the dictatorship, the crisis of leadership and organisation of the bourgeois parties and of the mass movement would still give the dictatorship a wide margin of manoeuvre.
This is the framework in which the Christian Democracy (DC), the main bourgeois opposition party must be viewed. If elections were held today in Chile, the DC would undoubtedly, and by a long way, be the first party in the country. The university elections which have always constituted a kind of sounding board in Chile for the general elections demonstrate this tendency by showing 30% of the
A tank in front of the presidential palace in Santiago — September 11 1973 (DR)
The economic and social crisis runs very deep but it is the element of political decomposition now affec-
1982-1983 the has become extremely It was at this to this in August 1983 by the government and the Ministry of president of the extreme right organisation, the National Party, which had supported the 1973 coup d' etat. The floodgates were opened and the regime appeared to be vacillating But in reality by pretending to share with Jarpa, dialogue with the bourgeois opposition, Pinochet was trying to win time. He was trying to paralyse the bourgeois parties in a pretence at negotiation and also wear out the masses series of mobilisations leading nowhere. Pinochet manoeuvres to stay in power
However, this dialogue with the military got everyone embroiled in endless discussions on the possibility of reforming the regime whilst the mass movement was becoming more and more threatening. In particular the centre of gravity of the movement shifted from the bourgeois opposition forces to the forces of the left and above all towards the Chilean
Communist Party (PCC). Pinochet wanted to show up the weaknesses of the bourgeois political forces and the fact that they did not control the mass movement and that there was even a risk that they would be bypassed by it. In fact he was able to demonstrate this to great effect in the 12
October 30, 1984 general strike when
Chilean bourgeoisie were at the spectre of the mass helped to make Pinochet appear as, in some way, the saviour of a bourgeoisie who would breathe more easily if the movement were contained.
Once again, after manouevres and counter-manoeuvres, able to demonstrate and assert that, when confronted with people, the only effective policy for bourgeoisie despite the fact that the regime no longer has a real substantial social base of its own. This is what has allowed Pinochet to start negotiations recently on the basis of his maintaining power until 1989, the date set by the Chilean constitution of 1980. Such a thing was unthinkable around 1982-1983. This is the meaning, moreover, of the about the various forms of the transition. They are currently assembly appointed either wholly or the junta and alongside that how to integrate bourgeois political forces in this process. The dictatorship is putting extra pressure on all political forces in order to exclude the PCC from the transition.
All these plans are very and all these structures could come crashing down, but they do reflect the political situation in Chile today. The economic, social and political crisis is deepening, but the weakness of any bourgeois or working class political alternatives to the dictatorship for the moment gives Pinochet, who has kept control of the army, a fundamental regime, some room to manoeuvre.
This situation makes it difficult to put forward predictions about what will happen in the short term. Because if the deepening crisis were to go in the direction of some kind of 'opening votes for the DC. This party is not just an electoral machine but a bourgeois party with a popular base. This is a key factor. Even if it does not retain the same direct links with the masses which it had in the past, it capable of mobilising. rebuilding of this party has given rise to the emergence of a whole series of currents within it which are evolving to the left especially trade unionists and in the Christianbase communities. However, its apand leadership are in the hands of bourgeois politicians who are looking for an agreement with the the significance of the recent letter general secretary of the DC, which spells out the key aspects party's line, notably;
the construction of a civil front made up of all social forces in the country except the PCC. create a consensus for adhering to the diktats of the IMF especially with regard to the foreign debt.
finally to create a dialogue with the PCC, on condition that it breaks with its policy of popular
This is also the meaning behind the initiative, in August, the bourgeois tion forces which, in their vast majority manoeuvres are aimed to marginalise the PCC and force them to accept eventual accord between the military dictatorship and the bourgeois is happening is therefon an attempt by the DC to establish a policy which guarantees to the militar a certain continuity and assures th
See International Viewpoin September 19, 1983 and No 41,
International Viewpoint 28 October 19l
Chilean bourgeoisie of its ability to control the PCC and the mass movement. The main drawback to this policy is the lack to share it. The problem is that the PCC is still representative enough to be difficult to go around. But DC rejects them for the moment and yet on the other hand the partners wants, that is the military, the DC, at least, again, not at social pact, it is not only very much at the level of theory, but the economic crisis and the diktats of the IMF will make it very difficult to put
So although Christian Democracy bourgeois party and constitutes for the bourgeoisie the main instrument for any political alternative to the military the depth of the social and political not allowed it the space policies. In fact, of Pinochet and the military dictatorship have succeeded, to some extent, part of the political credibility of Christian Democracy.
fundamental changes in the last decade, compared to the historical pattern 1930s until the 1970s, is the complete disappearance of the Socialist Party (PS). This party was a mass workers party with centrist tendencies, vacillating between reform and revoluThe demise of the Socialist Party
The SP, which was more vulnerable to repression than the PCC has not been able to rise above the changes which the country has gone through. It has undergone a process of disintegration into several different currents and groupings; the Socialist Bloc, the PS-Briones, a member of the Democratic Alliance (5), the PS-Almeyda, a satellite of the PCC and now divided factions, and others. With the socialism, all these currents coming out of the PS have moved towards
Revolution to largely illustrated in the multiplication democracy, whereas Chilean socialism identity. Furthermore, with the exception of the Almeyda factions, in the name of 'democracy' , all these currents capitalism. Thus in the name of democratic socialism and base' as against Stalinism in particular,
International Viewpoint 28 October 1985 democracy and bourgeois democratic institutions are upheld and an orientation towards reforms of the state and of the capitalist economy have been adopted. In the name of abandoning struggle, which these 'new' socialists in the past defended, they have also abandoned any perspective of dismantling the bourgeois state. This is most classic of all social democratic
On the question of political tactics, the socialists are divided on several counts. Firstly, on the question of participation coalitions initiated by Christian Democracy, where the
Bloc, for to create a better relation of forces DC. Also on the attitude to the PCC, the PS-Almeyda are linked to it while others reject any prospect of an alliance. And lastly, the socialists are divided on of the trade unions, the majority of the currents favouring pluralism supposedly in order to build ideological union federations' in reality in order that each party and each current of opinion can build its
Today, it is the Communist Party itself. The PCC is dominant amongst the youth, in the communities and in most able to mobilise people within the country and especially amongst the youth, even if it has not re-established organic links with class as strong as were achieved in the past. This can be explained as much by objective reasons, general weakening of the structures of the workers movement, as by subjective reasons rooted in the class collaborationism which, in the current conditions in Chile, limits the structuring of the Party and its periphery organisations. This is shown the experience of the MDP (People's Democratic Movement): in order to provide a counter-weight to the Democratic Alliance, the PPC launched the MDP in 1983. It was made up of the PCC, the PS-Almeyda
Movement of Revolutionary Left). Despite the programmatic limitations and its platform and statements representing class colquickly became a pole of attraction for the popular masses challenged and later took away from the Democratic Alliance the leadership of the most recent protestas and finally of the October 1984 general strike. However, the PCC deliberately set up rank and file of the MDP. This is a
### ALLENDE
Poster outside PCC headquarters (DR) task which revolutionaries should have taken up and which would have been a qualitative step forward. The PCC's policy also had repercussions in the trade unions. Basically, their social pact strategy prevented the PCC from rebuilding the trade union movement. Moreover, • Christian Democracy is trying at the moment to obtain, in exchange for certain political deals, the dissolution of the Workers Metropolitan Command (CMT), an organisation which groups together the most combative unions the weakness of the PCC's organic links with the masses should not mask the fact of its growth on the basis of an orientation of popular revolt. In fact, this orientation has given the PCC one great advantage; it allows them to cover whole spectrum Poutical activity from armed struggle to agreements with Christian Democracy. With
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front), the PCC can, on the
Vol all the military activity of members of the Communist Youth or the MIR, activities which
Their control, and, on the other hand, strengthen their popularity, especially latter there are thousands who support this line of popular revolt, giving it not only an anti-dictatorial character but a revolutionary one. For instance they compare their struggle to that of the FSLN in Nicaragua.
These young people give a revolutionary content to the line for popular
5. The Democratic Alliance groups together Christian Democracy, the PSBriones, the Republican Right, the Liberal Movement, the Radical Party, the Social Democracy and the People's Socialist Union.
13
the democrati-
Intransigence.
But despite all this, it is impor-
Popular arms problem of collaboration in any balance sheet that young of the PCC.
It is in this context that we have to at the current policy of the look and its adaptation to the PCC
MIR within the
MDP.
The MIR has suffered a loss of identity vis-a-vis
14 policies of class geois forces. acterised by its weaknesses union movement illustrates this very clearly. The trade union movement began to get active again at the beginthrough a fragmentation, a division, and a split between the different organisations. This can be explained the structural weakening of the class and, in particular, by a decline in the main concentrations of workers as well as by the political are characteristic the Chilean trade union movement. the MSU (Unified Union Movement) set up by the social democrats; the Workers National Command - CNT, the CMT activated by the PCC and class struggle militants; plus a certain mining sector is dominated Copper-workers union movement
Nevertheless which called
September 5, 1983. A student is arrested of action and political mobilisations. Because of its history and traditions, also, the trade union movement must take its place in the unfolding struggles. The roots of the mass movement are in the poblaciones
If, from the point of view of centralisation of activities and struggles, the trade unions play a decisive role, it is in the poblaciones (shantytowns) that the mass movement has its deepest roots. Through initiatives such as land occupations, ollas comunes (soup kitchens), mobi-
Always litical movement has hools
6. The Unity governmen. headed by Salvador Allende comprise the Socialist and Communist Part and some small bourgeois and petty bou geois groups. International Viewpoint 28 October 1985
OR) strikes and occupations. Groups of school-students from several schools get together to occupy such and such an educational establishment, putting forward their demands for more school materials and more democracy and waiting for the police to intervene. This scenario has been repeated several times in the last few weeks. The student mobilisations in particular have turned towards the demand for democratisation of the universities, pinpointing especially the demand for the sacking of civil or military directors of education appointed by the dietatorship and for the election by the students of their own adminidynamism of the mass movement. Of course, the state of siege announced in 1984 and the accompanying repression have set back the popular mobilisations which exploded during the October 30 general strike, but this is only temporary. Today, following, the lifting of the state of siege, fresh mobilisations of students and the beg. innings of new protestas show a new in the mass movement demonstrates that the cycle of activity opened up in 1982-83 is far from
It is difficult to make predictions but it is clear that a new phase of the political crisis has opened up in Chile. The events of 1982-1983 gave glimpse of the unfolding of the crisis of the dictatorship in the wake of the examples of Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, that IS within the framework of a political 'opening up'. It is true that the rhythm of events has been shown to be slower and that the development of the situation has
International Viewpoint 28 October 1985 not confirmed all hypotheses, but the current situation does show that none of the bitter contradictions of Chilean society have been resolved. On the contrary, it shows that accelerations or sharp turns in the situation, which will only aggravate the crisis, are to be expected. That is why an analysis, going above and beyond the ins and outs of the conjuncture, and looking at a whole series of strategic questions, has become necessary.
First we must look back at the the revolutionary rising in 1970-1973 and at the breadth of the defeat in September 1973.
The revolution, built up under the Popular Unity government, political, social and economic counter-
The present regime, product of a military bloody repression against workers has subsequently and interrupted the process national development
The combination of the dictatorship's economic policy, and especially its neo-liberal expression under the egis of the Chicago Boys', and the world economic crisis have destroyed the national economy of Chile. This combination has led to the dismanproductive denationalisation of key sectors of bourgeoisie has been marginalised, for the benefit of the speculators and the main sections of the financial bourgeoisie. The size of the working population by massive unemployment. layers of society erished. structures of society have been broken up by the dictatorship.
Combined modifications which Chilean society crushed not only the popular masses of the bourgeois parties, especially of Christian Democracy, to the masses, as it did that of the parties of the working class themselves. It is the depth of the repression and the weight of the defeat which explain the difference between Chile and the other countries of the Southern Cone today.
explains the slowness of the process of recomposition and reorganibackwardness in consciousness and the of organising unions and political parties.
It is undeniably true that Christian
Long the parties, and the Communist Party, working class rebuilt themselves and that the PCC, in pa.
en wh mc stri ma decades.
It is for weakness of reasons org uni und had before 1973.
The mass
Chile toc onl sat of the and
It is also a ma of is typical res] tha crat and lea exp emergof ence coordinated any mol its
Also the the
Christian cha the mig the absence of a viable bourgeois alternative which gives the army a central role in the maintenance capitalist rule even though a series of bourgeois forces and the Church are working towards the creation of such an alternative. It is this weakness which makes it difficult for the tensions inside the army to find political expression as was over Dicomcar (Head of police Communications and Information) which was closely linked with the assassination of the three fact these tensions
Degollados. In might still be very much alive but they do not prevent Pinochet from playing a bonapartist role, nor do they prevent the maintenance of a military police dietatorship.
claims by Pinochet, explaining that
'he alone can lift Chile out of the mire are based not only on the strength of the hierarchical and selected military built by him, but also on the weakness of his adversaries.
Under these conditions it is dif.
ficult to make predictions. If international pressures and the relations betthe classes make it difficult
15
tion, rather than denying stages of development in a given political situation, takes into account the democratic phases, whilst at the same time advocating that the struggle for class struggle methods, linking togdemocratic and capitalist demands.
to put democratic important political and right to strike, for the right to demonstrate, for the right to freedom of leads to the need to break with the dictatorship and to organise free elections to a constituent assembly. What should be put in the place of the Pinochet regime? The answer will be that the question is not even posed. But the need to find an answer to question is being posed, in order to counter all those who are making plans for a transition period in continuity with the military dictatorship, no matter what the
'Democracy now' - demonstrators take to the streets of Santiago. (DR) to envisage continuing military repression of the type of September 1973, all sorts of other variants are possible. These could include the maintenance in power of Pinochet until 1989 combined with concessions to the bourgeois opposition; a 'coup d' etat within the coup d' etat by a section of the military; a greater or lesser degree of 'opening up' of the regime; or lastly, an 'opening up' based on mass popular explosion. But rather than make predictions the most important thing is to indicate the main tactical and strategic tasks for the Chilean revolution.
In the debates currently taking place within the Chilean left, any schematic repetition of the Nicaraguan or Salvadoran models must be rejected for several reasons. We are a long way from seeing the Pinochetisation' of Chilean society like we saw the "Somozisation' of Nicaraguan society. The geo-political situation of Chile does not lend itself to strategy of prolonged popular warfare. And also, Chile is not yet in pre-revolutionary or revolutionary situation, even from an objective point of view. But we cannot continue to content ourselves with general formulas borrowed from the traditional arsenal of the workers movement in Chile, and especially from its socialist left-wing. The traditional model of Chilean develop. ment has been broken up and that has certain consequences for the dynamic of the mass movement.
Chile's dependence on imperialism has grown considerably and the relations between the traditional 16 parties and the masses have changed. The fissure created by the counterour approach to a whole series of revolutionary tasks.
The theory of permanent revolution implies a combination of demoanti-imperialist the articulation of which will depend strictly on the characteristics social formation. In Chile, democratic demands play role for several reasons.
Pinochet's counter-revolution wiped out a whole series of people, on the institutional, as well as the social level. From the objective situation flows the need to fight for basic freedoms, rights for land and national independLink between democratic and socialist demands
Furthermore it is necessary to take into account the political develop ments in Chile, the consequences of the defeat on the delay in developing a socialist awareness amongst the masses, the relation of forces between workers organisations and those of the bourgeoisie, between reformists and revolutionaries. This all means that should place democratic demands at the centre of their struggle and not leave this to the bour geois or reformist parties, that they should fight to make the proletariat the 'caudillo of the nation. In this way the theory of permanent revolu-
To those people, revolutionaries must with a radical democratic perone for the overthrow of the dictatorship through mass mobilisation and the election of a free and sovereign constituent assembly excluserve a double function. the politicisation of the masses by placing radical democracy to the forefront and also by highlighting the differences with the bourgeois and reformist projections.
On the political level, the fight for democracy implies a break with the military, but all popular mobilisations also pose straight away another question; 'Democracy yes; but we also have to eat!' This pinpoints the need to link the demand for a free and other demands of the workers and demand to refuse to pay the external debt, to the demand for the expropriation of the finance houses, demands which raise the question of land. Also the extreme dependence of the country on imperialism means the anti-imperialist axis and tasks play a much more important imperialist issue, especially in relation to the foreign debt could constitute, today, the transitional route linking up the democratic issues, the issues of national independence and the social, anticapitalist issues such as the expropriation of the finance houses.
In this way, the particular form of combined and uneven develop ment imposed on Chile by the wod crisis not only places demands at the centre but mal between democratic, International Viewpoint 28 October 1985
imperialist and socialist demands all the more inextricable.
point of view of the
From the
IRAN
Chilean forces of the motor revolution, the proletariat remains the key force in the revolutionary process.
However, the position of the organi-
Mammon,but badly sed working class has been modified, for political reasons but not only for structural reasons. There also is no longer an equivalent organisation to the CUT [United Confederation of Workers]. Thus the copper-
MADE TO order for Khomeini, the second Majles, or parliament, with their unitary workers, union, of the Islamic Republic was elected in two rounds April 15 and still play a central role. But although trade unions still remain an essential
May 18, 1984. These elections represented a milestone for the clerical lever in all general mobilisations the regime, decimating or eliminating entirely the factions not under the unemployed, the inworkers, sector (street vendors, moonthe thumb of the "Imam. " Khomeini's right-hand man, Majles speaker lighters and so on), people organised
"Having seen the new Majles members, and mobilised in the poblaciones, have
I am sure we can get on well. " He added, "This time we won't have seen their role considerably strengthened. This gives a much more importvarious regional organiant role to
Commenting on these elections in our July 2, 1984 issue, Saber sations.
Thus, the mobilisation in the
"It would seem ... that less than six years after pobladores' poblaciaones and the could become the backthe February insurrection, the Khomeini regime is now consolidating committees bone of the popular mobilisations.
its political rule and ensuring an unchallenged grip for the next four
The structural changes in years." But, he asked, "how stable can this regime be? Despite all do not alter the central role of the over the masses, this question is not yet decided." This fight for the workers' united front or of the battle for unity and class hand-picked Majles has not been in office more than a year. Its record independence, is an indication both of the regime's objectives and its contradictions.
lems of class alliances and the developof political
Christian Democracy and the other sections of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie take on a new dimension.
this approach which the need for a struggle for a constituent trade union assembly to create the pre-condition for one united trade union confederation and for a struggle for the coordination of the movement of the pobladores and for the unification of the student movement.
also give meaning to the battle to set up committees of action, tion aiming to achieve unity in action.
From the military point of view the current weaknesses substitutionist actions by the FPMR or the MIR should not lead militants this terrain
First of all it is necessary to strengthen propaganda and actions of self of the mass movement. But also, at a certain stage of development of a revolutionary organisation, some thought must be given to the politico-
Finally, from the point of view of the construction of a revolutionary party, the most important task is to regroup, on the basis of practical intervention in the class struggle, all those who are ready to be involved in the construction of a revolutionary the left of the bloc hegemonised by the PCC.
International Viewpoint 28 October 1985
Hashemi Rafsanjani, crowed, the old troublemakers." Nikbeen wrote: its victories SABER NIKBEEN
As predicted after the elections, this session of the Majles has approved many bills that clearly show its capitalist orientation. The nost important of these are the following:
the first instance, there is the "The limits methods of operation for the private sector." (The way for this piece of legislation was paved by an earlier bill that already sector to intervene in distribution through compulsory purchases and
Secondly, there was the bill on the
Associations and Shoras," and then the "New Amended Labour
(The ground was prepared demagogically for the latter by a giving workers "shares in indu-
After the Imam came out openly in support of the private sector and government "intervention"
the name of "giving people their and allowing "these people" to politicians followed suit.
the body engaged safeguarding the Islamic constitution, Imam has ordered that there should not be any obstacle to more things coming from the Bazaar."
in charge of the Foundation for the Mostazafin [The Wretched of
I would have minister of industries, of the private sector." (2)
The chorus was joined by Rafsanjani himself, who proclaimed,
"The private
We believe that it must be activated." (3)
In the Majles, there are still some deputies, such who complain about this course. He said, for example, so bad that some think that what-
Islamic." He raised the complaint,
"Sometimes they even demand that the fishing industries, the railways, transport, etc. be given to the private sector. But when it comes to taxes, say that they will pay only and zakat [the traditional
Islamic levies, which are not progres-
Before being removed post, Belzad Nabavi, the so-called
2.
November 14, 1984.
'Etela'at', November 10, 1984.
17
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