"to call for a dialogue Commander of the Revolution Bayardo Arce answered categorically: "We are not going to permit public propaganda in support of US positions."
At bottom, Nicaraguan leaders say the State of Emergency is not aimed at "punishing" a reactionary minority by depriving everyone of their rights, but at defending and safeguarding the rights of the toiling majority.
As Commander of the Revolution Tomas Borge explained, "This is a State of Emergency to defend the workers, not repress them; to defend the aspirations of the peasants, artisans, students and professionals not to deny them ... This of Emergency to defend the homeland, not to sell it out.
"This is a State of Emergency only to tie the hands of the enemies of the
International Viewpoint 25 November 1985
VINCENT KERMEL
Daniel Ortega explained these measbrutal aggression allies has created a truly extraordinary situation.' Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge illustrated this situation more precisely; there be any doubt that we are at war? This is not a war with toy soldiers ... This is a kind of war that is turning our country into a nation riddled with bullets and in a permanent state of
The State of Emergency represents a series of preventative measures in defence of the revolution and does not appear to be a response to any immediate deterioration in the military situation. Indeed, on October 14 the vice-minister of defense and chief of staff of the Sandinista People's Army (EPS), Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, said that in 1985, 'the forces of the revolution have encountered a very favourable situation in the confrontation with the mercenary arm of the Reagan administration.' This does not mean the military pressure of the contras was any the less but rather that it had been contained, notably in its goal of occupying certain areas of the country where they might be able to establish a provisional government for which they could call for support from imper-
However, the contra army is still a large army of mercenaries equipped and trained by US imperialism. Its activity has already led to the destrucof 321 schools, fifty health several cooperatives, villages and large quantities of equip-
Social programmes aimed improving the lot of the working population have been totally disrupted because more than half the national budget has been unavoidably turned over to military spending.
The war has had disastrous consequences for agricultural production some areas. The involvement in military tasks of so many cadres and Sandinista militants has undermined their participation in the mass organisations. The human cost of this war is such that if related to the proportion of the population of the US it would represent the equivalent of 723,000 deaths.
To this also has to be added the US trade em bargo announced in May 1985 which was aimed at strangling the revolution by blocking Nicaraguan access to credit, closing off traditional outlets for Nicaraguan goods and by paralysing the economic infrastructure of the country through preventing access to spare parts.
On the diplomatic level US imperialism has kept up the pressure on those regimes in Latin America who wish, for their own reasons, to see a negotiated solution to the conflict in Central America.
The economic difficulties and the continuation of the war are beginning produce a weariness amongst certain sections of the population. The contras are trying to use this for their own advantage, in particular through the ideological offensive being waged publically and openly by the Catholic Church.
The Reagan administration is seeking to deliver a death sentence on the Sandinista revolution, to role back the social gains and dismantle the Nicaraguan workers state. And in order to achieve this objective it will use any means that its imperialist power can offer (military, diplomatic and economic) in order to weaken the capacity
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The revolution
Sandinista militias marching toward a combat zone (DR)
of the mass movement to resist and to undermine the Nicaraguan masses sufficiently to be able to deal them the final blow in one form or another.
But in order to limit the human and political costs of such an undertaking, US imperialism is seeking to open up and stabilise an internal military and political front aimed at undermining the social base of the regime. In this, the ideological pole of the counterrevolution inside the country plays a key role. The US administration has tried to beef this up by supporting the activity of COSEP (the employers' organisation), cf certain bourgeois parties and of personalities like Arturo Cruz during the November 1984 election campaign. The Catholic hierarchy -a fifth column.
In the past such manoeuvres have always failed in their objective because of the political initiatives of the Sandinista leadership and the accompanying mobilisation by the popular masses.
Today, it is the Catholic hierarchy that is playing a central role in the counter revolutionary political offensive within the country. It is the channel for the mobilisations in support of imperialist propaganda and the contras.
The Church hierarchy now represents a real fifth column. The declaration of the State of Emergency above all is an attempt to head off this ideolological campaign. This comes at a time when the political conjuncture is marked by increasing problems for the Nicaraguan revolution and by the absence of any immediate perspective of a solution to those problems.
This development in the situation is shown in the recent increase in US credits to the contras in accordance with Reagan's expressed wish to see the resources of the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) increased from about 10,000 to 30,000 men between now and the end of the year. So, a qualitative leap in the extent of military aggression against Nicaragua can now be expected.
What is more, US imperialism has also scored a point on the diplomatic level with Ecuador's breaking of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. This is the result of imperialism's efforts to torpedo the negotiations initiated under the auspices of the Contadora.
The Sandinista regime's room for diplomatic manoeuvre is narrowing correspondingly. Previously it had been possible to use this opening in order to win time and more support in the face of imperialist aggression.
Finally the ideological offensive of the Catholic hierarchy has been stepped up around the campaign for the opening up of a dialogue between the Sandinista government and the contras and around the increasingly systematic agitation against Patriotic Military Service (SMIP), which is a central element in the defence of the country.
Unlike the various bourgeois parties and associations, the Catholic Church has at its disposal a whole series of effective organisers, international support and large financial resources, plus wide margins of manoeuvre because of its religious activity, with which it can campaign of political destabilisation.
It has openly taken up the question of the SMP, thereby stirring up dissatisfaction among some layers of the population in order to wage its disruption against the revolutionary government.
This campaign has been accompanied by a direct provocation to the
Sandinista government in the form of the publication of a journal, glesia, by those close to Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo. This journal, of which 10,000 copies were produced, was not legally registered, and contained an editorial calling for a boycott of the SMP. That is why it was seized and the spokesperson of the Curia, Bismark Carballo - Cardinal Obando's righthand man - was searched in the headquarters on the order of the minister of the interior.
Such a challenge to revolutionary legality and to the need for defence against imperialist aggression in fact justifies resorting to exceptional measures. For the moment, these measures are only being used in a preventative way. So, for example, on October 21, 7,000 Catholics were allowed to meet in Esteli on the occasion of a religious procession led by Cardinal Obando. But the Sandinista leadership might be obliged to apply the measures more severely against the ideological and military offensives of the reaction in the future.
The State of Emergency • is thus above all a shot across the bows to the Catholic hierarchy. This is how the October 17, 1985 editorial in Barricada explains it; What is involved is a refusal to allow the religious beliefs of the people to be used to legitimise the denial of revolutionary legality, as certain groups within the hierarchy of the Catholic Church are trying to do by publishing political and counter revolutionary journals and by ignoring the legal steps necessary for using these means of communication.?
Barricada also presented the objective of these measures from another angle, declaring that it was a question of 'putting an end to attempts to create more problems in the economy; to sabotage productive work; and to International Viewpoint 25 November 1985
pretext of defending workers demands and by manipulating certain sections of workers and through denying the gravity of the economic situation which imperialist aggression has created. There will be no further toleration of such activity which, on the one hand, unjustly demands more material benefits than our economy is capable of producing and, on the other hand, contribute the minimum necessary for defence'.
This relates to a recent event which is rather revealing of the situation in Nicaragua. It also revealed some of the more fundamental contradictions that this county's process of transition is coming up against.
The very day of the proclamation of the State of Emergency, a long took place in the National Assembly on the question of the payment of the thirteenth month (an extra month's wages at the end of the year). The initial proposal of the FSLN was to retain the previous year's procedure which granted the full payment to all those wage earners whose wages were not above 5,000 cordobas, that is a little more than the minimum wage one dollar is worth about 700 cordobas). The money not paid to wage earners earning above contributed to a fund to fight unemployment.
In the National Assembly, a bourgeois grouping, the Democratic Conservative Party (PCD), together with one of the two pro-Soviet parties, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) opposed this proposition, demanding the allocation of the thirteenth month payment to all wage earners. The CST and the ATC (Rural Workers Association) then proposed the full payment extra month's wages workers earning up to 12,700 cordobas (level ten on the wages scale), which applies to 70% of wage earners. calculated on the basis of the previous month's wages which would allow the workers to benefit from any increases accruing over the year. This proposal was adopted by the Assembly.
The PCD, the PSN, the Movement
Action (MAP) and the Independent Liberal Party (PLI) maintained their opposition to this formula, continuing to demand the payment of the thirteenth month right up until the twentieth point on the wages scale, that is to 21,700 cordobas.
Parallel to these discussions in the National Assembly, Alejandro Solorzano, a leader of the CGT (Workers Confederation) linked to the PSN went on hunger strike in support of
Imprisoned and sequently released, he halted his action
International Viewpoint 25 November 1985
On October 15 a demonstration was organised by the Union of Carpenters, Masons and Allied Trades and led by the PSN, demanding the payment of the thirteenth month for all workers. This initiative attracted 1,500
A report published in Barricada on October 16 quoted several demonstrators, showing that the vast majority of the people present were wage earners earning less than 12,700 cordobas and therefore entitled to the payment of the thirteenth month.
This parliamentary debate and the reveal much about the current political situation in Nicaragua. Certain sections of the bourgeois opposition and other proposals, and to capitalise on the discontent which is emerging amongst a section of the population because of the economic difficulties which the country faces and the drop in their standard of living.
Beneath the tactical nature of the discussion on the thirteenth month, there lies a real debate on the fundamentals; that of the problem posed by the need to defend the revolution and the consequent necessity to share destined for the war effort and those needed to avert too great a decline in the standard of living of the popular profits and (that is uncontrolled labour market). contributes feelings economically and in sations that obstruct priorities for defence can arise.
This situation indeed has potential for an undermining of the social base of the revolution and the suppression of the right to strike could unfortunately aggravate this. What is needed are political dialogue with the masses, including with the section that could become despairing of the current situation or that could begin to put forward economic demands difficult to meet in the short-term, as well as calling for the mobilisation of those who support the revolution layers unwaveringly. This cannot be replaced by placing the sword the Damocles, the suspension of the right to strike, over the heads of those sections of the workers and peasants movement who want to take advantage of the situation.
A revolution with its back to the wall to administrative intermediary revolution.
in curbing tivation of masses.
One is a of interup to come to the
At this into objective.