International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

'You have an historic chance....' — Document

International Viewpoint No. 9, 21 June 1982 · pp 20-22 · 2,123 words

Eastern Europe

Wiktor KULERSKI Tygodnik Mazowsze No. 8 Warsaw 31 March 1982

SOLiDARNOSC

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SIM

"You have an historic chance...

As we saw in the polemic published in Tygodnik Mazowsze No. 8, between Zbigniew Bujak and Wiktor Kulerski on the one side, and myself on the other, there are important differences in our appreciation of the political situation, and which methods of activity to choose. This is not in itself a bad thing. But, if as we hope, the discussion is to be useful, then we must understand each others arguments fully.

If I have understood properly, your proposal is to build a movement in the image of that we called the 'social selfdefence' movement before August 1980. That is, a movement based on the organisation of people in different milieus which allows them to come together to resolve the problems that they face. This self-organisation can serve as a basis for the development of more general activities, publishing, education circles, programmatic discussions. In my article Reflections on a programme of action in 1976, I insisted that this type of movement must be based on the full autonomy of local and sectoral action groups. Forgive me for this self-advertisement, but I want to emphasise how close your ideas are to mine. The truth of this was demonstrated in the lead-up to the August 1980 victory, which is already an irreversible victory. Thus, I am not surprised that this idea is now meeting with wide support. In searching for historical analogies we look at everything, and try to base ourselves on experience. But we must not forget that we are discussing methods of action, and these are dependent above all on the conditions of struggle, and these are very different today from August 1980.

What are the indispensable conditions for the development of a self-defence movement? I see three:

each person must be able to act; -this activity must be able to reach the social system within which we are building the movement must have resources, even minimal, to allow it to de-

The system existing under Edward Gierek, from 1970, fulfilled the first two

That team wanted to govern by basing itself on the social consensus. This is why it forced the apparatus to concede to pressure.

Today, the generals and the secretaries have decided not only to bypass the consensus of opinion but even to govern against it. The basis of their power is their ability to break up demonstrations, to smash strikes, to arrest, to intern, beat up, to shoot....The generals and secretaries are so strong in they will not move an inch under pres-

All this has already been said and shown in practice. We should not be under any illusions. We should also point out that they cannot move under pressure because they do not have any room for cannot lower wages, sack workers nor reduce food rations. you know, any social movement-at least one that considers itself the co-manager of the country-cannot give up economic

We cannot stop the growing economic agony of our country without a true national reconciliation. My Theses... begins with a justification of this assertion, which unfortunately you overlook in your polemic. 16.01.1981. 128º-13°"

1- godzinny

STRAI

PROTESTACIONY REGIONU MALOPOLSKA MALOPOLSKA Thus, in these conditions of a state of war, we can only hope that a self-defence movement, or another form of social movement, would be able to bring about gradual change, by the sole fact of its existence.

There is a mass movement develop. ing underground, within which it is possible to organise publishing, educational, and-most importantly-other forms of activities which express the aspirations of society. Is this why people take part in the movement, despite the risks? I do not

A mass social movement is always a response to great aspirations which can be achieved through united action, and can only be achieved in this

Education is possible without such Publishing activity, as an end in itself, only involves a tiny minority

Demonstrations cannot lead to any immediate success. They are, of course, very important for morale, inasas they show the strength of the But, if this strength is used only to raise morale, it will eventually become powerless.

At the moment a number of people are absorbed which tend to take on tasks linked to the realisation of the desired aims. The most limited, and most popular, aim today is to get conditions which will allow people to live normally. The tasks that you put first cannot, any more than any other local or sectoral activity, bring us more than a millimetre nearer this aim. clandestine activity alone can get there. Because clandestine activity is always a preparation for something. If you do not explain practically what you are preparing for then there will be an organisation without aims, but with deception, discontent, and hate... From this hate, terrorism is born.

An organisation with a central leadership could, within certain limits, prevent unproductive acts of aggression and dispair, it it exists effectively and is able to reach all layers of the movement. But such a leadership will lose all its influence if it does not seem to have a programme for getting out of the present situation. Let us note, by the way, that organisational activity at the moment will naturally lead on to centralising the movement. If the leaders of Solidarnosc, or only one section of them, try to slow down the movement then several centres will appear, which, among other conflicts, would produce ideal conditions for a provocation.

You say that the people can hold on longer, and you refer to historical experience. On that we disagree on the facts. Last year national revenue dropped by 13 per cent. This year, if we obtain significant aid from the East, and some Western credits, then the national revenue will drop by 17-22 per cent more, according to the officially published experts' forecasts. Leaving aside the fact that there will not be significant aid from the East, and that to obtain Western credits at least requires some guarantee.

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Let us take only this new reduction of 20 per cent. This is a catastrophe unknown in Western society. No one is able to predict the political, social, and psychological effects.

On what precisely do you base your belief that the Polish people will be able to calmly support such a catastrophe? In a situation, moreover, where the government continues to provoke them by its arrogance, and by the terror it exercises? On the fact that they have been patient from January up till now? Let us leave on one side the fact that life is going to get worse in the future. On the contrary, let us note that the maturity of Polish society, on which we all agree, is nothing less than the confidence that they have in Solidarnose. That is to say, in you and in the resistance movement.

The people are keeping their despair, their anger and their rage to themselves because they have thrown themselves into activity, to which you have called them (or to which they think you have called them). They think that you know the way, and will lead them to victory. But, they will realise very quickly that the slogan 'stay underground' is the most costly way to defeat.

Then what will happen? Perhaps the government will be able to prevent a national explosion. Perhaps there will be a whole number of explosions, more or less local, put down in a more or less bloody manner. Let us add to this the social and political effects, and effects on an economic catastrophe. Even without a foreign intervention we might witness the destruction of the nation. I do not know if Solidarnose can allow itself another defeat. know that we cannot escape defeat by refusing to fight.

As its leaders we have taken a tremendous responsibility upon ourselves by organising Solidarnosc. We cannot run away from it today by refusing to put forward answers to the central questions. I am ready to announce maximum concessions from society, in order to avoid mass feeling in the country-lighted cancommon articles of clothing, work stoppages-would recall the threat, and show that the movement is ready.

I imagine that the movement will agitation among the soldiers and police militia immediately. call on them to co-ordinate their activities among themselves, and keep in contact with their co-ordinations. opinion, this is the principal task of the

The uprising thus announced could well take the form of an indefinite gen-

But in doing that we would give the generals and the secretaries the ability to attack in places of their choosing, and thus concentrate their superiority of men and materials in a given place. Therefore, if we are not sure that the majority of the soldiers and police militia will co-operate with us, it would be necessary to combine the strike with attacks on specific centres of information and power. In agreement with those solprimate are now considered as extremist because they are the only alternative to the official ones. When you are considered as spokespeople these proposals could be a real platform for compromise. It is true that if such a compromise was made those who terrorise would be on the margins of social life. Too bad.

I do not ask you to proclaim the offensive. On the contrary, I ask you to or ganise the centre of the movement, and an effective information network. important to emphasise that this will not undermine the authority of different sections of the movement. But it will limit the danger of provocations, and thought-

Because certain actions should be the exclusive responsibility of

I call on you to declare that, if the authorities do not listen to society; if they refuse to comply with its will, expressed in different ways; if they do not take action to save the country from catastrophe; if they do not accept conciliation with society; the movement will be who declare themselves ready to obliged to use violence.

the catastrophe which this state of war is bringing to Poland. But these concessions cannot be counterposed to the essential condition for a social compromise.

creation of a situation where the regime come over to our side.

We could equally well announce that such an attack will take place where factories on strike are

Lastly, I call on you to undertake agitation among the soldiers and police

You will find a good reception among them, and that alone would be a

The belief that the attitude of the mortal danger for the regime. And, above will make an agreement with society, and not with the State, even under different names and represented by different per- fear of an uprising could be well founded, which is agreed by all the principal leadsonalities. In other words, the indispensable pre-condition for compromise that society is organised independently from the state power.

We cannot base our programme on the hope that the generals and secretaries will willingly accept a compromise. We have to acknowledge that violence only retreats in front of violence. openly state that the movement itself will

For me it is necessary to make this more precise, example, 'in the summer', or 'in the autumn. This is the best way to prevent acts of desperation or aggression. From that moment on all the demonstrations of 22 secretaries and generals is hardened by if one thinks that anything else other fear leads to concessions. deceive them by declaring that the movement will not use violence. They think that they are safe and will not give

The authorities have undoubtedly had discussions with the Church hierarchy, on national conciliation and social agreement. But they have only done that to give a cover to a practice that is quite

From the moment that it becomes a real danger the Church will cease to be a spokesperson and become a mediator. You have seen how the moderate proposals of the Social Council of the Polish all, it is necessary to have a programme ers of the resistance.

Forgive me for this lecturing tone. I know that you work hard, and you have had important successes. But we find ourselves in a situation from which there appears no way out. Although we are not prepared we have to confront it. It is up to us to indicate a way out from this situation which appears to be an impasse.

You would not have chosen such a burden, but you could not shirk it. You have an historic opportunity....

### Jacek KURON

Tygodnik Mazowsze No. 13 Warsaw, 12 May, 1982

Czechoslovak bureaucrats fear spread of the

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