For a South Asian nuclear and taking part in the elections, Barnala's party has, in so many words, agreed to play according to the rules weapons free zone of the game of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, and to take over the task of policing the province and keeping peace on behalf of the central regime. On the other hand, while the base of terrorism is narrower than before, continuation of the centre's policy of THE FOLLOWING is a statement published by the Inquilabi Comrepression is likely to prove fruitless, munist Sangathan (ICS), the Indian section of the Fourth International, and detrimental to the standing of the calling for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South new provincial government.
The elections were noteworthy in various other ways. Above all, they were used to further curtail democratic rights. During the election campaign, an ordinance was promulgated saying that the death of independent candidates would no longer mean the cancellation of elections in the constituencies which they were contesting. Since the Indian election laws stipulate that a party must secure a minimum percentage of the votes cast in at least five states to get the status of a national party and the same percentage of votes in one state to be recognised as a state party in that state, "independent" candidates include those who belong to smaller parties as well. In itself, this law is discriminatory andundemocratic. But the implications are even more serious, in view of the repeated attacks on these independent candidates. In the 1985 Rajasthan assembly polls, an independent candidate was murdered by the police. In Bihar province, an
International Viewpoint 13 January 1986
Asia.
There can be no doubt that Pakistan is very close to developing a nuclear weapons making capacity. In view of the negative repercussions it might have the country is unlikely to announce it through any kind of Pokhran-type explosion. (1) Indeed the government in Islamabad is likely to pursue a policy of keeping the last wires of the bomb] unconnected so that technically she cannot be accused of being a nuclear weapons power.
India had, of course, demonstrated her nuclear weapons making capacity at Pokhran in 1974. Since all nuclear regimes (whether in authoritarian societies like the USSR, China or in bourgeois democratic societies like US, Great Britain, France) are fundamentally undemocratic, the
Indian public, has no way of knowing whether, or how many, bombs in the basement' India has. The country certainly has enough weapons gradefuel to construct a number of bombs, possibly with the last-wires-unconnected' also.
For some years now, a systematic hysteria has been generated [in India] about the 'Pak bomb'. Its purpose is to gather public support for the Indian government's policy on the bomb. This policy is not one of nuclear disarmament or to see to it that Pakistan also disarms, but to
1. India's first nuclear power plant was built with US help in 1970 near Bombay. Canada helped India build two reactors May 1974 at Pokhran, a nuclear device was exploded underground. -IV.
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keep the option open for India to openly and establish a proper nuclear weapons programme (which is much more than just having the capacity, or even keeping a few 'bombs in the basement whenever it decides to do so.)
This is why Rajiv Gandhi has, the one hand, rejected proposals from mutual inspection of nuclear facilities a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ)
and on the other, warning of the danger that a 'Pak bomb' will cause to the subevaluating" India's nuclear policy if this happens. At the same time, he and others in the government repeat that India has no intentions going in for nuclear weapons, and only wants to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. What this whole approach amounts to is a policy of nuclear ambiguity, of deliberately uncertainty as a way of maintaining some leverage vis-a-vis Pakistan, as well as the other nuclear weapons powers.
In fact, Pakistan is also pursuing of nuclear ambiguity serious and willing than India to close the nuclear option for both countries by having a NWFZ in South Asia.
This is not because General Zia is more peace-loving than Rajiv Gandhi. It is that he and that if there is a nuclear arms race in South Asia, the burden of 'matching the enemy' will be much greater on Pakistan than on India in every respect (economic, political, social) because of the great imbalance in power, is why Zia would be prepared to have 'non-nuclear parity' between Pakistan and India through establishment of a
That is why, although India says the Pakistani proposal for NWFZ dare to call Pakistan's bluff in this
The Indian government, in fact, argues that just because Pakistan and the US as well as other nuclear powers, want such a zone for their own reasons, 'we' should not be 'manipulated' into accepting this. This is a typical example of the kind of thinking which is responsible for promoting proliferation (both horizontal and vertical) of nuclear weapons. This kind of thinking fails to recognise the unique nature of nuclear weapons which are capable of mass destruction and tries to treat them like conventional weapons - as legitimate instruments of foreign policy to secure so-called "national interests' as defined by the bour 22 geois ruling class. But the nuclear weapons can never be used to defend territory. The threat of nuclear weapons far from leading to stability through deterrence, only leads to even more insecurity and a spiralling arms race. If there is to be genuine disarmament of nuclear weapons then, they not be used as instruments of foreign policy.
The question of nuclear security must as far as possible, be separated from other issues of national security security can be defined as the legitimate right of people of, say, South Asia to be progressively free of the use, the threat of the use, and even the possibility of the use embodied in the very existence of nuclear weapons. The only alternative to such an approach will be a proliferation in the name of national security which only leads to greater insecurity at ever higher levels of danger. This precisely the experience of the superpower arms race which has reached "insane" levels of overkill capacity on both sides and still shows no signs of even stopping temporarily.
Regardless of the motives of the US, USSR or Pakistan in wanting a NWFZ, the objective value of having a NWFZ in South Asia is profound. Keeping the nuclear option open for both countries through a policy of ambiguity means that the can well be exercised or realised if pressures to do so build point.
Having a NWFZ in South Asia does not mean the India-Pakistan conflict will disappear or that there will not be clashes. But it does mean that both sides agree that neither side will ever use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against each other's population, even if war breaks out between the countries.
will be an immense gain advance for sanity. It is up to India to positively to the Pakistan proposal for mutual inspection and a NWFZ, whatever the latter's motives, and to try and establish such a zone.
The arguments pro-bomb lobby and by Rajiv Gandhi such a zone are dishonest, hypocritical and weak. In fact if Pakistan's bomb is the real problem then this zone is the best way to eliminate the danger. That is why most objections to such a zone have nothing to do at all with Pakistan! To take some of these objections: - Rajiv Gandhi has publicly declared that having a NWFZ in South Asia is meaningless because it will not prevent clandestine betrayal, that it cannot guarantee against non-violation. which case why bother to have any treaty of any kind. No political pact can guarantee non-violation. bother to call for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean which the Indian government does? Nothing can prevent US or Soviet submarines from violating such a zone of peace if they want to. But does anyone doubt that if the zone of peace proposal was accepted by all concerned including the US and USSR that it would be a great political advance? Nuclear weapons no deterrence
The NWFZ is above all a political proposal of great merit. Like all such proposals it will work best when those governments who are party to it want to make it work and share an interest in maintaining it. The weight of mass opinion in the subcontinent must be brought to bear on the governments of India and are all in favour of such a zone) to accept the establishment of a South
The other major argument used by India's pro-bomb lobby is that if India gives up its nuclear option it has no defence or deterrence against nuclear blackmail by US, China or other nuclear powers. This is an insidious argument because (a) deceptively implies that keeping the option open could enable India to
La deterrence; ignores the historical character of conflicts and tensions and argues on an essentially, abstract, absolutist and hypothetical level. China has never threatened India (nor Vietnam) nor any other country with nuclear weapons. Neither the USSR nor the US has ever threatened with success any other non-nuclear nation. We continue to live in a world where the correlation of class forces on a world scale do not make it possible for any national bourgeoisie or state to get away with fulfilling such threats against the masses of another country.
Nor does keeping the option open help India to deter, even in a theoretical sense another nuclear weapons power. It is not enough to have the option or even a few weapons. To have any hope of deterring other nuclear weapons it is necessary to have what is known as a "credible deterrent equation," that is a sufficiently programme of warheads, missiles and other delivery systems which can promise massive retaliation even after an enemy first-strike. India is so backward (as UK and France are with respect to the USSR) in this respect that it can never have an effective nuclear deterrent against the superpowers who are going further International Viewpoint 13 January 1986
INTERNATIONAL