After the fall of Marcos
(1972-1981) has now been shattered.
A new configuration of forces is emerging. The respective place national level.
The anti-imperialist left in the country has to take this turn of least it has lost the initiative.
The first beneficiaries of the overthrow of the Marcos regime Ponce Enrile. PAUL PETITJEAN
The situation in the Philippines The new administration and the remains fluid. At least in the Metro- government enjoy real mass Manila area, the population has had support. Corazon Aquino has won the experience of "people's power," everybody's respect, both by of the might of a mass upsurge. she represents — as Ninoy's widow -Tomorrow, the revolutionary left the way she continued the may gather the fruits of this experi- fight after the February 7 elections. ence. government has acquired
The new regime has to assume a real legitimacy, forged in the democontrol of the provinces. It is divided cratic uprising and sanctified by the between a reformist pole attached to the president's office and a conser- a pro-imperialist bourvative one entrenched in the govern- geois government, as attested by the ment. It may be torn by conflicts composition of the government and of interests and personal ambitions. the support extended by Washington. Above all, it is going to have to con- The stakes in the period front an economic and social crisis opening are very great. The success without parallel in the region of a bourgeois transition to the postvital, urgent demands from the masses. era is far from assured. In
Likewise, relations with American fact, the orderly transition long hoped imperialism and negotiations on the for by the key sectors of US imperUS bases established in the archipelago and of the Philippine ruling are going to put contradictory classes was scuttled by Marcos' intranpressures on the new regime. More the dynamic of the mass important still, because of the mobilization and the contradictions dynamic of the mass mobilization, a of Reagan's policy. new democratic opening has emerged Since the end of the 1970s, the im the country; the repressive vise Philippine bishops and elements in has been loosened. The mass move- the US administration have been ments can take advantage of this ringing the alarm bell. The incompeopening to advance their own poli- tence of the Marcos regime was tical and social demands. becoming obvious. In the economic the country was sinking sphere, deeper into crisis. On the political st front, the Marcos clan was driving growing sections of the elite into ir opposition, and a Communist in-
Ci gained surrection weight and subal stance with the growth of the New
People's Army.
However, it was only after the st
"Ninoy"
assassination
Benigno
W
Aquino in August 1983 that Washing-
Ci ton began to really worried.
get indecision, the period of
After a th
United States opted for a policy of reform within the regime.
Marcos was part of the problem; he was also fi to be part of the solution. He was
CC to open up the regime by dumping th the harder-nosed including elements, ril
General Fabian Ver, the chief of the
This was
General Staff.
to make it th possible to bring the oppositionist of
Philippine bourgeoisie back into the government and reunify the Philippine elites.
lo
The ultimate objective was to th the conditions for a more create effective counterinsurgency campaign.
th de
Here we can see a coherent imperialist project. It involved relying on a th reformed army to control a limited democratic opening, restoring legitimacy to the neocolonial government, da at least in the eyes of the bourgeoisie pl and the middle classes and acting to in concert with the Church hierarchy, as the irreplaceable moral authority.
E
Nonetheless, this project failed, hi and the United States came to the gr brink of a real political disaster, a fo confrontation between Marcos' loyalists and a forces that went over to Cory. This failure had deepgoing causes.
ba
The first of these causes has to do with the nature of the regime that had been established with the direct and cl decisive help of the United States
Sil in the period of martial law. It was it not just a dictatorial government. It was a clientelist and nepotistic one.
The state was coalesced nationally under Marcos, ge instrument of a clan that enriched re itself and broadened its own patronage ar base through its control of the repressh sive forces, the public funds and government contracts. The state, as an instrument in the hands of a clan, in became finally a key element consolidating a political dynasty, that th of the Marcos-Romualdez family and th of its intimates, military men such as
General Ver, or businessmen such as
Eduardo Cojuangco.
The development of such a regime re
Walden
1.
See in particular
Bello,
"Les Etats-Unis et M. Marcos, ou comment s'en debarasser, " 'Le Monde diplomatique,
February
1985;
and
Naya
Chanda,
"Reagan's finally welcome fence-sitters
'Far Eastern Economic Review,
Aquino
March 6, 1986.
International Viewpoint 24 March 1986
International Viewpoint 24 March 1986 has of imperialist
The army, police and the a unifying that were first time in rilla struggle.
the state the opposition
And, the economic with
CrISIS all eyes of lost the middle classes.
the intimates his his ambition, forces but social
Despite self-reform alien to since forms functioning.
its of Ninoy
Thus, the bourdoor to sharing of power.
regime.
Thus,
State
Department ran up against Marcos' intransigence. But the American administration was itself divided. The
Pentagon and above all Reagan personally at all costs to long-standing a and the helped, by contributions, this.
of the ministration up and on definitively been
The overcome.
dictatorship although in crisis, is "reliable, of ambitious that could cularly high, immense US the of the aware divisions in administration he was able cunning
A week gave the an
Hawaii.
Reagan is setback, failure of his sonal into a appear since some are relying on the
Cory's cards
Corazon
Aquino is clearly not the naive and green little mother that she was believed to be. Since the and the start of the end of 1985 election campaign, she has demonstrated considerable political sense, a sense of how to maneuver and also how make
Her to compromises.
first moves as president show that she is definitely a factor in the new system of rule, and not just a symbolic moral figure.
before the electoral slates were closed, she was able to make a compromise with Salvador Laurel whereby she agreed to run under the label of his party, the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), president.
She first results.
the sudden her government in
General
Fidel police headto take dubious last- minute allies.
upsurge and that constitutes ment.
in remain, particular the of an before the regime, as hierarchy, considerable a and institutional life before power; more on
The new government
THE NEW government's center of gravity is quite conservative, despite some reformer Salvador Laurel, vice president premier, only late in the game, taking the of UNIDO, tional landholding oligarchy.
Juan Ponce Enrile.
was the guiding spirit of the martial one of the most figures in the Marcos after the end of the 1970s because of the rise of the faction of General
Ver and Imelda Marcos.
Jaime V Ongpin, minister of finance. Head of one of the coun try's main mining companies, the
Benguet Mining Corporation. Represents the big-business bourgeoisie identified with Makati, the "City"
or "Wall Street" of Manila.
Jose Conception Jr., minister of commerce and industry. A businessman who was president of the Namfrel, the independent movement to monitor the elections which played such an active role in the exposure of the election frauds.
Aquilino Pimentel, minister of local administration. Mayor of
Capagyan de Oro in the northern part of the island of Mindanao.
President of the PDP-Laban, linked the country's social elite, she has never broken her class ties. Her political options are polarized on one side by the figure of Cardinal Jaime Sin, the archbishop of Manila, the pivot in a conservative hierarchy but today resigned to reforms; and, on the other side, the currents linked to the "social democrats" and Catholic Action.
These currents have been around for a long time. Already at the beginning of the 1970s, they competed for influence in the student milieu with Marxist currents. But they were paralyzed to a considerable extent by the martial law regime. Only the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was then able to organize multiform resistance to the dictatorship
It alone was able to build an underground apparatus rooted in sections of the masses, able to act on a national scale, to absorb the blows of the repression, to extend progressively an armed struggle movement, to combine legal and semilegal struggles with clandestine activity. 6 to the "Social Democratic" current. A reformer.
government also includes a half dozen other ministers.
Around the government and the president's office are other figures known for their defense of human as well as many personalities belonging to Church circles and current. They include the following:
Jovito Salonga, chief of the president's Commission for Good Government. who lived long in exile in the president of the Liberal Party (progressive wing). dent's executive secretary. A lawyer known for his defense of political person of the president.
for his defense of political prisoners.
In the institutions of the state, the key figures have been kept in place to assure continuity. They are the following:
- General Fidel V Ramos, chief of the General Staff. Former assistant chief of the General Staff, moderate adversary of General Ver. Came over to the opposition at the last minute. Very close to the Pentagon. Expert in "counterinsurgency."
Jose B Fernandez, governor of the Central Bank. Veteran of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund.
martial-law regime did not leave much space for political "third forces," either of the right, the center or the left. The 1970s were a period of growing bipolarization. However, the government did leave certain semidemocratic openings that allowed various marginalized currents to surnot simply be brought to heel in a country where 85 per cent of the population is Catholic. An army-Church commission, in fact, was established to negotiate the fate of members of the religious orders threatened by the repression.
It was only at the end of the Marcos regime — when formally martial law had been lifted - that the target for liquidations. Church social activity could not be eliminated by
It was the crucible for very
The anti-Marcos lobbies established in the United States were powerful, and the regime had to respect minimum of formal rules in order to especially in the could not be made to march in step in a country that had never known a centralizing regime. Some provinces remained oppositional.
"social democratic" current maintained itself, although marginally. wing, unlike the Marxists, advocated nonviolence. This is true today of the Jesuit priest (2), who was denounced as a "clerico-fascist" as late as September 1985 in a communique of the National Democratic Front (NDF), for his divisive activity within the opposition forces. (3)
Another Jesuit priest, the Reverend Father Intengan, founded the underwing of this movement involved in mass work, opposed the anti-Communist orientation of the national leadership and often advoprinciple of an alliance with the CPP.
Members of the social democratic current were arrested for conducting armed actions and planting bombs in
In the hierarchy, since the end of the 1970s, the bishop of Bukidnon, Monseignor Francisco Claver, gained a reputation for his defense of a "third way" between the dictatorship and the guerrillas. While recognizing the primary responsibility of the government, he denounced the army and the NPA as two twin forces of militarization. (4)
The social democrat positions corresponded to the concerns of many of the bishops, who were worried about the radicalization of the Church base and convinced that liberation theology was an instrument for subversive penetration, manipulated
Socially, the Jesuits have had a considerable influence among members of the Philippine elite, in parti-
University. Now, and the "soc. dem. " personalities have gained an important political weight. They influence a party such as the Combat (PDP-Laban) and Corazon's brother-in-law, "Butz" Aquino. They are well represented in the presidential lobby. They advocate reform to forestall revolution.
2. See Reverend Father Jose Blanco, "Vers une revolution non-violente?" in 'Non-violence actualite, ' March 1986.
3. 'Liberation' (organ of the No. tional Democratic Front INDF), Special Issue No. 2, September 11, 1985, "In unity, our struggle will flourish; in division, our struggle will perish, "p.3. philippines
Francisco Claver, termoignage de Mgr., Claver, 'Croiss des Jeunes nations, No. 257, 1984. International Viewpoint 24 March 1986
Despite the obvious reluctance of the military, the president obtained the release of all the known political prisoners, including Jose Maria Sison, the CPP; and Bernabe Buscayno, accused of being the legendary Commander Dante, who symbolized the link between the Huk guerrillas in the 1950s and the NPA, which was formed in 1969. (5)
The conflict between the "reform-
"conservatives" developing today on other terrains, starting with the extent of special powers to be granted to the "revolutionary" presidency and the institutional reforms to be pushed through.
The conflicts that continue to shake the new regime can offer the anti-imperialist left in the Philippines the opportunity to regain a field of independent mass action.
The entire left, even that part that noted with concern the presence in government of such as Enrile. Ed Garcia, representative of the Movement for National (KAAKBAY), which is led politically
Diokno and also includes independent Marxists, argues that the "popular will" that brought Corazon Aquino to power has been deflected by the military.
But the entire left, including the part that advocated a boycott of the elections, recognises the popular character of Cory's victory.
In 1985, the Philippine left had begun to prepare its intervention in the 1986 regional and local elections. All the components of the left = including the CP - were thinking of participating directly or indirectly in the electoral confrontation in a series of regions. But the announcement of the confronted the anti-imperialist movement with a difficult tactical choice. Because it was divided it was difficult for the left to intervene rapidly enough to change the opposition candidates. The Aquino-Laurel ticket was bourgeois. But it raised great hopes among the people. The minority currents of the anti-imperialist left got involved in the election campaign. On the other hand the majority, represented by the CPP and the NDF, defended the principle of a boycott. (6)
Bayan, a mass coalition organization influenced by the NDF, theoretically justified the boycott by putting forward three non-negotiable preconditions for its participation in the elections: the resignation of Marcos (which was constitutionally necessary),
International Viewpoint 24 March 1986 the lifting of the decrees pernitting arbitrary arrests taneous organization of local elections. The CPP and the NDF generally denounced the February 7 as a farce without significance, if reactionary. statement dated January 15 the CPP
Cory Aquino's courage. predicted that presidential election' different from the US-Marcos dictatorship's past bogus election has the making of being the biggest political swindle ever attempted by the US-Marcos clique upon our
For the National Democratic Front also, these elections could only serve interests of the regime. solemn appeal the NDF declared
"The snap election is a farce that will only serve the interest of the and its US patron. This is the message that we impart in this manifesto." At the end of a lengthy analysis the NDF concluded that whatever the good will of Cory or of those who supported partici
"to participate in (this elecsupporting the US-Marcos ship and its bankrupt schemes. participate in it is ailing regime a new lease of life and further entrench tyranny. Far from securing the desired basic changes the present system, participation in the snap election will only prolong the life of the entire oppressive ruling system and intensify the sufferings of the broad masses of our people." (8)
This boycott policy was applied
The CPP did not try to oppose the course of the elections physically, and in several provinces movements that officially advocated a boycott helped the NAMFRED [National Citizens Movement for free Elections ] during the vote. Many members of Bayan, the radical coalition of mass organizations that advocated a boycott, joined in Cory's
It is likely that within the CPP divergent opinions have appeared. Sison himself critieized both too hard a boycott policy and an uncritical policy of participation. He maintained between the supporters of a "minimum boycott," in principle, nothing more - and the supporters of "critical participation."
However, it seems that in some groups of activists, which were divided about what attitude to take toward the elections, there were sharp between left engaged in "critical participation"
and supporters of the boycott, who were convinced that the reelection of Marcos would be the signal for a new wave of radicalization masses who had seen their hopes
That in fact was the prognosis on which the boycott call was based. Marcos could not lose control the electoral operation; the United States would not drop its protege on that occasion. In these conditions, the opposition could only give the clearly had not gauged the democratic people's movement whose force the tables on Marcos. error of perspective in fact extended even beyond February 7.
In an interview given on February 13, Antonio Zumel, a member of the Political Bureau of the CPP, and chair of the NDF, congratulated Corazon for the way in which she was continuing the struggle despite Marcos' electoral fraud.
While presenting a sober judgement on the forces left in the country and discussing the conditions for a ceasefire in the event of an Aquino victory, Zumel announced that the political and social polarization of the country was going
The role of the moderate opposition was going to decline more and more: with "this revolutionary situation that we have ... it is logical that the moderate opposition will tend to contract as forces go to one side or the other." In fact, "today there is hardly any room for reforms." (10) this error of judgement led them into a blind alley in these crucial weeks and that they now have to reevaluate their tactic. In early March, a debate was in progress in the CPP leadership over adopting a new tactical orientateading a rip orag ideological often- Aquino was sive, calling on the guerrillas to lay down their arms. At the same time,
In 1942, the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP), and from which the founders the present CP broke in 19 1, l uncane e guerrilla movement against movement known under the name of the Huks. See IV" No.
See International Viewpoint,' No.
92, February 10, 1986.
special release, January 15, 1986.
'Liberation,' Vol. 10, No. 1, Januar war; a call to boycott the snap elections,
An interview given on December reprinted in Intercontinental Press,'
Vol. 24, No. 5, March 10, 1986, p. 128.
Interview given to 'Far Eastern Economic Review,