In August 1968, the Soviet bureaucracy and its client bureaucracies in Poland and East Germany sent their armies into the country to stop il. Since the changes were initialed by the party leadership and the resistance to the occupation was led by the established authorities, the political limitations of this leadership undermined opposition to reconsolidation of the bureaucracy. Petr Uhl was a leading figure in the revolutionary Marxist current that was beginning to grow rapidly toward the end of the Prague Spring. He has continued to play a leading role in the opposition to bureaucratic dictatorship since most notably in Charter 77, the main human-rights organized in "normalized" Czechoslovakia. In the following article, he assesses the state of opposition to the bureaucracy 20 years after the start of the Prague
Spring and 10 years after the founding of Charter 77, In particular in the light of the Soviet new course under
Gorbachev, which many of the Prague Spring Czechoslovak Communist Party leaders see as a vindication of the policy reversed by the August 1968 Invasion. The article has been reproduced in a shortened form from inprekor, a Czech-language bulletin published under the auspices of the Fourth International. It is the first in an occasional series of retrospective articles on 1968-1988 that we will be publishing this year.
### PETR UHL all social life, from whose domination nothing escapes - has become the analytical framework of most works devoted to Eastern Europe.
Such conservative schemas have often included an attempt to demonstrate an ideological and functional similarity, if not an identity, between Soviet-type totalitarianism and the Nazism. The advocates of this approach are fundamentally interested in justifying capitalist productive relations and bourgeois democracy. Many of these authors, in fact, say that openly.
Nonetheless, a simple rejection of this approach is insufficient. It is insufficient first of all for those who have the experience of bourgeois democracy but whose views on the Soviet regime are influenced by a flood of second-hand information, or even outright disinformation. It is all the more insufficient for people in Eastern Europe who have little reliable information and are apt to form schematic notions about Western society and often about the causes of the phenomena that they encounter daily in their own lives.
Not the ideology of Marxism-Leninism
The scope of this article cannot offer a political analysis of the following points: that the development of the disagreeable state of society in Eastern Europe is not the ideology of Marxism-Leninism (or any other ideology); that the alleged expansionist character of the Soviet "empire" is not the logical outcome of the concept of "world revolution," but rather undeniable aggressiveness of the USSR is more and more the mark of its increasing defensiveness; that the tendency to totalitarianism - that is, absolute control and domination of everything and everyone - began to weaken in the 1950s; that judicial norms do exist (both good and bad ones, from the standpoint of the ruled), which the executive powers are increasingly trying to respect; or that the equation between Nazism and the system under which we are
68-88 living is senseless, because the historical economic and political roots, causes features of the two social systems are distinct - just as the phenomena of these systems, their aspirations and their crimes, as well as people's lives in both political formations, are distinct.
mat one we diake up in this article is the 19
March 7, 1988 • International Viewpoint
CZECHOSLOVAKIA political development in Czechoslovakia over recent months in order to point up some facts that may contribute to a better understanding of our part of the world
The grey totalitarian picture of the Soviet bloc, as we know, began to change with Gorbachev's rise to power. Many writers, but also many politicians and state leaders, welcomed his declarations and some of the changes that took place in the USSR with so much satisfaction that this gave a lot of people illusions that the Soviet system could be transformed into a democratic social order. This 180-degree turn, while not general and hedged with many reservations, has the same result as the old ap proach of damning Soviet totalitarianism as something malevolent. Before, everything was reprehensible: Soviet and East European society were "regimented" by the state power; law was denied, and there no human rights or human freedoms.
There was therefore, no reason to to bother with the details, to study the complex mechanism of power and of the political system, to look for allies in these countries, to make specific demands. Everything was grey, antipathetic, evil. But today, everything is on the right road. Gorbachev's reforms are advancing, sooner or later, they will carry the day. Stressing demands for respect for human rights or supthe democratic opposition and independents — which would require a deeper understanding of the complex political, social and cultural scene, based on detailed study - might in fact damage the Gorbachev leadership, weaken it, shake its precarious position. Idea of reformability of the
Soviet system
Or, from another point of view, pointing up the convergence of the two systems toward the elusive democratic mean could discredit it in the eyes of influential Soviet conservatives, for whom this might be proof that the Gorbachev leadership was "making deals with the capitalists. even today there is no need to concern yourself with details and get too involved with the probiems of the USSR and Eastern
Convenient notions, however, tend not to be the most reliable of guides. The dilemma is not totalitarianism or reforms, because believing in either is an illusion fostered by a lack of information or political prejudices.
Even a man known for his extraordinarily sharp judgement, secretary of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party at the time of the Prague Spring, Zdenek Mlynar, has fallen into the trap of this false dichotomy. While clearly rejecting the right-wing view of Soviet totalitarianism, he proposes as the only alternative the idea of the reformability of the 20 Soviet system.
Despite living in exile in Vienna since International Viewpoint • March 7, 1988
1977, Zdenek Mlynar is an excellent representative of the ex-Communist milieu, those who were expelled from the Czechoslovak CP in 1968. He is the spokesperson of a section of it. Let us look at the way this milieu interpreted Gorbachev's policy.
Belief in rehabilitation of reformist concepts
In the first place, it needs to be said that for the expelled Communists, especially inasmuch as they occupied the leading posts before 1970 and committed themselves in 1968-69 as the "progressive tendency," the present Soviet course represents a certain personal hope. That is understandable from a human point of view. Most of them, of course, if only because of their age, no longer believe that they will be "reintegrated" — to use their term — into the power structures. They do believe, however, in the rehabilitation of their reformist concepts. In fact, the similarities and correspondences between the Prague Spring and the present developments in the USSR are
Only reluctantly do these former Communist Party members concede that the overall social, economic and political situation in the USSR is very different from the situation in Czechoslovakia today or 20 years ago. Moreover, they often see only one feature of this difference - Soviet technological and social backwardness, and in the political field its lack of democratic traditions and so forth. They cannot therefore explain the fact - which indeed has escaped many of them, and most of of the Czechoslovak population - that Gorbachev's reforms have little social support in the Soviet Union. That only the intelligentsia, in particular, the humanistic intelenthusiasm, but that the Soviet working class and numerous other strata of the population are showing a lack of interest, or even sometimes opposition. The problem is that in discussions among former party members and other independents there is often a confusion of language. Concepts as reform, democracy or self-management have different meanings for different people.
The nub of the argument about the relationship between the process of renewal in Czechoslovakia and the present Soviet changes is probably that those who maintain that there is a resemblance or even a partial identity see the Czechoslovak process in 1968 (more accurately 1968-69) as only a process of reform. That is, they see it as positive political and also cultural, social and partially economic changes implemented by the party leadership of the time, headed by Alexandr Dubcek, which aroused a positive response among the population and encouraged initiative and activity by the people.
But truth is (although this is putting it necessarily a bit schematically), that there were two processes in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1968, which conditioned and complemented each other but had two rather clearly distinct aims and were supported by distinct social and political forces.
The first was the process conducted by the Czechoslovak CP, especially its leadership, parts of the apparatus, of the party intelligentsia and to a lesser extent by the party base. That was, to be sure, a reform process. This was a continuation of the 1963-68 period, which went barely noticed in the world because it was far from as spectacular or as stormy as the years 1968 and 1969. At that time important social changes took place, that were reluctantly accepted by the Novak and Lenart government, although over a long period.
The labor code was altered in the interests of the workers, the way was opened for travel abroad, the major barriers to international exchange of information fell. In the cultural world people began to breathe more easily, the most scandalous forms of "cadre policy" [discrimination] were eliminated in employment and education. Former political prisoners were gradually granted legal and civic rehabilitation. In a nutshell, conditions became freer. You could say that in the country an undramatic, slow but palpable liberalization, in the political sense of the term, painfully gained Economic situation called for reforms
This was the result of an international thaw, the overcoming of the cold war atmosphere and obviously of the changes in the USSR under Nikita Khrushchev, which appeared in Czechoslovakia somewhat later. Within the country, these changes have to be credited to those forces that fought for them — the humanitarian party intelligentsia, but also those working in the national economic sphere and technical sphere, as well as writers and to some extent students.
However, in the party and state apparatus there were also those who supported the reforms to a certain extent. The economic situation in particular called for reforms. It is quite appropriate to draw a parallel between that liberalization and the Soviet development. But there are also many differences. Among the most important are the much more pronounced stagnation of the Soviet economy today, by comparison with the Czechoslovak economic maladjustments of the time. In addition are the several decades of violent Stalinism in the USSR, which to a large extent broke the historical continuity of Russian, Baltic, Caucasian and other democratic traditions, and in particular the traditions of popular self-organization that developed in 1917 and the years that followed.
Another difference is in the general orientation and tempo of the two reform efforts. Slow changes in Czechoslovakia relaxed the grip of bureaucratic severity for
many social groupings in the population. But the "enlightened despotism" in the USSR is stressing intensification of work, discipline and order. That is is not very popular. It explains the fundamental difference in the reaction of the population to the reforms. The Soviet population as a whole does not consider glasnost —that is, more honest information and the removal of the bureaucratic barriers to art and culture in general — as a fundamental change, and is watching perestroika in the economic and political spheres with reserve and partial hostility.
The Czechoslovak population in the 1960s, on the other hand, was much more favorably inclined to the Czechoslovak CP's efforts at reform. In the area of rights and freedoms, it received welcome "gifts." In the economic field, it looked with sympathy on the introduction of less rigid forms of work and management.
The political crisis of the Czechoslovak CP leadership at the end of 1967 and the beginning of 1968 not only speeded up but underwent a qualitative change. That was because a second process was gradually taking hold on the country's political scene, a process developing from below. More and more people in various circles, first among the students and the humanistic intelligentsia, later among the youth in generintelligentsia and the trade-union functionaries in the factories and finally among the workers, joined this pow-
This current's objective was no longer reforms, that is, changes in the functioning of the existing political and social system, modernizing it and making it more efficient and generally loosening the bureaucratic straitjackets stifling the society. Its aim was structural changes, advancing increasingly towards a total change in the regime, to the creation of a pluralistic society, to a demo-
The fundamental thing is that this current had a real popular base - the broadest masses of workers adhered to it. The decisive thing is not that millions of the supporters of this current saw their own selforganized activity as support for the Dubcek leadership of the time and were not able to distinguish very well (with some exceptions) their own interests, aspirations and goals from those of the party leadership.
For the party leadership of the state, the meaning of the reform was only consolidating the existing political system, in order to prevent the rise and development of a democratic social order, toward which a more and more massive initiative from below was heading. This is why the reformist approaches, which in 1963-67 made such positive improvements in the social climate in the country and improved the living conditions of the population, became an obstacle one in view of the illusions that had been
— to a thoroughgoing democratiza-
That became evident after the Soviet intervention, from August 1968, to April 1969, when the party leadership still adhered to the reform policy, because the Czechoslovak CP set out on the road of concessions, "normalization" bureaucratization) mainly through waves of illegal repression. What was not accomplished by repression was achieved by a relatively rapid transition to "consumer society, the corruption of part of the population and general demoralization".
It is necessary to clarify the concept of democracy. In the Czechoslovak and East European conditions, it has to be understood as a program. Its definition has to have - in contrast to Western Europe, for example — revolutionary content. But it has to be defined. Otherwise, people are apt to regard any liberalization, any improvement in conditions, as an element of democratization.
However, you can only call democracy" a political order that institutionalizes a pluralism of views, which explicitly supports the development of such pluralism — pluralism in politics, philosophy, religion, culture and so on. You can only call "democracy" a political order that constitutionally, legally and irreversibly guarantees a plurality of conceptions, programs, projects and so forth. It can only be democracy if it guarantees freedom of discussion and publication of such a plurality of positions, in short, if it offers the possibility for competing and winning supporters for different viewpoints.
It can only be democracy if it systematically guarantees that anyone can adhere to any conception or view, and influence it.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA The majority have to be guaranteed the right to choose among various orientations, and the minority the right to criticize any conception and seek to win over more people to get the previous orientation changed.
The indications that the party leadership's attempts at reform in the spring of 1968 had an antidemocratic character are numerous. They can be seen from the discussion on eliminating censorship and the attempt to restore it at least partially, to the discussion on social democracy, on opposition and so-called oppositionism in the Action Program, on the leading role of the party, on the factory law, and the proposed law on association, and finally to the concealment of the real state of things - the Soviet threat - which the leadership must have known about.
In fact, many party members, and the party leadership itself, often made important progressive changes. Some of them overstepped the bounds between liberalization and democratization, between improving the political system and overcoming it. But, going up the pyramid of power, they became became rarer and rarer exceptions. The celebrated progressives themselves often took bureaucratic stands in crucial disputes in an attempt to maintain what had been previously achieved. So, it is simply an illusion — to come back to the positions that are held today by people who were Communist Party members at that time, those expelled from the party, positions that unfortunately influence public opinion, although more often Western than Czechoslovak - to look at the Prague Spring process of renewal as a single current, to present it as reforming and democratizing at the same time.
Finally, also in the ex-Communist milieu, the responses to the present Soviet process are quite differentiated. The view that the changes in the USSR may mean — as Gorbachev says— a real revolutionary transformation, whose aim is to democratize Soviet society (to democratize it in the sense we proposed) is far from universal in this initial period.
The minority that held this opinion (in any case, always with reservations, especially regarding the time necessary for such a change) were more disappointed by Gorbachev's visit this April than those who thought otherwise. An expression of this position before Gorbachev's visit was the well-known letter by 18 former Czechoslovak CP functionaries (including four members of the Central Committee), which 21 certainly did not represent a broad spec-
March 7, 1988 • International Viewpoint
CZECHOSLOVAKIA trum of the views of ex-Communists. Their identification with Gorbachev's policy, which forms the basis of the letter, aroused a wave of dissent in their milieu and others. Representatives of Charter 77 published a statement denying radio accounts linking the letter to the Charter.
Little in common with real democratization
A certainly more sophisticated position was taken by some other former Communists and and non-party people. They recognize that today the Gorbachev leadership's objectives have little in common with real democratization. But at the same time, they argue that by stressing the democratic aspects Soviet policy could have today, if Gorbachev were taken at his "word," by pointing out that his proposals have lacked credibility so far but could gain it in the future (pretending that they want to see it gain such credibility), it is possible to create a certain pressure from below, to change illusions into conceptions, and conceptions into results. In fact, they argue, that when ideas are embraced by the masses, they can become a powerful social force, even if they are taken from a leadership that does not sincerely hold them.
However, particularly in Czechoslovakia, the insincerity of the "democratization" theses is quite apparent. And those who hold such views, with varying intensity and various nuances, slackened somewhat in their propagation of the new Gorbachev "thought, when they saw the shift in the attitude of Czechoslovak citizens — as well as many ex-Communists - toward Gorbachev's policy after his visit to Czechoslovakia, a shift from hope to scepticism.
A very critical attitude to perestroika and MERCI MONSIEUR SYSSOŻEY International Viewpoint • March 7, 1988 glasnost was not exceptional, even in the ex-Communist milieu, even before April. There were and are people who see the changes in the USSR as purely cosmetic, who retain the conception of a basically unchanging Soviet (totalitarian) society. Most people, however, criticize this view, pointing to concrete changes and concrete liberalization in culture and art, partial liberalization in the area of human rights — with a decrease in repression and release of political prisoners however inadequate these measures may be. In particular, they point to liberalization in the economic sphere, where the term reform is justified, insofar as this is understood as a certain improvement in the quality of goods, discussion on the economy and its management in general.
With the exception of a sceptical minority, in the former Communist Party members' circles everyone starts out from the idea that the Soviet system can be reformed, meaning that it can be democratized. The argument is only over whether Gorbachev is serious, and whether in the given political, economic and other conditions his leadership is really able to direct this reform current, and over what chances he has for success.
The road of reforms from above
Generally, only one road to improved conditions is recognized — the road of reforms from above. Depending on how democratic an outlook participants in this debate have, and that of the former Communist Party members associated with Charter 77 is certainly more democratic than those who are not, this view is usually complemented by the idea of the need for pressure from below. This means pressure from the lower levels of the official structure (the base of the Communist Party, official departments, the Church, youth organizations, and so on), as well as pressure from the independent associations and initiative groups (Charter 77, Vons, Underground and so on).
From the opposite standpoint - that is, the standpoint that Soviet political system is basically unreformable — it does not, of course, follow that reform from above should be entirely rejected. While recognizing that improvements in the political system and of the economic "mechanism" are aimed at preserving this system, it is quite possible to support reforms of some aspects of it that improve the lives of specific people or groups of citizens, and which offer everyone a definite possibility to breathe more freely.
It is all the more necessary to support such reforms so that the entire society, and first of all intellectuals and technicians, can attain a higher level of social consciousness. A freer spirit generates more and more demands from below, and after liberalization real democratization starts to knock on the door - even though this is not what the reformers intend - even though they fear it as much as the devil is said to fear holy water.
In the circles of former Communist Party members, people have their eyes very firmly fixed on another road to democratizing the system. It is gradual transformation of the existing state and party institutions (first of all, the Communist party, but all institutions in general) into instruments of those who work in them and those whom they are supposed to represent. In effect, these institutions are supposed to be transformed into instruments that can be used to defend and advance the interests of the working people and the broadest layers of the population.
This is a conception of reform "from below," based on the conviction that the existing political system can, through its own structures, through its own institutions, renew itself, transform itself, change into a democratic system - insofar of course as the members of the CP, the departments, various unions and associations and so forth join in this process. On the basis of the experience of the Prague Spring, this conception is often linked with first road, that is, with reforms from above, viewed as part of an interlocking system.
Rigid boundaries of political system
This second conception of "reform from below" is certainly more agreeable than the first road [reform from above], because it is imbued with a democratic spirit. It must be acknowledged that as the beginning of a restructuring of society, of transition from bureaucratic dictatorship to a democratic order, such an approach is conceivable, and, in combination with the third road, which will be taken up further on, it de-
serves consideration. Under certain conditions, it would be possible to give it full support.
Insofar as the USSR today is concerned, it is necessary, of course, to discuss seriously why the Gorbachev reforms are not generating ferment in the structures (at least they have not so far). Likewise, there needs to be discussion on whether the real attempt at reform in Czechoslovakia in the 1960s was the sole cause of the tempestuous development in the official organizations and institutions in the spring of 1968 and into 1969.
In fact, the Czechoslovak experiences shows precisely that the bounds of the political system are quite rigid, and that reform "from above" and "from below" grinds to a halt and is transformed into an obstacle as the holders of power come to feel threatened by ever bolder demands. Nonetheless, it has to be recognized that a reform process in the official institutions can be the main current in the first phase of confrontation with the political system. It can prepare the way for a change in the system, that is, a political revolution.
Solidarnosc and Charter 77
In relation to Czechoslovakia (and more so to Poland), it is appropriate to formulate a third possible conception of democratization — the road of independent associations, a "parallel society, " the road of influencing society by independent activities and the growing over of such activities into a movement of the society as a whole. Polish Solidarnose tried this road, and to a more modest extent Charter 77 did so in Czechoslovakia as well. This conception is not counterposed to reformist views, in particular not to conceptions of reforms from below.
Historical experience, including that of the Prague Spring, testifies that if a reform movement from below develops in the official structures, it generates centrifugal, autonomistic tendencies.
On the remains of the old, unreformable bureaucratic "transition belts," new organizations, institutions and initiatives arise. They link up with independent initiatives. Their function is the opposite of a repressive or manipulative one. They strive for the emancipation of society by creating the conditions for the emancipation of every individual.
A section of the former Communist Party members reject this third road - that is, support for an independent movement as the germ of future social order - and turn their backs on Charter 77. Some even call on their old comrades to abandon this adventurist enterprise.
But many others sympathize with the Charter and a few hundred of them have even signed it. Among the few dozen active Chartists, roughly half are from these circles. *
The role
of
Charter
77
A N ANALYSIS of the view of
former Communist Party members on possible changes in Czechoslovakia and on the influence of the Gorbachev reforms is necessary because they are the most politicized in the unofficial, relatively independent part of society. The spectrum of their views corresponds to a considerable extent to the spectrum of opinions of the population.
Among the people, we find the most incredible views. Some are convinced that the Czechs are under the domination of the Slovaks (Husak, Bilak and Chnoupek are Slovaks). Another idea is that everything is a deception, like 1968 when the Dubcek leadership made a pact with Moscow and through the liberalization deliberately created the conditions for the Soviet military intervention. On the other hand there is a notion that Gorbachev will soon oust the Czechoslovak leadership in order to put Dubcek back in. Some think that it's all the fault of the free masons or atheism, and so
Nonetheless, the visit of Gorbachev, in whom so many "unpolitical" Czechs had placed their hopes, shattered a lot of
Despite the variety of views, and often the absence of any idea about how the country might develop, the population is united in its rejection of, and at times in its contempt for, the Czechoslovak party and
Positive and enriching contribution
Let us, return, however, once again to the former Communist Party members. Especially among Czechoslovak exiles, the most widely varying rumors and illusions prevail about their influence on Charter 77. Of course, they have a relatively great influence on Charter 77, both because of their numbers and their comparatively well-worked out, but highly differentiated, political and economic analyses. Nonetheless, as an opponent of many of their positions, stereotypes and conceptions, I would say that this influence is positive and enriching. Charter 77 is indebted to them for many ideas.
By accepting some of their ideas, as well as by rejecting others, Charter 77 orients
CZECHOSLOVAKIA and defines itself. In this way it also consolidates its vitality. Similarly, this goes for the influence of conservative circles and for all ideological positions appearing among Chartists and their sympathizers. Anyone who conceives of the Charter as an opposition coalition or the Czechoslovak National Front of 1945-48 does not understand it. The Charter is an association striving for human rights, it is a continuing citizen's initiative group with features of a movement (may they grow stronger!).
Simply to be able to exist at all, it has rejected any possibility of developing a common political program or, in general, of being a basis for political oppositional activity. The reasons for this basic selflimitation have to do more with consolidating internal cohesion than with fears about any threat from the outside, although those have played and continue to play a role. A pluralist association understood in this way, of course, does not prevent Chartists from organizing on a political basis outside the Charter. Nor does it prevent the existence of other groupings outside the Charter, and not only political ones, whose relations to the Charter tend to be complex. The notion of some sort of dominance in the Charter is, however, an illusion. Affection for feudalism and the Austrian empire
Inside Charter 77, people sometimes criticize the tendency to use it for the benefit of the political or ideological objectives of a part of its signatories. Before we discuss whether and, if so, to what extent such a tendency appeared this year in the formulation of the Charter's attitude to Gorbachev's glasnost and its reflection in Czechoslovakia, let us briefly look at the rather agitated discussion that took place in Charter 77 and its sympathizers' circles two or three years ago. It developed after the publication of the Charter document "The Right to History," and especially after the publication of an additional explanation by its anonymous authors
From these texts it was clear - although there was little open expression of this -that the authors opposed not only the fundamental concepts of Marxism and socialism, but modernity, the renaissance, the reformation and any sort of godlessness. Also clear was their affection for feudalism and the Austrian empire. This coincided with a lot of noise about an alleged religious revival in Czechoslovakia (this tendency has deeper socio-political roots and most likely is statistically weaker than the continual advance of atheism — or rather "agnosticism" - in society, not excluding Slovakia).
This argument was possible because the percentage of Christians (mainly Catholics) in Charter 77 is many times higher than it is in general, especially in Bohemia and Prague. (About a third of the Chartists con- 23 sider themselves believers, even if only a
March 7, 1988 • International Viewpoint
CZECHOSLOVAKIA minority of them are practicing. With the exception of Slovakia and some Moravian districts, only a small percentage of people are practicing Christians, while in Prague this is less than one per cent of the population.)
Some months of discussion did not settle the question of whether we should accept or reject "positive science." But it did illustrate again the limits of Charter 77 as a pluralistic association, united around its striving for human rights.
Another, less virulent tendency has threatened the Charter from its beginning. That is nationalism. The number of those in the Charter who consider the nation and the fatherland as sacrosanct values is insignificant. A certain healthy "national nihilism" of the population, especially among the youth, is very evident, and is useful as an argument in discussions.
In recent months, there has been a good discussion about the Charter's "ghettoization" (precisely in connection with the proclamation of glasnost), and about its insignificant, basically non-existent influence on Czechoslovak public opinion, which contrasts with its relatively weighty reputation abroad. The Charter's isolation is linked by its many critics and by a number of the signatories to an atmosphere of intellectual elitism and paternalism, and to the customary law of the Charter that decrces that the basic decisions are to be made by a vaguely defined "active cadre" of the group.
Charter governmed by consensus
Criticism has been both justified and unjustified, and there have been no lack of efforts to change this situation. The difficulty is that the Charter is not an organization, and so there are no democratic rules for it, either the right of the majority to decide or the right of minorities to organize opposition to the majority decisions. The Charter is basically governed by so-called general consensus, which Charter 77 representatives try to sound out - on the basis of their own judgment, but mainly in accordance with real possibilities - before they issue documents or take other actions.
The principle of consensus is quite vague. Strict observance of it would condemn the Charter to ineffectiveness, because in an association of roughly a thousand signatories (out of 1,300, about 200 have gone abroad, some dozens have died, and some others have "renounced" their signatures), there will always be some objection to anything. What is worse is that most of the signatories have no contact with the designated representatives of the
This is partly because hundreds of the signatories are completely passive. Often this is not out of fear of the police but out of an aversion to the work that the Charter has " done so far. Or there are other reasons, International Viewpoint • March 7, 1988 such as inadequate education, age, shyness and geographical isolation. In the main, outside Prague contacts are made difficult by actual or threatened police interference, absence of any organizational Stalinist legacy of "unity"
Perhaps as a result of general debate about the possibilities for democratization, both inside and outside of the Charter, these problems are beginning to be discussed in the group. The lack of critical spirit, the Stalinist legacy of "unity," a conservative, self-indulgent clinging to the present unsatisfactory internal functioning of the Charter - all these are obstacles to this discussion. Therefore, real improvement is proceeding only very slowly and with many difficulties.
This internal weakness of the Charter also has a negative effect outside of it. The group is only slowly and hesitatingly developing new initiatives and activities (both those that fall directly under its aegis and those that it might stimulate and support). And new forms of work are being carried out only with great difficulty. But this is the area where the first signs of a revival appeared this year: increased interest in international collaboration with East European independents (such contacts with the Western peace movement and effective dialogue have been a reality for some years); increased interest in ecology; appeals to the population; public appearances by signatories; various conferences — mainly, the organization of so-called Charter forums — places where signatories can meet non-signatories and where the consensus in the Charter can be verified with those who previously have not been in a good position to express opinions about its
Despite all these good signs, a clear turn has not yet taken place in the Charter. It is necessary, however, to remember that for ten whole years its main importance has been that in a relatively unfree society, it has been a milieu of relatively free people and relatively free discussion.
A new phenomenum has been appearing in the Charter in recent months. It is an appeal for democracy, for political democracy for the society - that is, for the possibility of a new order that is beyond the scope of the Charter alone to conceive. There is no doubt that this new tone is the result of the developments in the USSR and of the outlook mainly of the former Communist Party members. A call for democracy was included in this year's declaration on the tenth anniversary of the founding of the Charter, which was published under the title "A Word to Fellow Citizens."
The Charter's formulation of the need for a democratic order is probably only a general framework, justified by a logical connection between the political conditions in the country and the state of human rights. In this regard, it is similar to the formulation of conceptions of a future political order in a peaceful Europe, or of the Charter's dialogue with the Western peace groups. This dialogue and these conceptions are limited by the Charter's explicit renunciation (in its founding declaration) of "any program of its own for political or social reforms or changes." Likewise, the Charter's interest in questions of peace is explained by the connection between peace and human
However, further steps in this direction, a more precise definition of the nature of the democracy proposed (and this is far from simply being a question of a contrast between parliamentary and self-management forms of democracy), is hardly possible for the Charter. That is a task for political formations that have been virtually nonexistent up until now, whose formation the Charter could support and which it could
Theories of "limited democracy"
Even the call for democracy, which only appeared explicitly in the Charter's materials this year, probably does not enjoy a complete consensus in the group - especially on its fringes. Certain special-interest group tendencies in the conception and assessment of the role of spokespersons for the Charter could have parallels in specialinterest group conceptions of the society as a whole. Moreover, it is the case that theocratic, expressly anti-democratic conceptions have shown up not just outside the Charter but among its sympathizers, and have received a certain
Likewise, conservative thinkers often declare their support for the democratic social model. But some of their formulations have aroused certain doubts and reminiscences of theories of "limited democracy." The most distinct threat to the Charter's democratic platform, however, comes from technocratic positions that claim formally to support democracy (representative, of course), but in reality propagate decision-making by experts and professionals
Despite everything, we recognize that the Charter propagating the general need for democracy is entirely justified. This need is the heart and soul of the Charter. It flowed already from its founding statement.
A distinct threat to Charter 77 can be seen in the political philosophy that accompanies the proposal for democracy and demo-
It was indicated in some documents of the Charter this year (and in earlier ones). It has often been expressed in objections before the publication of documents, in a watered-down form. It is a reformist support for transition of the society toward democracy, a conception of "democratization from above," which of course stresses pressure from below, and may even