include a call for reform of the official structures from below.
This approach is based on calling for potential allies among those holding power and in the executive apparatus. "Together we, you who hold power and we who are excluded from it, along with all people of good will, have to proceed to democratize society, its political system, in harmony with the glasnost proclaimed in the USSR transition YOUI own proposals for the
That, obviously, is not a quote from any Charter document, but it paraphrases the reformist point of view, which is advocated in Charter 77, mainly (but not entirely) by people from the milieu of former party members. They take Gorbachev's fervent appeals and the cautious versions of the Czechoslovak ruling group at their word. A concrete expression of this approach was the offer of so-called national reconciliations, which was formulated by the Charter in two documents this year, in the "Word to Fellow Citizens" and the "Statement on August 21." But in Czechoslovakia there is neither civil war nor the threat of one. In view of the passivity of the population, social disputes do not have an excessively conflictual character. Therefore, talking about "national reconciliation" does not make very much sense.
Critics of the strategy of taking Gorbachev and company "at their word" and of the political line advanced in the Charter by supporters (either real or "tactical") of Gorbachev's line often get the objection that the Charter was founded on the idea of dialogue with the state power, and that it would be absurd not to take advantage of today's more favorable situation, when the state leadership itself, albeit in still vague terms, supports a nationwide discussion.
The Charter was indeed founded on the idea of dialogue about human rights. Later formulations, indeed, indicate what such dialogue cannot touch on, province of the Charter. On the other hand, no objection could be raised if people called for dialogue with the authorities not in the name of the Charter, regardless of whether they were signatories. Human rights are bound up with the political order
It is true that human rights are bound up with the political order. But the gamble of the Czechoslovak supporters of Gorbachev's perestroika in the party apparatus is not - like a gamble on any other political or ideological force and conception - a standpoint that the Charter could adopt as a goal. It is, of course, a good thing that such a position is developing precisely in Charter circles and that it is being discussed and corrected, precisely by the criticism of other Chartists.
The former Communist Party members and the very weak conservative forces have bases outside Charter 77. The non-Chartist ex-Communist Party members are very much more reformist than their former comrades in Charter 77. Likewise, the conservatives working outside Charter 77 are much more reactionary than their ideological friends in the Charter. Both these bases outside the Charter are very heterogeneous, unorganized. They represent no influential force in the country, even in comparison with the Charter, which can only exercise its influence by means of various pressures
As was said, in its unpolitical, human rights orientation, the Charter has been and continues to be enriched by Christians, both Catholics and Evangelical Reformed It is unfortunate that in the present period of somewhat freer conditions they have not come forward with an overall proposal for solving the social problems.
Those modern Catholic currents which for example have sought political expression in Latin American through liberation theology, or in Europe through new approaches to society and morals and to the Church itself - have left Czech and Slovak Catholics essentially untouched. However, many common points can be established between the fight for more just social conditions and for respect for human dignity waged by Catholics in various countries, including Latin America and Czechoslovakia.
The main problem seems to be the position of the Catholic Church itself, that is of its hierarchy (with the exception Archbishop Tomasek of Prague) and the majority of the clergy, who not only do not support social commitment by believers but often stifle it outright. *
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Prospects
for the
opposition
EFORE Gorbachev's visit, a sharp dispute developed within the tween its two traditional wings, the conservatives (dogmatists) and the progressives (pragmatists).
The conservatives openly rejected "mechanical transference" of the Soviet experience (that is, elements of Gorbachev's reforms). This had a rather comical effect, because 20 years ago they flaunted the slogan "The Soviet Union Is Our Model."
This obviously does not mean that there are fewer conservatives than progressives. In the party apparatus, in the armed forces, and especially in the police forces, a nostalgia prevails for toughness. There is little sympathy for Gorbachev's idea that precisely in order to preserve the existing system (which guarantees the privileged position of the individual bureaucrats) it is necessary to make changes, to liberalize, even to "part" with those who are too ossified or too marked by the past.
The 1968 syndrome is still strong in bureaucratic circles. In Czechoslovak conditions, those who fear for their jobs or positions say that any liberalization will unleash a groundswell that will grow and finally sweep away the whole political system. Their fears are not unfounded. The great majority of top party and other func tionaries worked in the party apparatus or other top posts in 1968. Illusions about Soviet-style restructuring
The power elite (the Politburo, the Presidium of the Central Committee and some people around it, who directly influence central decision-making) are a complex conglomerate. They include people who ruled happily even before 1968 (the positions of some were shaken in the Prague Spring), after August 1968 and who have remained in high positions continuously to this day.
That is the reason for the increasingly painful delay this summer, when finally, through the voice of Husak, the Czechoslovak leadership adhered to the Soviet policy of glasnost and perestroika. Some months previously, it had limited itself to the slogan of "restructuring the economic mechanism." Now, even in Czechoslovakia, they are talking about democratization — albeit cautiously. While there are still illusions about the Soviet restructuring of society 225 (the people have little information about
March 7, 1988 • International Viewpoint
CZECHOSLOVAKIA the situation in the USSR), there is probably no one in Czechoslovakia who believes in the sincerity of the parallel declarations of the Czechoslovak leadership.
In view of their extraordinary long continuance in their posts and, in the case of most of them, their advanced age, most of the members of the power elite are not inclined to make even the most necessary reforms, except perhaps in the economic sphere. In this regard, it is necessary to to explain that the Czechoslovak leadership and the functionaries of various apparatuses were not, as is often wrongly assumed in the outside world, put in their posts after
August 1968 by the Kremlin
(with the exception of a few individuals who
Moscow pushed at the outset of the normalization or who were kept in their previous posts). The fact that these people were not brought in by Moscow gives them a certain independence from the present Soviet leadership. And if the Czechoslovak leadership finally bowed to
Moscow this summer, unlike the East German leadership, for instance, it was no easy victory for Gorbachev.
It seems, in fact, that both the Soviet and
Czechoslovak parties had a common interest at the time of Gorbachev's visit. It was to preserve the Czechoslovak leadership as a whole. This is why Gorbachev supported it as a whole, and both party and non-party public were deprived of amusement. It brought to an end the period of shows, such as the party meeting in Prague's Lucerne a few weeks before Gorbachev's visit, when
Strougal and and Kapek as representatives of the progressives "publicly opposed the conservative dogmas and blamed the present discomforting economic situation on their comrades in the Politburo." (They did not do so directly of course, and also took some of the blame themselves.)
The extent of the compromise between the two wings of the party reached under
Gorbachev's aegis can only be guessed at.
Most of the concessions, however, must have been made by the conservative group.
For his support to the Czechoslovak leadership, Gorbachev certainly gained some-
26 thing. The development in the montes
International Viewpoint • March 7, 1988 since his visit indicates that the Czechoslovak leadership and its conservative wing yielded mainly on the question of repression. In this period fewer people have been locked up. There have been fewer political trials. Sentences have been shorter (mainly suspended sentences and fines). Two leading Charter 77 activists, Petr Pospichal and Jan Dus, were released from prison without
Gorbachev's demand for reducing repression was made and met not because anyone in the Soviet and Czechoslovak leadership wanted to humanize the society. The reason for this was rather to make the Soviet and Czechoslovak system look better to the world, and perhaps also so that economic reforms (the modernization of the economy and increasing its effectiveness) would gain more support among the
The activity of independents is obviously still kept under surveillance and "disrupted" by the state security forces. Repression against those who have little chance of getting publicity for their cases and international solidarity remains roughly on the same level as before. But this is changing. According to the statement of the general prosecutor reported in the party paper Rude Pravo of September 17, in the future some offenses, including political ones, may be dealt with more leniently and punished only by fines - insofar as they are not overly dangerous to society. Brutal repression, including beatings, continues against non-conformist youth, rock music fans,
It would be preposterous to think that the
Gorbachev leadership or part of the Czechoslovak leadership might entertain any sympathy for independent activists of the
Charter type, or to the those expelled from the Czechoslovak Communist Party. To the extent that there is a greater possibility for independent initiative today, this is the result of a complex development of international politics and of the current plans for some changes, especially in the economy, that the reformers are pursuing. Independent initiatives, in fact, represent a constant danger to the political system. And no one afford can to make any mistake about fact the that, if those who hold state power find it necessary, very harsh measures will be taken again once against independent activists.
The second area in which the influence of Gorbachev's glasnost has exercised a certain influence is culture, although the cultural liberalization is so far much weaker than in the USSR. It is interesting to note that a slight trend to cultural liberalization has been in evidence for some years, with small, gradual changes for the better. There has been not a marked shift in this in recent months. Definite efforts have, however, been made to achieve compromises, to create certain new possibilities in culture, for example for the youth (which would of course be kept under surveillance by the state apparatus). It can be said that Gorbachev's new policy and perhaps his visit to Czechoslovakia confirmed or even strengthened this liberalizing trend in culture.
Self-censorship (which is more effective than the censorship of the authorities) has relaxed somewhat. More interesting things are being written. But the difference from the past is not so terribly great.
The timid experiments to improve commandist and centralized decision-making in administrative matters in the USSR (for example the experimental introduction of two candidates for a few representative posts, public criticism of higher functionaries and so on), which are sometimes wrongly considered democratization, have in practice had no concrete echo in Czechoslovakia, aside from the publication of information about such phenomena in the USSR.
Clearly, questions that are taboo in the USSR remain taboo in Czechoslovakia. This includes the structure of power (the hierarchy) in society and the party, outright anti-democratic conditions in the Czechoslovak CP, the party apparatus' control over the organization of the national economy, security, the army, as well as the subordination of justice to the party and sometimes to the security apparatus.
Complexity of economic questions
The question remains of the economy, which is the the most complex and the most important. The assessment of this area continues to divide the two wings in the party, even if this is not apparent today. From the outset Gorbachev's call for economic restructuring was grist to Strougal's mill, inasmuch as he is the spokesperson of the progressives. It is true that many elements of this restructuring were cautiously formulated by him and other politicians dealing with economics some years ago. In recent years, they became more insistent. But they had to avoid the word "reform," which became a "non-word" after August 1968. It was first used again by Husak this
More independence of factories, sellfinancing, more linking of workers' interests — mainly those of the leaders but also of rank-and-file workers - in the economic results of the factories, shops and individual units. All these were the means by which to raise the low productivity of labor, to increase the efficiency of the national economy, to reduce the technological lag (which is notable, for example, in computer technology), to progressively increase the range of goods, to improve the possibility for innovation, to reduce the energy input in goods and so on and so forth.
The conservatives, who sought the same goals, always limited themselves to noneconomic incentives (instructions and orders, appeals to socialist emulation and to greater effort by workers). The progressives on the other had had a better understanding of the interconnections in the economy, and won numerous supporters for their reform concepts among the leading economic workers. The conservatives' strength among the "captains of industry" was negligible.
Politically, it is amusing to note that similar reform projects, sometimes formulated in the exactly same terms, were put forward during the Prague Spring. And it was precisely the political anathematization of the Prague Spring in the 1970s and 1980s, up to last spring, that constituted the main obstacle to formulating a general economic restructuring. Proposals for improvements were half-way measures, they took the form of short-lived campaigns, and always
With Gorbachev's rise to power, a lot of this changed. The progressives got unhoped-for moral support from the party. Now they were the ones who could base themselves on the argument that until then had been conservatives trump card: the Soviet example.
As a result of this, in the first months of 1987, the Czechoslovak leadership gave reserved backing only to economic restructuring, which the progressive propagators of reform were able to get accepted more easily and were most interested in. Only later, again under the pressure of the prowho were prompted by interest in a broader political-economic liberalization, did the political aspects of perestroika begin to emerge, naturally in ambiguous formulations.
It was only on July 18, 1987, that is more than three months after Gorbachev's visit, that the "State Enterprises Bill" was introduced. It is the counterpart of the Soviet enterprise law. The bill offers a certain picture of the Czechoslovak leadership's conception of how the economy is to function in the future. The solution it proposes is entirely technocratic. Workers must have the feeling that they are collaborating in the resolution of economic questions in the enterprises. That should increase their colresponsibility, improve their relationship to the enterprise and their attitude to their work, which in turn will increase labor productivity (not only in the
The bill, of course, did not provide for real involvement of the working people in decision-making, only a quite formal form of consultation. Self-management by teams of workers is also limited in practice to a certain inspection role. Moreover, the possibility of state intervention was assured in manifold ways.
First of all, there is a new proclamation of the leading role of the party. Then, there is a codification of the right of higher bodies to intervene directly, including the right to take over in cases of economic mismanagement. The economic power is, to a certain extent, to shift from the ministries to the "enterprises," that is, to the factory managers and their teams, but in no way to the
The law also does not provide for democratic means of drawing up the plan, only for formal assent by workers' collectives (in five-year plans), or a councils of workers' collectives (in yearly plans). Aside from the provision permitting a certain workers' control, but which can be blocked by bureaucratic obstacles, the following democratic feature of the law deserves mention - election of factory managers by all the workers in the enterprise,
However, we know very well that elections, and in particular candidacies, can be manipulated. Only practice will show whether the implementation of the new enterprise law will, after all, open up real new possibilities for workers. Today, scepticism is in order. And though the newspapers are printing reports and contributions that make a positive assessment of the law,
CZECHOSLOVAKIA and comments full of democratic spirit, most of the reactions in the present discussion are burdened by conservative approaches — by the fear that the "leading role of the party" may be weakened, that the authority of the managers may be reduced in the eyes of the workers'
What is worse is that the discussion in the newspapers is so artificial. People are not taking an interest in the proposed law, they sense its fraudelent nature. It has not become a cause that they consider their own. Finally, since the whole thing was conceived hastily, the bill contains a number of contradictions and many unclarities.
So how do we move forward in these somewhat changed conditions? There is no other way but to pursue our citizen's initiative with patience, courage and determination. In order for Charter 77 not to stagnate, it has to broaden out, consider new roads, take up new problems, involve new, mainly young people. Only in this way can it overcome its relative ghettoization.
The new atmosphere that has developed as a result of Gorbachev's reforms and their echo in Czechoslovakia is more favorable for that than the previous bureaucratic Charter's international links growing
One of the positive aspects of such a broadening out is the gradual internationalization of our movement. So far, international meetings, common statements and common actions, have been mainly with the Polish democratic opposition, but also with peace and human-rights initiative groups in East Germany and with our friends in Hungary. These methods should be developed to a higher level and extended to other countries in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.
We cannot afford, on the other hand, to lose sight of another road leading to democratization of the society or of a development that can start such a process rolling. It is the road of "reform from below," that is gradual changes within the official struc tures whenever there is a real possibility for such changes. Today, in Czechoslovak there is no sign of such phenomenum.
We must, however, energetically speak out against believing in "reforms from above," believing in "enlightened despots," and at the same time give critical support to every small liberal change that such reform from above might bring, every change that improves living conditions and creates a freer atmosphere. Our criteria for this will be acts and not words. We should continue take pride in our independence and not identify ourselves with positions held by rulers, even by implication.
And if we are again driven into greater isolation, once again we must maintain the continuity of critical thought, which is the only guarantee of a better future. *
March 7, 1988 • International Viewpoint
IRELAND
Towards a
revival of
the mass
movement
ALREADY before the Thatcher government started kicking its would-be Irish collaborators in the teeth visibly and repeatedly, the conditions had begun to be assembled for for a turn in the political situation in Ireland. In hindsight it seems that the crossroads was the massive raids in early November, which were carried out in both jurisdictions on the island.
### GERRY FOLEY
F IFTY THOUSAND homes were
hit, affecting about 8per percent of the total population. The miscarried IRA bombing in Enniskillen that followed the raids enabled the Dublin government to push through a law for extraditing persons sought by British and Northern Ireland authorities for political offenses. This period marked a highpoint of the collaboration between the Irish bourgeois establishment and the British government that was consecrated by the Anglo-Irish Agreement.
The very magnitude of the repressive offensive gave a strong impulse for the revival of united-front work and broad protest activity. That had an important impact on the major anti-imperialist organization, Sinn Fein, as well as independents who had tended to stay on the sidelines since the end of the mass campaign in support of the H-Block hunger strikers in the autumn of - 1981.
In January and February, public discussions began to be held to lay the groundwork for broader initiatives. In Dublin on January 21 People's Democracy, Irish section of the Fourth International, organized a meeting in collaboration with Sinn Fein 28 repression organizations and activists to and other anti-imperialist International Viewpoint • March 7, 1988 discuss how to build a broad response to the Fianna Fail government's reactionary attacks. On the same day in Belfast, People's Democracy sponsored a forum on strategy for the anti-imperialist movement, which attracted an unexpectedly large number of activists.
On February 7, a conference was held in Coalisland, called by an ad-hoc committee, including Bernadette McAliskey, to initiate planning to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the civil rights movement. In her words, it brought together "almost every geographic and political area."
"One of the many points of consensus running through the numerous, wellarticulated contributions," the Sinn Fein paper An Phoblacht reported in its February Il issue, "was the need to broaden the forces, the need for a mass movement....Tom Hartley of Sinn Fein said: 'We do see the isolation and we do see the need to break out of it'."
The keynote speech of the day, according to An Phoblacht, was given by Michael Farrell, a revolutionary Marxist and one of the original leaders of the civil rights movement. Among other sections, it stressed the following part of Farrell's speech: