A new more profound and more explosive crisis was brewing.
THE POLITICAL CRISIS AND THE REALIGNMENT OF THE BOURGEOIS FORCES
The military defeat precipitated the fall of Galtieri, after the refusal of the political parties to meet with the president to study the framework in which to continue "The Process." Bignone, put in office by the army on the basis of no more qualifications than the fact that he was not directly compromised in the war, was unable to restore the unity of the military commands.
A general, Delia Larroca, was in fact expressing criticisms about the conduct of the war. The airforce and the navy avoided committing themselves in the nomination of Bignone, who was thus put in office in violation of the political rules established by the military officers themselves.
went around Buenos Aires about possible pronunciamentos, as a result of the continuing dissention among the military officers. A new episode in this conflict erupted with the resignation of General Lami Dozo, chief of the airforce, who had openly advocated creating a party of the military to continue the
It is true that throughout the crisis the military maintained certain coordinating bodies. The Military Committee has been meeting since July 3 to study the progress of diplomatic moves with respect to the Beagle canal in particular. In reality, this military leadership has continued to fune. tion, the big difference being that none of
the three armed forces has been able to achieve political and military dominance.
commenting to journalists about Bignone's instalation, summed up the situation as follows: "We through an extraordinarily difficult situation. The question of the government become extremely delicate."
To restore the unity of the military, Bignone set as his first objective integrating the various currents in the army into government. includes ministers from all three of the preceding military dictatorships.
Galtieri's cabinet, Licardo for education and Castella for public health. From Ongania's cabinet, there is Pastore for economics and Bauer for public works. There is even a minister from Lanusse's time, Nosiglia for housing. This military team bears a clear responsibility for the repression. Major Minicucci, Bignone's liaison officer with the ministers was responsible for the concentration Buenos Aires until 1978.
The aims of this government were defined by the chief of the army, Nicolaides: "It will be necessary to take advantage of this transitional period to achieve the following objectives: a) to reinforce our basic institutions; b) to use the support for the Malvinas campaign as the basis for genuine national unity; c) to assure by all respectable means a national solution." (Clarin, July 4.)
These are the outlines of a plan for a "controlled liberalization," involving considerable reinforcement of the repressive apparatuses and tight political control by the military officers. In his inauguration speech, Bignone said: "It must be clearly understood that any pursuit of personal or group special interests in the period that is opening up will do grave harm to the development that has been charted, and could provoke a major crisis in the country. This is true both as regards poliin an official statement, dated July 2, "that there be a clarification of responsibilities." But its orientation is the same -collaboration with the military officers to organize the transition and later the formation of the government that will come out of the March 1983 elections. the major force in the electoral arena in Argentina, and it was the first current to take public initiatives after the end of the "moratorium on politics." Some 8,000 persons demonstrated to commemorate the anniversary of Evita's death, and 5,000 for the anniversary of Peron's the Peronist current deeply divided, and it does not seem able to achieve the minimum homogeneity for sustaining a government. This is one of the factors that led the Multipartidaria to discuss the difficult course of turning itself into an electoral front to organize a future civilian government, if the military chiefs keep their promises!
The trade-union bureaucracy has lined up with the Peronist positions. Lorenzo Miguel of the CGT told a journalist: "The country has an urgent need for moraliza-
You see the paradox, when people talk about the armed forces today and criticize them, it has to be kept clearly in mind that the man who was and remains our leader was a member of these armed forces. This is why we think that these institutions must serve the welfare of the Argentine people and in particular the workers." (Clarin, July 27.)
The other bourgeois forces have the same attitude, which was summed up brilliantly by Oscar Allende, the leader of the Partido Intransigente: "My party will not follow and will not support the new course of the military regime but it will not try to destabilize it either."
Finally, the church is strongly supporting the regime: "We appeal to all those responsible for leading and building the on all levels, to unite in the name of the common good, without any
The option supported by the majority of the military officers is Bignone's accord with the Multipartidaria, which provides for elections on July 30, 1982, followed by a transfer of power to the view of the means assures that the situation can be
Thus, the country is entering into a period of prolonged political crisis and great instability. The way in which this crisis develops will depend essentially on whether the working class can regain the level of organization achieved at the time of the March 30 clashes. In this situation, the possibility of attempts at a military coup by sectors opposed to the process of liberalization cannot be ruled out. Such coups could be based on the strength of the repressive forces and would be the military's manoeuvring room by striking a new repressive blow against the working class. They might be headed up by figures such
Dozo or Ongania. The debate over which of these two roads to take is being conducted almost openly among
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS -THE COST OF SIX YEARS OF THE "PROCESS"
The political crisis has been aggravated by the economic recession with which it has coincided. In 1950, Argentine production represented 25% • of the total Latin-American production. In 1960, this proportion had already fallen to 19%, and in 1982, it was only 10%. (Aldo Ferrer, Economie et Politique en Argentine.)
The figures that testify to the gravity of the Argentine economic crisis vary somewhat from source to source. But they converge to show the following result of monetarist policy that has been pursued. The 1981 domestic product was socio-economic and in a spirit of no more than the 1970 total. (Adolfo
What is the most striking in this political crisis, and to a large extent determines its tempo, is the total unity between the military dictatorship and the bourgeois parties. All the bourgeois leaderships have declared in favor of Bignone and the continuation of the military regime:
is supporting Bignone on the basis of his promises of democratization. As for the main Peronist leader, Bittel, before he even knew that Bignone must take the presidency, he told Folha da Sao Paulo:
"A major effort has to be made to restore the credibility of the armed forces in the eyes of the Argentine people. If the new president does not assume that task, this possibility will be definitively compromised, because this would indicate that they were trying to find a new government formula within the circle of top military officers." (June 26, 1982.)
It is true that the National Commission of the Partido Justicialista demanded narrow self-interest, liberality and fraternity, so that we can overcome one of the gravest dangers that the country has ever had to face - the possibility of the fragmentation of the state, which would represent failure for the entire community." (Resolution of the Executive Commission of the Conference of Bishops.) It was not until the last days in August that the church began to raise some timid questions about the situation of the "missing persons."
This broad compromise by all the bourgeois forces with the Bignone governhas given the present crisis a special twist. The breakdown of dictatorship, divisions among the different military commands, has been aggravated by the breakdown of the bourgeois opposition parties, which have been deprived of their traditional leaders and are already divided by the support of different factions for several different candidates who have already declared that they will run for the
Canotro, Jornal do Brasil, August 1,
5 speech of Economics Minister Pastore, since 1974, there was only a 2% growth. In the first quarter of 1982, the domestic product dropped by 9.4% by comparison with the same period in the previous year (Clarin, July 4) Moreover, the gross domestic industrial product is reportedly 30% lower today than it was in 1975 (Folha de Sao Paulo, August 20, 1982.)
During the first five months of the current year, the crisis reached its deepest point. According to the government's own figures, industrial employment fell by 25%. In reality, it must have fallen by about 30%. The internal market has contracted drastically - 56% less cars have been sold than in the same period in the preceding year (according to the figures of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry), and sales of light consumer goods have collapsed. The effect of this crisis on the traditional economy has
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been disastrous, considering that 80% of Argentine businesses are oriented to the internal market. Unutilized industrial capacity rose from 41% to 46% (according to the figures of the Argentine university.
While it is true that in the first phase of the "Process" that businesses benefitted from the reduction of wage costs, they quickly began to run into other problems: "If the disease doesn't kill you, the cure will." A study done of the main businesses showed that for 60% of them labor costs were only 5% of their total costs. On the other hand, financial costs represented 30% to 50% of total costs, and in some cases as much as 80%. The devaluation of capital and capital concentration have accelerated. According to Martinez de Hoz's ministry, 301 financial concerns went bankrupt.
The social effects of this policy speak for themselves. The proportion of the Gross National Product represented by wages has dropped from 50% in 1975 to 30% now. The drop in real wages may have reached 60%, according to INDEC's
The wage freeze in the public sector was the main means for controlling the budget deficit.
Shortly after the 1976 coup, the first violent attack was launched against buying power. Real wages were cut but through political repression rather than massive unemployment. In the first three quarters of 1976, real wages were 40% lower than the average for the preceding year and 30% lower than the average for 1960 (Clarin editorial, July 3). But the 1982 crisis has already taken on another aspect - a new, still more abrupt drop in buying power, combined with massive unemployment. Aleman plan provided for increasing unemployment by about 50% in industry, that is, throwing about 5 million workers out of a job. Today, the Argentine economy is incapable of absorbing the social effects of these six years of dictatorship.
The policy of Pastora and Bignone who was already a collaborator of Martinez de Hoz the father of Argentine monetarism) was designed to deal with this situation by a combination of measures in two stages: First a temporary, formal price freeze in order to regain room for manoeuvre in the negotiations with the Multipartidaria; and then a new reduction of domestic consumption order to cutback imports and restore a possible to pay back the foreign debt and
The bourgeois parties agree with this policy, which is going to cause enormous inflation. After the speech by Pastora which announced the devaluation of the peso Emilio Mondelli, minister of the
Peronist government, had no difficulty in affirming that "The description of the situation is exact, and the proposed measures are the only ones that can be taken at the moment." 16 no doubt that the employers have not accepted the shortprice freeze, still less will they accept negotiations aiming at a general wage rise. The president of the Argentine Industrial Union, Jacques Hirsch, explicitthe present critical moments we have to reactivate the productive forces, but at the same time there is a risk of falling into a process of hyper-inflation. The conditions for free collective bargaining have not been restored, and government must continue to fix the fundamental terms of the contracts."
The radicals had the same line, "In my opinion we would make a very grave error in trying to resolve the crisis by a massive rise in wages. This type of measure would rapidly lead to generalized price rises which would harm the eventual aim. Wage rises must be differential and cautious, only helping the lowest paid,"
Vasquez, Clarin, June 27).
Thus, the Argentine bourgeoisie is sitnarrow room for negotiation. The possibilities of reforming this monster created by Martinez de Hoz are not very great either. Once more it is proven that only the political struggle of the working class can bring a radical response to the crisis. As Hegel said, "In South America the republics only rest on military power, and their whole history is a continuous revolution."
THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE STRUGGLE FOR A WORKERS PARTY
In this context, which can be summarised as the crisis of the military dictatorship, fed by its economic policy as much as by the humiliating defeat in the Malvinas, the struggle to build a Workers Party in Argentina takes on more and more immediacy. It already means more than just propaganda or education.
While Peronist populism is still hegemonic in the working class it no longer the strength of attraction with the last return of Peron. Bignone and the Multipartidaria worsens
On the other hand the Argentine working class has an experience and tradition of political and trade-union struggle far superior to that of the Brazilian working class for example. The construc tion of a party of workers could take root more quickly and deeply.
The example of a recent workers strike, in which the workers took to the streets with posters of Jean-Paul II and Lula indicates the impact of the Workers Party experience in Brazil.
why the construction of an Argentine Workers Party is already an organizational and agitational task. Certainly its concretization depends on the evolution of the CGT and the trade-union organization. Two new factors influence this evolution. First of all the manoeuvres of the dictatorship against the CGT have increased. A CGT-Azopardo has been created (see International Viewpoint No. 10, July 5, 1982), to which the government has given the former headquarters of the CGT in Azopardo street. This brings together all the most class-collaborationist sectors of the bureaucracy: the 20 who remained in the union administration during this period, constituting the most conciliatory wing towards the regime; and the CNT, the sectors who have abandoned the traditional political organization of Peronism.
Secondly, the historic leaders of the CGT itself (today called the CGT-Brazil, after the street where its headquarters is sited) is looking for recognition from the government and collaboration with it. Saul Ubaldini, the secretary of the CGT, and the other leaders were present at the investiture ceremony for the Minister of Labor.
This process is aggravating the contradictions within the CGT which has organized different mobilizations against the dictatorship: the two "strikes" of April 27, 1979 and July 22, 1981, the rally of November 1981, and the demonstrations of March 30, 1982. This experience is stimulating the interventions of certain political factions of the trade-union bureaucracy, including certain union leaders personally inclined to support the formation of a workers party.
The strikes which took place in August indicate a tendency towards the possibility of big workers struggles in the coming months, and confirm the process of radicalization and politicization in the working class. The struggle of the bus drivers which won their demands, and above all the struggle led by SMATA (the militant auto workers union), are the most advanced expression of this tendency. The auto workers are an extraordinary example. Some 800 demonstrated at Mercedes Benz and 2,500 occupied the centre of Buenos Aires on August 19. The police did not intervene. The leader of SMATA, Pepe Rodriguez, suspended in 1976, spoke to call for a struggle against the military dictatorship and to present a plan for action over the next weeks.
The confidence of the workers in their own strength has been increased through these initiatives. The wage demands are becoming generalized. Factory Committees are being organized. The working class is reorganizing, drawing on all the experience of its previous traditions, and becoming a protagonist in the evolution of the political situation. The fight for a Workers Party is linked to the totality of these elements and is a product of the necessity to unify these forces against
This is where the future of the dictaand of the Argentine working