The end of the SPD/FDP government:
the fightback must begin!
The break up of the Social Democrat/ Liberal coalition in Bonn brings to an end government. Although the SPD itself has expected this shift for a long time it nevertheless represents a major turn in the relationship of forces between the social classes and their political parties.
This change in Western Germany, the world's second most powerful imperialist state, strengthens the and US imperialism, when only a year ago the Socialist Party in France won the presidential and parliamentary elections — the greatest victory in its history - and, in the last few days,
Swedish Social Democratic majority in Parliament.
The occasion for the final end of the Social Democrats in government was the 'Lambsdorff Paper' produced by the FDP Minister for the Economy. Given its concept of a 'social-market economy' and deepening economic crisis autumn it would mean that practically all the reforms introduced by the SPD-FDP government would be withdrawn. The paper had every possible proposal to the rate of employers at the expense of the working class. It proposed a massive shift from direct to indirect taxation, cancellation of and reduction of trade taxes. There would be unlimited scope to change working hours to suit the employers' interests. gramme of privatisation of the public sector was proposed, along with even more drastic cutbacks in the welfare state - the reduction of unemployment pay to fifty per cent of the previous wage -which is only the first step in dismantling the social gains of the working class.
Lambsdorff's proposals were not political slip. They had the approval of almost all the employers organisations. With the sustained economic recession, the expected record figure of two million unemployed, and a new budget deficit of over one billion marks, the paper made clear that a governmental party which has to take into consideration the interests of the trade-union leadership is not viable in
The FDP's wish for a change government was not however the reason for the break up of the coalition, despite the SPD's attempts to create a myth of 'betrayal'. Genscher and Lambsdorff, the leaders of the FDP, would not have dared to act in this way if the SPD had possessed the ability to mobilise the working class and young people as it did during the 1980 elections, or during the attempt 12 of the CDU leader Barzel to remove the SPD from office in 1972. The massive loss of votes for the SPD among working class, youth, and the middle class, to the point where its votes in state elections fell to below 35 per cent, was the work of the SPD itself.
It was the SPD which explained, in its 1982 and projected 1983 austerity policies, that the workers must make sacrithat misled the workers as to the dimensions and the causes of the crisis. It was the SPD in alliance with the tradeleadership that obstructed any against austerity. It was the infamous call for repression against those protesting at the extension of Frankfurt airport for military reasons, and Schmidt's fervent support for NATO's rearmament policy, that led hundreds of thousands of young people to seek an alternative to Social Democracy.
It is dishonest of the Social Democrats to accuse the FDP of wanting the wage earners and trade unions to accept lower real wages, and the unemployed, pensioners, tenants, and the socially vulnerable great sacrifices' when the SPD itself asks exactly the same from wage the socially oppressed. Schmidt in fact repeated his support for these policies in his declaration to
The task now is to find another policy - one which means that the employers themselves bear the burden of the crisis they have created, which does not stop short of breaking the power of the bankers and the employers in its effort to defend jobs. A programme which bases itself on the distribution of the available between all the workers, and prevents the employers' efforts to secure their profit through new rearmament
All the calls to the trade-union leadership by the SPD 'not to rock the boat' so that the Social Democrats can solve the problems have failed. In fact they have led to deep discouragement and political uncertainty among the workers. This has been shown during factory closures and redundancies, as well as at the last elections. For the first time in the history of the Bundesrepublik half the working class today chooses to vote for the CDU/CSU. The SPD has opened the way to government by the employers through its reformist policies.
The DGB, Western Germany's central trade union federation, has called demonstrations against austerity on October 23 possible forces must be mobilised to turn these demonstrations into the beginning of a strong opposition to the bourgeois measures. Trade unionists, supporters of the peace movement, groups, those who are fighting discrimination against immigrants, ment, as well as all those who suffer from the austerity measures of the bourgeoisie, should join forces to demonstrate against unemployment, rearmament, and destruction of the environment. For the trade demonstrations should be the first steps in a new line of march. - For joint trade union action against the employers' anti-union measures - For jobs not bombs - For the 35 hour week now - with full pay and job creation - Against any other austerity policy, whether budget cuts or decrease in real - A militant common line of march for the big majority of wage earners, employed, unemployed, pensioners, young or old, immigrant or German, women or
SPD members who disagree with the line of their party, who hold Schmidt and the SPD leadership responsible for having made it possible to throw the burden of the crisis onto the backs of the workers, and for having disarmed the working class, must fight for the SPD to draw the conclusions from these develop-
The SPD in opposition will no more turn to a socialist policy than it did in government. This was made explicit by Willy Brandt when he stated that the Social Democrats will not change their political line with the change in govern-
For all these reasons it is necessary to put forward a political course that attacks the power of the employers instead of the completely failed line followed by the SPD leadership. It is important that all those who support a socialist solution to the crisis, who want to organise opposition to unemployment, social cuts and national chauvinism, who oppose the destruction of the environment, rearmament, and discrimination against women can present their own alternative in the coming federal elections.
Gruppe International Marxisten (International Marxist Group) German section of the Fourth September 20, 1982
Crisis in the Argentinian dictatorship
Jorge BUARQUE
During the inauguration of Bignone government, a top functionary said: "We're back in 1972." This remark summed up the Argentine political situation pretty well.
Clarin, one of the leading dailies in Buenos Aires, commented: "The difference is that it's worse now. Lanusse [who headed the fading military government in 1972] had the support of his lieutenants. Peron and Balbin were possible alternatives. And we were not coming out of a war in which we were defeated."
The defeat Argentina suffered at the hands of the British intervention force in June at a time when the dictatorship was being increasingly challenged within the country has opened up a new political situation.
A former minister of Galtieri summarized the main characteristics of this new stage rather well - a crisis of the military junta, fragility of the credible bourgeois alternatives, and the start of a slow process of recomposition of the workers movement after the grave defeat it suffered in March 1976 and the massive slaughter of its cadres by one of the bloodiest dictatorships in the history of Latin America.
WHY DID THE MILITARY JUNTA
GO FOR DOUBLE OR NOTHING?
After the end of 1981, the military junta stepped up the warlike tone of its declarations. Using the conflict with Chile over the Beagle canal as a pretext, the dictatorship started up an intense campaign to prepare public opinion for a military undertaking. It was a classical recipe. The objective was to reconsolidate the unity of the military commands on the basis of a broad social consensus that would include the bourgeois opposition parties and neutralize democratic and workers struggle.
The fundamental objective of military operation was to improve the national political situation for the dictatorship and not to oppose the imperialists in fact and still less to unleash a war. This has been confirmed by the revelations made since the military defeat.
The soldiers coming back from the Malvinas were not afraid of the censorship. They denounced not only the extreme cowardice of their officers but also the army's total lack of preparation for war. "We went off for a military parade and not a war. We had no ammunition, and infrastructure to face the cold and British encirclement," a soldier said. All the eyewitness accounts this judgment. General Lami Doza, chief of the airforce, has himself recognized that at least a third of the Argentine airplanes could not be used in combat because of innumerable techni-
Why then did the military junta decide to launch this operation? The decisive factor was the rise of workers struggles, which were making the political situation explosive and increasing the dictatorship's isolation. The March 30 demonstrations represented the peak of the workers resistance over the six years of the dictatorship. That was just a week before the landing in the Malvinas. This was the final argument that impelled the dictatorship available to stop the March 30 day struggle. It stepped up social surveillance, went after the trade unionists, and tried to intimidate the movement (this was the objective, for example of the kidnapping of Ana Maria Martinez, an activist of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores).
Despite this, the demonstrations were a resounding success. Some details about them are not well known, and it is important to understand their real scope. The demonstration in Buenos Aires mobilized 15,000 persons, who clashed for hours with the enormous repressive array. The demonstrations in the provincial cities were also large.
What happened in Mendoza is a good example. The demonstration began peacefully with about 500 participants, and the police refused to obey orders to use force to stop it. Then the gendarmeria, a special unit know for its brutality, went into action, opening fire on the front ranks and killing a leader of the reform move-
The local TV station was broadcasting live from the spot and showed the events to the entire population. The reaction was a clear indication of the political changes underway in Argentina and of the readiness of the workers to fight. The center of the city filled with demonstrators, who fought the repressive forces and into retreat. Three more workers were killed in the fighting
This radicalization reflects a working-class response to the economic and political crisis of the dictatorship. This crisis in fact grew qualitatively worse in 1981 and
• the first five months of 1982. buying power of 51.5% between February 1981 and February 1982. Almost 30% of the population (some 3 million persons) are out of work. The Aleman-Galtieri economic plan is designed to raise this figure to 5 million! The level of wages of the working class is 30% lower than it was before the 1976 coup d'etat. The official calculations themselves recognize that the drop in the real wages of public employees is at least about 40%
Before the March 30 day of struggle, there were already various signs of the rebellion brewing among the population. In the southern zone of Buenos Aires -
Berazateguie -persons occupied land to guarantee their right to housing. They set up occupation committees and resisted the repressive
The struggle for "Peace, Bread, and Work," the slogan of the demonstra-
For the dictatorship, it was becoming urgent to alter this situation. what tipped the scales for the Malvinas
AFTER 74 DAYS, A HUMILIATING
MILITARY DEFEAT
The streets of Buenos Aires are still with posters on the Malvinas. Among the appeals, the patriotic prodenunciations Thatcher and the U.S., one poster stands out as the most colorful and the most widely circulated. It is "The Prayer of a Malvinas Soldier." Calling on Heaven for help, it begins with a plea for "my
The plea was fruitless. The 10,000 who fought in the Malvinas know that well, along with the rest of the Argentine population. caused, first of all, by the inability of the military junta to fight imperialism. And it is essentially for that reason that the grave crisis now afflicting the military dictatorship was touched off.
In selecting the target of the military operation, Galtieri tried to avert confrontation. Why else would he have sent troops that were not prepared for war? Why also choose the Malvinas and not the Beagle canal, since it was evident that the Chilean dictatorship would be forced to fight for the same reasons as the Argentine one was. But Galtieri thought that not move in, explained clearly in an interview with
Oriana Fallaci. It is not impossible that this belief was fostered by information provided by the U.S. State Department representatives in Buenos Aires itself. According to this version, Washington was not only warned of the operation, gave the greenlight. It is not the way it The February 28 coup in Spain has already illustrated the existence of parallel, and even contradictory, dip operations within the
On the other hand, the choice of the for this military operation was designed to enable the government to exploit the anti-imperialist feelings of the Argentine people. Such sentiment exists, and it is a basic factor in the history of the country. It was expressed and deepened in the course of the war itself. British imperialism was and remains an enemy to be toppled. The Latin-American solidarity based on this sentiment was expressed most strongly in the monster demonstrations in Lima and the diplomatic activity of the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments.
However, despite the confusion that it created, and despite the reality of this anti-imperialist feeling, the dictatorship's political operation failed even before the outcome of its military venture was
At the first mass rally in front of the presidential palace, the Casa Rosada, Galtieri was violently hooted when he tried to present himself as the representative of Argentina. After that, the demonstrations and rallies supporting the war effort shrunk rapidly. Despite its support for driving out British colonialism, the did not mobilize actively because it did not want to support the military junta. And, in the absence of an independent working-class anti-imperialist struggle did not take a clear enough form.
The April 30 demonstration called to celebrate May Day by national union federation, support of the authorities, brought out no more than 2,000 persons. There were ten times this number the month before for a head-on cash with the police. The demonstrations on June 10, after the British Army had landed on the islands, no more than 3,000
The reason for this lack of support is clear. After six years of "The Process," with 30,000 missing persons (by comparison with 191 under the Brazilian dictatorship), and 15,000 political prisoners, with a third of the working class out of work and living from hand to mouth, and with a drop in the wages of those employed of more than 50%, the Argentine people could not place the least confidence in the dictatorship to fight the imperialist aggressors militarily.
Everything that happened shows that this distrust was justified. The junta refused to touch the imperialist economic interests in Argentina. It was unable to respond militarily and to mobilize the potential forces. The navy let the Belgrano be sunk. The army retreated, leaving its soldiers stranded. The airforce refused to continue fighting the last three days in order to cover the retreat of the army.
The political and military cowardice of the junta was exposed by the action of of its exemplary representatives, Lieutenant Astiz. In 1976, he was responsible for the Navy Mechanics where prisoners were held and tortured, through which, according to Amnesty International, 4,700 men, women, children passed. Only a hundred survived. Shortly after this, he was responsible for the operation to infiltrate the movement of the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo and for the kidnapping and murder of 12 of them. Subsequently, he was in charge of the exile organizations Paris. And he was the first to surrender to
ANTI-IMPERIALIST POLICY NEEDED FOR THE ARGENTINE WORKERS MOVEMENT
In deciding to launch the Malvinas to regain the initiative in domestic politics. First of all, he threw the workers offensive that started with the March 30 demonstrations out of gear. Next, the dictatorship accomplished its objective of getting the bourgeois operations and the trade union leaderships to accept an agreement for collaboration. The silence of these sectors about the employers' offensive (3,000 layoffs at Ford) and even about the continuation of kidnappings (three workers accused of being members of Politica Obrera were abducted on June 21 and 22) for a short period created favorable conditions for the junta's operation, since there was serious political confusion in the workers was needed to counter the manoeuvres of the dictatorship clear line of class independence. It was necessary to keep up the fight against the dictatorship and find ways to build the measures that would have been effective in fighting the imperialists. Such a line was not put forward. The responsibility for this failure lies with the workers
1. The Peronist trade-union leaders and the Partido Justicialista supported the junta and opposed any independent working-class mobilization. Miguel, the main leader of the CGT, went so far as to compare Galtieri to Peron! In an article published by the magazine El Caudillo, under the title "The Brothers Are United," the picture of Galtieri appeared with the following caption: "It is a long time since we have heard a president talk this way." In demanding a "military transition government, Peronists made a compromise accepting the continuity of the military dictatorship. The Argentine Communist Party adopted a similar position.
2. The PST (the Argentine section of the International Workers League) and Politica Obrera, organizations that claim to be Trotskyist, started by presenting a plan of anti-imperialist and anti-dictatorial demands, but they very rapidly dropped any perspective of an independent workers struggle. In fact, they dissolved themselves into the support for the patriotism of the junta. This evolution was particularly striking and scandalous in practice. Both parties organized festivals and collected money, as well as calling for compulsory contributions to be deducted from wages for a "Patriotic Fund Drive," launched and controlled by the dictatorship. They eliminated anti-dictatorial demands from their agitation, arguing "we are in the same military camp as the dictatorship."
3. Finally, other revolutionary groups failed to grasp the new situation. They kept on operating in their accustomed pattern, without changing their approach one iota. They held to a neutralist position toward the war.
In this situation, the political confusion deepended, and this enabled the dictatorship to manoeuvre freely during the initial weeks of the war. But the hatred of the dictatorship also deepened qualitatively after the surrender of Puerto Argentino.