Serious threats to Nicaraguan revolution
This summer two comrades of the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire, section of the Fourth International, went to Nicaragua to participate in national solidarity brigades organised by the European solidarity committees. On their return they spoke to Daniel Jebrac about their experiences. Question: You were both in Nicaragua as members of a solidarity brigade. What was this initiative? Answer: The European solidarity committees decided to send solidarity brigades to Nicaragua this summer, coming most of the countries of the Old World.
were several hundred of us. The role of the brigades was to work in the villages on rebuilding, particularly after the catastrophic floods of last May. Rebuilding bridges and roads and schools. This allowed us to have a direct and daily link with the population, particularly the peasants. From the point of view of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) it was important, above and beyond the material help which was modest, to give a feeling in the rural regions of the political solidarity and international resonance for the Nicaraguan revolution. Thus the initiative was considered very positive by the Sandinista leadership. As for us, it allowed us to visit the country and to have contact with the mass organisations, to see the revolutionary ardour and enthusiasm which exists, despite the extremely difficult condi-
Thus, the comrades of the French brigade in August were able to have direct experience of the situation of permanent aggression in which Nicaragua lives. While they were working at La Rencheria, north of Chinandega, near the Pacific coast, the village was attacked by a group of 'contras' (counter-revolutionaries). Two militia were killed, including the leader. A group of twenty five contras was broken up afterwards. Moreover, one of the aggressors had infiltrated the Sandinista Peoples' Militia (MPS). All the comrades in the brigade were hit by the extreme military and political tension in the country. Q. What are the precise forms that the counter-revolution is taking now? A. The counter-revolution is a lot more active than it was three years ago. Firstly, North American strategy is clearer. Since Reagan took office a whole series of plans have been worked out. Considerable sums have been released for this. The 19 10 million dollars set aside for the destabilisation of Nicaragua, and openly admitted by Thomas Enders, the Under Secretary of State in charge of Latin American affairs, in front of the American Senate, is only what is known. By the adoption of the Symms amendment the Senate gave the President carte blanche to intervene in the region. The Americans cannot tolerate the development of this revolu-
The military co-operation of the US with Honduras has become a real operation of constructing an army of intervention in the region, as much against the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front-Revolutionary Democratic Front (FMLN-FDR) in El Salvador as against the Nicaraguan revolution. The Somocista groups have been reinforced by the desertions of the former member of the Government of National Reconstruction (GRN), Alfonso Robelo, leader of the Nicaraguan Movement (MDN), and of the Vice Minister for Defence, responsible for the militias, Eden Pastora, as well as by the departure to Honduras of about ten thousand Miskito Indians in October 1981.
These groups are the spearhead of the direct aggression against Nicaragua. The (ex-Somocista guards) who have a radio station of the same name, the Nicaraguan
Democratic Union (UDN), and the sector of the Misurasata (Indian organisations) controlled by the minister Stedman Fagoth. In total, three to four thousand armed men along the Honduran front.
On July 24, 1982 a band of about a hundred contras, with mortars and heavy machine guns, made an incursion into Nicaragua. They occupied the village of San Francisco, between Choluteca and Esteli, for two and a half hours, leaving fourteen dead and taking eight hostages. These assassins explained that they would have spared their victims 'if they had been members of religious sects'. On their return to Honduras they were taken in lorries to their camp by Honduran soldiers.
However these groups of contras have still not succeeded in uniting or establishing a coherent strategy. The excommander Eden Pastora has not sided with them. After the massacre at San Francisco he even stated publicly that he would not ally with criminals and that he would do nothing that would facilitate an American intervention. This attitude indicates how seriously we should take threats hanging over
You have talked of the role of the religious sects. What is their place in the counter-revolutionary plans? A. A striking aspect of the present situa-
Women workers in Nicaragua (DR)
tion is their proliferation. There almost two hundred. They financed by the North American sects. They have a dual objective. Internally, to organise the sectors of the population find themselves marginalised by the revolutionary process and to divert them from the tasks of defence, the sects particularly make a campaign against the carrying of arms. On the other hand, on the international scale, to contribute to the isolation of the progressive sectors of the American church, which is more and more active in the movement against the war and against intervention in Central give some more precise information on the particular role of the Miskito Indians, given the orchestrated international campaign there has been on this subject. In December 1981 the situation became particularly serious. Since July 1979 several religious sects have worked amongst them, particularly the Moravians, including a former minister linked to the Somoza dictatorship, Stedman Fagoth. The Sandinistas did commit some errors in their attitude, paternalism, authoritarianism, would have shocked the Indian community which is attached to its traditional values and respect for the old, while the Sandinistas
'muchachos' (young men).
At the time when the contras increasHonduran border the Sandinistas evacuated the population to stop the haemorrhage and to face the attacks coming from Honduras. In Honduras itself the Miskitos live in camps financed by the United Nations. Some of them are in favour of a policy of returning. But the current of Stedman Fagoth opposes this. The unit which launched military aggression at the beginning of July was composed of two hundred Miskitos.
In Nicaragua itself the situation seems to be considerable improved. The new villages built by the FSLN at Tasba Pry are now finished and offer the Miskitos living conditions and standards of hygiene that they have never had before. Last July Commandant Tomas Borge, Minister of the Interior, went there to do a meeting and give the communities in the zone the title deeds for the collective property. But although the situation is better it is still precarious because of the military tensions. Thus, for defence reasons, the Sandinistas have had to forbid the fishing boats to leave the port of Puerto Cabezas on the Caribbean coast.
the whole international campaign on the supposed massacres of Miskitos is a huge propaganda operation orchestrated by the imperialists. Q. You have just described several aspects of the counter-revolutionary manoeuvres. How do these link up with the internal resistance of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie? A. It is undeniable that the sabotage by the bourgeoisie has reached the proportions where it puts into question the 'national unity' advocated by the Sandinistas and the projections for economic development.
PETER GRAHAM, MEMORIAL LIBRARY
Despite the strict control and reprisals decapitalisation continues. Almost the whole of the leadership of the main bourgeois political organisation, the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) of Alfonso Robelo, has taken the road to voluntary exile in Costa Rica. The MDN and the Council for Private Enterprise (COSEP) still refuse to take the seats reserved for them in the Council of State. Last spring the director of the Central Bank resigned from his post, denouncing the growing control of the Ministry for
Sandinista commandant Henri Ruiz, on monetary policy which - according to him - was putting into question the existence of the
At the moment the main political attack of the bourgeoisie is to take over the campaigns of the Catholic hierarchy the atheism of the Sandinista revolution, and against the popular mobilisation against American Which sometimes has a restricting charac-
In fact the private sector is more and more marginalised. In agriculture, which is the main productive sector oriented towards export, the public sector, which represents only 20 percent of activity, work works in close liaison with the co. operative sector which is strongly developed. Today it is really only within cotton cultivation that big property remains a majority.
In industry the successive measures of expropriation have increased the public sector to nearly 40 per cent of produccontrols two-thirds of the activity, following the extension of the network of the peoples' shops. In general one can say that the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie no longer has control over the essential part of the economic machine.
However, faced with American aggression, the social gains that have been made, and the strengthening of the mass organisations, inspired by the FSLN, the bourgeoisie does not have a solid enough social base to allow it to throw the process into question itself. Thus, unlike two years ago, it can have hardly any hope of turning the situation to its advantage by elections in 1984 or 1985. Its only way out is an alliance with imperial-
Certainly there is a regroupment, rather than a bourgeois force, which is called the Doctor Sacasa Democratic Coordination (CDDS). Weakened by the departure abroad of Alfonso Robelo, it maintains a position which it calls "patriotic' against the imperialist pressure. In this framework certain sectors of the bourgeoisie still hope that the gravity of the economic difficulties will lead to disaffection from the government and they will be able to present themselves as a
You should know that there will be nil growth in 1982, and that the catastrophic floods of May 1982 have been followed by unusual dryness which is a serious blow to the harvest of crops like maize.
Q. Faced with the pressures and threats from imperialism without, with the manoeuvres of the sects and the bourgeoisie within, the Sandinista leadership has radicalised its political formulations. In his May 1 speech Commandant Tomas Borge talked openly of socialism, as did other trade union leaders. Does this mean anything? A. This ideological radicalisation has a certain importance at the level of the mass organisations rather than meaning a turn in political orientation - the references to the 'mixed economy' are still there. Previously they only called themselves Sandinista, now they claim to be socialist.
The main mass organisations are the Sandinista People's Militias (MPS). They are massive and very popular. Practically everybody is involved in them.
At first they were conceived as workplace militias. Now they have developed towards geographical militias, village or neighbourhood. This is for the good and simple reason that the units of production are often too small to provide operational units. Nevertheless, in the bigger enterprises there is a specific militia organisation.
But the militias are so massive that the political level is very uneven. The mass organisation that plays the central political role is still the Sandinista Defence Committees, CDS. These are the local committees which have the responsibility to discuss and organise all aspects of social life. The people participate more or less regularly but, even if they do not go to all the meetings, if they have a question to put they do it through the CDS. The CDS are the structure of representation and dialogue between the state apparatus and the citizens.
The situation in the trade-union movement has changed in the last few months. The Sandinista Workers Central (CST) seems to have become the main trade union, ahead of the CTN, an anti-Sandinista trade union, more or less linked to the North American unions; the CAUS, linked to the ultra-Stalinist Nicaraguan Communist Party, or the Workers Front, of Maoist origin. The last two seem to be much smaller now. Thus, the FSLN is now for the first time a majority within influence is still contested. This was not the case in the first months after the fall of Somoza. All this gives an idea of the main features in the evolution of the
To conclude we would like to emphasise the importance of solidarity work, and the necessity for it to be restarted. Nicaragua is facing a hostile campaign permanent aggression. comrades who participated in the solidarity brigades this summer were able to see this, and go back to their respective countries with the conviction necessary to give life to the indispensible work of