Jaime Pastor, a leader of the LCR ter. Although a PSOE victory may be just about assured, the on October 12 about the present situation in Spain.
exact governmental form that will follow and the resulting
Spain:
mentary life'.
Question: Could you specify the reasons that led Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo to dissolve the Cortes (Spanish Parliament)
and, towards the moderate right led by former Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, evident that the government was obliged to call a general election, who set up the Democratic and Social although the reunification of bourgeois last August, and to call an election for Answer: The dissolution of the Cortes last August by the Sotelo government had become inevitable because of the irreversible crisis in which the governmental party, the Union of the Democratic Centre (UCD) found itself. This followed two important events: the coup attempt on February 23, 1981, and the landslide victory of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) in the elections last May to the Andalusian Assembly. The result was a crisis, not only of the government, but of the regime as such, making the UCD unable to reconcile the inherited institutions of Francoism with the viability of parliamentary- type mechanisms.
This is what provoked the crisis and the splintering of the UCD, accompanied by a flow out of the party in two directowards the Popular Alliance (AP) of Fraga Tribarne on the one hand,
Centre (CDS) last August, on the other. The UCD could not wait any longer in such a climate of political decomposition.
Calvo Sotelo's aim in calling elections was to reconstruct the right. But since then it is evident that these attempts to reconstitute the unity of the right wing bourgeoisie have failed. The right-wing bourgeoisie remains divided among three parties. First of all, the Popular Alliance led by the caudillo Fraga Iribarne; the UCD, chaired since last July 13 by Landelino Lavilla, who does not even have any authority in whatever remains of the party; and, finally, the CDS of Adolfo Suarez. Indeed, the AP has the support of big capitalists, the bankers, the less hardened sectors of the army and the church, but it does not have a chance of getting as much electoral support as the PSOE. And in the bourgeois camp, neither the UCD nor the CDS has the weight to forge a bourgeois democratic right. Moreover, it political forces has not made much headway. This is what has created favourable conditions for a possible PSOE victory in the elections. Q: What are the most widely forecast electoral results, and the governmental forms that might result following a PSOE victory? A: The most likely outcome is a PSOE government with some independents. Right now, Democratic Action (AD) led by Fernandez Ordonez, which came out of the crisis in the UCD, is part of the PSOE electoral list. On the other hand, it seems that Adolfo Suarez does not want to be part of the government. Rather, he contemplates a sort of arrangement with the PSOE in parliament while staying out of the government, in order not to leave too much room for the right that will regroup around the AP and the UCD.
Obviously, all this depends on the final electoral results. The PSOE, which has
not given up hope of winning the absolute majority, is waging a frantic campaign in favour of a 'useful vote', in order to marginalise the Communist Party (CPE). At the moment the polls give at least 48% to the PSOE (its own polls gave it up to 58%). The AP is improving, but still failing to reach 20%. The UCD and the CDS seem to have levelled off at under 10%: this is amazing for a party which, like the UCD, is still in office. Finally, the CP is very preoccupied with speculations that barely give it 5 to 6%. If they do not make the 5% minimum, they would lose their parliamentary representation. Q: How will the electoral victory of the PSOE affect the political crisis that you spoke of above? A: The victory of the PSOE will step up the instability even further. With the PSOE as the majority in parliament, compromise between the state apparatus inherited from Francoism and the parliamentary institutions is not going to stabilize. But the victory of the PSOE will compel the bourgeoisie to speed up the process of political regroupment around the AP. After the elections, the AP would have to push the UCD to create a coalition of the opposition against the parties in government. The wing of the bourgeoisie that supports this perspective may have a majority in the big bourgeoisie for pushing the project of a 'great right'.
But on the other hand, within the bourgeois camp, there will be the right nationalists, the bourgeois parties of the Basque country, of Catalonia and the party of Adolfo Suarez (CDS), that will adopt a different attitude towards the PSOE, mid-way between direct confrontation and collaboration with the government coming out of the October 28 elections. The division within the bourgeoisie will continue after the electoral victory of the PSOE, even though it is likely that the forces polarised around the AP will turn out to be the most powerful. Q: On October 2, it was announced that a military plot to prevent the elections had been discovered. Was this a bluff or a real reaction of certain sectors of the army? In general, how is the military reacting to the perspective of a PSOE A: The Francoist sectors of the state apparatus very much doubt the capacity of the right-wing bourgeoisie to prevent the PSOE from, sooner or later, undertaking certain reforms of the state apparatus and thus attacking their privileges. This is why the coup attempt discovered on October 2 was not a bluff. It is certainly not an initiative of the majority of the military hierarchy. But it is an action of the toughest sector of the army, who do not want to rely on the PSOE's collaboration with the regime, and do not even want to give the bourgeois parties the chance to force the PSOE to carry out a right wing policy. Moreover, from the start, the PSOE denounced this coup attempt as a bluff of the bourgeois forces
But they could not keep up this argument for very long. It is now clear that the hardest sectors of the army wanted to carry out a coup. They will continue to use this threat after the elections.
But what is still the greatest danger is that using the excuse of the presence of these ultra-reactionary sectors within the army, a majority of the military hierarchy is considering a sort of institutional coup after the elections, a semi-constitutional coup as we call it here, with the establishment of a civil-military junta, or something like that. After an initial period of PSOE government where the PSOE will have felt the pressure of the bourgeoisie to follow a right wing line, if the AP can
Felipe Gonzalez, leader of PSOE (DR) appear as a viable governmental alternative, especially after the municipal elections in February 1983, this bourgeois sector could, without openly attacking parliamentary institutions, and with the support of King Juan Carlos, provoke the setting up of a new form of government, what we call here an 'administrative government' of the right wing parties and the military. Relying on the Bonapartist role of the king, this institutional coup would aim to undo the results of the October 28 elections, while avoiding a central confrontation with parliamentary institutions. If the majority of the military hierarchy plays this card, it nevertheless will have to take into account the great difficulty in carrying through this project: the lack of a social base for an attempt of this nature, even if it enjoys the support of the king and the constitution ... Q: What kind of electoral campaign are the bourgeois parties conducting? A: The campaign of all bourgeois forces is affected by the fact that they expect favourable results for the PSOE. It is rather a campaign for the day after the election. The basic picture presented by the electoral campaign of the bourgeoisie is one of a divided right with no confidence in its ability to win in the electoral arena. Certainly, Fraga Iribarne and the bourgeois leaders sometimes say that they can win the elections, but nobody really believes them.
Popular Action, for example, has as its main slogan 'It's time for solutions!' which refers to problems such as insecurity in the cities' 'terrorism' or 'danger of division in Spain', etc. The AP rests on certain traditional values, like the family, absolute opposition to abortion rights or even decriminalisation, defense of private education, while combining these with populist promises such as reduction of
7
taxes or economic protection for houseWives ... Moreover, the economic orientation of the AP is the open defense of the neo-liberal options of Milton Friedman (1). Certainly, Fraga Iribarne does not talk about Pinochet, but he does lay claim to Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. It is thus a very rightist campaign, with a populist aspect, that has a certain resonance in some layers of the traditional petty bourgeoisie. There is an however, of the AP's political orientation that is very much used against it, even by rival bourgeois parties - it appears as a party conciliatory to the putschist sectors of the army. Thus, after the last coup attempt, Fraga Iribarne declared that one must understand motives of the golpistas, because of a risk of a split in the Spanish state.
The UCD is leading a very defensive electoral campaign, with enormous programmatic confusion, because it is not able to find an electoral niche between the right of Fraga Iribarne and the liberalSuarez's CDS. The fundamental differwith the AP is that it combines themes like the defence of freedom of education, rejection of decriminalisation for abortion, with the affirmation of defence of democratic and parliamentary institutions.
As for the CDS, it develops the perspective of progressive social reforms on the economic terrain, of support of the most modern sectors of industry. Certainly, the proposed reforms do not go very far, but this is enough to distinguish the CDS from other bourgeois formations.
after the recent military putsch Suarez reacted more strongly than the leaders of the PSO themselves, stating that all officers implicated in this action be removed, and that the army must remain in its barracks. Q: How do the different bourgeois forces define themselves in relation to the problem of nationalities? A: That is precisely another difference between the bourgeois formations. While the AP and the UCD appear to be the two parties of the centre bourgeoisie, it seems to be the CDS that is more ready to compromise with the bourgeois nationalist parties, especially in Catalonia, but also in the Basque country. For example, the CDS does not agree with the LOAPA (Organic Law for the Harmonisation of the Process of Autonomy). (2) It supports negotiation with the bourgeois parties and a new law on the nationalities. Undoubtedly the CDS would be ready to make concessions on issues such as the withdrawal of the police force from the country, on the extension of autonomous governmental responsibilities in the area of education or communication, but it does not make any concrete Q: What would a vote and a victory for the PSOE represent for the working class? A: For the workers and for whole different strands of the population who are prepared to vote for its candidates, the PSOE represents the hope for change. But
8
### Trotskyists election campaign
The Liga Comunista Revolucionaria, section of the Fourth International in the Spanish state, will be putting forward candidates in 48 out of 52 constituencies, the exceptions
Cuenta, and Moroccan territories of Ceuta and
The LCR is part of the following electoral coalitions: Front Comunista de Catalunya (Catalonian Communist Front); Esquerda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left of Galicia);
Comunista (Communist Left of Aragon); Esquerra Unida del Pais Valencia (United Left of Valencia) and Frente de Izquierda Comunista (Communist Left Front) in
The LCR is also participating in electoral regroupments in Rioja and
Asturias in the Bloque de la Izquierda Asturiana (Bloc of the Asturian
Left), and in Caceres in Bloque Popular de Extremadura (Popular Bloc of
Estremadura). All in all our comrades participating in 18 united
In 30 other constituencies, they are standing alone. This is the case of the Liga Komunista Iraultzailea
(LKI, section of the Fourth International in Euzkadi) in the four constituencies in Euzkadi, and of the LCR in Andalucia,
Islands, the regon of Murcia and in etc. In these 30 dis tricts, the LCR is standing both for
Congres (Parliament) and the Senate.
In some cases, the comrades intend to stand down after the campaign in favour of candidates from radical nationalist organisations, such
Herri Batasuna in Euzkadi.
The comrades are legally entitled to a half hour on national television,
45 minutes on national radio, and corresponding time on regional and local TV and radio. The LCR has demanded to be represented on electoral bodies, such as the central electoral Junta and the Radio-TV
Committee. at the same time, while the central slogan of this campaign is simply 'For change!' its actual programme seems to get more and more watered down the closer we get to October 28. The policy of the PSOE is to achieve an electoral victory, if possible an absolute majority in the Cortes, while maintaining a willingness to consult with the 'real powers, that is, the employers, the church, the institutions and the army, even if in the last case this is not overtly
In the electoral campaign the process of change has become focused above all on the question of links with the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). With its proposal for a referendum on this question, the PSOE indicated its continuing desire to freeze the integration of the Spanish state into the military organisations of NATO, although no precise date was proposed. On all its other promises it is clear that the PSOE is reducing the scope of the changes it stands for. For example, on the question of unemployment: the PSOE promised to create 800,000 new jobs in the next four years of government. But this would only mean a reduction in the unemployment rate from 16 to 12% of the active population, that is, it would keep a high level of unemployment for the next four years. While the PSOE promised to increase the period of unemployment benefit to two years it still refuses to extend it to all the unemployed. The reduction of the work week to 40 hours is offset by an increase in productivity. The PSOE has also accepted the essential argument which has gone along with signing various social pacts in the last while, that is the proposal to insalaries in line with the rate of inflation predicted for the year to come, and not inflation in the current year.
On the land question, which is crucial in Andalusia and Estremadura, the PSOE is content to put forward a 'minimum income guarantee for the poor peasants, and very weak laws on the question of division of the land. The power of the big landowners is still respected. The only nationalisation envisaged by the PSOE is of the high-tension wires.
In the field of democratic liberties the PSOE intends to keep the laws that were approved after February 23, 1981, such as the law for defence of the constitution, which can in fact be used against workers organisations and newspapers. Anyone who denounces state repression being used to suppress the demands of the nationalities in the Spanish state can be arrested under the charge of apologism for terrorism.
One of the weak links in the policies of the PSOE is precisely this question of nationalities. Not only does it not oppose the LOAPA, but it refuses account of the most immediate demands supported by the radical nationalists, from the Basque country for example.
The same goes for the nuclear power centre at Leminiz, 15 kilometres Bilbao, which is a real scandal from the point of view of the safety of the local
Milton Friedman, American economist and Nobel prizewinner, is the leader of the 'monethe fight against rising prices.
to re-establish the rate of profit by a brutal attack through a massive rise in unemployment in
The Organic Law for the Harmonisation or
La of Under the pretext of bringing into line the differences in autonomy status of different nationalities in the Spanish state the law reduces further the power of local insti-
The PSOE supported the adoption of this law, just like the UCD. This measure centralist bourgeoisie and the nationalist bour increased the contradictions between the geois formations.
doing in the present electoral campaign? that fights). Around this slogan we have population. The PSOE has declared itself in favour of stopping the functioning of nuclear centres which do not offer sufficient guarantees of safety. However, it is in favour of maintaining this one because they want to distinguish themselves from the radical Basque nationalists and ETA who are opposed to building this centre. But it is likely that once the PSOE is in government they will be forced to make certain concessions on this because it is a very popular issue in Euzkadi.
salir de la OTAN
The PSOE also refuses to retreat on the freeing of the Basque political prisoners and the withdrawal of the police force from the Basque country because it knows that the Army is intransigent on these points.
The decriminalisation of abortion is only seen in extreme cases of rape or malformation of the foetus, but this question hardly appears in the election campaign. The PSOE has also retreated already from one of the proposals to abolish a law which maintains the privileges of private education with respect to subsidies and the role of the church. The PSOE did not intend to stop these subsidies, but to control them in order to prioritise the development of public education. The right made a fuss and the PSOE backed down. But there will be a lot of popular pressure around this issue once the PSOE is in government. Finally the PSOE, in its electoral programme does not propose any concrete measure to purge the army, even though it denounces the continual threats of a coup d'etat, golpismo.
To the workers and the layers ready to vote for it, the PSOE appears as a hope for change rather than as a party able to make big radical reforms. But above all, it is seen as an instrument of defence for the workers against the danger of a coup d'etat, and a right wing which is tending to concentrate itself behind the AP of Fraga Iribarne. This is not to say that the present vague promises meet the expectations of the PSOE electorate. They want the defence of democratic freedoms, the fight against unemployment, and against entry into NATO, to be linked to policies that really oppose the right and the threats of a coup c'etat. Q: What is the Communist Party (PCE)
A: The PCE more than ever seems to be running the risk of decomposition after these elections. In fact, according to the electoral law and the organisation of the Cortes, if the PCE does not get 15 deputies in Parliament, it cannot have its own
This risk of being squeezed out of parliamentary representation rather militant campaign of the PCE base for these elections. But the problem of the PCE is that it wants to get deputies with a programme that is not sufficiently differentiated from that of the PSOE, bar a few differences. For example, the PCE is against LOAPA, for a rapid exit from NATO, and it has put a time limit of six months on calling a referendum on this question. It is for the removal of American bases, and has been bolder on the question of abortion than the PSOE. But these differences are very limited. And all the more so as their way of applying these demands is totally within the framework of the consultation policy advocated by the PSOE.
In fact, at the same time as it criticises the PSOE as a right wing social democrathe PCE puts forward a policy of democratic front with the UCD, with Suarez's party, and with the PSOE. Essentially, it reproaches the PSOE for not taking sufficient account of it in its Q: What is the attitude of the trade union confederations, the General Workers Union (UGT), and the Workers Commissions (CCOO) to the question of how to A: The UGT has called for a vote for the even though it has stated it will not give a blank cheque to a socialist government, and that it will retain independent trade union policies. There are moreover some differences between the electoral programme of the PSOE and that of the UGT. For example, there are several trade union federations of the UGT which have declared themselves in favour of nationalisation of their sector, as was done during the congress of the
Marcellino Camacho, leader of the Workers Commissions is trying to maintain a certain autonomy from the PCE in order to shield the union from the effects of the Party's crises. Therefore, while remaining closely linked to it, they have not called openly for a vote for its candidates alone. The CCOO have called for a vote for the parties which support their programme. However, this programme remains quite cautious, though there is an attempt to differentiate the CCOO's position from that of the UGT. The CCOO, for example, has called for a 35 hour work week as soon as posQ: What are the central axes of your own election campaign? A: Our central slogan has to thrusts: Que no nos rebajen el cambio, ven con la izquierda que lucha. (So that they don't minimise the change, come with the left elaborated five themes of the campaign.
the struggle against the continuous threat of a coup d'etat. This demands, we say, a radical purge of the
Against the LOAPA we say, with LOAPA, self-determination for the nationalities in the Spanish state.'
On unemployment, we say that, as there are two million unemployed, two million jobs should be created, through immediate investment, and that unemployment benefit should be instituted for all women and men. And, if money is needed, then it should be taken from where it is, by nationalising the banks.
We demand immediate withdrawal from NATO and the calling of a referendum on this question, the removal of American bases in Spain, and refusal of nuclear weapons. As for the practicalities, we have not set a date for this referendum. But within the electoral coalition in Madrid, for example, we support the position of the PCE, which proposes a referendum within six months of the inauguration of the new government.
We demand, which is very important, legalisation of abortion rights, for this medical service to be free and reimbursed by social security.
Thus, we have not developed a general programme for the elections. We preferred to put the emphasis mainly on these five themes, to try to get electoral alliances with the radical and revolutionQ: On that point, what results have you gotten in your attempts to get unitedA: The outcome of our policy of electoral alliances is very uneven. We have made formal alliances with the Communist Movement in Spain (MCE) in four areas, Catalonia, Madrid, Aragon and Galicia. In these four regions we are putting forward common candidates on a two-party slate. In addition, in Madrid, a section of the former Maoist Workers Party is participating in the electoral list.
In other regions there are coalitions which are not coalitions of parties but in which the MCE and LCR are present.
are coalitions of political fronts, some of which existed before the elections, some of which have now been creawith independents. In Valencia, for fuera la LOAPA autodeterminación
example, there is a coalition which is called the United Left of Valencia, in which sections of the radical nationalists are taking part and which is structured through collectives at the base. This coalition is campaigning on key themes similar to our own, while putting a lot more emphasis on the national question.
Then there is Asturias, where there is an electoral front in which the MCE and
LCR are participating, but which also includes a current of workers leaders, which has come out of the Workers
Commissions. It is better known as the left current of the Workers Commissions.
It was actually expelled, but continues to fight for reinstatement. This coalition is called the Left Bloc of Asturias.
Outside these examples, which show that it is in fact possible to pursue a policy of electoral alliances, the LCR is standing separately in places where such agreements cannot be reached, even with the MCE. This is the case in the Basque country or in Andalusia. The Liga Komunista Iraultzailea (LKI), section of the
LCR in Euzkadi, are standing candidates and running an election campaign, but they are going to stand down before the vote, for the nationalist organisation
Herri Batasuna. For our Basque comrades it seemed better, since we could not get a unitary candidature of the radical and revolutionary left, and since there is the candidature of Herri Batasuna, an organisation which has already shown itself, in previous elections and during struggles, as the principal force of the currents resisting the present regime and the national oppression of the Basque coun try, to concentrate the votes on this candidature. This 'useful vote' is not unconditional support, as we will show during our campaign.
In fact we have three areas of difference with Herri Batasuna. First of all, their underestimation of the usefulness of having a presence in the parliamentary institutions. While they use election campaigns to popularise their programme, Herri Batasuna do not want to use their elected representatives to attend and take part in parliamentary debates. This criti¿ism does not fall into a void, in so far as this question has already created tension within the organisation during internal debates. Second point of difference, the relationship that this coalition has with ETA. And that is not because we are opposed to armed struggle in principle, but because we consider that the policy of mass mobilisation cannot be subordinated to the minority armed actions of ETA. Activity which we think, as a general rule, does not relate to the actual balance of force. Finally, we criticise the sectarian attitude of Herri Batasuna to other currents in the workers movement, and the fact that they do not want to develop any type of unity with the CCOO, the UGT, the PSOE, or the PCE. These very important criticisms cannot however hide the fact that Herri Batasuna has been the principal force of resistance to the regime of reform and that 10 counter-reform following February 23, If we had reached agreement with this 1981(3). dissident current in Madrid, this could
To summarise our voting advice: we have extended to other provinces of the can say that where we have not formal- country. However, the bridges to this ised common candidates we call for a current are not broken. For example we vote for nationalist radical formations have campaigned together on Palestine, like Herri Batasuna in Euzkadi, and we continue to work together in National Popular Bloc in Galicia, and the trade unions .... Union of the Peoples of the Canaries in Q: Does the unity in action you have the Canary Isles, or worker candidates of developed with the MCE open up new the reformist left in the rest of the Span- possibilities in the political and organiis state. This is an orientation which takes sational level, in the perspective of buildaccount of our objective, to strengthen ding the revolutionary party? the radical left and our comradely rela- A: We think that the electoral agreements tions with different forces in this current. with the MCE constitute a step forward But where there are not significant can- in unity between the two parties. But in didatures of the radical left we call for a order to see the next step forward we are vote for the reformist left parties, against waiting for the result of this joint camthe right. and above all Q: Have you had negotiations and discus- towards a PSOE government. There could sions on common list with groups be political differences on this, even coming out of the PCE? though there are points of convergence A: In the case of Madrid there was in fact The risk the MCE is running is that it a very good chance that a whole left does not want to take into account the current from the PCE would reach agree- illusions, even limited, that part of the ment with us to stand together in the will have in this elections. Since the dissolution of the government. This could raise tactica Cortes at the end of August there has differences between the two parties. But been a whole process of debate with this there is now a common wish to work together and not to treat political differdissident left current in Madrid, led by trade-union leaders, in fact the majority ences as irreconcilable. But we cannot of the CCOO leaders in the province. We make predictions on how far the results had almost reached agreement around the of October 28 will open a new period for central themes of our campaign outlined all the revolutionary left. above. But, when the agreement was to be concluded, a pro-Soviet faction in this The rule of 'political reform' is the process current came out against the agreement, of gradual transition towards a form of parlia and won the day. It is nevertheless posi- mentary democracy, after the fall of the Prime tive that this current refused to have an Minister at the time, Adolfo Suarez, within the limits of the monarchical institutions inherited electoral list with the pro-Soviets. There from Francoism. The 'counter-reform' was is in fact a pro-Soviet candidature which ry 23, 1981. This is a period in which the direct initiated by the military coup d'etat of Februais called the candidature of Communist or indirect pressure of the armed forces blockUnity, it comes from groups which came ed, or even reversed, the process of opening up with the adoption of the anti-terrorist laws, and out of the PCE several years ago. laws against the autonomy of nationalities.
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