(70%), involving 2.6 million workers.
Metalworkers stopped work in four states - São Paulo: in the suburbs; in million workers
Campinas and more than 15 towns; Rio de Janeiro: in the capital, in Volta Redonda (100%) and in two other cities; Minas Gerals: at Belo Horizonte, Contagem and Acesita; Espiritu Santo: partial strike in the capital.
IT WAS one of the biggest general strikes in Brazil's history. On March 14 and 15, 35 million workers responded to the strike call put out by the two big union federations, the CUT and the CGT. The central demand of the strikers was for a 40% minimum wage rise to compensate for losses in buying power. In the last round of negotiations, José Sarney's government offered a non-backdated increase of 14.6%, while the bosses did not want to go higher than a 7.1% offer.
The latest train of governmental measures to try to stem inflation - called the Summer plan (plano Verão), and popularly christened by workers the "Thieves' plan"
(plano Ladrão) - had been barely announced when it began to founder. Sarney's prediction of a 3% inflation rate in March doubled in reality to over 6%. But the general strike, with the participation of around 70% of the country's 50 million workers to defend their living standards, was the biggest single blow to the government's project.
ISAAC AKCELRUD
HE GENERAL STRIKE was a battle on a variety of fronts that was begun even before the two days of work stoppage on March 14 and 15, and which culminated in paralysing the country. And it went on even after the mobilization had apparently stopped. Each of these three phases had its own characteristics. In the beginning, the government tried to prevent the strike. Afterwards, it had to cover up its demoralization and isolation. Finally, it tried to minimize the scope of the workers' immediate economic gains and to limit their political impact.
The government attempted to prevent -or at least to reduce — the dimensions of the strike through a campaign of disinformation, police and military threats and demagogy about non-existent future "discussions". The generals demanded that President Sarney himself make a televised broadcast to declare his opposition to the general strike. But his self-preservation instinct kept him from sticking his neck out, so he sent his new justice minister, Oscar Dias Correa, instead. The latter, a survivor of a reactionary current, prepared a fire-and-brimstone speech. Sarney then
In this latter region, the strike was more or less successful among oil workers and electricians, in the chemical, plastics, glass and food industries, and among civil servants in the education, health and insurance sectors.
In the Southern region, those most involved in action were metalworkers (64%) in Porto Alegre, Joinville, Curitibia and Cascavel; and electricians (75%), especially at Electrosul. Telephone lines were almost totally cut off in Rio Grande do Sul.
Nationally, metalworkers came top of the strike chart with an average participation level of over 55% - a million workers! * opposed a whole paragraph of it, saying: "the cup is already running over, as it is" Correa's television appearance was delayed for half an hour. This was the first sign of dissension and political divergences inside the authorities' ranks.
Workers mobilized in every corner of Brazil
These manoeuvres were largely neutralized by the militant climate during the final run-up to the general strike. In a number of cities, many categories of workers brought forward the day of action, sometimes beginning unlimited strikes. Metalworkers at Belgo Mineira in Minas Gerais state, for example, occupied their factory for a number of days. In Campinas, São Paulo state, the strike leaders decided to extend the mobilization from 48 to 72 hours. In São Paulo itself, workers in many workplaces also anticipated the movement. In total, half of the metalworkers went on strike. The figures esie ted ray the unhe stride: 9 firm the generalized character of the strike, May 15, 1989 • #163 International Viewpoint
BRAZIL although it's impact was uneven (see box). The strike's success has altered the relationship of forces and changed the political situation to the workers' advantage.
Quantitatively, the general strike affected all the states and territories in the country. It mobilized workers in the towns and countryside in every corner of Brazil. A number of localities that had no previous tradition of struggle and where strikes had never been seen before joined in the mobilization. From the Amazon to the industrialized southern central region - albeit unevenly - a total of 35 million strikers responded to the united strike call made by the United Workers' Confederation (CUT) and the General Workers' Confederation (CGT). Its scope both numerically and geographically - since it covered the whole country — is a clear indication of the merging of struggles at a national level.
A step forward for workers' unity
Qualitatively, the general strike represented a step forward in the building of unity in struggle. This time, unity was somewhat easier to achieve than usual. This was partly due to the weakness of the CGT, which was forced to tag along behind the CUT, and partly because the joint struggle against the austerity plan's wage freeze rattled the reformist and class collaborationist leaderships, who had previously been oriented towards the objective of a social pact. The militant slogans against the "Thieves' plan" — direct, simple and easy to understand, even by the least experienced and politicized workers — made the way forward from the economic struggle to the political level clear. The CUT and those trade unionists sensitive to the vital interests and aspirations of the workers were bolstered during this test of strength.
At the political level, the trade-union movement was able to make use of its broad capacities for initiatives and of the self-confidence built up by the workers' movement after the recent victories in the municipal elections. It took the initiative and began an offensive against the government and the bosses. The March 14-15 action marked a break from isolated strikes and the predominance of the service and civil servants' sectors. It was an audacious united mobilization led by the proletariat in the ABC working-class suburbs of São Paulo, the concentrations of metalworkers from Volta Redonda in the state of Rio de Janeiro and from Vale do Aço in Minas Gerais, shoulder to shoulder with the unions in the big urban centres.
The strike also had important repercussions in the countryside — for example thousands and thousands of agricultural workers from Pernambuco joined the workers' demonstration in Recife. There were many other examples of broad soli10 darity and sympathy from the population in the industrial regions of São Paulo. * International Viewpoint #163 • May 15, 1989
The strike
and the
political
crisis THE GENERAL strike came at a time when the crisis of the ruling classes' political front was intensifying in the run-up to the presidential elections due to be held in November. The following article is from Em Tempo, monthly paper of the Socialist Democracy current inside the Workers Party. D OUBTS were expressed even among the bourgeoisie, not only about the specific issue of the wage freeze. They went almost so far as to justify the general strike.
The most important example was that of the President of the São Paolo Stock Exchange, Eduardo Rocha Azevedo, a supporter of Ronaldo Caiado of the UDR. In substance he stated that many industrialists had made a lot of money out of the price readjustment that preceded the price freeze. They were therefore in a position to pay higher wages without raising prices. It seemed that he had drawn the conclusion that for the time being the capitalists should be cautious.
### LANO
SALARIO
SEU DEFE
ADRAO
The group whose interests are most immediately at stake is the commercial bourgeoisie who are at loggerheads with the industrialists over the issue of prices and of the distribution of the surplus value between the two sectors. The president of the Chamber of Commerce, Abram Szaiman accused the industrialists of being "backward and obscurantist" and of going after "easy money". The industrialists have promised to reply. Many beans get spilt in the course of these mutual accusations.
The final resort of those who want to condemn the general strike is to claim that it was a political strike. This is close to being a cry of despair. Nobody, in fact, made at any time any attempt to hide the political character and content of the strike. It is obvious that a protest by tens of millions against the economic policy of the government, a massive demonstration against the national authorities, and open denunciation of the way that people's wages are being stolen under the "Thieves' Plan" are all political acts.
This charge against the workers' movement rebounds on the government, since it its the regime's determination to hamstring the workers' movement politically. All this only serves to strengthen Lula's candidacy.
Another "argument" used by the officials and bosses is to claim that the success of the strike was due solely to the fact that transport was paralyzed at the behest of the municipal councils controlled by the PT. Public transport paralyzed all over Brazil
But, if this is the case, why was there also a transport strike in municipalities such as Rio de Janeiro which are not led by the PT? Public transport was paralyzed by strikes throughout the whole country. Could it be that the idea of depriving these sectors of the right to strike is being contemplated? The press reported that Mrs. Dorotheia from the Ministry of Transport had talked about such a possibility. This comes from someone who wants to revive the defunct social pact!
Even in those parts of São Paolo which are served by the train or metro, which were not on strike, the workers in the big multinational firms went on strike. These firms' own transport services were not working because there were not enough passengers.
Secondly a PT local council is there to support strikes, not repress them. The capitalists are angry because they have found that they cannot buy the PT's elected representatives with offers of government funds. (See IV 161, April 17, 1989.) Olivia Dutra on a picket line, Erundina refusing to send the police to run the buses, Buaiz physically confronting police violence — these are all signs of the changes set in motion by the PT's recent victories. The PT uses its power to support the people. And if the state machine cannot be used
May 15, 1989 • #163 International Viewpoint for that purpose then it will have to be replaced by something more adequate.
Another weapon used against the general strike was the role of Antonio Medeiros, the leader of the metalworkers' union in São Paolo. The slanders against the general strike of March 14/15 were in contrast with the praise lavished on the isolated and partial strikes led by Medeiros. He is regularly showered with praise by Mario Amato, the President of the Employers' Federation (FIESP), just as he was previously praised to the skies by the aspirant President Leonel Brizola.
Madeiros was a parasite on the strike
What did Madeiros, who refused to participate in the leadership of the strike as a representative of the CGT, do that was so useful and constructive? He offered the bourgeoisie an alternative. Instead of uniting the workers and concentrating their forces in the general strike, he kept them isolated at the factory level. The effect of this fragmentation is to dilute the strength of the workers and would inevitably lead to leaving them defenceless in the face of a new offensive by the employers. The crumbs gained one day will be lost the next.
Madeiros took advantage of the general strike to increase the number of local and limited agreements. Although he supported the action, he was in reality a parasite on the general strike. The results that he is so proud of are spurious. In reality he lowered the level of wage increase demanded from a minimum of 40% to a maximum of 29%. This was a good deal for the employers frightened by the general
It is thus necessary to patiently explain to the metalworkers of São Paolo in the grip of Medeiros that they are isolated, weakened and vulnerable to the blows of the bosses. But if they were to unite with other workers, and first of all with their fellow metalworkers of the ABC suburbs under the banner of the CUT, then their strength would be multiplied.
In the second phase of the battle, the government ended up by contradicting itself, when it was compelled to recognize the real wage losses of the workers, which it had previously denied. The Employers' Federation for its part has decided to reconsider its previous refusal to pay a wage increase and has also had to recognize that the general strike was justified. This shows clearly who the winners were in this national confrontation.
The independent class-struggle workers' movement now has the responsibility to formulate and spread the lessons of this memorable episode in the class struggle. The bourgeoisie will also be drawing its own conclusions and will return to the fray with fury and hatred.
This discussion will have to take place in the course of the struggle. We do not have the time to stop and think, and the workers cannot go on a spiritual retreat to meditate on the general strike.
The first lesson of the general strike is the example of mass mobilization around basic economic demands. In order to be a truly general strike, the movement had to draw in new layers of non-politicized workers without any previous experience of the struggle and give them a baptism of
Being general, however, the strike was inevitably political, and this fact raised the working class to a higher level of understanding and action. The level of the class struggle was raised to higher thresholds by means of the most basic economic demands. That is the dialectic of the gen-
The most responsible union leaderships and the most politically aware workers are involved in discussions based on the clear facts observed in the heat of the struggle. They wonder why, in spite of their aspirations and their dedication, the strike only received its decisive impulse during the last few days of its preparation.
It seems clear that there were signs of a lack of confidence in the strike and in an adequate response from the masses. The final surge was full of energy and vitality. But there was a pause before the big mobilization was launched. Why?
Two facts provide the most likely answer. One is the negative experience of the last attempt to organize a general strike in November 1987. The other is a structural reason, that is to say, the problems in building the CUT and the individual which need to enlarge and improve their grassroots organization in order to measure up to the dimensions of the impending struggles. involves the development of a layer of competent medium level leaders.
Weakness of political leadership
A sense of responsibility and a determination to avoid mistakes, dictated a very cautious and moderate approach to preparations for the strike in many cases. Perhaps there was also a lack of political
But the situation now is very different and much better. It seems that the lack of a middle leadership was the crucial weakness, given that the leadership of a strike of these dimensions could not left to the 14 members of the national leadership.
When there are only a handful of people taking the responsibility for transmitting the overall orientation and instructions, adjusting them to local conditions and transmitting the living experiences of the masses back to the central leadership, these few are overworked. They try to be in several places at the same time and cannot make proper contacts with a whole
BRAZIL series of sectors in the country.
The broadening of the middle layer of union leaders would also ensure the renovation and rejuvenation of the union leaderships
A criticism should also be made of the largely spontaneous nature of the popular support for the strike. There was not systematic work started early enough to build up the material support needed by the workers in their confrontation with the government. This is a sign that the PT is not sufficiently involved in the great struggle against the "plano Verão". . At every level the leadership of the PT took the easy option of leaving things to the leadership of the CUT.
This default reflects a political overestimation of the trade union struggle, which also explains the the absence of a serious attempt to educate politically the young workers who are coming to the fore in the workers' movement.
Good grounds for confidence in the future
Despite all this we have been through a stimulating and enriching experience. The response of the workers passed all expectations, just as the masses surprised the leaders in the recent municipal elections.
There are good grounds for confidence in the morale and level of understanding of the people and the workers. The general strike has consolidated this determined and confident frame of mind and rooted it in the political and trade union movements.
A great wave of strikes, sector by sector, spreading contagiously to the more isolated factories until whole categories of workers are involved, is a real possibility.
The wage demands of the working class are more and more clearly intersecting with the struggle for non-payment of the foreign debt. The capitalist government is trapped by the vicious circle of the debt. Whatever it does, the debt gets bigger and cannot be shaken off. The bourgeoisie is powerless to deal with the debt crisis. As a result it tries to squeeze the money to pay the the interest and the dividends out of the
The explosive nature of the situation has already been shown by the many important actions that have taken place since the end of the strike in a number of States. A number of militant sectors will be putting in their claims in April and May.
The eruption of a wave of strikes in the second half of April and the first half of May is practically inevitable. This is also when the price freeze on a number of products will end. Inflation may well take off
May Day 1989 promises to be intense and exciting, taking place against a background of powerful mass struggles. The lessons of the general strike need to be Loomed to prepare for what is already 11 looming on the horizon. *