Czechoslovak Communist Party resists glasnost
THE CZECHOSLOVAK Communist Party (CzCP) seems completely impervious to the new Impulses coming from
Moscow. Last August the forces of law and order dispersed a demonstration on the anniversary of the Warsaw Pact
Invasion of 1968 with truncheons. Recently a new wave of repression has been launched against the opposition. Petr
International Viewpoint #173 • November 13, 1989
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Lubomir Strougal The latter, under the influence of Gorbachev and encouraged by developments in the Soviet Union, had expressed clearly, even publicly, his
Cibulka, known for his independent cultural activities is serving his fourth prison sentence in ten years, while two editors of the independent monthly journal, Lidové Noviny,
Jirl Rumi and Rudolf Zeman, were arrested on October 12 and charged with anti-state incitement. Hundreds of people were arrested during demonstrations on October 28, the anniversary of the emergence of an independent
Czechoslovak Republic in 1918.
Some 30 oppositionists are currently serving sentences for political reasons. International Viewpoint talked to Petr Uhl, a revolutionary Marxist and a member of Charter 77, and the
Committee in Defence of The Unjustly Prosecuted (VONS), in
Prague, about the way the CzCP works.
P
EIR UHL: The first thing to get straight about the Czechoslovak Communist Party is that it is neither a communist party nor, strictly speaking, a political party at all. It is a structure that brings together 1.7 million people in a hierarchy of powers and responsibilities. Most of its members join in order to obtain some small benefits in their daily lives. They are not revolutionary Marxists nor any other kind of Marxist. In Czechoslovakia people do not say
"I am a communist", they say "I am a party member"
Of course, some party members, especially those that work in the repressive apparatuses, who have unpopular jobs or who are subject to criticism, adopt Marxist phraseology. They come out with an anticapitalist line that "in the West things are even worse", and so on, in order to motivate themselves and justify their activities.
But this is nothing more than a psychological alibi.
Yesterday I read in Rudé Právo [the CP daily] a long interview by comrade Nyers from the Hungarian leadership. He exp lains the evolution of the Hungarian party after the re-establishment of its power in
1956 and the ideological currents inside it.
After Kádár's death, the currents recomposed themselves. I was astonished that
Rudé Právo published an
8 admitted that tendencies existed inside the article
Hungarian CP even before Kádár's death.
Here there are no debates in the cells or base organizations apart from about very concrete problems connected to the functioning of the enterprise or productivity. There are no debates about genuinely political questions in the party base organizations. • The party is thus a sort of white collar union....
It is a group that defends its own interests. The lack of discussion at the base is connected with the silence that surrounds the debates that one supposes go on at the top - debates that certainly exist. Of course these discussions get through to the middle cadres especially in the regional and district committees. I imagine that political debates also take place amongst the full-time officials.
The most interesting thing is what goes on at the top — in any case Western journalists always ask us about the currents in the party. They envisage contradictions between the party leader, Milos Jakes, and the Prime Minister, Ladislav Adamec. It is clear that after he became general secretary, Jakes and his circle cast off the extremes. On one side Vasil Bilak, who represented the hard dogmatic and conservative wing and on the other, a bit earlier, ex-Prime Minister desire to carry out a very profound economic reform as soon as possible.
It seems that he was thinking of reforming the administration, not only economically, but also politically, in a way that involved issues of rights, freedoms, and cultural and social life. He was sacked and replaced by Adame who continues Strougal's line but in a much more timid way. Adamec is careful. He avoids getting directly implicated in repression and does not explicitly support it, while trying to find excuses.
After casting off the extremes - not only Bilak and Strougal, but others as well - the current leadership seems united or reunited, although tensions continue to exist. Some want the reforms to go faster, while others warn of the dangers represented by a new Prague Spring. There are also purely personal tensions. It seems that Stepan wants to replace Jakes and is trying to compromise him in one way or
Unlike Poland or even Hungary and the Soviet Union, the CzCP — its leadership, its apparatus and its base appears to be intact and capable of reacting and managing" (that is dominating) the society. It retains the services of all the traditional transmission belts — the unions, youth organizations, women's organizations, other political parties and even a large part of the Catholic hierarchy, priests, journalists and so on. The whole hierarchical and bureaucratized system has functioned quite well up until now. But this is at odds with growing awareness among ordinary people, including active (in a critical sense) members of the party, who express their views openly, some (although not as party members) going so far as to get involved with independent movements. • Are there structured currents Inside the party who would support reforms?
Not at the base of the party. But such a tendency does exist in the leadership — the Adamec current. There can be no doubt that Adame has many political supporters in the party apparatus, even at a regional and district level. He has the sup-
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November 13, 1989 • #173 International Viewpoint port of a lot of ministers and directors of big enterprises who make up the technocratic current. On the other hand, Jakes has the backing of the many dogmatists who remain in the party apparatus. Thus one can say that there are two wings in the party, but that does not affect the base. • How do you explain the fact that, while in Poland, Hungary and the Soviet Union, the CPs are trying to reform themselves in order to survive, the CzCP remains so monolithic?
There are many differences among the so-called Communist parties. In Poland, the party is in decay, is completely bankrupt, in crisis, and is fighting for its life. The most favourable situation for the party is in Hungary. Thanks to its reform policy it is certain to keep a significant base in the society. It risks losing the next elections, but even if the opposition (for example, the Democratic Forum) wins them, the party's participation in the regime is ensured. The party will still be present in the political, economic and social system
I have the impression that in the Soviet Union, as in Czechoslovakia, but in a quite different context, there is a gulf between the leadership and the base. It seems as if the base has not yet been sufficiently "reactivated". It may be more active than in Czechoslovakia, but it is no more than defending itself.
It is worth noting, moreover, that the party is playing a conservative rather than a progressive role in the Soviet Union. The progressive role falls to the independent movements, to the People's Fronts, to the movements among the intellectuals and so on.. Of course many party members are active in these movements, but not the party as an entity. But one feature of the
Soviet Union is the shift in power, which goes from the chair of the party to the organs of state which are now to some extent democratically elected.
Nonetheless the differences between the
Soviet, Hungarian and Polish parties does not explain why there is no similar movement in the CzCP. The reasons for this are historical. The leaders of this party came to power, or else had their positions confirmed, through the Soviet invasion of 1968. It was this leadership that then carried out the repressive "normalization" which tied it irrevocably to Brezhnevism. The present CzCP leadership cannot now turn around and say "we have been lying for 20 years", "the Soviet invasion was a
"we must now more or less resume the path followed during the Prague Spring, since that was correct, Moscow is now doing the same thing, and it is the only possible way out." This is impossible and thus they are reacting defensively and sticking to conservative positions.
Thus, the CzCP finds its friends where it can, which is in East Germany, and now in China and Albania. Very friendly relations are being developed with the Chinese. When our Minister of National Defence spent a fortnight in China, very favourable reports appeared in our press, in particular concerning the Chinese army. Ambassadorial relations have been restored with Albania and not a word is said against Romania except for calling
The Czechoslovak leadership knows very well that this profoundly displeases the population. For this reason they do not make a big show of these contacts. The strongest links are with East Germany, although recently they have been toned down owing to the Soviet pressure on East Berlin that has led to the East German authorities making concessions on the question of those leaving or trying to leave for the West.
• There are other political parties.
What about them?
There are several political parties in
Czechoslovakia. They arose in the 1945-
49 period when there was a National
Front that was formed during the Second
World War, coming out of the resistance.
The Communists played an important role, but there were also social democrats who were swallowed up by the CzCP in
1948. Then there was Benes' National
Socialist Party, which changed its name to the Socialist Party (SP), and a descendant of the People's Party (PP), a populist
Christian party. There are also two other
CZECHOSLOVAKIA parties in Slovakia — Czechoslovakia is a federation of the Czech Lands and Slovakia — whose origins I do not know. The largest postwar Slovak party, the Democratic Party, was suppressed.
Between 1945 and 1948 there was a system of controlled and limited democracy. The National Front monopolized power and the weight within it of the CzCP was very important. In 1948 the CzCP changed this system. It took all the power, but kept most of the other parties in existence in a gutted form.
This has been used to pretend that Czechoslovakia has a multi-party democratic system. In this sense I agree with the objections that the Czechoslovak leadership makes to the new thinking in the USSR about multi-partyism. They say "In Czechoslovakia multi-partyism has ways existed. It is the Soviet Union that must now introduce it." • Do these parties have parliamentary groups and are there different candidates in elections?
Each party has a parliamentary group The National Front presents a single slate of candidates which does not specify who comes from the CP, the SP, the PP, from other parties, from a union, from the women's organization and so on. This works for elections at every level. The Communists always have the decisive majority and, of course, the slate is first of all discussed by the CP before being presented to the National Front, who make a few
Finally the list is put forward as the single list of the National Front and there is only one candidate for each position. The CP has, of course, an absolute majority in Parliament, and it is ultimately the CP that has chosen the deputies from the other parties, selecting from among those who are the most loyal and servile to the
However, something very interesting is happening. Although there is no sign of movement in the CP, massive opposition is appearing at the base of the small parties and also among the middle cadres — that is, the fulltimers and elected officials at regional and district level. Opposition to the leadership is showing up openly in their internal bulletins but is also being reflected in the newspapers that these par-
Although these parties have only a small membership and weight, both the SP and the PP have a daily paper. The PP has
Lidová Demokracie (People's Democracy) and the SP has Svobodné Slovo (Free
Word).
In Svobodné Slovo, in particular, there are really interesting things. For example, the SP's proposal on the new law on association is really very progressive and could never be voted through parliament.
The discussion at the base is beginning in the other parties rather than in the Communist party. *
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9
The meaning of the Ochoa affair
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