A balance sheet of the
Intifada - interview
INTIFADA the PLO, who had opted for a negotiated compromise with Israel under the aegis of the great powers, the PFLP was the organizing force in the Palestinian Front for the Rejection of Capitulationist Solutions (widely known as the Rejection Front), and withdrew from the leading bodies of the PLO. In 1984 Habash's formation, with George Habash along with other factions of the PLO left, boycotted the 17th session of the Palestine National Council (PNC), the broadest representative body of the organization, because of the alliance between the PLO leadership and the Jordanian monarchy (the session itself took place in the Jordanian capital Amman). In April 1987 the PLO left participated in the 18th session of the PNC in Algiers after the Arafat leadership decided to renounce the "Jordanian option" for which the Jordanian state itself had shown little respect (see /V 121,122).
In November 1988, during the 19th PNC session, the PFLP voted, with a minority of the Council members, against the acceptance of resolution 242, adopted by the United Nations' Security Council in November 1967 after the Arab-Israeli war in June of that year. The PLO had previously rejected this resolution in its entirety, in the first place because it connected withdrawal from the territories conquered in 1967 with peace with the Zionist state on the latter's terms and secondly because the resolution makes no mention of the Palestinian people and of their national rights.
The PFLP has been playing a major role in the Intifada inside the occupied territories. Its branch on the ground often comes up with much more radical positions than those expressed by the external leadership and Dr. Habash (see /V 158). Nonetheless Dr. Habash continues to enjoy a prestige
Introduction by Salah Jaber N December 9, 1989, the Intifada — the uprising of the Palestinian population of the West Bank of the River Jordan and the Gaza Strip, occupied by Israel since the 1967 war - entered its third year. Since its first anniversary in December 1988, the Intifada seems to have reached cruising speed and to be ready for the long haul.
Last year we marked the anniversary with a long balance-sheet of the trajectory of the PLO and the dynamic of the Palestinian uprising (see IV 156, 157, 158). This year we have chosen to publish the views of Dr. George Habash, the most prestigious Palestinian leader after Yasser Arafat. Dr. Habash is the founder and general secretary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which is the main left-wing faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the second most significant Palestinian organization after Arafat's Fatah.
Born in 1926, Habash, whose family was, along with the great majority of Palestinians, forced into exile in 1948, studied medicine in Beirut. There he founded the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). This pan-Arabist organization was chaucot camil 1050 vinist and socially conservative before aligning itself at the end of the 1950s with Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser, who became the champion of Arab nationalism and then of socialism" in the 1960s.
The crushing defeat of Egypt in the 1967 war led to the ANM's break with Nasserism. In October 1967, the Palestinian groups of the ANM founded the PFLP that described itself as Marxist-Leninist and supported revolutonary armed struggle. The PFLP was known, until 1972, for its spectacular hijacking of airlines, a practise it renounced, with self criticism.
From 1974 to 1981, taking the lead of the opposition to the rightist leadership of that goes far beyond the ranks of his own organization for his commitment and personal probity. The interview published below was granted us at the end of last November and was carried out and translated from Arabic by the author of these lines. *
19
The Intifada enters its third year
International Viewpoint #77 • January 29, 1990
INTIFADA
W HAT balance-sheet do
you draw of the struggle of the masses after two years of the intifada? What have been the principal achievements? How do you see the perspectives of this struggle? What, in your opinion, are the objectives that could be achieved by the intifada, and by what means?
The heroic patriotic intifada, of which the first spark flared on December 9 1987, constitutes a qualitative new stage of the Palestinian national struggle, with its own characteristics, complimentary in relation to the preceding stages. This intifada, with its new particularities, has allowed the realization of numerous achievements at all levels — Palestinian, Israeli, Arab and international. It has also allowed the drawing of new theoretical and practical lessons, Which will influence positively all the objectives of the Palestinian national struggle.
I would summarize as follows the principal specific characteristics of the stage which the intifada represents:
Firstly, the mass democratic character of the intifada — it has encompassed all the classes and categories of the Palestinian people without exception (except for a small handful of collaborators) on the one hand, and the people of both sexes and all ages on the other. The intifada has extended itself to each city, town, village, refugee camp, quarter and street, throughout the territory of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
It is important in this respect to emphasize some facts which have a particular importance in my eyes — it has been possible, in the context of the intifada, to unify all the classes and categories of the Palestinian people, including the national bourgeoisie which suffers from the effects of the political and economic measures of the occupation. It has been possible, all the same, to neutralise certain social categories that, before the intifada, would follow this or that Arab state, notably Jordan or Egypt.
On the other hand, the clearly political character of the intifada has allowed the overcoming of numerous social obstacles that, beforehand, made it difficult for Palestinian women to engage in the national struggle in a massive and clear fashion. I can even say that the phenomenon of the involvement of Palestinian women in the struggle is one of the most important and most generalized aspects of the intifada.
Finally, it is inevitable that in such a 20 are exceptions, manifested by the appear- vast mass movement as the intifada there ance in our ranks of cliques of collaborators. The Unified National Leadership (UNL) of the Intifada has addressed itself to this problem. It is important to be constantly aware of the presence of such a fifth column. It is also very important to know that it is the Zionist authorities themselves who support, organize and arm these collaborators. It is not true at all, as pretended by the capitalist press, that what has happened at this level, that is the operations of liquidation of collaborators, constitutes an internal Palestinian war. The UNL watches attentively to avoid all secondary battles within the ranks of the Palestinian people — all our differences are of a political nature and are resolved by political means. As to the collaborators, they are first warned and publicly denounced, but when they do not cease to collaborate with the occupation and disrupt the unity of the Palestinian people and its national interest, it is necessary to purity the ranks of the people from them.
Secondly, for the first time in the modem history of the Palestinian national struggle, the centre of gravity of the Palestinian national movement has transferred itself from the exterior to the interior of Palestine. As is well known, the contemporary Palestinian revolution remained for a long time confined, in a large meas ure, to Jordan between 1967 and 1971, then to the Lebanon until 1982. This does not mean that the Palestinian revolution did not exist inside Palestine or that an organizational, political and mass activity was not engaged in there — however, the principal aspect of the revolution was the exterior one. There were several objective reasons for this, which it is not necessary to go into here, but it is possible to list briefly the most important. The control by the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was relatively easy, although not to the same extent in both areas, because the Jordanian and Egyptian authorities had, through a range of repressive measures, prevented these regions from being prepared to confronț the occupation immediately and massively. On the other hand, the Arab armies defeated in the 1967 war were incapable of confronting the vast movement of the Palestinian masses opposed to the occupation, which had shot up in Jordan and in the other countries bordering Palestine, notably in Lebanon.
I said, when beginning this second point, that the Palestinian exterior had remained the principal aspect of the Palestinian national struggle until 1982. It is well known that following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon - principal centre of gravity of the Palestinian revolution until then — this latter received a very heavy blow. Its components had to reconsider a number of questions, one of the most important among them being the nature of the relationship between activity inside and outside Palestine. In the PFLP, for example, we came to the conclusion that it was necessary to accord a special and priority attention to the interior. This does not mean that we did not concern ourselves with the interior beforehand, but, as I have said, the circumstances in which we found ourselves in the exterior placed us more in a position to act there. However, after the departure of the Palestinian revolution from Beirut, it became natural that our attentions were focused more sharply on the interior. Since 1982, several objective and subjective factors have come together in the interior which have made
January 29, 1990 • #177 International Viewpoint the intifada possible.
Among the most important of these conditions is the fact that the Zionist occupation has pursued its repressive economic, administrative policies, which seek to destroy the Palestinian national economy and to push the Palestinians into exiling themselves and leaving their country, policies which have culminated in the seizure of Palestinian land, the pillage of irrigation water and the employment of Palestinian workhands, estimated at 120,000 people, at very low salaries etc. Moreover, several Palestinian organizations, amongst them ours, have accumulated an organizational and militant experience that allowed them, when the intifada broke out, to place themselves at the forefront of the masses of the Palestinian people, to organize and lead them in this broad mass movement.
It is important, when speaking of the relationship between the interior and the exterior, to stress that the transfer of the centre of gravity of the Palestinian national movement from the exterior towards the interior absolutely does not signify that the exterior no longer exists or no longer has importance. The Palestinian revolution, by virtue of the forced dispersal of the Palestinian people, will always rest itself on the two fundamental points of support which are the interior and the
Thirdly, the intifada has put to the forefront, clearly, the Zionist-Palestinian character of the conflict, whereas in the preceding wars (1956, 1967, 1973), the conflict was Arab-Zionist. In mentioning this new development, we do not wish to say that the element of Arab-Zionist conflict no longer exists, but only that it has receded in importance. The Palestinian people have thus retaken things in hand, which means that its cause has appeared more clearly than beforehand. This has never happened in this way since 1948.
Fourthly, the combative character of the intifada — this character has essentially taken the form of a peaceful struggle with demonstrations, marches, strikes, boycott of work in the Israeli economic institutions, refusal to pay taxes, as well as pamphlets, wall inscriptions etc.This peaceful form of combat has not been in conflict with the presence of peaceful form, with recourse to violence even if it limits itself to elementary levels - throwing of stones and Molotov cocktails, use of knives and some restrained military operations.
Fifthly, the organized character of the intifada. We understand by this the existence of organized partisan structures leading the intifada and formed by the different core organizations of the PLO — the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), the PFLP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Palestinian Communist Party. These organizations have come together in the interior of the occupied territories in the context of the UNL. In addition to the Palestinian political organizaorganizations in the different economic, political and social fields. The result is that, on the basis of these organized elements, Popular Committees have been constituted for the leadership of the mass activity in the various sectors. These organizational forms have themselves solidly in the ranks of the people to the extent that it has become difficult to distinguish them. Our people have applied in a creative fashion the principle of the fish swimming in the water of the masses. On the other hand, following the consolidation of the organized character of the intifada, it is no longer possible for anybody to pretend that it is spontaneous, as the enemy forces sought to do at the beginning.
The establishment of a
Palestinian state
SUCH are the principal characteristics of the intifada. As I said previously, it is on the basis of these characteristics that numerous achievements have been realized on all planes — Palestinian, Israeli, Arab and international. It is not possible here to describe these achievements at all their levels - I will content myself then to evoke the principal ones.
Firstly, on the Palestinian plane - the unity of the struggle of the Palestinian people has consolidated itself strongly than ever. The rallying of the masses of the Palestinian people around the UNL, the PLO and the legitimate national objectives of the Palestinian peo-
Let us remember the period of disagreement which preceded because of the Amman Accord' as well as the attempts of the reactionary Arab regimes to bypass the PLO at the Arab summit in Amman in November 1987. Since the intifada, it is no longer possible for anyone to hope to provoke a split in the PLO or to exploit some tactical differences to lessen the unity of the Palestinian people. In the course of the 19th extraordinary session of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) held in Algiers in November 1988, we, PFLP, raised the slogan of "revolution until victory, unity until victory".
Secondly, on the Israeli plane, the intifada has had numerous economic, social, psychological, effects. At the economic level, for example, the rate of growth of Israel's Gross National Product has started to fall, to the point where GNP is no longer growing, even in a minimal fashion. nomic losses attributable to the intifada are estimated at five million dollars a day. At the military level, Israeli army chiefs now recognize that they are incapable of defeating the intifada. Cases of refusal to serve in the occupied territories have mul-
INTIFADA tiplied. At the political level, movements of protest and opposition have appeared. The effects of the intifada have reached small political parties represented in the Israeli Parliament. There have been political embarrassments inside the coalition emerged even inside the two big political parties, the Labour Party and the Likud.
To sum up, I can say that a current has appeared inside Israel demanding peace and the recognition of Palestinian national rights. In mentioning this reality, we do not ignore the fact that the general Israeli attitude remains intransigent on the question of peace, and even that opinion polls in Israel indicate generally a tendency towards the extreme right so far as the rights of the Palestinian people are con-
Thirdly, on the international plane, numerous achievements have been realized. In addition to the recognition by numerous governments of the Palestinian state proclaimed on November 15 1988, and numerous expressions mass support to the intifada and to the struggle of the Palestinian people which have been seen in very many countries and notably in Europe, the intifada has been able to make a strong impact inside the United Nations Organization.
The General Assembly of the UN has adopted several resolutions supporting, on the one hand, the rights of the Palestinian people, and condemning, on the other hand, the Zionist acts. At the same time, the Security Council has adopted some important resolutions among would cite in particular resolution 605
This has designated the occupied territories, for the first time, as Palestinian territories, and underlined the necessity of Israeli withdrawal from all these territories, whereas Security Council resolution 242, adopted in the aftermath of the 1967 war, designated the occupied territories only as those which Israel occupied, without any other identification, and called for withdrawal "from occupied territories" and not from all of these. Let us add that the reality of the existence of the Palestinian people and the justice of its cause have become more obvious than they have ever been since the time of the Balfour Declar-
Fourthly, the achievements in the Arab context have been the most slender, 1. The Amman Accord was concluded in February 1985 between King Hussein of Jordan and the head of the PLO, Yasser Arafat. It envisaged a common Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to peace negotiations with Israel and, following Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, the creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. King Hussein would himself denounce the accord a year later, judging that he could henceforth do without the PLO 2. The Balfour Declaration made in the name of the British govemment in November 1917, gave the Zionist movement authorization to establish a "Jewish national homeland" in Palestine, a territory destined to become a British colonial mandate at the end of the 21 First World War.
International Viewpoint #77 • January 29, 1990
INTIFADA despite the recognition by the Arab states of the Palestinian state, despite the holding of the Arab summits at Algiers and Casablanca dedicated to the intifada, despite the severing of links between Jordan and the West Bank3 and despite the numerous resolutions adopted by the two summits to support the intifada politically, financially and in the field of information. Worse still, certain Arab regimes, like Egypt, which have recognized the Palestinian state, have proceeded to empty this commitment of all content by dealing with American and Zionist initiatives or proposing their own initiatives, which do not mention in any way the Palestinian state and are close to the Camp David Accords 4 — which accord to the Palestinians only a right of autonomy, without independence and without a state.
So much for the Arab governments. At the level of the Arab masses, the balance sheet is no better. I regret to say that despite some mass mobilizations in support of the intifada, which we appreciate, the expressions of support and of popular Arab solidarity have been very restrained. The responsibility is incumbent upon the components of the movement for Arab national liberation which have found themselves, or put themselves, in a situation where they could not fulfil their national tasks of support to the intifada and to the struggle of the Palestinian people.
In any case, the totality of the achievements realized by the intifada has led us to the following conclusion — the establishment of the Palestinian state has passed from the realm of historic possibility to that of factual possibility. That is to say that the establishment of this state has become possible in the foreseeable future. It is on this basis that it has been possible, during the 19th session of the PNC, to proclaim the foundation of the Palestinian state on 15 November 1988.
It is nonetheless necessary to draw attention to the fact that we, in the PFLP, have distinguished between the proclamation of the Palestinian state and its actual establishment on the ground. We have affirmed, from the beginning, that the complete material realization of the slogan of liberty, independence and the Palestinian state, was a long term task requiring still more struggle and sacrifice. We have maintained this, for we know well the nature of the enemy which confronts us, an enemy Zionist, reactionary, colonialist, fascist, expansionist, which will not retreat or renounce its objectives easily.
Strengthening the Intifada
ON THIS basis, we, in the PFLP, had reservations on the question of the conces22 ) sions made, and especially the unilateral concessions, not compensated for by any concessions made by the enemy. We insisted more than once, in particular during the 19th session of the PNC, on the necessity of basing ourselves on the intifada, on the masses of our people and on all our gains at the Arab and international level, to bring about a change in the relationship of forces forcing the enemy to retreat, to make concessions and to accept the political settlement.
Therefore, our essential interest is still that of concentrating on the development and of upscaling of the intifada by every means. These tasks, in our opinion, can be summarized as follows.
Firstly, the radicalization of the intifada — we understand by this the consolidation of the implantation of the UNL in all parts of the Palestinian occupied territories, this by the building of branches of the UNL in all the regions and by the unification of the Palestinian mass organizations, so as to complete organization on both regional and trade union levels. This should be complemented by the extension of the Popular Committees in all their forms until they cover all the regions. In other words, it is about consolidating the unity of the people and its rallying around
In this respect, it is necessary to work for the integration into the UNL of those Palestinian forces which still remain outside its framework. More precisely, we mean by this the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), with which common action has until now taken the form of coordination on the ground. Our aim is that Hamas should become a part of the UNL — this is possible if the necessity is considered of agreeing on the confrontation with the occupation, and leaving aside all ideological divergences. In any case, we attempt to regroup all the organized masses around the UNL
Secondly, the upscaling of the intifada — we understand by this its upscaling on the economic and military planes. We think that the infliction of growing economic and human losses on the Zionist enemy will constitute an important factor in making it retreat.
In this area, our people will find themselves confronting the objective necessity of defending themselves against the daily Zionist repression which kills, wounds, imprisons, deports, destroys houses, etc. It will be thus legitimate for them to use arms. On the other hand, we would not carry arms, were it not for Israeli intransigence and the refusal of the Israeli government to submit to the will for peace.
Thirdly, the development of the support given to the intifada by the masses of the Palestinian people from the Palestinian territories occupied since 1948 and of the diaspora, under all forms, political, material and in the field of information. In this respect, we concentrate ourselves in particular on the development of the support of our people within the "Green Line"5 , in such a way as to progressively raise the level of their support until the stage of their integration into the intifada. For our part, we think that such an integration is impossible today because of objective and subjective conditions which differ from those of the regions occupied in 1967. To achieve that, a further stage will be neces-
Fourthly, the political protection of the intifada. Our Palestinian people face not only the daily reality of Zionist oppression in all its forms — it also faces the American-Zionist-Arab reactionary projects which seek to put an end to the intifada without realizing its objective of freedom and independence. Since the period when George Shultz was at the US State Department until now, our people have defeated all enemy plans. Today, they face the plans of Shamir, Mubarak and Baker. We are confident that the unity of our people will defeat all these plans, like their prede-
Fifthly, the realization of a democratic reform of the framework of the PLO -we think that the intifada offers the opportunity to realize such a reform. It is inconceivable, after two years of the intifada, that the offices, embassies and institutions of the PLO remain as they are, incapable of structuring and dynamising more than three million Palestinians in the diaspora who do not carry out in full their task of support for the intifada.
Sixthly, on the Israeli plane, it is necessary that we strengthen links with the whole range of Jewish non-Zionist forces that support the rights of the Palestinian people, as well as with the protest movements which oppose the terrorist methods of the Zionist repression.
Seventhly, on the Arab plane, we will act at two levels — governmental and • popular. As to the first, we will work to make the Arab states meet their commitments of support made at the Algiers and Casablanca summits. I specify here that the Arab states must, at least, say to the American administration that its relations with them depend on its attitude to the intifada. The American administration must know that its interests in the Arab region are in danger as long as it will support Israel and its attitude.
As for the Arab popular level, the Arab liberation movement must upscale its solidarity with the intifada by every means. We hope that the second anniversary of the intifada will be the occasion for these 3. On 31 July 1988, faced with the strength of the intifada in the West Bank which, until 1967, had been annexed by Jordan, King Hussein decided to "sever legal and administrative links between the two banks of the Jordan", that is to abandon his pretensions to regain the West Bank for his own kingdom. 4. The Camp David Accords were agreed, in 1978, between President Sadat of Egypt, the Israeli Prime Minister Begin and President Carter of the United States. They opened the way for the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty signed in 1979. 5. The "Green Line": the name given to the frontier which separated the state of Israel from the West Bank until 1967.
January 29, 1990 • #177 International Viewpoint organizations to do it. We have the right to ask them: why have they not raised themselves up to the level of the intifada?
Eighthly, at the international level, we have the obvious possibility of gaining new recognitions of the state of Palestine. There is the invitation to Euro-Arab dia-
INTIFADA There are now 65,000 settlers inte West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Israelis hold 52% of the W.B: and 50% of the G.S. with a total of 211 settlements in those two areas and the Golan Heights.
logue launched by President François Mitterand, which we must use to unify efforts towards an international peace conference zionopoly with the participation of the PLO as an independent party, as well as the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council. Let us add to this the importance of pressure on Israel in the fields of information and economy, and on the American administration to modify its position of absolute support for Israel, as well as the necessity of continuing to foster the international public opinion which supports the intifada and condemns the repressive Zionist practic-
These are the tasks whose realization will permit the establishment of the Palestinian state in the next stage. • What balance sheet do you draw of the political options of the leadership of the PLO, a year after the last session of the PNC? How do you evaluate the consequences of the acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242? In your opinion, where will these concessions lead, as well as the subsequent concessions made to the United States and the Zionist state?
I would like first to clarify the position which we adopted during the session of the PNC on the subject of resolution 242 and of its acceptance as the basis of a political settlement. Without any doubt, we take into consideration the importance of world public opinion for our cause and we underline constantly in our publications the importance of the international level — we do not live in isolation from the world, its changes and its attitudes. That is why we said - the PLO must make use of international legality, that is the UN resolutions relating to the question of Palestine and the Middle East. These resolutions, as is known, recognize the PLO, the international conference, as well as the rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to return, to self-determination and to the establishment of the independent Palestinian state. Resolution 242, on the contrary, does not recognize the Palestinian people, and treats the Palestinians solely as refugees, of whom the problem must be resolved. Consequently, this resolution on its own, separate from the other UN resolutions, is not enough, in our opinion, to settle the conflict. The question that we posed at the
Morton. PNC was — why limit ourselves to one resolution, bypassed by international legality itself?! After this, we saw the leadership of the PLO make new unilater-
Today, one year after the session of the PNC, we ask ourselves — what have been the tangible results of the policy followed by the PLO leadership? We do not deny that there have been some effects and some changes due to this policy, without forgetting however that the fundamental reason for the change is the intifada itself. It is the European attitude, for example, which has been principally modified, as well as the beginning of the AmericanPalestinian dialogue. But the results can not be judged solely in relation to the European position or to the dialogue with the United States. Europe which calls for an international conference, for example, has not been able to pass beyond the American position which continues to procrastinate on the subject of this conference and to work for bilateral negotiations
The Israeli attitude is more important than all this. The Israeli government persists until now in its intransigent attitude of refusal to recognize the PLO, the international conference and the rights of the Palestinian people.
We are aware of the positive changes which have taken place in Israel at both the civil and political levels. However, the general tendency of Israeli public opinion, on the other hand, is more and more extremist and rightist. We have always known the nature of the Zionist enemy, its ideology and its concrete policy founded on the material profits drawn from the occupation. We said that the policy of unilateral concessions would not push the enemy to make concessions and recognize our rights. It is the intifada and its unceasing upscaling which will force it to
E. JERUS
AN HEIGH
come to a political settlement.
Similarly, the American administration, which has begun its dialogue with the PLO (we consider the dialogue as a positive achievement for us), has not ceased, after the concessions which have been made to it by the PLO, to demand new concessions. Regrettably, the PLO leadership, after having accepted resolution 242, made new concessions, such as the recognition of Israel, the renunciation of "terrorism" and the declaration that the National Charter was "void". And nevertheless, the American administration persists in its attitude, in the same way as the Israeli establishment.
In the light of all this, is it not permissible for us to ask ourselves what the utility of this policy is, are we not right to say that this policy creates confusion in the ranks of our masses, as well as in the ranks of the Arab masses?! Are we not right to say -the policy of unilateral concessions has weakened and continues to weaken our demand for the isolation of Israel?! In all seriousness and responsibility, we wish that the PLO leadership considers these results so as to draw from them lessons and experience, to adopt a firm attitude towards the American and Israeli governments and to concentrate anew on the development and intensification of the intifada which has realized our greatest achievements.
That said, it is important to specify that this disagreement inside the PLO does not stop us from pointing to the elements of unity in its midst. The resolution of the PNC relating to UN Security Council resolution 242 is not the only one. There are also the resolutions of national unanimity on the subject of the proclamation of the Palestinian state, and those of support to the intifada and of its development. In the sexte whe UL, in the groin the con: 23 text of the UNL, inside the occupied terri-
International Viewpoint #77 • January 29, 1990
INTIFADA tories, is strong and well rooted. • How do you assess the role of the Egyptian and Jordanian regimes, as well as the relations of the PLO with them? What are the tasks which are incumbent upon the Palestinian movement in Jordan?
In the current phase, the Jordanian regime is less dangerous for the Palestinian cause than the Egyptian regime. Before the severing of links between Jordan and the occupied territories, the Jordanian regime represented a danger for the Palestinian cause. It presented itself as an alternative to the PLO on the question of the representation of the Palestinian people, and considered itself as the possessor of legitimate rights over the territories if Israel should renounce them. That is why it prepared and attempted several initiatives to strike at the PLO and take its place, or link itself with it. The Jordanian option remained, until the beginning of the intifada, in the thoughts of the United States, Israel, and Arab reaction. It is on this basis that, for our part, we fought the Amman Accord which we considered as a violation of the principle according to which the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and a renunciation of the programme of the present stage, that of the establishment of the Palestinian state. The Accord signified that the Jordanian regime shared with the PLO the representation of the Palestinian people, and replaced the objective of the Palestinian state by that of the Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. We also fought against the Arab summit of November 1987 in Amman which attempted to orient the political evolution in the direction of the Jordanian option. However, the intifada, after having imposed on King Hussein the severing of links with the West Bank, has for the time being pushed back the Jordanian danger, all the more so because the PLO has stood up against the challenge of the Jordanian regime by considering itself responsible for the occu-
USED TO BE UNTHINKABLE. POLAND LET'S TRY A SOLIDARITY GOVERNMENT! USED To BE UNTHINKABLE.
SOUTH AFRICA
LET'S ALLOW AN AN. C RALLY! 24 AUTH pied territories and proclaiming the Palestinian state. In saying this, we do not exclude the possibility that the Jordanian regime will try again to supplant the PLO — but we do not sense this danger today.
In our opinion, the Egyptian regime is more dangerous today. The danger which it represents stems from the role which it plays at present of attempting to put an end to the intifada. It is this regime which in 1988 a proposal which essentially offered to exchange an end to the intifada against a cessation of the establishment of settlements on the West Bank. It is this regime which has formulated the ten point proposal which does not differ in substance from the "Shamir Plan", and which recognizes neither the PLO, nor the international conference, nor the rights of the Palestinian people. Add to this the pressures exerted by Hosni Mubarak and his regime on the PLO. • To what forces within the Zionist state must the Palestinian movement address itself in your opinion? What is your assessment of the choice to hold a dialogue with the
As I said previously, we address ourselves to the Jewish non-Zionist democratic forces, those who support our legitimate national rights, and we refuse to address ourselves to the Zionist forces. Zionism, as you know, is a racist, coloniexpansionist movement. base our opposition to Zionism on resolution 3379 of the UN General Assembly which characterized Zionism as a form of racism and ethnic discrimination.
We consider that meeting with Zionist forces, aside from the fact that we refuse it on principle, is tactically dangerous. For example, some African states which had broken relations with Israel after the 1973 war, reestablished them after Egypt recognized Israel. Our task, and that of all our friends, is that of isolating Zionism, not of breaking its isolation through contact with various Zionist forces. I recall on USED TO BE UNTHINKABLE.
LET'S ADMIT SOVIET UNION
ALL OUR
MISTAKES!
TARA
STILL UNTHINKABLE. ISRAEL LET'S TALK To THE P.L.O.!
this subject that the PLO has established numerous contacts with Zionist forces, and that we considered this as constituting a violation of the PNC resolutions which restricted relations to the democratic Jew• What, in your opinion are the fundamental conditions for a genuine solution to the Palestinian question? And what are the tasks of the Palestinian left in relation to these objectives?
First, the genuine solution to the Palestinian question is the liberation of all of Palestine. It is a strategic objective which does not stop us from seeing the necessity of intermediate objectives. assign to the intifada the task of realizing all our objectives at a single blow. The intifada has put the call for a Palestinian state on the agenda. As to the project of the democratic state including Palestinians and Jews, the intifada cannot realize this by itself. We desire a democratic Palestinian state which is a model of coexistence for all humanity. The conditions for the realization of this democratic state differ from those of the Palestinian state in the occupied territories. The principal condition for the realization of the democratic state is a common Judeo-Palestinian
We believe that the creation of a Palestinian state today will open to us new perspectives for the future, perspectives for which Jews and Arabs can- act together. Why then do we insist on the liberation of Palestine and the realization of our strategic objective of establishing a democratic Palestinian state? Because we consider the state of Israel as the embodiment of Zionist ideology and of its colonialist project of settlement and expansionism in the Arab region. Israel being like this, it is not possible in our opinion to coexist with it. Add to this that Israel is not only a danger for the Palestinian people whose land it has usurped, but also a danger for the whole of the Arab peoples. In addition to its seizure of Palestinian territory, Israel occupies still areas of Syria and Lebanon, and has even officially annexed the Syrian Golan Heights by act of Parliament. This is not to mention the strategic role which Israel plays regionally and internationally, as a junior partner of US imperialism.
I can say, furthermore, that the creation of the state of Israel has not resolved and will not resolve the Jewish question. Israel is today a big ghetto, and the majority of the Jews of the world have not emigrated there and are integrated into the countries where they live. Marxism has presented assimilation as a solution to the Jewish question — we present also the democratic state as a solution. As to the solution presented by Zionism through the creation of the state of Israel, it is only a mystification which has not resolved the Jewish question in practice.
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