After the fall of the government, it became clear that neither Shamir nor Peres had a parliamentary majority for the formation of a new government, and Rabin pressed for the formation of a new national unity government, which is the best way to stop Peres from becoming prime minister. But contrary to what happened a year and a half ago, the president of the state, Chaim Herzog, would not attempt this easy solution and instead nominated Peres as candidate to form a new government.
The reason for this is simple; since the formation of the government of national unity, the intifada has not been neutralized, and has led to a political polarization inside the Israeli ruling class. The options are the military solution, that is massive repression, deportation by the hundreds if not the thousands, and detention of tens of thousands of Palestinians, or the opening of negotiations, even if only indirectly, with the PLO; a middle path no longer exists, and the 12 months grace which the Americans have given to Shamir to manoeuvre are reaching their end. In this sense, Yasser Arafat was right when he affirmed in his greetings to the Tunisian
22 pres ten that "the uprising in the occu-
pied territories has led to the collapse of International Viewpoint #183 • April 23, 1990 the enemy front. For the first time an Israeli government has fallen thanks to our struggle and thanks to the Palestinian peace initiative". The question now is who will form the new government, and what its policy will be.
Majority in Knesset for negotiated solution
As has been confirmed by the declarations of the rabbinical authorities controlling the fundamentalist parties, there is a clear majority in the Knesset for a negotiated solution. If Peres succeeds in neutralizing his fraternal enemy Rabin, he will have good grounds for hoping to be the next prime minister - in which case, the new government will reply positively to Baker's recent propositions and, after a meeting with the Egyptian foreign minister, negotiations will be opened with a Palestinian delegation ratified by the
It is in the interest of Peres not to drag things out too much in the first stage, so that the Palestinians on the one hand, and Israeli and world public opinion on the other, can be persuaded that the "peace process" has emerged from the rut in which Shamir had buried it. To the extent that the first stage is crowned with success, the Israeli government can then turn to the difficult task of neutralizing the intifada, creating thus a new status quo which, according to the old Labour tradition, will be presented as temporary but will last indefinitely.
What neither Peres, nor Rabin, nor even the learned rabbis can predict is the extent to which the Palestinian population in the occupied territories is ready to play their part in the game, and put in jeopardy the gains of two and a half years of exemplary struggle and very heavy
ARAFAT BACKS PERES
THE KNESSET, the Israeli parliament, falled on April 11 1o agree on a new government headed by Shimon Peres, On April 5, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
Yasser Arafat, took a further step in his policy of allgnment with the requirements of Wash
Ington, In Rome, before another meeting with the Pope, he stated: "I have asked the Arab deputles in the Knesset to vote for Peres; this Is the irst time such
La thing has happened."
T he Vietnamese army that inter-
vened in Cambodia in 1978 to overthrow the Khmer Rouge was up to 200,000 strong. In the years since, its role has remained decisive. It is the Vietnamese army which has allowed the new government in Phnom Penh to consolidate and develop itself, and which has pushed back beyond the Thai frontier the forces of the tripartite
Certainly, Hanoi has kept numerous civil and military advisers in Cambodia. In November, some elite Vietnamese units were sent again, albeit in limited numbers, to Battambang, in the west of the country. But the Hun Sen regime must now provide the essentials of its defence itself, and this represents a real turning point in the internal situation. The Paris Conference which met in August 1989 adopted a plan for a negotiated settlement of the conflict, but it would be much more true to say that it ended in an impasse. This diplomatic defeat was confirmed at the Djakarta conference in Feb-
The field was then left free, after the Vietnamese retreat, for an intensification of the civil war. Phnom Penh must show its own independent capacity for combat, while the tripartite coalition must, to remain credible, win control over a part of the country.
as the military situation remains unclear, it is probable that the negotiations will not notably progress.
Stalemate in the military confrontation
The evolution of the military struggle since October 1990 seems to indicate that there has been no radical transformation of the situation, at least in the short term. The Phnom Penh forces have had to cede some ground in the north and west of the country, which was predictable. However, they have made some significant counter attacks, like the reconquest of the town of Svay-Check on February 23, profiting from the dry season which allows them to use some of their heavy
The Khmer Rouge rapidly conquered the mining center of Pailing, (an important strategic and economic position central to the trade in precious stones) in the Cardamom mountain range, near to the Thai frontier. The tripartite coalition controls a strip of territory along the western and northern borders of Cambodia. But in general these are very thinly populated areas.
Insecurity reigns sporadically in numerous regions of the country and Khmer Rouge units can operate in the environs of Phnom Penh. But no important urban centre has as yet been really menaced - not even Battambang where there does not seem to have been any real fighting, at the end of 1989), despite alarmist
Imperialist diplomacy and the Cambodian
CAMBODIA located near the front lines.
The Khmer Rouge undoubtedly retain a network of contacts and sympathizers in Cambodia. Around the Thai frontier, they control a refugee population of around 100,000 people — the families of the soldiers. From here they can recruit a steady supply of porters and back-up workers, as civil war well as youth who decide to join their army rather than languish in the camps without jobs or hopes of emigration. The guerilla units can easily penetrate deep into the country, under the cover of the vast jungle in the west and north. The
IN MARCH 1990 the United Nations Security Council attempted to work out a plan for the resolution of the
Cambodian conflict which for ten years has opposed the
Phnom Penh regime, supported by Vietnam, to a tripartite coalition including Prince-President Sihanouk and the Khmer
Rouge, supported by China and the West. This plan accords a predominant role to the UN which is envisaged as administering the country whilst general elections are organized. But certain essential questions are far from being resolved and the Cambodian factions have not been able to reach agreement on the implementation of the plan.
The rapid change in the international situation, In Eastern
Europe and the USSR, as in South East Asia, has profoundly affected the Cambodian negotiations. Nonetheless, what happens in the country Itself is no less important. The key question there is the extent to which the withdrawal of the bulk of Vietnamese forces in September 1989 has affected the relationship of forces.
PIERRE ROUSSET rumours.
The evolution of the military situation seems to confirm the analysis of the forces on the ground which could have been made before the withdrawal of the Vietnamese troops.
THE Khmer Rouge; More than ten years after the fall of their regime, they maintain their cohesion and remain, on the ground, the principal component of the tripartite coalition. Originating from the Cambodian Communist movement, they underwent a profound evolution during the 1970s. Radical nationalism, of a racist character, fundamentalist and became an essential ideological cement.
Behind the egalitarian facade of their program, a command structure simultaneously secret and unchangeable) assured victory over the other factions of the
Communist Party of Cambodia, giving rise to the perpetuity of the leadership identified with Pol Pot. From before 1978, their social base, for a long time genuine, has been shrinking through a series of and has purges progressively become identified with their armed forces.
After their defeat in 1978-79, they were able to rebuild their army and command structure, thanks to the refuge they found in Thailand. They have made good use of the massive aid which received above all from China, but also ASEAN*, from the West and, via the refugee camps that they administer, from the UN. Today they comprise between 30,000 and 40,000 combatants, often battle-hardened, disciplined armed. Their principal zone of operation is located in the west of the country in the Cardamom mountains.
Their weakness is obviously at the political level. It is difficult to forget, in Cambodia as in the wider world, the regime of terror that the Pol Pot faction of the Khmer Rouge unleashed from 1975-76, once it had defeated US imperialism and the other components of the Cambodian Communist movement. This explains why the Vietnamese army was welcomed by the population, with suspicion certainly, but also with relief, when it intervened in 1978 — it explains also why the recent return of Vietnamese units to Battambang seems to have been welcomed by the inhabitants of this town
Khmer Rouge have not disappeared and will not disappear, at least while they receive effective international aid and can operate from the refugee camps.
THE FNLK and the Sihanoukists; The two other components of the tripartite coalition benefit from both the political support of the West, primarily the United States, and, in the case of the ANS, from the symbolic authority which the princepresident Sihanouk maintains. They control immense refugee camps, which contain altogether as many as 200,000 people, in Thailand. They have received considerable material aid. Nonetheless, their armies, estimated respectively at 16,000 and 21,000 men, remain militarily weak. Their principal zone of operation is in the north west of the country, beyond the town of Sisophon which they have not yet succeeded in capturing.
The pro-western components of the anti-Phnom Penh coalition, and notably Sihanouk, must, in the eyes of the United States, play a central role in any negotiated settlement of the conflict. But, weakened by factional struggles, and engaged in too much corrupt racketeering, they have been unable to prove themselves. They remain incapable of effectively fighting the Phnom Penh troops and are marginalized on the ground by the Khmer Rouge.
THE Phnom Penh regime; Ten years after its foundation, it remains fragile, but survives on the military and administrative levels. The government army comprises 30,000 to 40,000 regular soldiers 1. On the Khmer Rouge regime and the Vietnamese intervention, see IV 76, May 20, 1985, and /V 77, June 3, 1985. 2. In addition to the Khmer Rouge, the forces of the tripartite coalition include the - Sihanoukist National Army (ANS) and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) of Son Sann. The differences between the Sihanoukist movement and that of Son Sann are more to do with clique and personal differences than politics. 3. Jacques Bekaert, Le Monde, February 9, 1990. JeanClaude Pomonti estimates at 2,000 the number of Vietnamese soldiers who were sent to Battambang in November 1989, after the fall of Pailing. He believes that perhaps 700 Vietnamese advisors are still in the country (Le Monde, March 10, 1990). 4. ASEAN; Association of South East Asian Nations including, in addition to Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei. 5. See in particular the article already cited by Jacques 23 Bekaert. April 23, 1990• #183 International Viewpoint
CAMBODIA - the same number as the Khmer Rouge but much less battle-hardened - and around 150,000 men in total, taking account of provincial forces and local militias. The quality and the discipline of these troops is very uneven. The regular tanks, planes) superior to their guerilla adversaries, but these are not fully utilized, for fear, in particular, of provoking a frontier incident with Thailand through the use of fighter planes.
An administrative structure, flimsy, has been built down to village level. The regime bases itself on the fear of the Khmer Rouge and the weakness of the Sihanoukists. It receives a kind of passive support from a significant part of the population — to the extent, above all, that it respects Buddhism (once again the state religion) and laissez-faire in economic matters. It could, on the other hand, lose this passive support if it is unable to convince people that it is doing all in its power to obtain peace.
The liberalization of trade has favoured an extraordinary development of trade and trafficking of all kinds. Cambodia has become a crossroads between the ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, on the one hand, and Vietnam (indeed the south of China) on the other. It has attained self-sufficiency in rice, whilst exporting forest products, animal skins and stones. It imports consumer goods, from second-hand motorcycles to brand new limousines. For now, the government is benefiting from this economic awakening. But the fortunes being made reinforce a social layer of big traders who could tomorrow turn against the government. Corruption is growing amongst (very badly paid) government functionaries and cadres, which could also strongly alienate the government from the masses.
In times of war, peace negotiations can never be reduced to a simple totting up of the balance of forces. They are a field of battle and influence — more or less -the very evolution of the conflict. This is particularly true at a time when the consequences of the recent international transformations in this part of the world have not yet been worked through, and when movement can claim for itself an assured legitimacy. Hun Sen regime is not just a slave of Hanol
This essential question of legitimacy poses in difficult terms the concrete question of the Cambodian people's right to social and political self-determination, for this is what is above all at stake. The forces on the ground are all Cambodian, even if each has its own system of international alliances. The Khmer Rouge are not the simple creatures of Beijing, any 24 more than the Hun Sen regime is the • slave of Hanoi — or Prince Sihanouk that International Viewpoint #183 • April 23, 1990 of Paris or Washington. Even though the tripartite coalition justifies its existence in the name of the struggle against "the Vietnamese invader" theirs is not a national liberation struggle. There is, in
The sovereignty, present or future, of Cambodia, is obviously not secure. Part of the Indochinese entity, the country could see itself subordinated to Vietnam. Situated next to the ASEAN countries, it could just as easily, if not more, find itself subordinated to Thailand. Under the Khmer Rouge, it was inextricably linked to China's anti-Vietnamese diplomatic policy. Administered by UNO, as seems to be envisaged by the Australian negotiations plan, it would be subject to the agreements of the great powers. Without a popular base and historic legitimacy, no regime can guarantee the independence of the country. Cambodian history provides weak basis for democracy
Legitimacy can come from the ballot box. That has never been the case in Cambodia. The contemporary history of this country makes the holding of genuinely representative elections highly uncertain, even under the control of the UN! French colonization was no school of democracy, far from it. Neither was independence. After having dispersed the principal resistance movements, nouk carved out his own legitimacy within the tradition of the divine right of
Outwardly transforming himself into a modern prince, he remained an autocrat. The CIA-sponsored coup that overthrew him in 1970 opened a sombre period — that of the police state regime of Lon Nol, the U.S. war and the aerial bombardments. The victory of the Khmer Rouge, in 1975, unhappily opened up another period, still more sombre, of massive displacements of population, bloody purges, and physical liquidation of elites and of the work force.
With the brutal abortion of the Cambodian revolution through Khmer Rouge terror, the second modern source of legitimacy was emptied of all meaning which proceeds from a revolutionary struggle for liberation, in which the commitment of the population can affirm itself still more clearly than through democratic elections. The contemporary history of Cambodia and collective trauma provoked by the U.S. war and the Pol Pot regime explain the absence today of representative organizations. The situation is different in this respect to the prevalent one in Eastern Europe. The Hun Sen regime is far too to suppress all open opposition. The general impression of a political vacuum stems from more profound causes. The very fabric of Cambodian society seems to have been torn apart during the
1970s. Over the latter period, the process of rebuilding this fabric has begun, on the religious and economic planes particularly. But we are a long way at the moment from seeing any notable part of the population engaging anew in socio-political action.
In such a situation, the question of administrative and military power poses itself particularly sharply. The weight of a coherent well-armed movement, like the Khmer Rouge, can be very much more real than its effective military force or its limited implantation might lead one to suppose. It is on this question that the negotiations have until now stumbled.
Coalition formula Is diplomatic stumbling block
The most significant disagreement is probably that touching on the composiof a transitory administration, charged with organizing elections. For China and the coalition it supports, it is necessary to establish a government where the four Cambodian factions are equally represented. The Hun Sen regime will thus find, itself a small minority and the entry of the Khmer Rouge into the government will be legitimized, which will give it a great freedom of action.
For Vietnam and Hun Sen, it is necessary on the contrary to recognize the two existing governments - the tripartite coalition government on the one hand, that of Phnom Penh on the other. On this basis, a cease-fire on the ground could be organized, which, in the present situation, would leave the Hun Sen regime in a position of strength.
The Paris conference on Cambodia ended, in August 1989, in a failure to agree on the definition of a transitional government. To escape from this impasse a key role is now being assigned to the United Nations. The permanent members of the UN Security Council have met several times to discuss this®. All the parties concerned say that they are agreed on this principle. But the Djakarta conference, in February 1990, showed that the fundamental problem had still not been settled.
Vietnam and Phnom Penh, the intervention of the UN could allow the avoidance of the insoluble question of the recognition of the Khmer Rouge. The UN would be charged with the implementation of the negotiated agreements and organizing the elections. The two existing governments (that of the tripartite coalition and that of Phnom Penh) would delegate their responsibilities to to international authorities while remaining in place and continuing to administer the zones under their control.
For the Chinese and the Khmer Rouge, on the other hand, the intervention of the 6. The permanent members of the UN Security Concil are China, the United States, France, Great Britain and the USSR.
UN must be accompanied by the dissolution of the Hun Sen administration and the formation of a quadripartite Cambodian governmental organism.
It is in this context that Australia has proposed that the UN should not confine itself to verifying the implementation of the accords and organizing the elections. The international authority would have the task also of temporarily administering the country, that is replacing the existing administration in every field. In the absence of a quadripartite government, tional withdrawal of their troops from Cambodia would put an end to the diplomatic and economic blockade organized by the United States. It has done nothing of the sort. Washington Hanoi's request for International Monetary Fund loans. Last October, the UN reaffirmed its recognition, by an overwhelming majority, of the coalition government - thus its recognition of the Khmer Rouge representation?.
The spirit of imperialist revenge and the priority accorded to China still domi-
CAMBODIA for testing the balance of forces in Cambodia itself. The impact of the current transformations in Eastern Europe and the USSR will become more clear. Deprived of the assured support of its traditional allies, the Phnom Penh regime will be economically dependent on the uncontrolled development of the market. On the diplomatic level, it will seek to improve its relations with certain governments in the region. All this will weigh heavily on its evolution in a manner which is as yet difficult to predict.
China could accept such a solution.
THAiLAND
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Kreko which is trying to supplant France on the terrain of diplomacy, to the great displeasure of Paris which continues to think that Indochina belongs to its zone of influence.
As for the USA, pressures from the right are coming to bear pushing tion of the Phnom Penh government" Nguyen Co Thach, Koh-Kong (P the Vietnamese For-
LE BEC DE CANARD eign Secretary, has for his part said that OSAIGON"the UN cannot place Kompong-Som HO CHI MINH-VILLE Cambodia under UN (Sihanoukville)
km 100 because Cambodia is an independent country"8
The UN Security Council has more or less endorsed the Australian solution, which speaks volumes on the distant attitude of the USSR to its Indochinese allies. But it has not stipulated at what point the international authority must replace the Khmer administration, nor indicated what means it will dispose of.
For the implementation of the Australian plan would demand human resources which are difficult to find a qualified international personnel which can speak Khmer) and prohibitive financial resources. In particular, it is doubtful that Washington would be ready today to undertake an engagement of this kind in Cambodia.
The US administration has up until now shown no inclination to accord priority attention to its Cambodian dossier. It is certainly not indifferent to the fate of Indochina and has not forgotten the humiliation of 1975. It continues to make Vietnam pay as dearly as possible for its victory. Despite having urged Moscow to intervene last year in Romania to overthrow the Ceaucescu regime, it continues to use the pretext of Hanoi's intervention against the Khmer Rouge in 1978 to isolate the country.
The Vietnamese hoped that the uncondi-
PHNOM-PENHO Prey-Veng 4 Kampong-Speu o Tay-Ninh
Tram-Khnar -Neak-Luong Svay-Rieng
MekongMytho nate US Indochinese policy. The attitude of Washington on the Khmer Rouge question is striking from this point of View. The latter constitute a useful means of pressure against Phnom Penh and Vietnam. But they also represent an obstacle to the implementation of a pro-western solution to the Cambodian conflict. They constitute a force that neither Bangkok nor Sihanouk can pretend to control.
### Khmer Rouge recelves
Chinese support
However, the US administration does not seem to have profited from the difficult situation of Beijing, diplomatically weakened after the Tien An Men Square massacre in June 1989, to put a decisive pressure against its interests in the area. The Khmer Rouge maintains its force, largely through the political and material support the Chinese leadership accords
The negotiations on the question of Cambodia are now in an impasse, but it is possible that certain important variables will be modified in the course of the year.
The coming months will be decisive
Washington to intervene VIETNAM more vigorously to procounter-revolution" ardy its Chinese policylo changed notably since the Choonhavan to the post of prime minister in 1988. On the Indoch-
Bangkok maintained a strict alliance with Beijing and the army unsparingly aided the Khmer Rouge so as to exercise the maximum pressure on
The Thai position on the question of negotiations has today become more flexible and closer to that of the Indonesians, who have always maintained that it was weight of China in the region, at the expense of Vietnam. Soon, then, the proposals of ASEAN could be modified.
The context of the negotiations on Cambodia is undergoing substantial changes, albeit gradually, as much on the international plane as on the regional or national. In this area, 1990 will perhaps prove to be a turning point of major proportions. * 7. Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/0703 A3/1. 8. SWB, FE/0705 A3/1. 9. The resolution sponsored by ASEAN obtained 124 votes for, 17 against and 2 abstentions. As a significant indicator of changes currently underway, Hungary withdrew its traditional support for the resolution sponsored by the Indochinese countries. 10. See for example Carl Gershman (president of the National Endowment for Democracy), "The United States and the World Democratic Revolution", The 25 Washington Quarterly, Winter 1989. April 23, 1990 • #183 International Viewpoint
----- photo credits and running heads -----
amon des /'Eléphant