International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Israel: The Coalition Government Falls, What Will Succeed It?

· International Viewpoint No. 183, 23 April 1990 · pp 21-22 · 1,272 words

Middle East

Coalition breaks up under blows of

ISRAEL qualifications to the Shamir plan which rendered it practically unworkable. From then on, the Labour leader Shimon Peres began to manoeuvre for the setting up of a coalition government between Labour and the religious parties. Caught between the far right in his own party and the BakerMubarak-Labour bloc, Shamir has reinforced his alliance with Rabin, who in no circumstances wishes to see the government of national unity fall and Shimon Peres become prime minister.

Shamir, world champion in the field of

IN THE following article prominent Israeli revolutionary

Marxist Michel Warshawsky describes attempts to form a new government in Israel against the background of the continuation of the Palestinian Intifada. Since the article was written, the process of forming a new government had still not been carried through by April 11.

The possibility of a government led by Labour leader Shimon

Peres talking - even in a roundabout way - with the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has, furthermore, brought warnings from the right-wing of outgoing prime minister Shamir's Likud Party that they would regard any government that engaged in such negotiations as illegitimate.

MICHEL WARSHAWSKY

HE PALESTINIAN intifada had

T impelled the two big political formations to set up a government of national unity, with the goal of confronting the growing danger of peace. But the tenacity of the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza

Strip provoked a polarization inside both

Israeli society and the government.

In order to maintain the "Sacred Union", and throw responsibility for the refusal of peace back into the Palestinian camp, in

May 1989 Prime Minister Shamir accepted the broad outlines of a "peace plan"

drawn up by his minister for defence. This involved the opening of negotiations with a delegation of Palestinians from the occupied territories to prepare for elections, which would lead to a status of enlarged autonomy for the territories.

For Shamir — and this is something he has never really hidden — this plan was not to be put into practice; it was simply a means of buying time, in the hope that the

Palestinians would sooner or later reject the plan. For Labour, on the other hand, it became more and more obvious that

Israel's interests demanded an unblocking of the situation, and that the Rabin-Shamir plan offered the optimal conditions for a political solution. One plan, two readings, two strategies.

Labour had an important advantage;

their policy fitted in perfectly with the needs of Washington and the Egyptian president. Weizman, who represents the

Labour left inside the government, and who believes that the PLO must be openly integrated into the process of negotiations, even undertook to coordinate the Israeli initiatives with Yasser Arafat. Shamir's attempt to exclude Weizman from the government, indeed to indict him for contacts with the enemy, proved unsuccessful.

Large coalition to remove

Shamir

This reinforced the right wing of Likud which has for a long time affirmed that Labour's interpretation of the plan is the more realistic, and that the peace plan will not lead to an impasse but to indirect negotiations with the PLO. It became more and more clear that the "misunderstanding", as it became known, around the Israeli peace initiative, could not go on for much longer. While Shamir and Rabin have continued to seek formulas capable of preserving the unity of the come against a large coalition of those, both in Labour and the Likud, who want to get rid of Shamir as head of government.

Shamir's alleged moderation has become the target of all those inside the Likud who covet his post as head of party and government, and in particular of Ariel Sharon and the vice prime minister David Levy. Already, at the Likud Central Committee 6 months ago, they succeeded in imposing a series of conservatism and prevarication, has played for time; like a schoolboy who does not know how to answer an examination question, the Israeli prime minister asked for a whole series of clarifications, then demanded guarantees, then added new conditions to the plan that bears his own name, up until the day when the U.S Secretary of State finally said "enough of this, is it yes or no?".

This is exactly what both Peres and the Likud hard-liners expected. Peres demanded a vote in the cabinet, Sharon and Levy demanded a rejection of the U.S. ultimatum at the Likud central committee. Shamir prevented the debate at the central committee, sabotaged the vote of the delegates of his own party, and, back in the cabinet, twice postponed the vote demanded by Peres. Rabin, for his part, considered seeking a compromise between the leader of Likud and the leader of his own party, until March 11, when Shamir decided to shake off his typical torpor and expelled Peres from his government.

Rabin was obliged to go along with the other Labour ministers who resigned in solidarity with Peres. Shamir was convinced that the promises given by the religious parties to Peres, to the effect that they would vote for the fall of the Shamir government, were only bluff. There, once again, he was wrong.

Religious parties decide fate of government

While Shamir was not certain of the support of all the Likud deputies, let alone the extreme right who think he is too moderate, Peres could count on the votes of all the left formations who wish to put an end to the Shamir government. But this was not enough to have a majority in the Knesset; once again, the votes of the religious parties were to decide the fate of the government. The National Religious Party, which has been on the extreme right for several years, supports Shamir. The fundamentalist Agudat Israel party had for some months promised its support to Peres, after Shamir had cynically refused to respect the agreements he had signed with it— "you can put them in the museum" — and had thus provoked their departure from the government 8 months ago.

There remained two other fundamentalise remainin those voting intention 21 were uncertain; the 2 deputies of Deguel April 23, 1990 • #183 International Viewpoint

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Intifada

ISRAEL / CAMBODIA Hatorah, and the 6 deputies of the Chass party. Subventions for religious institutions

For five days, the politicians flocked to see the rabbis; Labour ministers succeeded Likud ministers, skull-caps on head, in the waiting rooms of the old men — who for the most part do not even speak Hebrew — and explained to them the broad outlines of their respective strategies, without forgetting to promise alluring subventions for their institutions. But for the fundamentalist parties, it is not the leaders who decide, but the councils of sages composed of venerable - and often • The height of this farce was reached five minutes before the vote motion of censure, when Shamir demanded a suspension of the session so he could call on the Grand Rabbi Ovadia Yossef, authority of the Oriental Jews and spiritual patron of the Chass party. This latter had submitted an ultimatum to Shamir and Peres; the first must agree to accept the propositions of the U.S. Secretary of State and reintegrate the Labour ministers in the government, in which case the Labour leader would promise not to attempt to form an alternative government until the next elections. In accepting the proposition of the Grand Rabbi, Shamir would lose face; in rejecting it, he would lose the support of Chass, and thus the majority. He chose the latter course, and for the first time in the history of Israel a government fell through a motion

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