It has placed in reserves a sum of $650 As the price increase is passed on to consumer goods, pressure is million for insurance "non-performing" exercised on consumption, all the more so when the crisis leads to the property loans. Analysts consider that the immediate revival of austerity policies which deepen the recessive tenCity Bank has $2.3 billion of virtually dencies at work. worthless property commitments on its The transfer of surplus value from the Imperialist countries to the probooks, as against $1.8 billion for Chase ducer countries, through an Increased "oil bill", (or for both an average of 17% of their It has nothing in common with the transfers from the countrles of the total portfolio in property). For Manufac- periphery to the centre through the servicing of the debt. Indeed, a turer Hanover's, the percentage is 16%20 great part of this "bill" returns to the Imperlalist countries, under the
The upturn of these last years has been form of orders (recycling) to industries and to the civil construction symbolized by a property boom - the giants, who export manufactured goods and build Infrastructures in the collapse of this sector now will be on the oil producing countries. There could be a transfer of surplus values same scale. Empty offices, an image remi- between different branches inside the industrialized countries. Great niscent of the 1930s, indicate the severity Britain and Norway will profit also from a price rise; the Soviet Union could do the same, if it is capable of increasing its production.
The phase of upturn in 1983-89 in the The big oil companles (Exxon, Royal Dutch, Mobil, BP, Texaco, ChevUnited States was largely financed ron, Amoco, and so on) will make gigantic gains, all the more so through an inflow of European and Japa- because they have direct access to crude oil. BP draws 54% of its opernese capital. The decisive question ational profits from extraction (see the Financial Times of October 26 today is whether this flow can continue. 1990, or Fortune, September 10, 1990). Big dealers, like Mark Rich of
This is another element, as important, if Zoug, who operate on forward contracts, have obtained "absolutely not more so, than the direct effects of the staggering returns" (L'AGEFI, October 13, 1990). oil shock. The recycling of petrodollars,
The car Industry, which has for some years put the emphasis on the bigger, more profitable, cars, will be amongst the sectors most affected 15. Sophie Gherardi in Le Monde, October 16, 1990, P6. Financial Times, August 11-12, 1990. by a lasting rise in the price of oil. But the car groups are often diversified and they also benefit from arms orders (Mercedes, Fiat, General 17. La Brèche, no. 454, June 29, 1990. Motors, Renault, and so on). The Japanese use oil more efficiently, but 18. Barron's, October 15, 1990, "Targeting Defense are dependent on Imports for 99% of It. Their car sector will be the most Stock" and US News and World Report, October 15, 1990, "War gains in the Gulf" affected, even more so because their biggest market, the United States, 19. See in this respect the survey done in Barron's, is In recession. October 1, 1990 and the IHT, October 12, 1990, "Real Estate Slide Threatens Insurers". 20. US News and World Report, October 1, 1990, "Rotten to the Core". 21. See La Brèche, no. 396, November 13, 1987.
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, is a complex operation. 17
UNITED STATES / WESTERN EUROPE
How united is Europe?
International Viewpoint #194 • November 12, 1990 imposed by the US presence in the Gulf, assures a certain flow of funds. However, the rise of interest rates in Japan and the losses suffered on the Tokyo stock exchange are impelling the Japanese to invest their surplus on the domestic market, while the approach of 1992 leads them to direct their investments towards
AS EVERYONE will tell you, the Cold War is over. This implies
Europe.
that the Western defence system must be transformed. The
As very many Japanese investors have
Gulf crisis has arrived at the right moment to stimulate this borrowed on the Japanese market at debate. Where does the new danger lie for the civilized world, floating interest rates, they tend to return their capital to Japan, because the returns where the universal democratic values find their are too low in the United States in relation to Japan, where the rates are rising.
Now that the Reds are not what they once were, the Third
Finally Japanese and European investments, the source of numerous industrial
World, ravaged by a social and economic crisis, appears all jobs in the United States, are going to be the more dangerous. Everything is being done to depict the reduced.
Third World as a mysterious and enigmatic region, located
Since the beginning of this year, Japasomewhere outside the boundaries. This picture is the result nese investors have bought only 10 bilof racism, but also of a method of political thinking that tends lion US treasury bonds
- the lowest to see every issue through the prism of a Manichean conflict total since 1984. They have repatriated some $8.9 billion during the first six between good and evil. We can expect many poor countries to months". If the dollar declines in relation to the yen the withdrawal of Japanese capital could be dramatic, despite the
"solidarity"
which
Washington will demand from Japan in the fight against
Saddam Hussein. Without the Japanese lending machine and with Germany preoccupied by its own process of unification - and more generally, with its projects in Eastern Europe
- the US economy must submit itself to a brutal slimming down.
Music of the future
Certainly, the ruling circles will demand international support - in this the struggle against the "Hitler of the
Middle East" has a role — and attempt to accelerate the Canada-USA-Mexico integration. But this is the music of the future. There is a more pressing problem
— to attract capital, in case of a Japanese withdrawal, the Fed (the US central bank) must raise interest rates (all the more so if the dollar is weak). The effects of such an operation are predictable;
accentuation of the recession (the cost of loans for consumption and investment is higher, the charges on the debts also) and the risk of a financial crash, given the differential of return between shares (in free fall and more interesting investments.
Obviously, there remain exports to countries which are not yet in recession.
But, while a lower dollar benefits exports, are US industries competitive? It is far from certain.
And, above all, exports cannot compensate for the weak.
ness of the internal sectors in difficulty.
The recession will be serious. *
22. TWSJ, October 11, 1990; Journal de Genève,
18
October 9,1990; AGEFI, October 12, 1990; US News and World Report, September 17, 1990.
embodiment? bring forth new "Hitlers". CLAUDE GABRIEL
E ASTERN EUROPE has been
easily absorbed into this Manichean framework, which prepares the ground for war, due to the dangers of "Third Worldization" there. The West knows that if a viable cconomic system is not rapidly established in that region, there will be an increasing danger of social chaos, civil wars and racial and national clashes.
As a result two debates intertwine. First of all there is a debate about the type of armament required. Nuclear war between Washington and Moscow is no longer on the cards, and, as a consequence, military systems must be readjusted to face the mounting dangers in the Third World. Confronted with increasing instability -not to speak of social explosions - it is necessary to reinforce the capacity for rapid intervention. Arms, means of transports and suitably trained personnel are needed which can respond to a variety of situations. After today's oil war, tomorrow there can be a coffee or a coca war. The cocaine war in South America directed by the United States is one specific example. In the last few months imperialist troops have gone into action in Panama, Gabon, Liberia, Saudi Arabia and Rwanda, which may be a record.
The second debate is about the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which, under US hegemony, has been at the centre of much of Western military doctrine for the past 40 years. One possibility is that NATO will change into a common security body in the face of chaos in the East of Europe. Another is that it could change into a new institution, essentially directed towards the Third
All these issues are not only to do with military policy as such. Political and economic considerations also enter into the debate. In fact, behind the façade of unity on the defence of the democratic West there are tensions which reflect the relative decline of American power and the rise of Japan and Germany. Bush's policy on the Gulf should be seen in this light. At a moment when the whole Western defence doctrine has been thrown into question by the collapse of the regimes in Eastern Europe, American leadership of the West is looking increasingly like an anachronism, at least at the economic and political levels. It is the convergence of these two great changes in international politics that makes the issue of European defence so
Industrial interests and military decisions
These questions can be approached from a number of angles. But one approach that leads nowhere is to view defence solely from the military angle. Huge industrial lobbies stand behind the generals and defence ministries. One aspect of the new debates on defence is the global industrial restructuring that also involves arms
This "branch" of industry obeys the same rules as industry as a whole. Indeed for many of the firms arms are only one part, if a substantial one, of their business. The subsidiary firms are inter-connected, and face the same financial, technological and commercial chal-
November 12, 1990• #194 International Viewpoint lenges. These restructurings are taking place both on a European and world scale, and the alliances obey laws which go beyond purely political criteria.
What are the new constraints?
• The production costs for the latest ultra-sophisticated armaments are truly vast. Research and development account now for some 30% of these costs. The risk is considerable, and this provides an impulse towards alliances and marriages of convenience. The search for economies of scale leads beyond any national framework. Here, as in other industries, it is necessary to be among the top few world leaders to keep in the race.
The United States has tried to provide a systematic answer to this problem, both to reduce the risks of competition and maintain their relative hegemony. They have produced the notion of "families of arms" with the idea of establishing a division of peans. This rationalization of the armaments' systems favours the monopolies and tends to guarantee long-term markets
• The market is saturated. The fall in the oil price before the Gulf war limited the income of the producing countries, who were big purchasers of arms. At the competitors have appeared for a whole range of types of equipment, notably in some Third World
The main market for European arms manufacturers is the South, and this makes the issue of the solvency of these states all the more urgent. The Iraqi debt resulting from arms purchases is a good example of the contradictions that can appear. In 1989, French arms exports fell by 40% due to the financial difficulties of the Third World. Belgium exported more than FB25bn worth of arms in 1981, a figure that had fallen to less than 10bn a dec-
• The reduction in state budgets due to state debt has imposed a partial rationalization of the public arms market. In the US for example 1990 will be the fifth year in succession in which the budget has been cut in real terms. This will combine with a change in the type of arms produced — less cost, but also more precisely designed for the new-style conflicts.
All this leads to an increase in the tempo of the reorganization of the international arms industry. And this must be borne in mind because in some respects it cuts across efforts to establish a strictly European integrated defence system, given that military policy cannot be conducted independently from industrial resources and technical and commercial alliances.
Several considerations weigh on the debate on European defence. First of all there are the economic and financial stakes involved in a vital industrial branch. In this branch, as in others, two major tendencies combine, and sometimes come into conflict. The first is that firms want to be able to freely establish alliances and international cooperation. For "European" defence firms, Europe is not, in fact, necessarily the main consideration. They are going to fight to defend their part of the world market, even if this means linking up with an American or Japanese partner. Political will plays economic
The second tendency is to look to the European political institutions, above all the EC, to assist in the competition with the US. In France for example, where a significant proportion of production is by nationalized enterprises, "political will" plays a significant role. It is also a reason why the French are the most enthusiastic partisans of "European" defence, which would provide them with a new form of protectionism.
Given that state orders are the crucial thing for arms sales, and that exports are inseparable from the course of diplomacy, arms subsidiaries are particularly sensitive to political-strategic issues. Le Monde on September 29, 1990, points out that "British and French arms exporters are fearful of being pushed out by the Americans" who may saturate the Saudi market in the course of the Gulf expedition. The troop withdrawals from Europe will also mean that there will be an abundant supply of American and Soviet secondhand material at knockdown prices. Egypt and Morocco are already said to have been flooded with M60 tanks!.
However, this does not give the governments total freedom as regards strictly industrial decisions. Technological and commercial imperatives affect the political sphere owing to the size of investments required, so that often the wishes of
WESTERN EUROPE governments can have little impact on the choice of commercial alliances or on the possibilities for defending a "national" defence sector. The case of the French Rafal fighter aircraft is an example of such constraints. The notion that a new type of aircraft can be produced on a purely French scale but in agreement with the American competition, as in the good old days with the Mirages, is a delusion. The world market has moved on.
Restructuring and international cooperation
What is no longer possible at a national level is hardly more feasible on the European scale. Even so, it has to be accepted that in the arms sector politics enters in more than elsewhere even as far as restructuring and international cooperation are
In the course of a press conference on the François Mitterrand declared: "We have already known for a long time that no European defence system exists properly speaking, since it is this we have been on...On the other hand, this doesn't mean that Europe is so divided, since the members of the Western European Union, including the observers, work together and I have not heard divergent voices there. Thus, there is progress, but it is still true that European defence comes the existing alliances for the
At this level decisions are not purely industrial. "European construction" is a long-term strategy. It obeys the demands of world restructuring - opening up of markets and globalization of production
- but it is also determined by the specific policies of Europe, which, even if it is overall more productive than the United States, feels itself threatened by Japanese performance levels. European integration is thus being promoted by some big industrial and financial sectors - in opposition to others- and by the governments.
The aim now is economic and monetary union (EMU) with a common currency, 1. Le Monde, June 26, 1990. 19 2. Le Monde, August 23, 1990
International Viewpoint #194 • November 12, 1990
WESTERN EUROPE the ecu (European Currency Unit). Historically, fusions of this kind have been preceded by political fusion. The very recent absorption of East Germany by the Federal Republic shows that it remains normal for monctary fusion to be backed up by a single political power. This is why Mitterrand and others are pushing for moves towards political union to run parallel with
But this project faces a mass of obstacles. Everyone understands that it is going to be extremely difficult to set up ex-nihilo a European state enjoying a portion of the legitimacy now possessed by the existing national states. How can such a state be "manufactured"? What would be its powers and objectives? And finally, what are common global commercial, diplomatic and military interests of "Europcan" capitalism?
cstablishment of a European defence doctrine in this context is a means rather than an end. It involves a certain number of industrial and strategic decisions which tend to favour political integration. This is thus a very risky opcration, although a number of factors spcak in its
Common arms market created
• In February 1990, an agreement was struck between nine European countries to establish a common arms market. This accord offered arms firms the opportunity to tender for contracts from the signatory
• On June 29, 1989, the defence minisarms project ("Euclid"), a sort of lesser version of the Eureka European military programme. A first instalment of 845 million French francs was handed out, to the profit of the firms concerned
The definition of independent Europcan defence is thus tied up with technological industrial independence from United States in the sphere of the new gen-
. European governfor openings coopcrative ventures that can enhance European military cohesion. At the start of the 1970s, Aérospatiale of France and MBB from Germany cooperated to produce anti-tank and ground-to-air missiles. British Acrospace, MBB and Acritalia cooperated on the Tornado aircraft. In October 1989 the French Thomson group and British Aerospace proposed to their governments a jointly conceived project for missile production ( the Eurodynamics France's Matra bought 20% of BGT, the leading German air-air missiles manufacturers. Aérospatiale and MBB reaffirmed their cooperation at the start of 1990 to launch a Franco-German helicopter project. The estimated costs of the project is 20 6.8bn francs. This partnership is to be enlarged to include Italian, Dutch and significantly — eventually American
The same month the governments France, Germany and Britain signed an defense radar. The cost of getting the project off the ground was 1bn francs. In March of the same year, France proposed to Spain joint construction of conventional submarines. In May some of the same companies, Matra, Aérospatiale and MBB came together over the Roland missile project. Another consortium has been formed between Thomson, Aérospatiale and Selenia (Italy) for the construction of a family of anti-aircraft armaments. Offers to join in were made to Spanish and British firms.
Finally, European cooperation on satellite construction and development has its military dimension. The European Ariane space firm links in with a number of mili-
Besides the production agreements, a number of big European trusts are being formed which will play an essential role in the eventual development of an independent European defence system. An example of this was the takeover of the British Plessey firm by Germany's Daimler, at a time when the latter enterprise was amalgamating with MBB Messerschmidt. The new DM-MBB group is involved with some 20 lines of military production in cooperation both with other European firms and American and Canadian firms. The new group is worth 7bn D-Marks in the military sector, of which 60% are orders from the German defence minis-
At a national level, concentration is also taking place. This is the case, for example, with the amalgamation of Acritalia and Selenia in Italy, which has given birth to the world's seventh largest aeronautical firms, employing 26,000 people. The same thing can be seen with the formation in France of the Industrial Group for Land Armaments (GIAT) which brings together state enterprises within a regulatory framework that permits them to make for-
Despite this general tendency to the formation of a vast European militaryindustrial lobby, a certain number of obstacles remain in the way of a strictly European defence system.
• Industrial coopcration is not exclusively inter-European. This was shown for example in June 1989 when the British chose the American SRAM air-to-ground missile rather than French. This was also the case when Daimler decided on a vast plan of cooperation with the Japanese Mitsubishi notably for aeronautics, and there are many other examples?
• The notion of "weapons' families" has favoured a high degree of interdependence between the Europeans and Ameri-
American industry considerable weight, insofar as, for historical reasons, the Japanese and Germans cannot get fully involved in the competition. The American strength also sets limits for France, for example in air transport surveillance (dependence on the
• British industry, which plays a leading role in the European military network, is deeply involved in joint work with the Americans. At the same time the French have given special emphasis to collaboration with the Germans, creating a disloca-
Many European military grand
The two countries with nuclear arms, France and Britain, have been pursuing completely different policies in this field, with Paris defending the principle of a nuclear force independent of NATO control. An integrated European military force could only be created by sorting this question out. The French have for some years now been proposing a common European "deterrent"®. But this raises the question of where Germany would fit in. German constitution obstacle to intervention
• The German constitution forbids the federal army from deploying troops outside the NATO framework. At a time when attention is being shifted to the Third World, this acts as an additional obstacle, as has been underlined by the Gulf crisis. German chancellor Helmut Kohl is probably not too unhappy that he cannot send troops to the Gulf, but he has nonetheless already announced that the German constitution must be changed so that Germany can play the global military role that corresponds to its economic strength.
• NATO and the Atlantic Alliance continue to exist, although their future is being discussed. The US is using the delay to hold up the European defence project. The Europeans are in any case themselves facing the difficult dilemma of whether they can do without American forces in Europe. They are asking whether it is really time to "definitively turn the NATO page, when tomorrow anarchy and disorder can be at our doors, in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean?" The future of NATO is one of the issues at stake in the European disarmament negotiations - the CFE process for conventional armed forces and START for strategic arms
The Europeans want to keep two irons in the fire — their own integration project 3. The Pentagon budget remains two and a half times as great as the military budget of the EC states 5. Libération, September 18, 1990
See Memento Defense-désarmament, 1990, GRIP, 7. Financial Times, March 28, 1990 8. See also the French Prime Minister Michel Rocard
See the interview with NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wömer in Libération, October 17, 1990. Gorbachev himself has talked of the "Lebanonization" of
November 12, 1990 • #194 International Viewpoint and cooperation with the Americans — for more than purely diplomatic reasons. We have seen how, in the negotiations over German unification, the issue of NATO membership for a united state was the corner stone of the bargaining with the Kremlin. The hand-wringings European leaders is a good illustration of despite the relative weakening Americans. Thus the Belgian foreign minister Marc Eyskens explained on Novem-
23, 1989: "I am a partisan of a European pillar in NATO. I am a EuroAtlanticist. Detente and the establishment of a heartfelt peace could easily lead to a sort of American-Soviet condominium if Europe dilutes itself."
The Americans meanwhile are looking for a new role for NATO that will prevent it from becoming irrelevant. In speech in Berlin on December 12, 1989, American Secretary of State James Baker
ARMS reminded us that it was necessary "to ican security - from the political, military, and economic points of view — remains tied to the security of Europe" so that the elaboration of "common Western approaches" must continue, in the face of all kinds of dangers.
Despite this, the debate continues to rage to the point where the leader writer for Le Monde diplomatique, Claude Julien felt able to describe the American military role with the phrase "the gendarme is fin-
At the centre of the controversy is the problem of the West European Union (WEU), which has until now been little more than a talking shop, and above all of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
The CSCE came into being in Helsinki in 1975. Every European country except Albania is involved, along with the US and Canada. Some Europeans see the CSCE as a point of support for a security framework under the sole control of the European states — a project that would tie in with Mitterrand's scheme for a European Confederation. Thus the aforementioned Marc Eyskens has proposed to provide the CSCE with a "security council" reserved for Europeans'!. Last September, the Council of Europe proposed the setting up of an Assembly bringing together the European countries involved
All this is not to Washington's taste. The US wants to retain NATO as the crucial defence framework and keep it the preserve of the "West". This, in fact, was what finally came out of a meeting of the foreign ministers of the 35 European countries, the US, Canada and the USSR in the United States in September. The scheme launched there was for a body drawing together all the existing alliances, with its headquarters perhaps in Prague. Until then NATO would remain the basic Western defence structure.
So, "new Atlanticism" or not? Manfred Wörner, the NATO secretary general replied: "The CSCE can be very useful for preventing crises - or resolving them in a peaceful manner. But could it replace NATO? With 34 very different states, each disposing of a right of veto, what would CSCE do if a real conflict explod-
In reality it is no longer American economic power that is the obstacle to the working out of an independent European defence system. It is the lack of cohesion in Europcan diplomatic and commercial interests which allows the Americans to keep relative hegemony. Over the Gulf crisis for example there have been significant differences between the policies of the leading EC states.
### West European Union marginalized
The WEU for its part, which brings together nine states except for Denmark, Greece and Ireland — has hardly played any role. In the Gulf affair it did not meet until August 23, that is two weeks after the American decision to intervene, and even then restricted itself to statements of principle. Only the French made use of the occasion to try to give the impression that a new step had been taken towards European unity. Even so, it could be a useful stepping stone for the partisans of swift political integration. The WEU has the advantage of to some extent overlapping with the EC'3. On the other hand it is not yet adapted to the demand for adherence to the EC of neutral countries such as Austria.
Some real steps have been taken, nonetheless. Thus the Franco-German brigade is a first attempt at integration. It is under the control of a Franco-German cooperation group which is the executive body of the Franco-German Defence and Security Council. This is a very limited experiment, but the Germans are proposing to repeat it with other European countries. There is thus already a military dimension to the complex and difficult process of integration in a situation where no federal state exists. The existence of this military dimen-
WESTERN EUROPE sion must be taken into account in the perspectives of the European workers' movement. The traditional parties — the Social Democrats and recycled ex-Stalinists — are virtually certain to come out in support of European military integration. Their unconditional support for national and European industrial interests will lead them directly to this new surrender.
However what is involved is not simply some reconversion to peaceful ends of the old defence systems of the cold war era. On the contrary, what is to be created is a new integrated system that can supply imperialist appetites and would be capable of acting in the Third World as much as in Europe in case of social disturbances. The armed forces will continue to change taking into account the new European dimension. The "missions"
they will have to fulfill professionalization. Conscription will tend to lose importance for the state. A high level of training for military personnel that can meet the needs of increasingly sophisticated weapons is no guarantee of respectability or "democratization" of the social body that is the army. It is significant that at the very moment when voices are beginning to be heard questioning the secretive and undemocratic involved in European construction, governments are establishing an increasingly integrated European military frameone increasingly linked to an international industrial lobby, which more and more escapes the influence of the soci-
Thus, European anti-militarism must learn to take the continent wide dimension into account. It also needs to find the joint action. Real militarism in Europe can only exist if it takes into account the overall European
This is yet another argument against notions of self-sufficient national strug gles and organizations and in favour of a new internationalism. Civil disobedience, the refusal to pay for all the dirty wars that are happening or are coming, solidarity with the Third World under attack, the untiring struggle against social militariza. tion, are all essential themes around which a new European anti-militarist movement 10. Le Monde diplomatique, October, 1990. 11. Nouvelles Atlantiques, March 2, 1990. 12. Libération, October 17, 1990. 13. See the Boesman report adopted by the Institutional Commission of the European Parliament, March 2, 1989. 14. It has recently come to light that a secret "antisubversion" operation, named "Operation Sword", was mounted in Italy in the 1960s in connection with 21 NATO.
The war is not over
International Viewpoint #194 • November 12, 1990
EL SALVADOR THE negotiations between the Salvadoran government and the revolutionary opposition of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) are at a stalemate, since President Alfredo Cristiani is refusing to discuss the issue of the army. While the FMLN has stated that it wants to continue the negotiations, it has also maintained its military pressure. Thus, on October 17, 1990 it launched attacks on the capital, attacking a barracks and shelling the airport. SERGIO RODRIGUEZ
A FIRST balance sheet of the vari-
Nous meetings between the Cristiani government and the FMLN shows that the revolutionaries have manoeuvred capably in this difficult situation.
The far-right Salvadoran government of Cristiani's Alliance for National Renewal (ARENA) has tried to take advantage of the new international situation. But its objectives have proved illusory. According to the FMLN: "the schema according to which the Salvadoran problem is an integral part of the East/West conflict can no longer be defended in the light of present developments. A year has passed since the events in Eastern Europe and the FMLN remains in good health, both politically and militarily".
Divergent views on how to end war
Throughout the negotiations, two divergent views on the way to finish the war have confronted each other. On the one side, the Cristiani government and his North American advisers have wanted to impose a plan for a transition on the Colombian model, that is to say a surrender disguised as "integration"?. On the other, the FMLN has tried to oblige its rival to reply to the urgent questions facing the country. 22 he regoutionarics into difficulties wiel The government has been trying to get the aim of imposing its own logic. It wants above all to resolve questions which do not affect the state apparatus of the dictatorship — that is to say the army repressive forces. Cristiani shown himself ready to discuss human rights and accept the formation of a United Nations commission of enquiry on this theme. It even prepared a flexible proposal for holding elections to be put forward at the last Costa Rica meeting — which did not in the end take place.
The government is thus trying to get partial agreements and leave the problem of the armed forces to one side, and thus neutralize the FMLN. The aim of these manoeuvres is simple. Concessions are to be made on questions that are not central and thus make the FMLN's position — of not accepting a unilateral cease fire until the question of the army is resolved — seem incomprehensible. The revolutionaries would then be forced to participate in elections while the government retains intact its military apparatus. At the very moment when Cristiani was signing the accord on human rights he named General Ponce - chief of the most ultra-rightwing section of the Tandona3 — as minister of defence.
FLN signs human rights agreement
As for the FMLN, while it had agreed to sign the agreement on human rights, it now seems to have reverted to its initial conception of the negotiations. It did not agree to discuss elections at the last Costa Rica meeting, and has put the question of militarization back on the table, as the key to the negotiations.
The FMLN's demilitarization proposals are in fact very popular. The population, including some sections of the employers, is tired of the war. The Tandona's role in the war has become clear, along with that of the death squads and the profiteering of a small group of officers from the situation. By demanding the FMLN has once again struck the keynote of popular concerns in El Salvador.
The Cristiani government has understood this, at a time when a new debate on military credits is about to open in the United States. The current of opinion in the US Congress and even more amongst the US public opposed to more military aid is growing. The present conflict with Iraq has if anything accentuated this sentiment, given the widespread preoccupation with the economic consequences of this action. Furthermore if the
OC whole world has rightly welcomed the end of the East German secret police, similar enthusiasm should be aroused by the prospect of the downfall of this notorious
In such a context US aid to the El Salvador government death squads and army — responsible for the death of a large part of the population over the past years, apart from the much publicized murders of Archbishop Romero*, dozens of journalists and six Jesuit priests — becomes ever more incomprehensible to many Americans.
Cristiani attitude justifies military offensive
Nobody knows if the FMLN is planning to launch new military offensives. But they would find their justification in the immovable attitude of Cristiani, flowing from his need to defend the army's control over the country.
This war is not finished. Nobody can know what the next battle will be or how it will take place — whether around the negotiating table, in a general strike or a but the FMLN has clearly maintained its ability to address the democratic sentiments of the popula1. Schafick Jorge Handal, press conference at the United Nations, September 20, 1990. 2. On March 9, 1990, the guerillas of M-19 in Colombia laid down their arms in exchange for the organization's participation in the electoral process. Its candidate for the presidency, Antonio Navarro Wolf, has in addition accepted the post of minister of health in the current Gaviria govemment. 3. The "Tandona" is the name given to the military class from which many of the current leaders of the Salvadoran army emerged. 4. Monsignor Oscar Amulfo Romero was assassinated on March 24, 1980, whilst celebrating mass in San Salvador cathedral. His assassins were the death squads led by major d'Aubuisson, leader of the party currently in power, ARENA. 5. During the offensive launched by the FMLN in November 1989, the army savagely murdered Father Ignacio Ellacuria and five other Jesuit priests from the Central American University. Nobody has been arrested for the murders and the only witness has "disappeared" - under the pretext of protecting him, the FBI has hidden him in the United States.
A government of
T HE government of Alfredo Cris-
tiani and the Bush administration operate in these negotiations on the basis of a geopolitical analysis of the situation inside El Salvador. In their view, the problems in the Soviet Union and the changes underway in Eastern Europe will progressively weaken the COMMANDANTE Joaquin Villalobos is a member of the leadership of the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN). In