It is in this context that the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) is preparing its first congress (see IV 203).
During a conference on the revolutionary movements in Latin America held in Belgium on May 9-10, FSLN leader and former president Daniel Ortega made some interesting comments. Speaking of the "new international order" he said that the partisans of this latter disposed of their own internationals (liberal, Christian democrat, and socialist).
It is the first time that an FLN leader has taken such a position in relation to social democracy - the FSLN had observer status at the Socialist International and the question of formal membership has been raised during its pre-congress debate. Ortega also said that revolutionaries could not identify with the Socialist International and that what was necessary was "a new international of revolutionaries, formed by all those who oppose the new world order".
We publish below substantial extracts from an interview with Daniel Ortega which recently appeared in Barricada. DOCUMENT
Y OU recently said that it
would be possible, in spite of the current government, to pursue, with the people, the social and economic revolution, on the basis of the political revolution realized by the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN). What confidence is it possible to have in this government?
It is important to recall that this government has not lost its class character and that it is the fruit of the interventionist policy of the United States. We can have no illusions in it. We can have confidence only in the strength of the workers.
Imperialism has not disappeared. It is 20 the revolutionary process, to weaken San- seeking, by different means, to dismantle International Viewpoint #209 • June 24, 1991 dinism — which it attempts to divide and neutralize - and to reestablish neoSomozism and neo-capitalism. We are thus obliged to rely on our own popular and patriotic forces to impose a policy which genuinely serves the interests of the country, and not those of the United States.
When we talk about defending the social and economic revolution in our country, starting from the fundamental transformations made in the social, economic and political domain, we are talkan active struggle of workers, an expression of the class struggle which has not disappeared and which is not about to disappear. Our objective can only be to pursue this active struggle to oblige the government to respect the revolution. • What is the FSLN's role in this struggle?
It is necessary to understand that the FLN is a revolutionary force. For this reason it cannot be on the centre, but must be resolutely on the left. This left force can work to change the positions of the government, which is of the right and lead it to the centre and even to the left. It is an objective which no revolutionary force can renounce.
There has been no previous revolutionary movement in history which, after having brought down a dictator by force of arms, has taken the head of the struggle against US aggression and laid the bases of a real democracy, with planning, and which, having held the second free elections in the history of Nicaragua, has lost them and passed into opposition. • What can be done concretely to bring this government towards correct positions?
It is necessary to act from below. It is necessary to "govern from below" by exercising real power. Any government, as strong as it might appear, holding all the instruments of power, can only hold power, in the last instance, by a consensus which is born at the base. That is to say that power is determined from below. And this power, when it decides to change the government, does it, even if this latter holds all the constitutional and even repressive mechanisms. In Eastern Europe, governments have fallen leaving intact armies, police forces, and security services.
In the bourgeois democracies we meet the same situation, where governments which have been elected with popular support, can lose that support in a short period of time, and thus real power. • To be more precise, what is revolutionary about the Chamorro government?
The revolutionary element is not to be found in this government, and is not dependent on it. It resides in national reality, profoundly transformed by the revolutionary process started on July 19, 1979, and which has given place to a government which, paradoxically, is not revolutionary. That which is revolutionary is found in collective consciousness, which has established new values of solidarity and national pride. • Does the signature of the dialogue
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NICARAGUA force"
accords represent a new dimension of the transition agreement [signed during the transfer of power]?
The transition agreements were signed with a great deal of mistrust on both sides.
From April 1990 to March 1991 - the day we met the government to discuss its economic adjustment plan — we held regular meetings with the government, where we always expressed our concern about its unfulfilled promises. When we met on March 3, 1991, we first explained: "We consider that these measures come at the worst moment, when the essential problems, like, for example, the political stability of the country have not been resolved: the monetary measures hit everyone and above all the workers, they are not just and it is for this reason that they must be modified to the benefit of the workers, the small farmers, the cooperatives, small industry, the artisans and petty commerce. They must also protect the earnings of the police and
In this climate of mistrust, we were in favour of giving them a reprieve, but with guarantees for the workers, in favour of the protection of wages and employment. It could not then be said that this was a new dimension of the agreement of transi• In some sectors confidence has never been so weak and Sandinism appears to be becoming the accomplice of a systematic dismantling of the revolutionary conquests. What is your opinion of this?
Reprieves have limits, and the dismantling of the revolutionary conquests is not a problem of confidence, it is determined by the combativity of the workers, the popular sectors and the Sandinista militants. Lack of combativity, accommodation, opportunism, are the accomplices of the dismantling of the consequences of the revolution. • Has the Front lost its identity since the electoral defeat?
The Sandinista Front is not a traditional opposition. It has been a revolutionary political force, in the vanguard of the process of struggle in this country. Since April 25, 1990, we are a revolutionary force which exists to defend the conquests of the revolution. We have our own identity which must always be linked to the popular interests and not to the temporary situation. There is no risk, in that case, of • Can we have confidence in a government which, following your own expression, proposes to apply a series of economic measures which hit the workers?
The test will be the forthcoming policy of structural adjustments. The monetary adjustment policy is in a critical phase; inflation reached 285% this month, or a cumulative rate for February and March 1991 of 800%, which is intolerable for the workers. The government must rapidly decide on a devaluation of the cordoba at around 12 to 1.
The policy of structural adjustments will determine the future of the country; either it is the well known model of the capitalist oligarchy which is chosen, and thus neo-Somozism, neo-capitalism; or Nicaragua will go towards new forms of economic development, respecting the conquests of the revolu• What is the reaction of the workers to the government, when it betrays its promises?
The peasants who want the land to work it, faced with a government which favours the big proprietors and the Somozists, must unite to defend their rights instead of fighting each other for a scrap of land. This combat is the sole guarantee of the agreements signed with the gov• How far are the trade unions and the popular movement able to influence the measures of structural adjustment?
They are in the process of launching discussions and mobilizations; they must strengthen this role starting from now. It is inadmissible that a Sandinista militant should remain outside a struggle which is going on in their workplace. • Is there a risk of a recomposition of social and economic groups and of a weakening of the working
When Sandino said that only the workers and the peasants would go all the way, he defined correctly the fundamental forces of the revolutionary struggle, and this remains true. But, as much at the time of Sandino as today, the working class is not as developed in Nicaragua as in an industrialized society. The weight of the peasants, traders and artisans is significant. Yet, our working class is well organized: if, quantitatively, it represents only one force in the social reality, from the qualitative point of view, the workers of the town and the country are at the head of the struggles; it is necessary to recognize the maturity and combativity which the FNT has shown. • What is the position of the FSLN on the property question?
We have put the accent on the democratization of property. Today, we demand the privatization of state enterprises in favour of the workers, and that the property distributed by the agrarian reform be respected. This question will be decisive for the FLN, for the future of the revolution and for the stability of the country. The FSLN is not an electoralist party, but a political force whose task is to defend
NICARAGUA the gains of the revolution. • Why did you insist on the fact that the FSLN is not an electoralist party?
It would mean nothing to the FSLN to win the 1996 elections in a neo-capitalist, neo-Somozist country where all the conquests of the revolution have been dismantled. It is preferable that the Front succeed in maintaining and developing the gains of the revolution, and thus reinforce the consciousness of Nicaraguan society, so that the truly democratic model consolidates itself. That is why the Front cannot be electoralist. • The current government symbolizes the interventionist policy of the United States. How is that reflected in its behaviour?
The government is under the influence of the policy of the US, which believes it has a right to govern Nicaragua. The forces of the far right sense also that it is their government, and that it is necessary to go forward to the extermination of Sandinism, without respecting the democratic game.
Meanwhile, the Somozist forces, the big landowners and the capitalists are returning to the country to strip Nicaraguan society of the essential elements of the democratic process. They wish to take the land from the peasants, deprive thousands of families of their means of subsistence and take back what the revolution has given them, to take the industries and the factories from the workers.
It is the counter-revolution which is seeking to gain space. It is no longer the armed counter-revolution, but a force which wishes to force the government to dismantle the revolution. • What is the role of the Sandinista police? What side will they be on if the conflict deepens?
They must be on the side of the constitution which states clearly that the army should defend national sovereignty and should never be an instrument of repression against the workers and the people. The role of the police is also defined in the constitution as the guardian of interior order and the guarantor of laws; it is in no case the protector of the capitalists and the big landowners.
The government has already tried to turn the army and the police against the workers, exerting pressure on them to act in a repressive way. These institutions did not allow it and they acted in accord with • Many think that the FSLN has not been combative enough in recent conflicts; some say that its role is reduced to that of social mediator. ole is necessary diat te dendersand the 21 role of the national leadership of the June 24, 1991• #209 International Viewpoint
NICARAGUA/ ITALY FSLN, that of the trade unions and that of Sandinista militants. The FSLN is not a social mediator, it plays a role of political leadership. The national leadership defends the gains of the revolution; that is clear from the agreement of transition. We have devoted all our forces to the disarming of the Contras; we supported the workers in the course of the May, June and July strikes of 1990; we have clearly stated our position with regard to the monetary measures of March 1991.
The Sandinistas are at the head of the trade union movement. But not all the militants have taken their place in the struggles. A Sandinista militant in a factory or a hospital should obviously be in the first rank of the struggles. * group.
On May 12, 1991, the MCR faced its first electoral test in partial local elections involving around a million voters.
The movement's low overall share of the vote - 2.6% - is hardly significant, for it was contesting only nine districts. In the latter, its score was relatively satisfactory, at between 4-5% and 16%. As might have been expected, these results were basically obtained at the expense of the PDS, which saw a general fallback in its share of the vote.