International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Yugoslavia: Serbian Dictator Slobodan Milosevic Pursues Strategy of Tension

· International Viewpoint No. 209, 24 June 1991 · pp 17-20 · 3,107 words

Eastern Europe Armed forces and soldiers Middle East

The death of the

Yugoslav federation there is repression in Iran and writers cannot publish their books.

After his interview other writers also began to talk in the press about their rights. Three months ago, five famous writers in Iran signed a petition saying that they want to rebuild a writers' association. Other writers expressed their support. Shamloo is presently in America — he is unwell. But he has expressed his support for such an organization. He says

IRAN / YUGOSLAVIA na and Montenegro and replace them erupted on May 15, when Serbia he is going to go back and join it. This could be a very important step in the intellectual circles at least in Tehran. This is reminiscent of Iran in 1979. In another interview he said that a poet must be able to read his work in front of people.

Perhaps this kind of thing is getting into the papers as part of the government's efforts to improve its image in the West.

• What has become of the Iranian and its satellites flouted the Yugoslav constitution by blocking Stipe Mesic (Croatia's representative on the Federal Presidency, Yugoslavia's collective head of state from taking his turn as president for the coming year.

with Serbian stooges.

Kosovo, though abandoned by the rest of Yugoslavia, resisted. There were mass demonstrations of Albanian citizens there, and, in February 1989, a general strike led by Kosovo miners. The province was then placed under military occupation. The following month, with tanks ringing the assembly building and military jets flying overhead, Kosovo left?

Inside the country it has disintegrated and people are demoralized. The Iranian

Yugoslavia: the representatives Kevolution was a very complex event. Most of the schemas of the left organizations, with extremely few exceptions, turned out to be in glaring contradiction with the real course of development and

The worst of all was the Stalinist schenational-revolutionary imperialist and supported it all along the line. The events in the Eastern bloc have definitely not helped.

People came out of jail and found that the organizations had gone and many had left the country. Given the crisis in Iran there is big pressure to find a job. It is not only a matter of a lack of activity, but of people renouncing their ideas.

But in fact a solid organization could do a lot now. The government is divided and in crisis. The old organizations of the left have disappeared. When we were active as Trotskyists we were under pressure from both sides, and both sources of pres-

About two months ago there was a meeting of about a hundred in Khuzestan where I could read my poems. All my poems are against the government and people wanted to discuss. In queues everybody talks against the government. It is not just people from organizations.

Nor does it seem obvious that the government, even if it can carry through centralization, can resolve the economic crisis, which weighs on people more and more with ever higher taxes, soaring rents and so on. If there was a genuine election they would all be thrown out. Their base is in the military organs, regular or irregular.

At the moment there is no sign of a popular explosion, although in the future anything can happen. * 1. Under the Shah the price of a paykan was, at its height, 40 to 50,000 tumans.

The voting confirmed the basic division within of Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Slovenia and Croatia voted for Mesic; Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro voted against. But the men who cast the votes for Vojvodina and Kosovo had no legal and political right to be there in the first place. MICHELE LEE

A CCORDING to the Yugoslav

constitution, the eight-man presidency is made up of representatives from each of the six republics and two provinces. Each of these representatives is elected by secret vote in the appropriate republican or provincial assembly and remains responsible to that assembly. On May 15 each year, the presidency elects a new president in accordance with a strict rota. Thus on May 15, 1989, the post went to Slovenia (Janez Drvnosek), on May 15, 1990 to Serbia (Borislav Jovic) and on May 15, 1991 it was due to go to Croatia (Stipe Mesic).

The system of rotation was established in the early 1970s to express the equal status of members of the Yugoslav Federation.

This constitution was drawn up when Yugoslavia was still a federation of equal nations. But only a year after his rise to power in Serbia, Milosevic began to dismantle it. In 1988, the Serbian assembly adopted an amendment to the republican constitution cancelling Vojvodina's and Kosovo's political autonomy. Nationalist mobilizations were organized bring down the governments in Vojvodideputies voted in the required constitutional amendment.

In July 1990, however, following the break-up of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, multiparty elections in Slovenia and Croatia and

(most important) the establishment of a state of terror in Kosovo, the provincial assembly declared Kosovo's independence from Serbia. Serbia responded by dissolving the provincial assembly and government, and its own assembly voted in a new republican constitution which reduced the provinces to a status lower than that of a municipality.

With the adoption of the new Serbian constitution, the federation as defined by the Yugoslav constitution ceased to exist. Without a functioning assembly, Kosovo representatives in the Federal Assembly and on the Federal Presidency became illegitimate, and with them also the work of these bodies. The other republics, pursuing their own selfish interests, connived at this illegal state of affairs until May 15, 1991, when it was no longer possible to avoid the issue. For if Serbia could get away with vetoing Croatia's representative, then it, rather than Yugoslavia, would decide the country's future.

The Kosovo boomerang

The Federal Presidency consequently fell apart. As this author predicted at the time, the boomerang released in Kosovo in 1988 returned three years later to deliver a mortal blow to Yugoslavia. The decision by the Serbian regime to bring down the Yugoslav presidency proves conclusively that it sees federal organs outside its control as an impediment to its own survival.

At the beginning of 1991, Milosevic appeared at the height of his powers. Although the dissolution of the Yugoslav Communist party had scuppered his ear- 17 lier plan to use the party machine to win June 24, 1991 • #209 International Viewpoint

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YUGOSLAVIA's latest crisis

YUGOSLAVIA for Serbia the hegemony it had enjoyed in pre-war Yugoslavia, the illusion that this could be achieved persisted because of the army's evident hostility to the new regimes in Slovenia and Croatia. With control over four federal units, Serbia now enjoyed disproportionate influence within the federal institutions.

On the presidency, which is also commander-in-chief of the army, Milosevic now wielded four of the eight votes. Furthermore, egged on by renegades such as Mihailo Markovic of Praxis [a prestigious Marxist journal of the 1960s and 70s] fame, he encouraged armed rebellion among Serbs in parts of Croatia (the Herzegovina, in order to undermine these republics' ability to resist. Last, but not least, by winning a huge majority in the 1990 Serbian elections, he marginalized the domestic opposition. Moment of truth for Milosevic

The March 1991 demonstrations in Serbia, however, were the moment of truth for Milosevic. He entered history as the first republican head of state to ask the army to intervene in a domestic dispute. Indeed, Milosevic pressed the army to introduce a state of emergency throughout Yugoslavia. But the Army — keen in principle, but fearing a possible breakdown of discipline in its own ranks — would not comply without the authority of the presidency. The latter, supported by federal prime minister Markovic, refused the request. Kosovo's representative broke ranks to vote with the independent republics.

The army high command, shaken by the Serbian demonstrations, now rallied

•VOJVODINA

color (SLOVENIA

YUGOSLAV 18 International Viewpoint #209 • June 24, 1991 behind Markovic (though not all of them unequivocally).

Milosevic, defeated in the presidency and challenged at home, now opted for a strategy of making the federal institutions unworkable. His immediate response was to denounce the Federal Presidency as an agent of Yugoslavia's destruction, and Markovic as a western stooge. On March 18, the representatives of Serbia, Montenegro and Vojvodina resigned from the presidency.

Milosevic declared that the presidency no longer existed, and (somewhat inconsistently) that Serbia no longer recognized its authority. At a hastily convened secret meeting, he told local government heads that Serbia was in a de facto state however, and two days later it was back to business as usual on the presidency — but only for the time being.

The Kosovo representative was placed summarily under house replaced by a man appointed by the Serbian assembly. The new man, Sejdo Bajis an oddity even for recent Serbian politics: elected by 0.03% of votes in his Kosovo constituency (Albanians had unanimously boycotted the Serbian elections), this retired army sergeant is renowned only for his addiction to tombola. Vojvodina and Montenegro also came up with new presidential rep-

Between mid-March and mid-May Yugoslavia lived a charmed life as a country tottering on the brink of civil war and/or military coup, while its high politics became more and more of a charade.

weeks during March and April republican heads met in conference at different luxurious locations, accompa-

MACEDONIA

KOSSOVO nied by a swarm of journalists, in order supposedly to forge a new consensus. These meetings, all of which ended in failure, served only to shore up Milosevic's position in Serbia. His strategy of destabilization, if anything, gained a new lease of life. The following brief survey of some of the key events in the period between the end of March and the middle of May give the reader an idea of how this strategy works.

A strategy of provocation ON March 31, an armed unit from "Krajina" (a part of Croatia where Serbs form a majority) tried to occupy the Plitvice National Park in Croatia, and were repulsed by the Croatian police. At Jovic's request, but over Slovene and Croatian protests, the Federal Presidency met in emergency session and ordered the army to occupy the park.

• On April 18, some 750,000 Serbian workers declared a general strike and the republican government quickly met their terms for the sake of Serb national unity.

• On May 2, in Borovo Selo in eastern Croatia, Serb militants ambushed a bus carrying Croatian police, killing twelve. Serb Chetniks, a proto-fascist nationalist formation, boasted publicly of having taken part in the massacre. The fact that some of the victims had been severely tortured gave credence to their claim. There followed another emergency session of the Federal Presidency, and another threat of military takeover - and another part of Croatia was occupied by

• In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb followers of Milosevic set up two new "Krajinas" as a future part of Serbia, and authority of the republican government.

• By now, an anti-army mood had become entrenched in Croatia, reaching a high point on May 6 in Split, when 30,000 workers massed outside the navy command centre demanding an end to the blockading of Croatian villages by the militia (with army complicity). A soldier's death led to yet another emergency session of the Federal Presidency, at which the army was given additional policing powers in Croatia.

• Fearing that a military occupation of Croatia was imminent, the population of several Croat villages and towns in Bosnia-Herzegovina took to the streets to block army tanks moving towards Croatia. The army sent in a parachute unit to "liberate" its troops. Thanks to the combined efforts of the Croatian and Bosnian presidents this particular conflict was

• In the Dalmatian ports of Zadar and Sibenik, however, anti-Serb riots and destruction of Serb property erupted, after a local man was killed by a "Krajina" activist. Anti-Croat riots and destruction of Croat property followed in

"Krajina".

YUGOSLAVIA accept the basic rules of

Since the soldier killed in Split was a Macedonian, demonstrations followed in Mace- SLOVENIA donia, at which Milosevic and Croatian president Tudjman were denounced as warmongers.

• Slovenia's response to this turbulence was to speed up legislative procedures preparing inde-

& HUNGARY

Zagreb

CROATIA

Rijekan democratic procedures. They have shown, in other words, that they no longer recognize Yugoslavia."

If so, then war remains the only option. Ever since the March demonstrations Milosevic's regime has been sliding fast to the right, embracing cooperation with the Chetniks. His followers outside Serbia — Milan Babic, in the Croapendence.

Benkovac assembly, demands were voiced that Serbia should

BOSNIA -

ACEGOVIN

•Khin

Sarajevo tian "Krajina" and Radov-

Karadzic, an his counterpart in

Bosnia-

Herzegovina — are openly army for war enemies.

Adriatic

Though this was rejected

(albeit only formally, for plit

S

Sea collaborating with the

Chetnik leader Vojislav

Seselj.

in reality Serbia already ITALY has a well-armed paramilitary force), a Serb Areas with

Serb majority involving the ruling party and the main opposition parties, was established, its chief aim being to create "one state for all Serbs" the slogan of the Serbian extreme right.

• Political ferment has also been evident in Montenegro, tion has left the republican assembly for

• In the Serbian part of the Sandjak, which is largely Moslem in ethnic terms, a Moslem National Council was set up, aiming at winning local autonomy.

• Also in May, the Serbian authorities distributed firearms to all Serb nationals in Kosovo, who proceeded to practice by shooting unarmed Albanian civilians.

In mid-May, a constitutional crisis was added to this inflammable mixture. On May 10, a federal assembly session broke up in confusion when the delegates from Croatia, Slovenia and Kosovo refused to recognize Bajramovic as Kosovo's representative on the Federal Presidency. Vojvodina and Montenegro then withdrew their own candidates. On May 15 they, together with Serbia and Kosovo (represented temporarily by the vice-president of the Serbian assembly) cast their votes

The country was suddenly left without a head of state. Federal premier Markovic, supported by the army, proposed a compromise: Slovenia and Croatia should accept Bajramovic in return for Serbia voting for Mesic. Slovenia refused this shabby deal, but a desperate Croatia agreed — and was tricked.

In the assembly, Kosovo delegates protested against their rights being traded in such a cynical manner - Serb delegates responded by questioning their very right to sit in the federal assembly. Eventually, although the Slovene and Albanian delegates, accompanied by many Croats and Moslems, voted against Bajramovic, his

MONTENEGRO confirmation went through.

But the farce reached its apex when, at a renewed meeting of the presidency,

Vojvodina and Kosovo solemnly proceeded once again to vote against Mesic. The Slovene, Croatian and Macedonian representatives then packed their bags and went home.

attempt to destroy the Federal Presidency has succeeded. His next target will be the federal gov-

Seething chaos

The logic behind this combination of crisis at the top and seething chaos below was spelt out by the Serbian branch of the Alliance of Forces of Reform (which supports Ante Markovic): "By obstructing the election to the post of president of the member from Croatia, Milosevic's personal regime has completely revealed its full intentions in regard to the future of Yugoslavia. We are witnessing the final act in the destruction of Yugoslavia, which has been pursued over the last few years in accordance with a clear plan: to force Slovenia to leave the country; to cause chaos within, and the territorial of, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina; to transform Macedonia into a southern province of Serbia; to provoke a military intervention in name of protecting Yugoslavia; to stop all economic and political changes that could bring Milosevic's personal regime

"By their refusal to accept the constitutionally prescribed procedure for electing the president, the representatives of so-called "unified" Serbia, acting as Milosevic's personal executives, have shown that they do not recognize the equality and sovereignty of the other republics, or

Judging by the growing occupation of Croatia, by the disintegration of the authority of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by the growing number of incidents involving armed civilians, and by the rising number of dead it would be fair to say that civil war in Yugoslavia has already begun.

The destruction of the Yugoslav presidency, on the other hand, has left the Yugoslav army without its civilian commander-in-chief, strengthening the hand of putschist currents within it. There is little doubt, however, that a military coup would only hasten the disintegration of the army. This is why the army leaders, working with Markovic, expressed their support for Mesic's election.

But time is running out for Yugoslavia. ocratic alternative emerging in Serbia, strong enough to remove Milosevic -could save it now. Such a miracle almost materialized at the beginning of March, when Serbian democracy suddenly displayed its tremendous potential. Then the youth demanded an end to Milosevic's politics of war. It was cast aside, however, by the main parties of the opposition, eager to join Milosevic in his megalomaniac quest for a Greater Serbia ('one state for all Serbs").

Herein lies Serbia's tragedy. The so-called democratic opposition seems to be unaware that Milosevic is grooming the Chetniks not simply as a striking force against the Croat, Moslem, Albanian, Slovene, Macedonian, Hungarian "national enemy" but also as his personal insurance against any "velvet revolution" happening in Serbia. It was only in the aftermath of the March demonstrations Seselj's Serb Radical Party.

Serbian democrats would be wise to heed the words of Ibrahim Rugova, leadof the Albanian Democratic Party, are all sotential Albanians aymen: you 19 are all potential Albanians." * June 24, 1991 • #209 International Viewpoint

"A revolutionary transformations made.

The policy of this government, determined by its class nature, tends to privilege the capitalists to the detriment of the interests of the workers. But governments do not do what they want, but what the people allow them to do. Popular mobilization and struggle can ensure that the government respects the conquests of the

THE "truce" which the Sandinista trade union confederation, the National Front of Workers (FNT), had granted to the Chamorro government so that it could launch its new economic plan is approaching its end. However, strikes have continued in the public sector.

On April 27, 1990, an attempt was made on the life of president Violeta Chamorro; the police are pursuing inquiries in circles linked to the rightwing Contras. Some of the latter, supporters of "commandante" Ruben - himself close to Vice-President Virgilio Godoy - have threatened to return to armed struggle if leading Sandinista, Humberto Ortega, is not dismissed as commander of the military forces (see /V 205).

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