YUGOSLAVIA / ALGERIA The abdication of the democrats
S INCE October 1990, in agree-
ment with the general secretary of the ruling National Liberation Front (NLF), Mehri, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, the new president of the People's National Assembly (APN), has been trying to restore coherence to the ruling party and reduce the impact of the FIS. Since autumn 1990 disappointment has become evident among the FIS' electorate, since the Islamic local councils, which had promised to provide housing, work and marriage for the young,
The new deputies, who had once dealt with problems in front of everybody in the mosques, have retreated behind the townhall railings, in the manner of their predecessors. The only evident difference is that those who are getting whatever housing or other benefits exist have beards. The FIS has been slow to react, leading a campaign against the financial strangulation of the town-halls by the central state and supporting the demands of those who have yet to be rehoused after the 1989 earthquake. However, they have not been able to regain the confidence of disillusioned voters. Indeed, a new fundamentalist organization, Hamas, has begun to nibble away at the FIS' more moderate wing.
The Gulf war gave the FIS a new opportunity to appear at the head of the rebellious masses, despite the complications due to its relations with Saudi Arabia. However, its militarist rhetoric, which had strong appeal amongst the youth, has only led to the arming of bands dedicated to the "holy war", not to fighting George Bush.
Then the complete success of the March 12-13 general strike to protest against the cost of living, called by the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), which was virulently opposed by the FIS and the Islamic Workers Union (SIT), contributed to a further decline in the fundamentalists' credibility. Believing the time was ripe, Chadli decided to gamble and, having passed the necessary electoral laws, on April 3, announced elections for June 27.
During Ramadan (which this year began in mid-April), fundamentalist gangs led by Takfir Oual Hidjra (one of the most radical Islamic groups) attacked theatres and gatherings of young women. At the same time the FIS took up a more fundamental issue through its "Islamic markets", free from taxes, financed by the town halls and set up by supporters who brought down prices. Fraudulent electoral system
However the FLN prime minister, Hamrouche, had his answer ready, using a completely fraudulent electoral system to undermine the fundamentalists' hopes.
The number of voters per seat varied from 2,000 to 100,000, depending whether the FLN or FIS had been supported previously, the south and far east of the country being favoured to the detriment of the cities. Supposing that the voting scores remained the same as on June 12, 1990, the FLN would have gained 198 to 320 deputies with 17% of the vote, the FIS 135 to 265 deputies with 34%. This voting system would effectively cut down the representation of all the parties except the FLN; thus the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) would be reduced to its stronghold in Kabylia and the centre, its other votes wasted. This meant that the FLN would appear as the only place for anti-FIS votes to go in the second round, bringing two thirds of the electorate behind its candi-
The FIS could not accept its coming defeat in the June 27 elections. It demanded the repeal of the electoral laws and the of the anticipated election, with Abassi raising the tempera-
ALGERIA ture by threatening a general strike if these demands were not met.
There was little chance of this strike being a success, given the FIS' embarrassment over the UGTA general strike in
March, and given the widespread feeling that the party conflict offered nothing. The regime therefore tried to push the FIS into carrying out its threats. The call for the strike on May 25 thus appeared as a blunder committed by Abassi under pressure.
The initial results were indeed derisory: of 15,000 workers at the Industrial Vehicles Complex (CVI) at Huiba, 100 went on strike; three out of 500 in the chemical works and so on. Individual militants, at best groups of dozens, walked off the job to general indifference, with the possible exception of the oil fields where a more significant proportion of the workforce joined the strike. The Islamic markets shut, as did the FIS controlled town halls, but most shops remained open except in two medium sized towns in the interior, Médéa and Tlemen.
Democracy on campuses
There was some ferment on the campuses, but a healthy reaction of solidarity against the repression was combined with insistence on a vote on the strike by general assemblies, which ended in the isolation of the few hundred FIS marchers. The demonstrations were very small, although the regime talked up the numbers, wanting to show the FIS' impotence on the televi-
The FIS then decided to change its tactics and concentrate on evening marches. Hamrouche met FIS leaders to grant them permission to meet in four places in Algiers, with the aim of increasing the tension and rallying voters around the FLN.
However by this time the popular mood was beginning to change; the abandonment by the democratic and revolutionary parties of any serious challenge to the dictatorship — the former on account of their electoral preoccupations, the latter owing to their material weakness - rendered them irrelevant at this moment. A few tear gas canisters and the youth began to reconsider, and when, on the night of June 2, the police attempted to clear the squares, some of the youth reacted and the movement changed its dimensions and nature; the state of emergency was
In the run up to June 27, Hamrouche had carried out a sort of coup d'état within the regime, shutting up the parties and journals (such as the Democratic Cultural Assembly (RCD), the liberals and the Nouvel Hebdo) close to the president, and eliminating all the currents from the FLN lists. As long as this seemed to be working, Chadli kept his peace. On June 4, when Hamrouche still considered the situ1. The FIS' leading body. It has lost around 20 of its
Fi dare in prison and another 5 July 22, 1991 • #211 International Viewpoint
ALGERIA ation controllable, his opponents demanded a state of emergency. And indeed, Italian lenders had just suspended a credit of $7bn owing to the prevailing instability, while the International Monetary Fund was among the first to support the state of emergency.
Hamrouche's resignation, on the grounds that he did not want to be "a man of two policies" (in reality he did not want to sacrifice his ambitions by being made a scapegoat for the repression). gave the impression that the regime was in panic. It seemed as if a poorly followed strike call had in fact overthrown the government, and won presidential elections and a coalition government. These incomprehensible concessions, coming in the wake of the country's being put under military rule, inflated the fundamentalists' power and demoralized everyone else, above all the modernist middle classes, who have come close to panic.
Fundamentalist arms deals
Very quickly however, the regime acted to erase the impression of disarray, first announcing that the state of emergency was going to continue, and then launching a sally of communiqués and against the FIS. Belhadj was accused in an affair involving the French Islamist Didier
Roger Guyan, who wanted to take arms and explosives into Algeria; the town halls were instructed to take down their signs saying "Islamic town halls"; the
Islamists' Friday meetings in the Mosques have been regularly denounced and threatened by communiqués from the military authorities. However it was not the fundamentalists who were hardest hit by these measures; Belhadi remained at liberty, the town halls put up in the morning the signs taken down by the military in the night;
and each Friday, despite the deployment of tanks, the fundamentalist meetings continued with the traditional appeals for holy
On the other hand the FFS' meetings had already been banned before the state of emergency, and the Socialist Workers
Party (PST — the sympathizing group of the Fourth International in Algeria) was forbidden to hold a meeting while its offices in Oran were raided after a leaflet distribution and
Bejaia were interrogated after a flyposting
There was, furthermore, a religious turn in the official line. Every minister and official has been using and abusing ritual formulas and Koranic verses. The arrests of Belhadj and Abassi were the first sign exercising its strength; in the previous phase its policy had had the effect of pushing the undecided towards the strongest, the fundamentalists. This is a pyrrhic victory for the army;
by making the fundamentalists appear the 6 fact allowing theme to demonstrate for a only victims of the repression, while in International Viewpoint #211 • July 22, 1991 whole period, they have paved the way for a fundamentalist flood tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, when the FLN's liberal reforms are applied and misery and despair grow still further.
The democratic parties are passing one after another through the antechamber of the new head of the government, Ghozali, to whom they pledge allegiance. They accept the indignity of bending the knee to the regime while muttering a few abstract declarations when they are forbidden to demonstrate and subjected to curfew. The PST, the only party to reject this approach, is totally outside the community of parties accepted by Chadli, and is continuing to demand the lifting of the state of emergen-
The democratic parties have ended up supporting this curious "coalition government" which contains only FLN members. They have come together to support this latest of the interminable FLN governments Algeria has had since independence, whose prime minister treats them haughtily, while summoning them to the government's favour and against the FIS. Their attitude to the state of emergency has been hesitant and more often than not they support the use of the
The honest army
Thus, on June 19, the anniversary of the day when the army overthrew him, former post-independence president Ben Bella the army: "above the fray and composed of honest men." He timidly demanded that steps be taken towards lifting the state of siege, as has Ait Ahmed of the FFS, who at least had the courage to openly. However, besides Ali
Yahia's League for the Defence of Human
Rights and the PST, nobody has been vigorously demanding the end of the state of
One exception has been Louiza Hanoun of the Workers Party (PT - linked to the
Lambertiste current of Trotskyism), but she has become seriously compromised with the FIS since her visit to Abassi
Madani and her support for the FIS strike.
The Party of the Socialist Vanguard
(PAGS — the Communist Party) has been calling for the banning of the FIS and thus effectively banning itself from any activity in the popular neighbourhoods.
For the time being, however, the contradictions in the positions of Abassi Madani and the incoherence of his resistance to the state of emergency have affected his credibility. The parents of the victims have not pardoned him for sending their children to the slaughter, while his sup porters cannot continue to accept small group actions without rhyme or reason, in the absence of any observable plan. Abassi started off supporting the Ghozali govemment, even reaffirming this support after the accusation against Belhadj, then, suddenly, he demanded the ending of the state of emergency, a few days before his own arrest. This came after strikes against the FIS apparatus and the arrest of intermediate cadres, which effectively forestalled any vigorous solidarity actions with the FIS leaders.
In the western media there has been much talk of a military coup. But why should the Algerian military need to carry out such a coup when they have been in power since 1962? The democratic opening conceded after the events of October 1988 will not be reversed, since it is necessary to gain the confidence of the imperialists. Besides, it is much more efficient and stable to govern flexibly than to rule by military decree. The regime would only turn to the latter resort if it thought that the danger was truly mortal. But in fact it was not, despite fears at the outset that FIS militants would be able to destabilize the army rank-and-file and render the repressive forces impotent.
Today, what is on the cards is a more deep going economic opening. "More than half measures", headlined L' Horizon, the big evening paper, on July 2, 1991. The limited opening made to foreign companies in July 1990, which permit them to sell in hard currency in exchange for promises of investment, was followed up in February 1991 by total liberalization of foreign trade, at least on paper. In order to meet the obligations to Japanese, French and Italian creditors who are flocking to the Ghozali government, the opening will become more thoroughgoing.
Bankrupt local enterprises, which have been propped up for six months - the time needed to get through the elections — will find themselves in serious difficulties.
The opening up of foreign trade will mean the collapse of the textile industry, shoemaking and processing. The government has promised that the opening will not undermine the national industrial base — we will see, though squaring the circle is usually difficult.
### Devaluation of dinar
The deliberate attacks on purchasing power through the administrative devaluation of the dinar by the regime, and through tax reforms that hit the masses, are bringing about an increase in poverty.
After the elections we will be looking forward to four million unemployed. Thus, what other possibility does the regime have than to prostrate itself further before imperialism and abandon all the efforts made to industrialize the country!
It would be a mistake, in these circumstances, to imagine that we have seen the last of the fundamentalists. The FIS has been the only genuinely mass party, and a socialist, populist or democratic alternative does not exist. Thus, when the liberal reforms bring forth the inevitable misery, this or another party of despair, whether called the FIS or not, may well take the head of the rebellion of the youth. *
Confusion and
TURKEY and sympathizers of the fascist party of Türkes (the sinister "Führer" of the Grey Wolves).
Moreover, the new economic supremo, minister Pakdemir, was considered as an "Islamic conservative" close to Akbulut, until he decided at the last minute to go over to the side of Yilmaz.
DURING the last decade, the political struggle in Turkey has been marked by a continuing fight against the avatars of the
1980 military dictatorship. Today all political forces, from the heirs of the dictatorship to its victims on the right and the left, are agreed that the framework fixed by the 1980 regime is obsolete and that the state must be reorganized on a new basis. But everybody also agrees that there is a political impasse.