democracy, respect for the rights of all national groups and without outside interference. New regional confederations can be envisaged to replace the crumbling post-First World War nation states — the notion of a Balkan Federation was in the air in Balkan Communist circles at the end of the Second World War, before being
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SERBIA during his visit to Paris. "I do not think that it will last long, for economic and social problems will not permit that." CATHERINE SAMARY
W
sense, it was unrealistic from the political point of view. In any case, the army intervention, far from assisting any possible variant of a redefinition of the Yugoslav union, is a big step towards its break up. It is an aggression against the right of the Yugoslav republics to independence, a right which must be unconditionally defended.
Of the six Yugoslav republics, four -Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina — have expressed their desire for a union of sovereign republics, thus accentuating the dynamic towards a confederal system which has existed since the 1970s. The 1974-76 constitution (the last before Tito's death in 1980) had established the collegial presidency with six representatives from the republics and two from the autonomous prov-
ADRIATIC SEA ITALY the clear and strong among Serbs that they had been the main losers from the evolution of the system. Equality of representation regardless of the size of the units evidently meant a relative under-representation of the largest republic, Serbia. Furthermore, Serbia was the only republic where the regime was not sovereign over the whole of its territory, owing to the veto powers of the two
Finally, Serbs are scattered across three republics — outside Serbia they make up about 12% of the population of Croatia and a third of that of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
These states, which were created parts of the federation with the idea of creating an equality of weight among the republics, have been until now constitutionally defined as multinational states so far as language, alphabet and religion are concerned. The new Croat constitution of December 1990 did away
MONTENEGRO
BULGARIA KOSOVO MACEDONIA ALBANIA: GREECE with this pluralism and transformed the Serbs in Croatia into a national minority.
The Serbs have protested against this treatment, although they have followed a similar or worse policy towards the Albanians in their own territory. The difference is that the Serbs feel "at home" in Yugoslavia; the scattering of Serbs throughout the federation makes them federalists. However the affirmation of the Serb nation means challenging Yugoslavia's internal frontiers, with the recentralization of Serbia and the annexation of Serb inhabited areas in other republics.
Serbian nationalism also tends to deny the identity of those other nations and nationalities which are closest to the Serbs — that is, the Montenegrins, distinguished only by their histhe Macedonians, elevated to the status of a nation by Tito's regime; and the Muslims of Bos-
Vojvodina).
Veto rights
TALKS have been taking place between Croat and Serb leaders on the redrawing of the frontiers between their two republics, according to The Financial Times of July
Each of these eight representatives
10, 1991. Croat president Franjo Tudjman sees this as the way towards the "rational enjoyed veto rights, greatly limiting the issues of intra-national Croatia-Serbian relations". Any real powers of the centre and leading to redrawing of the frontiers would open a whole series of analogous questions, both an increased weight of the party/ state within Yugoslavia and between that country and its neighbours.
apparatuses in each of the republics. The
For example: Bulgaria has claims on Macedonia, as does Greece, there is a half annual rotation of the Federal Presidency million strong Hungarian minority in Vojvodina, and the Kosovo Albanians may amongst the eight functioned automatiwell look towards Tirana insofar as the regime there changes.
cally until May 15 this year. Then, for
The Western authorities and their media view such prospects with a mixture of the first time, a formal vote and the acute anxiety and condescension. They see themselves being inexorably sucked into situations which they cannot control, and which will stretch the institutions of absence of a majority blocked the nomithe Old/New World Order, designed to uphold existing borders, not to oversee their nation of the Croat Stipe Mesic, with
Serbia, supported by Montenegro and the
The independent left, which has never been taken in by the fashionable nonvotes from the two autonomous provincsense about the "end of history", can afford a more rational approach, insisting on es, voting down Mesic.
the need for any such changes to take place on the basis of the fullest internal
Behind this paralysis lurked Serbia leader Slobodan Milosevic's efforts at recentralization, strengthened by his election last year to the Serbian presidency, with 60% of the vote. His popularity
New frontiers?
modification, to breaking point.
vetoed by Stalin. - C.M. *
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Crisis in the Balkans "THE federation-confederation YUGOSLAL conflict is irrational" declared HERCEGOVINA Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic in Le Monde (May 23)
Recognize independence of Slovenia and Croatia
THE following statement was issued on July 3, 1991 by Sozialistische Alternative
(SOAL), the Austrian section of the Fourth International.
IN recent days, the Yugoslav People's Army has employed brute force in Slovenia.
Tanks, artillery and the airforce have been called in and airports and border posts bombed. Cars which have been used as roadblocks have been flattened. Deaths, injuries and immense material losses have been the result. * The independence of Slovenia and Croatia has been suspended, but not withdrawn. It remains to be seen what role economic and political pressure from the
USA and the EC, who have decided to defend the bureaucratic dictatorship of the central government, have played in this retreat. * Every nation has the right to decide its own fate. If Slovenes and Croats have decided in a democratic fashion in favour of sovereignty for their states, the issue is clear-cut.
* We demand:
* An end to the aggression against Slovenia and Croatia.
* A peaceful solution to the conflict.
* Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as sovereign states by the Austrian federal government.
* While fully supporting the right to national self-determination, we also believe that the creation of small states and nationalism cannot solve the problems of the peoples of Yugoslavia. What is needed are moves towards a free union of sovereign states in the form of a confederation and the organization of society on the basis of workers' power.
* We oppose all attempts to exploit the events in Yugoslavia as a justification for whipping up militarist hysteria and steps towards strengthening the armed forces in Austria. At the same time, we demand the opening of the borders for people flee ing the fighting or deserting. * nia, who since the 1970s have been considered as a people sharing sovereignty in Bosnia with Croats and Serbs. Croat nationalism is equally menacing for the
Bosnian Muslims since the Croat president, Franjo Tudjman, considers them to be Croats. Bosnia-Herzegovina, indeed, may well turn out to be the most explosive region in Yugoslavia.
In the immediate sense, it is Slovenia that has taken the initiative, fortified by its ethnic homogeneity, which makes it less fearful of internal ethnic clashes. Its declaration of sovereignty has come into conflict with the explicit support of the
European Monetary Fund and Community for the federalism of Ante Markovic's government. The EC thus carries the primary responsibility for the army intervention against the proclamation of independence, born out of the collapse of negotiations.
It was the "liberal" Ante Markovic who initially ordered the army to intervene in
Slovenia to defend the integrity of the country's frontiers. It appears that he did not expect serious resistance, and thus hoped to maintain his liberal reputation.
The resistance by the Slovene territorial army's own logic have units and the made things turn out otherwise.
The army is increasingly arrogating powers to itself which may go beyond assuring the frontiers to involve a challenge to the newly elected regimes. Furthermore, purges in which Serb officers have been replacing those from other nationalities point in the direction of a change in the character of this army, in which it would lose its "Titoist" features
4 as a multinational, federalist force with a
International Viewpoint #211 • July 22, 1991 multi-ethnic leadership under the control of the collegial Yugoslav presidency. These are all factors that have kept the army from responding directly to strong Serbian pressures intended to bring about a state of emergency in Croatia.
The partial community of interests between an army whose privileges are directly tied to the maintenance of the Yugoslav state and Slobodan Milosevic does not mean that they have identical aims. Milosevic has responded to the affirmation of the other state/nations by an affirmation of the Serb state/nation, even if this means exploding the federation. This is one of the reasons for the army's reserved attitude to Milosevic in recent months. The defeat inflicted on the army in the first battle in Slovenia will push the army high command into raising the stakes throughout the coun
Everything breadth of political and social resistance to the military and on its own internal
The pro-independence anti-militarist movement in Slovenia is strong; and the same is true in Serbia despite the armed bands on the far right. The student movement last march came out against the civil war logic implicit in the actions of the Serbian regime. Parents of conscripts have invaded the Serbian parliament to demand the withdrawal of their children engaged in this dirty war. Tito's Yugoslavia is no more. A new union can only arise on the basis of full respect for the independence of the communities concerned and in opposition to any intervention by the army. *
THE arrest of Ali Belhadj, revered tribune of the rebellious youth of the poorest neighbourhoods of Algiers, and Abassi Madani, the spokesman and president of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), on June 30, 1991, left Algeria's fundamentalists in disarray.
These quasi-mythical figures, who threatened holy war and dealt with the regime as an equal force, could in fact, it seemed, be arrested by mere mortals in police uniforms, without the heavens falling on president Chadli.
Exhausted by their dispersed and poorly supported attacks in Algiers, shaken by the public denunciation of Abassi as a "danger for Islam and the country" during a retelevized interview with members of the Majlis al-Chura, isolated from a public that now wants nothing more than a return to calm, the fundamentalists have been unable to respond.
The appeals for holy war were followed only by small and militarily ineffective demonstrations in a few areas. The best prepared elements were put out of action by raids and arrests. CHAWKI SALHI
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