Changing landscape of
International Viewpoint #216 • November 11, 1991
SPANISH STATE / PORTUGAL
Mary nationalist left or the revolutionary left which supports national independence. The positions taken by ETA in the framework of negotiations are moderate enough — they do not demand self-determination, but rather an agreement that would make possible a new politicaljuridical framework (which could even be Portuguese society understood in the framework of Constitutional reform), within which political competition could take place in a democratic and non-violent manner. But ETA's outlook is so deeply rooted in armed struggle, exemplified recently by the use of car bombs in particular, that it takes on the character of a break with the norms of the system, albeit placing the confrontation solely on the military plane. This allows the state to solidify its rejection of any dialogue with them.
How long will this situation last? Nobody can tell, but the balance of forces at the level of the Spanish state as well as internationally favors Madrid. The bourgeoisie and rightist nationalists not long ago promoted independence with different arguments (even if they defended independence by stages and by peaceful means). One of the arguments they advanced was economic; Spanish centralism takes more than it gives. This argument was turned around and used against independence. Isolation ruins us. Spanish state affirmed more or less the same thing, adding that in order to enter the EEC, Euskadi had to remain within the framework of the Spanish state which alone is recognized by the European community. At the center of all these arguis attachment to the capitalist system, and the desire for a little place in the reorganization of Europe and the avoidance of destabilizing traumas.
bourgeois nationalists advantage of the crisis of the Eastern European countries to justify their "toothless" nationalism and their attachment to the system. They hold that the Lithuanian road stems from the fact that communism was profoundly undemocratic and that it prevented the peoples from coexisting under the same roof. Under these conditions, according to the PNV, it is logical that these nations want to separate and also to move towards the West. Although they, the Basques or the Catalans, enjoy freedoms, they also aspire to have their own governments without being deprived of the benefits Europe has to offer. These arguments can be turned around when the nationalists of the right need to make the opposite point®.
This counter weight to radical nationalism, registered by bourgeois nationalism, helps it to justify the new PSOE-
PNV government (with EE as a junior partner which, in both its image and its objectives, is the opposite of a nationalist 12 ful resistance movement (possibly one of There still exists in Euskadi a power-
THE Social Democratic Party (PSD) of Prime Minister Cavaco Silva won the Portuguese elections of October 6, 1991 with more than 50% of the votes. The Socialist Party (PS) of President Marlo Soares struggled to reach 29.25% while the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) scored less than 9%. FRANCISCO LOUÇA
HE right wing government's most significant success, and one which has astonished all observers, has been its ability to survive its four-year term. The PSD has been able not only to stabilize the political regime but also to bring together the whole right — both the more traditional and the more "European" wings — the strongest in capitalist Europe) composed of diverse elements, even if the nationalist factor is dominant. This manifests itself in the existence of a current with an electoral expression (Herri Batasuna) and an armed wing (ETA) as well as organizations like the EMK-LKI which have a certain implantation in social movements — not to mention the existence of numerous organizations that lead antimilitarist, feminist and workers struggles?. These forces have not been crushed, but they are undergoing a process of change and are experiencing many problems of orientation; they need profound changes in their ideological and political discourse. The crisis in the East has created identity problems and some of these movements need new tactical objectives and new and more original ways of doing politics!°
The mass struggle against the Leizaran highway is a case in point; the route of this highway has been challenged as much by the ecologists as by the radical leftist parties, and has succeeded in leading to a broad coordinating committee which has organized mass demonstrabehind its system of distributing largesse, support for social lobbies and management by the dominant interests.
The PSD's victory in these elections rests on three main factors. Firstly, the end of the division of the right between the more pragmatic sectors (the PSD) and the more traditional elements in the Democratic Social Centre (CDS), which brings together Catholic conservatives and those nostalgic for the times of former dictator Salazar. When the PDS came to power many CDS notables and local officials joined the victors. Now, the CDS only retains five deputies to the PDS' 135 and the CDS' leadership an sis is shown by the resignation of toric leader, Freitas do Aman third party of the Portuguese mig
Democratic Renewal Party (PS. which got 20% at the previous el and had seven deputies) has simply peared from the political scene.
Secondly — and this is something cific to Portugal - the gathering in of th right by the PDS corresponds to a pe of strong economic development and t a strengthening of the govermen capacity to redistribute wealth. Sin tions. With the entry of ETA into this struggle the question has polarized the political life of Guipuzkoa and all of Euz kadi. Other problems remain, like the dra matic situation of the more than 500 political prisoners and numerous refugees, or the latest phase in industrial reconversion. The winds of neoliberalism and strident individualism are obstacles (as throughout Europe) confronting a left which remains determined but which also needs to prepare itself for the challenges to come. 8. The nationalist right and the social democracy often blame terrorism for the economic crises, the lack of investment and so on. Without minimizing the impor tance of the climate of violence, it is difficult to believe that this, rather than economic motives explains the lack of investment in the Basque country. 9. The Revolutionary Communist League (LI) was the Fourth International organization in Euskadi; for reasons connected to its fusion with the Communist Movement of Euskadi (EMK) (see International View. point #205, April 29, 1991), the LKI has ceased to be affiliated with the Fourth International. The new party maintains regular and fratemal links with the Fourth International. 10. The resistor movement exists throughout the Spanish state, but it is particularly strong in Euskadi. More than 55% of the resistors are Basque.
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Elections reveal
gaining broad respect on the left, which wanted to unite in a battle against the
November 11; 1991 • #216 International Viewpoint joining the European Economic Community (EEC) at the start of 1986, Portugal has benefited from a significant inflow of funds - the "structural funds" which now make up a third of the annual state budget. At the same time national industry and finance have been artificially protected from foreign competition by short-
Over the past five years Portugal has seen strong economic growth, well above the EEC average. Among the reasons for this are the EEC funds, the opening up of new markets, the low oil price (in an which largely depends on imports for its energy) and the low exchange rate of the dollar (for an economy which imports from the USA and exports to Europe and has a large foreign debt to manage). This growth has provided the government with significant resources allowing it to undertake large-scale programmes such as the modernization of the tax system, softening the blow of its anti-egalitarian policies and restructuring some big economic groups with the help of generous terms for privatization.
Memories of "leftwing"
terized the PS
The Communist Party is also in crisis. For the first time it has dropped below the symbolic 10% figure, with 8.8% -at the last elections it got 12% at the last legislative elections and 13% for its presidential candidate Carlos Cavalhas. CP's decline shows the cumulative impact of a prolonged internal crisis in the course of which some of the party's deputies and former leaders have left, as well as some members of its central com-
Another sign of the tensions tearing the PCP apart is the formation of minority currents, including the so-called "Third Way" which brings together the main leaders of the CGTP union confedera-
And finally there is the crisis provoked by the PCP leadership's support for the conservative coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August this year. The PCP has been losing votes to abstention, the PSD, the PS and to its left.
The response of the PCP leadership to the crisis has been to step up its sectarianism and self-proclamation, hoping
PORTUGAL thereby to gain time. The PCP is awaiting a miracle and has no real strategy.
The recent elections represented a challenge for the revolutionary currents. On the one hand these elections marked the exhaustion of the political currents born in the revolution of April 1974. Four organizations have disappeared from the political scene - the Democratic People's Union (UDP) and Revolutionary Communist Party (PCR), both of Maoist origin and previously dominant on the far left; the Democratic People's Movement (MDP), which now supports the PCP; and the United Socialist Workers Party (POUS) of Lambertist origin. These elections, furthermore, aroused the usual pressures for a "useful" vote for one of the big parties.
In this context, the necessarily limited but nonetheless real success of the campaign launched by the Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR — Portuguese section of the Fourth International — see box) provides some grounds for hope in an otherwise depressing scenario. * austerity
Trotskyist campaign in elections
The relation of forces in favour of the
THE Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR - Portuguese section of the Fourth right is also strengthened by memories of
International) put forward lists everywhere, which were open to independent the disastrous austerity programmes of militants. Under the title "a left for the left" it organized meetings in the country's
"left"
government led the by Mario main towns. With the help of journalists and TV technicians, the PSR organized
Soares and by his hostility to the popular a media campaign, which allowed it to put out high quality broadcasts with the and workers' movements.
participation of figures known to the listeners. Thus, in its electoral broadcasts
Finally, the government has made skillon Radio Renascença, a national station controlled by the Church, the PSR ful use of the media. It controls the televiused its time to transmit popular Portuguese and Brazilian music usually cension - despite repeated pledges about sored by this channel - which provoked a lot of discussion and exposed the democratization or privatization — and censorship practised by this station. The head of Radio Renascença decided organizes a permanent campaign glorifyto suppress the PSR's radio time, but the channel finally lost its case before the ing the activities of the prime minister.
National Electoral Commission. Actors and trade unionists also took part in the
For the first time in Portugal, these elec-
PSR's TV broadcasts. The support of a team of journalists allowed the productions saw the use of the campaign spectation of a daily broadsheet sent by fax to all the country's newspapers.
on the model of Spain's cle
The most significant result of the campaign was its impact amongst youth,
Gonzalez. We saw our prime minister who came in large numbers to the PR's meetings. The PSR doubled its score alone on enormous platforms at his party compared to 1987 to 1.2% at the national level; 2 to 2.5% in former PCP meetings.
The campaign, strongholds such as Evora Portalegre and Beja; and 2% in Lisbon.
strongly centred on personality, empha-
A surprising incident prolonged the election campaign. The small community sized strong ideas such as stability and of Dona Maria in the Lisbon area decided to boycott the vote to protest against economic
This brought growth.
good delays in installing long-promised water supplies. According to Portuguese results for the right. The PSD got 50% of law, in such cases, the voting is repeated as often as necessary. The PSR canthe votes and increased its absolute share didate was only 207 votes behind the PSD. The local left militants, both the of the vote compared to 1987. The CDS
Socialists and Communists, agreed to call for a vote for the PSR. However, the fell to 4.4%, but the total right wing vote
PCP Central Committee first called for a vote for their own list - which had no was 55%.
chance of winning — and then for a boycott. Furthermore, in a local meeting, a
The Socialist Party, which presented national PCP leader instructed local militants to support the PSD on the itself as an alternative government, also grounds that the election of a new right wing deputy would not change much put the emphasis on stability. It only got overall, while a PSR deputy would be highly critical of the Communist Party
29%, well below the score suggested in
Tensions reached such a point that pickets were set up outside the voting opinion polls. These results immediately booths to prevent the inhabitants from voting. Finally the PSD won the seat.
sparked off an internal struggle for the
The PSR in these two weeks has formed a new branch in a place where it has leadership of the PS; the leader of its parhad hardly any presence before and where clientelism is very strong liamentary group has put himself forward tants involved in the Dona Maria campaign were repeatedly threatened as a replacement for the current general
Despite the outcome the experience in Dona Maria is valuable in terms of givsecretary, Jorge Sampaio, proposing to ing us a better understanding of the political landscape and also in terms of introduce an even more right wing line and be even more obedient to President
Soares, who is the real inspiration behind the strategy of collaboration with and imitation of the right which has long characright wing. *
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13
International Viewpoint #216 • November 11, 1991
YUGOSLAVIA The antiwar movement in Yugoslavia LJUBLJANA, Zagreb, Belgrade, Sarajevo: four capitals and four radically different situations in each republic as the undeclared war spreads from one ceasefire
-петричин to another. A coordination of antiwar movements has begun to develop between the republics and the first joint actions have been undertaken. As is inevitable, the groups reflect the substantial differences in context and sometimes outlook of the different republics.
CATHERINE SAMARY
S
Bosnia-
ARAJEVO in
Herzegovina is still in a prewar period. And it is easier to mobilize against war before it breaks out, tearing apart old friendships and the ties of mixed families. There are many of these latter in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state of Croats, Serbs and Slav Muslims
— recognized as a specific ethnic group.
These three nations have lived together for centuries (whether under Ottoman rule or that of the Habsburgs) and people prefer to describe themselves as Bosnian.
Tolerance is evident in the streets of
Sarajevo, where mosques stand side-by- side with Catholic and Orthodox churches and synagogues. "If a new union is formed tomorrow, its capital should be here," people say.
However, the formation of a Greater
"liberated"
Serbia, supported by the autonomous territories of the Serb minorities in Serbia and Bosnia, implies the disappearance of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the hatred that fills the air in Croatia will appear here as well.
The anguish of the massacres of the last war is a barrier to getting involved in the logic of violence. Here, more than any-
"ethnic frontiers" run right where else, through villages, buildings and families.
But at the same time there is the fear of not being the first to open fire.
It is thus logical that Sarajevo has been the scene of the biggest antiwar demonstrations. The aptly named "insurrection for peace" last July brought out around
14100,000 people, under the decisive impulse of the movement of soldiers' mothers. Thirty-odd peace groups met here. Then, on August 22-24 a coordination was established in Kumrovec in Croatia, to establish a network and prin-
At the end of September, on the initiative of the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly, a "peace caravan" was jointly organized by groups from various republics with some hundreds of foreign sympathizers. Despite its small forces, it expressed a reality that has outlasted the collapse of the federation; that of the inextricable inter-dependence of the fate of each nation and nationality on the territory in question. This is why the antiwar movement aims to be active in the long term in a very diverse, decentralized and "non-political" way.
This desire to be "non-political" has several meanings: on the one hand, the refusal to set up a political party, and a decision to seek first and foremost to stimulate broad "civil" initiatives (women's movements; independent journals; cultural, religious and lifestyle-related activities with a common antiwar axis). As Ibrahim Spahic, president of Bosnia's Centre for Peace explained: "the different authorities have very quickly extorted appeals from women supporting this or that cause... But women's organizations continue to exist and play a very active role. Overall, despite the proliferation of parties, there is a sort of citizens' revolt against the impossibility of really expressing their point of view on the basic issues that affect them."
Ibrahim Spahic here touches on one of the leitmotifs of the activists from all the republics who meet here: their denunciation of the prowar media and the manipulation of people's understanding: "It is necrophilia. The corpses of the victims of the war are dug up; which has a powerful political charge. Both the living and the dead are played with, while "the others' are accused of being at the root of the crisis. Our movement is born out of a rejection of this."
### Rebuilding confidence
The function of the antiar movement, concludes Ibrahim "is not to be a tranquillizer, but to try to rebuild confidence in ourselves and to try to reject a mad dynamic where one has to be either the 'winner' or the 'loser' and where the logic of war hides the absence of answers to socio-economic questions." Whether from Sarajevo, Ljubljana, Zagreb or Belgrade, many antiwar activists have repeated the same judgement: "for the existing authorities the war is a way of consolidating the ranks of a population to which they have little otherwise to offer."
However, the "non-political" character of the movement also expresses the difficulty of establishing a platform expressing a common approach to the conflicts Debates and differences exist over who is responsible for what in the war, on the role of the army and its nature, and on the implications of the unilateral declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia, at a time when four of the six republics were already leading a battle for the sovereignty of all in a democratic union based on the right of self-determination and for means by which this could be applied