New government, resolving the structural problems of the
Basque economy, has succeeded nonetheless in creating a climate of economic enthusiasm in the wake of the internationsame situation al upturn, and a broad front against ETA and HB.
Earlier, all the parties that had supported the law on Basque autonomy also proclaimed their rejection of the ETA and
THE nationalist coalition government in Euskadi, made up of the Basque National Party (BNP), Basque Solidarity (Eusko
Alkartasuna - EA) and the Basque Left (Euskadiko Eskerre -
EE), has collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions.
Officially, the crisis was provoked by the refusal of EA to accept the ultimatum put to it by the President of the Basque government (Lehendakari) demanding that it cease to support or participate in appeals for Basque independence with the radical nationalist Herri Batasuna (HB) in certain mayoral districts. But the real reasons are quite different; the majority party, the PNV, did not want to continue with this tripartite coalition which did not advance its political objectives.
It preferred to orient towards an alliance with the ruling
Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), in order to have direct links with the central government, as well as a framework of stable alliances in the Basque country itself.
JOSE IRIARTE "BIKILA"*
HE strategy pursued by Basque
T bourgeois nationalism is not at all based on political affinities with the Socialists, and even less on ideological ones (it would appear strange even in the context of the "national unity" that exists in Eastern Europe); it is rather, a necessity in the current situation, a strategy for political stability and good relations with Madrid. But in order to understand the current strategy of the
PNV, it is necessary to recall the events of the last few years.
In 1986 the PNV underwent a split, with one part remaining in the PNV and the other leaving to found EA with the former
Carlos Garaikoetxea. Sud-
Lehendakari, denly, the party that had enjoyed a comfortable majority, and was capable of governing alone in the Basque Autonomous Community, had only a plurality and was unable to form a government alone. For the first time the PNV had to resort to a coalition. An alliance of nationalists, which would appear logical from an ideological point of view, was politically impossible. The force closest to the
PNV, the EA, had provoked a considerable trauma by leaving the PNV; the other nationalist organization, HB, found itself at the opposite end of institutional politics and has fought for the opening of negotia-
10 tions between the armed Basque nationalist organization ETA and the central government.
It was therefore by a process of elimination that the PSOE, the ideological enemy of the PNV with whom there had been much tension during the electoral campaign, became its potential partner. But another factor which had been key in the recent split also weighed in the balance; what attitude toward the central government and its political representative in Euskadi, the Socialist Party (PSE-PSOE). Aside from the electoral campaign, the majority of the PNV was tired of the conflicts and the hostile gestures towards centralism of the Garaikotxea government'. The PNV wanted long term negotiations to stabilize Basque society, avoiding a clash with those nationalists who supported HB and ETA and marginalizing the most radical sectors within the country. It also sought an economic and social accord to ameliorate the economic crisis that had hit the Basque country by revitalizing certain economic sectors, as well as providing business to the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois sectors, who are nationalist to be sure, but above all interested in the good life and their social privileges. This is in fact how things turned out.
The PNV-PSOE government, even if it did not succeed in eradicating the vioof violence, although this did not manifest itself in united action — on several occasions differences appeared concerning the policies of repression and the central state's actions, which amounted to a veritable boon for HB and ETA?. From this time on, a "democratic front" against violence and ETA was formed around the so-called Ajuria-Enea pact (named after the palace which served as the headquarters of the Basque government), which put Basque institutions at the center of the offensive which spilled out into the streets in the form of demonstrations.
Negotiations between ETA and government In this context, and in spite of apparent openings, and even attempted negotiations in Algiers between ETA and the Spanish government, the policy of harassing and isolating ETA and HB continued and ended up blocking the negotiations. The Basque government's position is largely responsible for this breakdown of negotiations. It has categorically refused all negotiation between ETA and the central government, claiming that this would undermine its authority and legitimize violence
Everyone was surprised when, after the 1990 elections, in the absence of big shifts in the political scene, excepting the * José Iriarte "Bikila" is a leader of the Communist Movement of Euskadi-Revolutionary Communist League (EMK-LKI) organization 1. The first Basque govemment, set up following the passing of the Autonomy statute of 1979, experienced numerous political and symbolic clashes with Madrid, which dragged its heels in transfering power to the new govemment. When the PSOE took over the central govemment in 1982 and initiated its "law on the harmonization of autonomies", the situation worsened
As a result, the most nationalist sectors of the PNV radicalized, while others tumed towards compromise solutions. This provoked, among other things, the split in the PNV.
2. After the murder of Santi Brouard, a lawyer and HB militant, the PNV joined HB in criticizing the State.
The PNV and the other parties were silent about the
Ajuria-Enea pact. When the HB deputy J. Muguruza was murdered, these parties were noticeably silent
3. After the Ajuria-Enea pact, the Basque Parliament and the parties that supported it launched an appeal to mobilize against ETA. The recent crisis of the government coalition led to the break down of this unity and therefore relieved the pressure on HB and ETA.
4. During the Algiers negotiations, the aggressiveness of the Lehendakari Ardanza was evident. Contrary to the traditional ambivalence of his party concerning negotiations, he came out strongly against any concessions to ETA on the part of the government.
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SPANISH STATE (EUSKADI) In Basque country:
November 11, 1991 • #216 International Viewpoint electoral advance of the PNV, a coalition government with the PSOE was not once again set up. The previous one had produced good results; the PNV was able to recover from its crisis and re-make its image as a strong and efficient party, and the PSOE, by registering some successes in the struggle against ETA, and especially by associating itself with a nationalist party, gave a certain "Basque" legitimacy to its electorate. Two things must be kept in mind in order to understand this development: firstly, on the ideological plane, the nationalists do not consider those who are not nationalists as true Basques; secondly, on the political plane, to the degree that the PSE was the Basque wing of the party of central government, which had harassed not only radical nationalism, but bourgeois nationalism as well, this pact implied a reconciliation between the bourgeois parties and Spanish centralist social
For reasons which are both complex and hidden (partially because the PSOE-PSE wanted to impede the rise of the PNV, and in part because of tensions within the PNV itself which promoted a more nationalist profile), the PNV-PSOE government was not repeated; on the contrary, a tripartite coalition between the nationalists was
Sectors in both the PNV and EA who
Spanish State, Catalonia and Euskadi had already sparked an institutional conflict a year ago when their Parliaments proclaimed the right to self-determination®. The ideological debates, the demands for independence, the question of links with the Common Market and construction of Europe [1992] dominate the front pages of the financial and political press. By affirming that what is happening in the East has nothing to do with the Spanish State, the Spanish government recognizes that similarities do exist - it is not by accident that Madrid has been the slowest government to recognize the independence proclamations in the East.
The events in Eastern Europe logically give support to the arguments of radical nationalism and to the parties (like the EMK-LKD who think that the right of self determination does not only apply to colonies or countries of the Third World, but also to stateless nations like Euskadi or Catalonia. They provide
SPANISH STATE (EUSKADI) arguments and a certain legitimacy to those who, confronted with the national question, think that neither borders nor states, nor social systems, are immutable or unchangeable, and that therefore in Europe what must be built is neither capitalist nor based on the old nation states?
But alongside the winds of self-determination blow other winds which go in the opposite direction. The crisis of Stalinism and the bureaucratic regimes have not brought about a will to deepen economic, political, and social democracy, but rather illusions in formal bourgeois parliamentarism and an irrational passion for consumption and the capitalist market. All this has contradictory effects in societies like Euskadi and Catalonia; far from encouraging national and democratic aspirations and goals of social change, this type of nationalism encourages different attitudes, some of which are very conservative and which have little in common with the positions of the revolution-
BASQUE were inclined towards the "unity of the
COUNTRY nationalists" were inspired by this, but it
_Bilbao rapidly became clear that this unity was
.:: NAVARRA totally incapable of clearing the way for a workable program or even of healing the wounds of the split. Those in the PNV who had not approved of the pact quickly began a counter-offensive by tying the hands of their Lehendakari and harassing their partners in the government. EA on the other hand, having suffered a setback in terms of support and political image, seemed increasingly fragile. EE divided
CANTABRIA la Corunas
ASTURIAS
GALICIA leon•
Burgos®, A HIOJA
Vigo
CASTILLA LEON
• Valladolid
Porto e
SPAIN
Madrid
EXTREMADURA
Toledo
Lisb
FRANCE
ANDORRA
CATALONIA
•Zaragoza
Barcelona
ARAGON
Menorca
Mallorca
BALEARES
Palma
•Valencia into two currents — a current that wanted CASTILLA LA MANCHA • to orient towards the PSOE and another which oriented towards nationalism and especially towards EA, with whom some alliances had been made in several mayoral districts and in the local government of Guipuzkoa (the provincial government).
The pact broke apart during the April 1991 municipal elections because the PNV cynically allied with the PSOE in several places; in Guipuzkoa the PNV and the PSOE united to unseat EA from the capital; the PNV offered the mayoralty of San Sebastian as a gift to the PSOE and the provincial government. This provoked a dual crisis and marked the beginning of a mortal clash between the PNV and EA, bringing the PNV and the PSOE closer together and increasing the tensions within EE.
It was in this context that the PNV took EA's support for independence as a pretext to break with it. The nationalist avalanche that shook what has been called the "socialist bloc" has had repercussions wherever national problems exist. In the
• Cordoba Sevilla • ANDALUCIA •Granada Málaga •GIBRALTAR • MOROCCO Ceuta Melilla 5. Aulestia, the Secretary general of EE since 1975, has sought to retrieve the nationalist past of this organization, which had been tarnished by the entry into it of the former leadership of the Communist Party of Euskadi. After the electoral defeat of 1990, Aulestia was replaced by a representative of the so-called Democratic Renovation current. The split in EE is today a fact to the extent that the legalist wing decided to remain in the govemment with the PNV and the PSOE, and penalize the nationalist current. 6. When the Baltic countries voted for their independence, the Catalan parliament decided to proclaim Cat-
### Formentera
•MURCIA
Lanzarote Palma Tenerife Fuerte Ventura Gomera Hierro Canaria Gran ISLANDS CANARY alonia's right to self-determination. The PNV could not remain on the sidelines, but being associated with the PSOE it found a formula which recognized the right of the Basque people to self-determination, but did not go beyond the limits of the autonomy statute and therefore remained within the Spanish constitution (which clearly refuses this right for nationalities). 7. The Spanish state is neither a national state nor a multinational state; it is a state which oppresses nationalities, and which does not even recognize their right to self-determination, nor the right to construct their 11 state in the framework of a multinational state.
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ENCI