Table 1: Length of working week
1983
July 20, 1992
1989*
1983*
1989
39.1
41.6
33.9 the Social
40.2
37.2
Europe
Germany
Belgium
Denmark
Spain
-
40.9
41.2
38.5
39.9
40.3
35.7
38.8
41.9
41.2
-
39.2
40.1
THE debate on abolishing
39.9 restrictions on nightwork for women in France
37.7 opened just a few weeks before the beginning of the process of ratification of the
France
Italy
Holland
Portugal
40.8
41.5
40.6
39.8
40.6
41.1
33.3
37.4
43.8
44.7
-
-
38.9
41.9
38.5
Maastricht Treaty on
European Union.
39.7**
This was no coincidence;
the Maastricht Europe is not
Britain
EEC
Source: Eurostat
41.1
41.3**
39.0
40.8
* Corrected to take account of part-time working about social progress.
The following article explores in more detail what the so-called European space implies for working conditions, starting with the most serious problem, which shapes all the others
- unemployment.
MAXIME DURAND*
* This article first appeared in the Summer 1992
22 issue of tbe French socialist feminist journal Cahiers i du féminisme.
International Viewpoint # 233
** Without Spain and Portugal
R ECENTLY, French president
Mitterrand has been at pains to stress the millions of new jobs that European unification would create. This took a certain amount of nerve; in fact, at the end of 1991, according to official figures, there were 13.5 million unemployed in the EEC — more than 9% of the active population.
The number fell between 1985 and 1990 but rose again last year by 880,000, of which 770,000 were in Britain - proof of the inability of ultra-liberal policies to provide a lasting solution to the problem of unemployment.
### Failure of market
This Euro-unemployment is to a large extent the result of the dynamic of European construction, which tends to restrict the possibilities of expansion in each country. However, the more fundamental reason is the crisis of the market economy, which cannot spread the benefits of the inexorable overall fall in working hours to everybody. This is why the organization of working time is one of the central social issues in Europe.
Table 1 shows us that since the mid-80s the average working week has been falling very slowly - from 39.7 hours in 1983 to 39 in 1989. However, these figures do not take into account part-time work, which is less secure and involves less rights than full time work: in Britain, the apparent average is 30 hours for women and 45 for men. If one makes the reasonable assumption that on average a part-time job involves two thirds of the working time of a full-time post, the results look very different.
Looked at in this way, the full-time working week has hardly fallen in recent years and remains over 40 hours. That is to say, the Europe of the Single Act has shown itself unable to translate the fall in working time into a reduction in unemployment and the reduction in working time is taking place through an increase in part time (and less secure) jobs.
Throughout the EEC, the number of part time jobs rose to 17 million as against 12 million ten years earlier; today one in seven European workers are in part-time jobs. Such jobs are 80% the preserve of women. However, as table 2 shows, there are sharp differences between countries. Denmark, the Netherlands and Britain have seen an especially sharp rise in part time work, which has become practically the norm for women's employment. Thus, in Britain nearly half of working women are in such jobs. The southern European countries (Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal) are distinguished by less part time jobs and a smaller proportion of women in such jobs about two thirds). France is striving to catch up with the leaders, although the level of part time work here is still less than in Germany.
The status of part time work relates to national cultural models. In France it is clearly seen as second best; here 89% of
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EUROPE The mirage of
Table 2: Part-time working in Europe
Part-time part time workers state that they would prefer a full time post, while the proportion in Britain is exactly the reverse
Generally speaking, one can draw a very clear connection between the proportion of women in the labour force and the number of part time jobs. Thus, women's employment only progresses insofar as part time work spreads. Certainly, women's involvement in the work force has not served as a cushioning variable for the jobs crisis; there has been no mass movement to "return to the home". In fact women's participation in the labour force has risen. However this is largely a matter of the growth in part time jobs; of the five million jobs created in the EEC between 1979 and 1989 more than three quarters are part time jobs done by women.
This does not mean that part time work is going to solve the unemployment crisis; in general it is in the countries where employment has grown most slowly that part time work has caught on. Such jobs thus appear as essentially a substitute for real job creation resulting from growth or an overall reduction in working time. Part time work for women is ultimately a way of sharing unemployment.
The choice of part time jobs tells us a
1979 Germany 11.4 Belgium 6.0 Denmark 22.7 Spain -France 8.2 Greece Italy 5.3 Holland 16.6 Portugal 7.8 Britain 16.4 EEC 9.6 Source: OCDE, Enquete
EUROPE Women Pref.* 1990 1979 1990 1989 13.2 91.6 90.5 8 10.2 88.9 89.6 19 23.7 86.9 79.4 6 4.8 77.2 12.0 82.2 83.1 89 5.5 65.7 78 5.7 61.4 64.7 49 33.2 76.4 70.4 18 5.9 80.4 69.8 40 21.8 92.8 87.0 11 13.2 86.3 82.9 37
* Part-time: percentage of workers in part-time jobs lot about the conflicts of interest between
* Women: percentage of women in part-time jobs the workers' aspirations for a shorter wor-
* Pref: percentage who would prefer a full-time job king week and the attempts of the bosses to get more flexible working conditions.
The employers' side has won big successes in this respect and much water has passed under the bridge since the 1979
Munich conference of the European
Confederation of Unions, which put forward demands for a 35 hour week without loss of pay, a fifth week of paid holiday and retirement at 60.
Significant struggles have since taken place in pursuit of these demands, with the high points being the successes of British and German engineering workers in 1989 and 1984 respectively. However the balance of forces has shifted slowly but surely in favour of the employers, one sign of which is the increase in working
This tendency to a change in the organization of working time to the benefit of the employers is common to all the countries but is relatively independent of European construction - the offensive has taken place country by country, taking different forms. The impact of European construction should be viewed in terms of this bosses' initiative.
Social democratic model
One can imagine two ways in which the Social Europe could be set up; firstly that of harmonization of a somewhat social democratic kind, and secondly that of firmly liberal deregulation. The first conception rests on the idea that there already exists a "European model" based on three points which all European countries have in common: significant public intervention in worker protection, the existence of institutionalized systems for employee representation and the weight
But this is not in fact the way things have developed, and the notion of the Social Europe put forward by Jacques Delors during the negotiation of the Single Act has been ruled out. In fact the philosophy of Maastricht has been better summed up in Margaret Thatcher's clear words: "The aim of a Europe open for business is the motor force behind the creation of the single European market between now and 1992... Our aim must not be to have the centre issuing increasing numbers of ever more detailed rules; it must be to deregulate, eliminate restrictions on trade and open up".
At about the same time, the European Round Table, which is connected to the European employers' organization UNICE, produced a document entitled Making Europe Work. This is a kind of anthology in which one learns for example that "Europe suffers from the problem of having too much work and too few workers". The remedies for such a situation are well known: "to raise the value of the young people coming on the jobs market through education and training while lowering the relative price of employing them" and attack the sources of rigidity "from the laws on job security to the high levels of social contributions 23 and tax" without of course forgetting July 20, 1992 • # 233 International Viewpoint
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63
EUROPE "national wage norms". There are appetising ideas on sub-contracting and even illegal working to enhance flexibility.
We should not count on jobs as a way of fighting unemployment since "machines and robots are more profitable, more flexible and more productive than human beings and offer a higher quality for direct tasks in production". In another report it is insinuated that the adoption of new technologies will be hindered by social protection measures. To those who think that we are heading straight towards a two-tier society, these experts respond with some embarrassment: "the threat of the emergence of a dual labour market... is exaggerated, but it is nonetheless near enough to the truth to arouse legitimate apprehension." This "legitimate apprehension" can only be reinforced by a look at the main points of what is, in effect, the European bosses' own "anti-social" charter, which demands:
• The ending of any form of discrimination against part-time workers and those with several jobs;
• The revision of labour protection legislation to further expand the range of legally permitted limited duration work contracts;
• The adaptation of social legislation to local realities;
• Greater flexibility in the organization of working hours without additional costs;
• An increase in wage differentials, especially for the young.
In this logic, the European bosses, whose outlook is well expressed by the British positions, have for a long time supported an ultra-restrictive notion of European construction, and oppose any community wide decision making "even in the form of a recommendation". Social dialogue is to be limited to an
24
International Viewpoint # 233 July 20, 1992 exchange of information.
There is no natural convergence, and the Social Europe should be limited to a few minimal protective norms. This approach explains the popularity of the principle of subsidiarity, according to which "the adequate level of government is the lowest level at which the given function can be efficiently carried out".
The present phase of European construction is essentially conceived as a means of reinforcing the offensive carried out by each bourgeoisie in each individual member state. In a book which came out four years ago,! Albert and Boissonnat insist vehemently on this. They sharply oppose harmonization and the "competition between national regulations": "This principle means delegating to civil society powers previously exercised by the states. The same principle means giving preference inside the EEC to the least restrictive national regulations, which amounts in effect to deregulation".
### Social dumping
There exists a clear danger of "social dumping", in which countries with poor social provisions engage in "unfair competition" which in its turn traps them in the position of being providers of cheap labour. However, cheap labour is not the only factor for capitalists; competitiveness cannot be reduced to low wages, which are guaranteed ultimately by a relative shortage of skilled labour. If there is to be dualism, it will tend to express itself inside national entities which, over the past 15 years, have experienced the same drive towards increasing flexibility and segmentation of the labour market.
We are thus on the way towards "a model of capitalist economy where the industrial firms on the cutting edge and the big 'neo-industrial' service firms draw their labour force from two very distinct markets, subject to different rules and where labour costs vary widely".
This process will tend to increase social inequality and sharpen the polarization between rich and poor regions, without any great respect for national boundaries, since it is also a matter of challenging national cohesion.
European deregulation can only speed up this process, but its scope needs to be measured. It is true that one can point to the significant differences that exist between countries in terms of social security systems or simply at prosaic details such as limitations on the working week, which do not exist at all in Britain and Italy. On the other hand one can also point to the relative proximity of European countries in terms of social traditions and average living standards, compared to the gulf that exists for example between the United States and Mexico. The European bourgeoisie do not want to see an uncontrolled deregulation that would undermine their instruments of social control.
This is why we should not under-estimate the nuances in the different approaches to the Social Europe. From this point of view the Social Charter can be conceived as a very low common denominator or as the start of a new juridical form destined to structure the social dimension in Europe.
In a speech at the 1988 congress of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), Delors proposed the introduction of the right for all workers to be covered by a collective agreement. It was precisely on this point that Delors succeeded in getting underway the Val-Duchesse meetings between the UNICE and the ETUC, which gave rise to the "common views" in which the ETUC demonstrated its willingness to compromise even beyond its mandate. On October 31, the unions and employers thus arrived at an agreement to ask for a change to article 118 of the Treaty of Rome to open the way to European collective agreements.
But Delors' biggest success was to persuade the European summit in Strasbourg in December 1989 to adopt the "Community Charter on the Basic Social Rights of Workers", which was accepted by all the governments present apart from Britain. This document is meant to form the social chapter of the Single Act, but does not in fact form part of the Maastricht Treaty. The text itself remains true to the sacred principle of subsidiarity, when it recalls that the guarantee of the basic rights it contains remains the responsibility of "the member states in conformity with national practices".
The Social Charter must thus take shape in the form of directives binding the member states in terms of the aims and implying that they take measures in their own chosen form and using their own chosen means. On this front things are to proceed in a rather more relaxed way than where monetary union is concerned!
Furthermore, most directives relate to matters which would anyway have had to be dealt with at European level, and the fact is that, two years later, only the most innocuous directives have been voted through. Of the 47 propositions, only those which come from the Commission have been applied while, on such essential matters as youth protection, subcontracting, or the procedures for collective layoffs, there has been no movement at all.
### Cohesion funds
The Maastricht treaty, strictly speaking,