Sandinistas confront fundamental
NICARAGUA himself in the internal affairs of the Sandinista Front. The head of the army is not called upon to decide on what the FSLN leaders should do and far less pass summary and disrespectful judgement on them" (Barricada,
Behind the scandal over the medal we can see at least two problems. Firstly there are the difficulties faced by the Sandinista People's Army (EPS) in this period. Since the change of govern-
THE Sandinista Assembly, the highest body of the
Nicaraguan Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) between congresses, met on March 28 and 29 to discuss two main issues: the FSLN's response to the appalling economic situation in Nicaragua and its application to become a full member of the Socialist International.
SERGIO RODRIGUEZ
HE assembly was preceded by
T a series of discussions among the Sandinistas which saw the emergence of important and sharp differences.
On January 16, the Nicaraguan people learned that General Humberto
Ortega had handed the Camilo Ortega medal to a US adviser, Lieutenant
Colonel David Quinn. Two days later,
FSLN leader comandante Luis Carrion stated in the Sandinista paper Barricada that the award was a "political error". "I think this was an error because the medal was a historical symbol for a generation of Sandinistas who were ready to make sacrifices, including that of their own lives, to defend the revolution... the expressions of indignation and shock from broad popular sectors are proof that a mistake has been made". At the same time,
Carrion called on the militants outraged by the award not to hand back their
Nevertheless, the following day,
January 19, in a public statement about the award of the medal, which was aimed at playing down the event's significance on the grounds that it had been given to military advisers from other countries, General Ortega chose to concentrate his reply on a condemnation of a supposed ultra-leftism in the Sandinista ranks:
"I am making an appeal to you not to be misled by the radical talk of ultraleft minorities who are hoping to manipulate sacred patriotic feelings and national dignity to bring about a fanatical and adventurist confrontation among
Nicaraguans and between Nicaragua and the USA. This radical minority maintains the futile hope that it can attract the poor, who are suffering serious socioeconomic difficulties, with unrealistic and destabilizing promises, when all they can really achieve is to make the terrible situation of the humble people worse... pressures and declarations of the member of the national leadership of the FSLN, Luis Carrion, to be a political error. He has given way to the understandable emotional reactions of some rank-and-file militants and some Sandinista middle-ranking cadres, when what is needed are firm and cool leaders who can explain and direct events" (Barricada, January 19, 1992).
A respectable voice
A highly respectable voice, that of Carlos Fernando Chamorro, son of Nicaraguan president Violeta Chamorro and a long time Sandinista and director of Barricada, entered the debate: "From the point of view of the government, to which the army is subordinate, the explanation provided by Humberto Ortega is logical and coherent, even if it will not necessarily convince the people who feel aggrieved. However the really serious aspect of his reply is that the whole apparent coherence of his institutional discourse falls apart when the general involves ment the EPS has passed through a series of crises. That of the missiles gıven to the Salvadoran rebels; the impossibility of solving the elementary problems of retired soldiers, which led to the recampos uprising!; the difficulty in finding countries willing to sell military equipment in the face of what is in effect a continuing US blockade on such sales — the US has prevented Taiwan from example. This is probably the reason
LIBE
why Ortega thought it a good idea to give an American officer
David Quinn is more than just any military adviser at the US Embassy in Managua. It was he who directed all the investigations into Sandinista military assistance to the Salvadoran FMLN, it was he who discovered the delivery of the missiles and it was he who exerted maximum pressure for the 1. The recompas crisis: groups of former anti-Sandinista contras took up arms again to attack cooperatives and known Sandinista militants, thus recontras. A short time later some 2,000 former Sandinista fighters began to organize guerilla groups, the recompas. These two groups came together at the start of 1992 to form the revueltos. They have been demanding that the government keep its promises regarding land and credits. The revueltos have a wide sphere of activity, organizing occupations of towns and cutting roads while demanding the opening of negotiations. Various social organizations, in particular the National Union of Workers and Farmers (UNAG) and the National Workers Front (FNT), have supported these demands. The FSLN leadership has also supported the movement in the name of popular unity. Also noteworthy is the appearance of armed women's groups, former recontras or recompas, who have formed the Nora Astorga Fromt in the north of 1 9
Nicaragua. July 20, 1992 # 233 International Viewpoint
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decisions
July 20, 1992
NICARAGUA jailing of the Sandinista officials the Salvadoran fighters involved in the deal. He was also instrumental in blocking the Taiwan deal.
The medal thus had the objective of establishing a place for the EPS in the new international context. This objective can be the subject of much debate, nonetheless, it clearly merits serious consideration. At the same time, however, when we come to the second problem the question becomes more complicated.
The general's dual role
By the award of the medal and above all by his reply to Carrion, General Ortega wants to place emphasis on the dual role that he would like to play -at once a member of the government of Mrs. Chamorro and a strategist of the FSLN, that is: of both the government and the opposition. The only way in which this can cease to be a glaring contradiction is if the FSLN ceases to be in opposition and joins the govern-
It is all summed up in one phrase by Humberto Ortega: "To get difficult things understood, the best means is an electric shock". The award of the medal is thus aimed at giving such a shock to the Nicaraguan people and the FSLN, to enable them to better understand what is going on.
He pursued a similar method at the end of the first Sandinista Assembly, when he did not accept his membership of the national leadership on the grounds that it was constitutionally impossible. Rather than simply withdrawing, he gave a speech which amounted to a lecture on what the PSLN should do in the new world situation, after losing governmental power in a situation of total instability.
In fact he offered a revised version of the Tercerista vision of the revolution of 1979.2 Even if this meant he made an impressive exit, this was not the Tercerism of 12 years previously. He said that Chamorro and Lacayo were not Somoza, Bush was not Carter, the Nicar guan people was no longer simply anti-dictatorial but has been educated in socialism and class politics. He attacked the workers for going on strike and called for all to sacrifice themselves for the national interest.
On that occasion, the reply was provided by Daniel Ortega, who stated that 99% of strikes in Nicaragua were motivated by the same reasons as in any other country, that is in pursuit of specific needs of workers. They were 20 out here is Humberto Ortega's idea of thus justified. However, what stands International Viewpoint # 233 how to approach the present situation in practice.
Towards a grand alliance?
Immediately afterwards there appeared in the Nicaraguan press a paid insertion from a self-styled "Centre Current" formed by some second-rank Sandinista figures, some of them, however, known to be close to Humberto Ortega. This current's main concern was the need for a redefinition of Sandinista politics based on the idea that the priority was the creation of a grand "national accord", above all with the president and her secretary. In practise, they spoke up for the need for
The reaction of the Sandinista leadership was virulent, at least in form. Daniel Ortega's criticism was centred on the error of presenting the FSLN as divided into currents. However, he did not deal with the fundamental issue of the political positions these Sandinista militants were putting forward. Nonetheless, the Centre Current soon became the object of attack by many Sandi-
In practice these militants had touched a sore point. Elements of coalition- independently of the name — have been present from the very first day of Violeta Chamorro's rule. In practice the agreements on the armed forces and police; the participation of prominent Sandinistas in the management of the banks; and Sandinista aid in obtaining foreign credits and the writing off of parts of the foreign debt have all expressed this. In this sense, the Centre Current did nothing more than add things up. And, as we will see later, the agreement of the Sandinista Assembly to a call for a "national accord" confirms this.
A social democratic fever has gripped much of the Latin American left. The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the French Socialist Party (PSF) have been the main proponents of the entry into the Socialist International (SI) of what Salvadoran FMLN leader Joaquin Villalobos has insisted on calling the "new left". At issue is the acceptance of the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) of Mexico, the M-19 in Colombia, the Farabundo Marti Liberation Front (FMLN) of El Salvador, the Broad Front (FA) of Uruguay, the Brazilian Workers Party and the FLN as full
The Sandinista case is the most surprising, not only in that it is the first to put itself forward as a candidate but also because of the forceful and correct criticisms made of the SI by Daniel Ortega immediately after the Gulf War. At that time, he explained that in practise the Liberal International, the Christian democracies and the SI all represented the North and imperialism, and that the peoples of the Third World would not find there an international that would represent them.
Suddenly the analysis has changed; not only has there been a return to the old authoritarian and anti-democratic methods but the national leadership took the decision to make the application for full membership of the SI without consulting the Sandinista Assembly. It is true that after sharp criticism of this, even from those who support the application and the presentation of a petition, the decision was discussed by the Assembly.
### Changing arguments
The arguments used to defend this act have changed radically. Suddenly, the SI is presented as "friendly", with no mention of the criminal role played by Mitterrand and Gonzalez in the Gulf War or the terrible record of the social democratic governments of Latin America such as that of Rodrigo Borja in Ecuador or Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela. Worse still, in an interview in Barricada, Daniel Ortega said that he had taken the decision on the basis that nobody had been against it at the Sandinista congress. Everything here is back to front. In fact, nobody proposed it at the congress and in his introductory speech at the congress Daniel Ortega talked of the cowardly and criminal behaviour of the SI during the war
Of course, it is possible to find tactical arguments to justify this decision but even these are pretty shaky. The SI is not passing through happy days, having lost elections in Germany, Bri2. In 1974, the FSLN divided into three tendencies. The strongest was the Prolonged People's War (GPP) tendency around Tomas Borge and Henry Ruiz. They supported a strategy prioritizing rural guerilla warfare and the reinforcement of the organization's military apparatus. The second tendency, the Proletarian Tendency, led notably by Jaime Wheelock, put the emphasis on the political struggle and saw the working class as the leading force in the revolutionary movement. Faced with this split, a third tendency, the "Terceristas", emerged around the Ortega brothers, who fought for the reunification of the FLN but also for a new strategy. They explained that the dictatorship was much weakened and the bourgeoisie divided. They believed that the moment had come for the final offensive and that for this end tactical alliances with the anti-dictatorship bourgeoisie should not be shunned. In their view, the force of the popular movement would allow the FSLN to retain hegemoThe three tendencies reunited in 1978.
July 20, 1992 tain and Sweden. If there were elections in France now, the PS would lose. In Latin America SI parties have lost power in Peru and Ecuador and would certainly lose Venezuela as well if there were elections.
In Europe, the Social Democratic government par excellence is in the Spanish state. Here there is 25% unemployment, the introduction of racist laws and a grovelling attitude to the USA. Thus entry into the SI will do more for the latter institution than for the new members, even on the strictly tactical level.
The limits of Social Democracy
One of the most forceful voices raised against the proposal was that of Carlos Fonseca Terin, in an article in Nueva Diario: "The social democratic model - called by its supporters 'democratic socialism' — is incapable of resolving the fundamental problems of humanity: social and individual frustration, alienation and the corresponding contradiction between our social nature and our individualist scale of values, all of which are the product of a mode of production in which capital and the market act as the absolute regulators of relations between individuals in the production pro-
"Now, supposing that the FSLN is accepted without being social democratic, reality tells us two things: one, that Sandinism will cease to be the alternative for the social majority of Nicaragua, since, having no alternative economic model, the FSLN will be absorbed by the social democratic options; secondly, the world revolutionary movement — now in crisis as part of its growth - will take stock of the assimilation of the FSLN by the SI as an ideological betrayal of the Nicaraguan revolution and the sign of the weakness of a sector of the left...?
This was the background to the Sandinista Assembly, whose resolutions confirm the mood in favour of an agreement with the Chamorro government. The weakness of the government also pushes in this direction. The forces brought together in the National Opposition Union (UNO), which won the 1991 elections, are very sharply
The seizure of control of the UNO's parliamentary fraction by the most rightwing elements has plunged the government further into crisis. In this sense, the government's main force lies in the EPS, the FLN's parliamentary group and even, to a certain extent, the
When the Sandinista Assembly discussed the possibility of launching an appeal for a "national accord" (although still formally ruling out "cogovernment") it accepted also the formation of commissions which, in practice, would resolve most problems with the aim of allowing the government to regain its ability to act.
According to the FSLN this proposal is above all aimed at "working out an alternative proposal which would change some aspects of government plans so that they exact a lower cost from the country". That is to say, the FSLN hopes to use the government's weakness and isolation and its own mass strength to blunt the anti-popular edge of the regime's economic and social
When the results of the Sandinista Assembly were made public the president's right-hand man Antonio Lacayo stated the FLN's position is positive, constructive and correct. The FLN is taking its place in a great national project for moving the country forward".
Economic considerations
Behind the FSLN's attitude lie two considerations. On the one hand the Nicaraguan economy is in a worse state than ever. If it is true that the government has been able to bring inflation and the state budget under control, this has been at a very high
Some 55% of the economically active population are unemployed; on the Atlantic Coast this figure goes as high as 90%. 300,000 peasants have no income, and the rural crisis has been aggravated by the crisis of coffee and cotton. US aid has been frozen by Congress on advice from Alfredo Cesar about alleged misappropriation of funds by the FSLN and EPS. All this has led the country to the edge of a social abyss and exerts a powerful pressure on those Sandinistas inclined to an agreement with the government.
On the other hand, there is a strong sense of failure at work. The idea is constantly spreading in the FLN that "we were lucky to have lost the elections". Behind this lies not only the war and the US intervention but also
The whole economic project — which was not about introducing a socialist economy, but of developing a market economy with a social vision — did not succeed in creating social improvement for the population or in developing Nicaraguan capitalism. And behind this lies a belief which
NICARAGUA weighs ever more heavily on the thinking of the Latin American left - the idea that there is no alternative to capitalism in countries like ours.
The most to which one can aspire is to humanize capitalism or modify its most savage aspects. And if this is the only alternative, then it is best not to be in government, or at least not to govern alone, or to be in government without controlling the executive, which appears to be the conclusion that some Sandinistas have drawn regarding the 1995 presidential elections.
The double discourse
This leads, as Aldo Diaz Lacayo has said, to a double discourse, which "works in the same direction as the government and at the same time makes oppositional noises. Opposes neo-liberalism and takes a line which fits in with the government's neo-liberal policies. Proclaims revolutionary principles and emphasizes the changes in the world. Reaffirms collective leadership but has an individualist practice. Proclaims unity but also explicitly excludes ideas which are felt to be out of line" (Barricada Internacional, March 1992).
This situation holds out great dangers that can be simply stated: the FSLN has used its social strength to implement its new vision. But it is by no means obvious that it can do this for ever. The workers in the cities and the countryside, the thousands of unemployed or the thousands of sacked EPS soldiers have little reason to support a collaborationist line that does nothing for their living standards.
Until now it has proved possible to control some very explosive situations, as was shown in the Aeronica anti-privatization strike or in the recompas crisis, but it is becoming more difficult
The Sandinista's popular support is beginning to losing hope insofar as they had been sold the idea that the loss of government in the last elections would result in an improvement in their living situation. While the war is over, the social conflict that led to the July 1979 revolution persists and is biting harder than ever. The notion of "governing from below" has not proved possible. The FSLN is increasingly participating in government while at the same time trying to channel popular mobilizations into limits, which it is increasingly hard to get accepted.
The FSLN is twisting and turning in the coils of its own contradictions - in America way as most of the Latin 21 American left. *