SPECULATION has recently been rife about the possibility of a rapprochement between Israel and Syria — Syrian president Hafez al-Assad has spoken of the need to conclude a "peace of the brave" with the Zionist state, while Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin talks of "territorial
International Viewpoint # 235• September 28, 1992
ISRAEL / EL SALVADOR
N February 1, 1992, the cease fire between the two opposing forces came into effect. The members of the National
Army for Democracy (the END, armed wing of the FMLN), were grouped in compromise" around the question of the Golan Heights, conquered by
Israel from Syria in 1967.
At first sight, this would seem an unlikely development. It had previously been thought possible that Yitzhak Shamir's Likud government might seek such a settlement with Syria - the area does not form part of the biblical territory of Eretz Israel, and the Likud's ideological attachment to it was accordingly not strong. Moreover, the "security value" of the Golan is fairly dubious - in the October 1973 war Israel had to divert vital military forces to protect the tiny handful of settlers then
Rabin's Labor Party initially seemed much less likely to strike a deal. The 12,000 Jewish settlers in the Golan are overwhelmingly
Laborite and the last Labor Party convention in December 1991 passed a resolution favouring increased settlement in the area.
Why the change in tone now? The basic Syrian position seems unchanged: a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan as a precondition for any peace treaty. The kind of partial withdrawal mooted by
Rabin will not satisfy the Syrians, and any final settlement could not ignore the other area where the two states confront each other, directly or through proxies: southern Lebanon. But it does seem that there have been signals of flexibility from the Syrian side, which Rabin is using in the hope of dividing the Arab negotiating teams, threatening the Palestinians with the prospect of complete isolation and preparing his own hardline political base for any eventual settlement.
However, Israel's presentation of a seven page proposal to Syria on
September 15 which failed to mention withdrawal from the Golan indicates that there is still a long way to go. In any case, "peace" is the least likely outcome of all this. Israel's 1979 peace treaty with Egypt gave it a free hand to launch its murderous invasion of Lebanon in
1982: the prospect of a similar deal with Syria would be seen by the likes of Rabin as a golden opportunity to isolate and smash the resistance of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. - ries. They included a partial freeze on new settlements but also the freeing of 800 political prisoners, the cancelling of the decision to deport 11 Palestinian leaders and a liberalization of the work permits for
Palestinians employed in Israel.
Aside from the cancellation of the deportation orders which has real political significance, the measures announced by Rabin hardly go very far. For example, it has been the Israeli employers who have long demanded work permits for workers working in Israel. The freeing of 800 prisoners is similar to the amounts regularly released by the army during religious holidays, which often only concern prisoners with several weeks left to serve of their sentences. But the most serious point is clearly the continuation of the building in the occupied territories of what Rabin has called "security settlements". According to
Amiram Goldblum, spokesperson for
Peace Now, the exceptions to the freeze on settlements will allow the introduction during the four year mandate of the Rabin government of more colonists than any of his successors could ever have installed in
20 the occupied terriories.
This explains why the Palestinians in these territories have not reacted positively to these measures, which have been welcomed with enthusiasm in the Western press. To show its good faith, the Israeli government must do better, much better, in other words totally freeze the new installations; free all the administrative detainees (there are at least 800 and according to the Israeli authorities they are the true popular leaders) who have never been convicted of anything at all; allow the immediate return to the West Bank and Gaza strip of all those residents and their families who for administrative reasons have been denied the right to live in their land or with their family; respect the right of political association; observe and respect the letter of the fourth Geneva convention.
These are the measures which would prove that the new government has the intention of turning over a new leaf and beginning, even at a slow pace, the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories. Unfortunately, nothing seems to indicate that these are the intentions of Rabin and his government. * camps spread throughout the country, while the armed forces were shut up in their barracks.
In order to verify compliance with the accords a UN commission, ONUSAL, was set up. It was charged with overseeing three areas: the military aspects
(surveillance and verification of the two parties), policing (helping the constitution of the national and civil police) and
Though the fighting has stopped, the application of the accords has encountered many difficulties. On August 13, 1992
Marrack Goulding, deputy secretary for
UN special affairs, traveled to El Salvador to try to overcome the obstacles.
The negotiations touched on several crucial questions which lie at the origins of the armed conflict: the demilitarization of society, the land problem and the distri-
Since 1932, and the repression of the peasant insurrection begun by Farabundo
Marti, the Salvadoran army has always played the role of the oligarchy's watch dog. The accords aim at ending this by calling for its subordination to a civilian regime as well as an overall restructuring in order to make it serve the needs of territorial defense.
Dissolution of national guard
The legislative assembly thus decreed the dissolution of the national guard and the rural police at the end of June 1992. However about 2,000 of their members were illegally reintegrated into the natio-
This body is now the sole public security body placed directly under the control of the president of the Republic, Alfredo Cristiani), while the National Civilian Police (PNC) has been set up which is to be composed of 20% former members of the END, 20% men from the national police and 60% new recruits.
However the PNC still has no offices. There are other problems as well. For example, Cristiani has named its leaders without consulting the COPAZ.5
The accords also involve a 52% reduction of the members of the army before January 31, 1994. In January 1992, the general staff declared that the armed forces had 63,000 men (a figure inflated by forced recruitment).
According to Ponce Enrile, the commander in chief of the army, 20,700 soldiers should already have been demobilized - particularly conscripts at the end of
Towards war or
September 28, 1992
EL SALVADOR
Also, the minister of agriculture dragged his feet before providing the land commission with the means at his disposal. Finally, on July 27, representatives of the FMLN and of the government began the verification process of the land in litigation, under the arbitration of the ONUSAL.
According to an inventory carried out
ON January 16, 1992 the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Salvadoran government signed accords under the aegis of the United Nations (UN), which were aimed at ending twelve years of war? and, at least officially, resolving the causes of the crisis within nine months.
On August 2, 1992, the FMLN sent a declaration to a
"friendly" group of countries? and to the UN announcing that 46 of the 56 points of the agreement that should have been applied by that date had not yet been implemented due to opposition from the authorities, the army, and the employers. Does such a situation indicate that hostilities will begin anew?
PAQUITO GOMEZ
RUDIE HASTING their term and the 6,000 members of the national police.
Also, the ad hoc committee entrusted with investigating the past of soldiers charged with human rights violations has not been able to work because those who are probably guilty have been sent out of the country (as military attaches in consulates, or for study trips).
Officers become economic force
Since the 1930s, and especially in the aftermath of the large amount of money provided by the US to finance the war, the army's superior officers have represented a significant economic force. Several private enterprises (electricity, water, and telephone companies) belong to the colonels.
The officers closely tied to the traditional oligarchy also control the banks, factories and large agricultural properties. This situation cannot be resolved by simple measures of demilitarization; it can only happen through a profound evolution of the balance of forces.
The land question is another stumbling block in the negotiations. In the zones occupied by the FMLN during the war
(the departments of Chatelango, Morazan,
San Vicente, Cabanas, North Usulatan, La
Union), the peasants have occupied the large abandoned properties.
The accords stipulate that those owners who agree will sell their land to the government who will in turn resell them at a modest price to the current occupants. The purchase of the totality of the land claimed by the FMLN (18% of the country's territory) would cost about $460 million.
But until now the government has only released $15m dollars for this purpose. It has even made a proposal to the FMLN that they work together to obtain donations or loans from the international community.
These loans will aggravate the country's debt. As for donations, they are not in general given without strings attached: some countries in the European Community (EC) have already made demands concerning the organization of agricultural production.
### US aid restricted
Aid from the US is clearly reserved for individual farming plans, and therefore is not available to communities and peasant cooperatives. The EC's plans currently follow the same pattern. $62mn has already been granted by the EC to support the land bank and rural development in the department of Usulutan.
In addition to the problem of financing, there are other important problems like the absence of land registers, falsified or non-existent property deeds, the large debt of the landed proprietors who have not paid their land taxes during the war years, and so on.
It therefore seems unlikely that the land question can be resolved in nine months.
on a national level, 45 out of 116 owners of more than 10 hectares of land refused to sell, while 71 planned to do so.
The latter are subjected to contradictory pressures: on one hand, the government encourages them to not sell, so that it can itself be responsible for the redistribution of land, which would augment its prestige and allow it to control the process.
On the other hand, they know that the peasants who currently occupy the land and the FMLN will probably not allow their land to be taken away.
Likewise, article 205 of the constitution, introduced as part of the agrarian reform of Duarte's Christian Democratic government in 1984, limits the size of land holdings to 254 hectares. This clause should have been applied no later than May 1, 1992. But 300 land holdings still exceed that limit.
### Ambiguity of negotiations
The ambiguity of the land negotiations arises from the fact that the government in fact has no intention of "leaving" 18% of the land in the hands of the FMLN. This also explains the haziness that characterizes the means of reselling and credit.
For the moment, neither the 20% of the demobilized FMLN fighters, nor even those of the army, have received land.
although the government was involved in the transfer of 175 state properties to former soldiers in order to facilitate their return to civilian life.
In the August 11, 1992 issue of Diario
Latino former members of the national guard and the rural police complained of having received neither indemnities nor professional training.
An organization of demobilized handicapped veterans of the armed forces has already organized a demonstration to
1. The FMLN is composed of 5 parties: the People's
Revolutionary Army (ERP, which emerged from a radicalized Christian base movement); the Popular
Forces of Liberation (FPL, which split from the CP in the 1960s); the Armed Forces of Liberation
(FAL); the National Resistance (RN, a split from the
ERP); the Revolutionary Party of Central American
Workers (PRTC).
2. See /V 222, February 17, 1992.
3. The "friendly" countries during the negotiations process were Mexico, the Spanish state and Colom-
4. Most of the figures given are taken from Diario
Latino, July and August 1992.
5. The COPAZ comprises representatives from the government, the FMLN and the parliamentary par- 21 ties.
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peace?
International Viewpoint # 235 • September 28, 1992
EL SALVADOR demand land and credit. During the first semester of 1992, only 30% of the workers obtained loans. In the absence of these loans, land redistribution cannot be
The other big obstacle to implementing the accords is the attitude of the businessmen tied to the industrial sector. Organized in the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP), they refuse to participate in the forum on economic and social concentration which is charged with drawing up a new economic development model in El Salvador that would represent a more equitable distribution of the nation's wealth.
The implementation of this plan in the context of the peace accords goes against the grain of of the neo-liberal policies of the Cristiani government, supported by
For the moment, a coalition of six union federations, the government, small and medium enterprises and the FMLN are participating in the forum.6 The refusal of the employers to participate prevents this body from functioning properly.
### General strike called
In an attempt to force the ANEP to participate in the forum the unions issued a call for a general strike on July 13 and 14 which also demanded that the proposed sales tax of 10% be rescinded and that wages be increased.
But the strike was only a mixed success. Over 150,000 public sector workers struck but transport workers and private sector
The government has justified the sales tax as vital for the reconstruction of the country. But it is in fact a direct function of its neo-liberal policies. This indirect tax will hit the entire population hard, especially the poorer layers for whom income taxes were lowered by 34% in the first quarter of 1992.
The price of many basic goods rose at the end of July. The Consumer Defense Committee has noted that 70% of the Salvadoran population lives under conditions of extreme poverty.
It has urged that sugar, oil, eggs and flour be excluded from the sales tax - a request that has been ignored by the government. The Permanent Committee for a National Peace Debate (CPDN), which involves 73 organizations, also asked Cristiani to veto the law on the sales tax, again without success.
The introduction of this tax demonstrates the fragility of the peace process and the limitations of the different institutions set up to monitor it - the COPAZ, CPDN, the Forum, and others. 22 the Plan of National Reconstruction The same is true of another element of
(PRN), which is supposed to equitably distribute international aid to those who need it the most the poor peasants who have suffered from the war.
In the various zones under FMLN control, Committees of National Reconstruction (CRN) are to be established with municipal councils, community representatives, FMLN members, governmental leaders, non-governmental Salvadoran organizations and peasant associations.8 They are to elaborate various proposals concerning basic infrastructures such as roads, electricity, waterways, health centers, schools and so on.
Where the municipal governments are in the hands of the Christian Democrats, the committees have for the most part been set up and the first cabildos abiertos (open assemblies) held. On the other hand, it is very difficult to have the accords respected in the areas where ARENA controls the municipal govern-
The CRN represent for the FMLN above all a means of institutionalizing its presence and influence, consolidating the bases won during the war and allowing the civilian population in the war zones to participate in communal life in prepara-
However the national reconstruction plan does not include the zones where the conflict was the heaviest, which includes many poor regions, in particular the slums that have been swollen by the war and
Far right hinders negotiations
The delays in applying the accords underline the contradictions within the government, the army and the employers. The most reactionary sectors have tried to
They have not accepted the military stalemate and do not in any way want to give up their prerogatives, in spite of US pressure to contain the Central American conflagration in the interests of the big American market.9
These stalling tactics take their toll. The FMLN is forced to assign many cadres to the successive negotiations of the treaty, which has the result of reducing the political propaganda work it can do in the rank and file in the regions where it has little influence. The FMLN leaders are aware of
Faced with such a situation, the FMLN nevertheless has an important asset: its army. On June 30 in compliance with the accords, 20% of the END was to be demobilized. On July 31, 1992 a second contingent representing 20% of the fighters were to hand in their arms.
But this never happened due to a conflict arising from the lack of a plan to reintegrate into civilian life the first batch of demobilized fighters. The END is the FMLN's bargaining chip in the negotiations. It would be utopian to think that the FMLN will allow itself to be disarmed without adequate safeguards after 12 years of war in which it has not been militarily defeated.
In fact, certain far right sectors have stated that as soon as the FMLN is totally disarmed they will carry out a general massacre to wipe out the "reds". Since the summer of 1992 death squad activity has increased. On June 2 the offices of the Associated Press (AP) and the Inter Press Service (IPS) in El Salvador were fire bombed. In early June, the Salvadoran press agency (SALPRESS) was the victim of a similar attack.
In mid-July a leader of the Salvador Workers Union Federation (FENASTRAS) was kidnapped, tortured and then assassinated, bringing to 16 the number of such incidents since mid-January. On July 31, another FENASTRAS leader was killed while a member of the human rights commission (created by the accords) was injured by a bullet.
On August 3, a unionist of the Workers Association of the Ministry of Public Works (ATMOP) was murdered. On August 7, the leader of the Reconstruction Committee of the southeast zone, commander Tomas Martinez Ramos, was shot
On August 10, the house of a commander of the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL) in Santa Ana was broken into and many documents stolen. Several days later, the offices of the Federation of Agricultural Production Cooperatives (PEDECOPADES) was raided.
Every day members of unions and political organizations receive threatening letters. Many of these militants are medium level cadres who for the moment have escaped assassination attempts.
This psychological pressure is obviously aimed at frightening Salvadorans who are 6. National Union of Workers and Peasants (UNOC, Christian Democratic); National Union of Salvadoran Workers (UNTS, close to the FMLN); Confederation of Salvadoran Workers (CTS, rightist); General Confederation of Workers (CGT, social Christian); Democratic Alliance of Peasants (ADC, peasant organization close to the FMLN); General Association of Public and Municipal Employees (AGEPYM). Each of these confederations includes numerous branches. 7. The CPDN includes the churches, the social movement, the small enterprises, the Central American University (UCA) and the University of Salvador (UES). 8. Each party in the FMLN has formed its own nongovernmental organization. They work principally in the areas of education, health and development. 9. See /V 223, March 2, 1992. 10. This legalization has been rejected on the basis of a number of legal arguments. The ARENA group in the assembly opposed it, arguing that, according to the constitution, an armed organization cannot be declared a political organization.
September 28, 1992 ready to work with the FMLN. Coupled with the delay in sanctioning the Front as a political party, it impedes the organization of propaganda work. 1° Resumption of armed struggle unlikely
In spite of these provocations, which are inspired by conservative forces probably tied to the army, a relaunching of armed hostilities is unlikely for the moment. The FMLN appears to be convinced that armed struggle must now give way to political and social struggle, with an eye to the 1994 general elections.
It is very probable that we will see a renegotiation of the timetable for implementing the accords after October 31 and a prolongation of the cease-fire. The ONUSAL will probably remain in the country after that date. FMLN leaders figure that the process will last around two
The Front has no illusions as to its appeal today. The western part of the country, which was largely spared during the armed conflict, has been swamped by government propaganda and is much less open to FMLN influence. ARENA on the other hand has enjoyed new legitimacy in the eyes of many after it signed the peace
The presence since last May of the FMLN's two principal radio stations — Radio Farabundo Marti of the FPL and Radio Venceremos of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), which beforehand had only broadcast several hours a day under difficult conditions, should help the
But these means of communication remain modest compared to the many private and governmental radio and television stations. Furthermore, with the exception of Diario Latino, taken over by the workers in cooperative form since
1990, the press is entirely under the control of the government and private
Although certain sectors of the intelligentsia (high school and university students and professors, lawyers and so on are close to the FMLN, a part of the middle classes who have benefitted from the colossal US aid given during the war years are not ready to give support to the
"subversives".
Faced with such a situation, the FMLN has given priority to reinforcing its influence in its "bastions" for the municipal elections. But it also intends to work in other parts of the country during the campaign for the legislative elections.
As far as the presidential election is concerned, certain observers think that the
FMLN could overtake the Christian
Democrats in the first round but still emerge behind ARENA. The
CD, discredited by the previous president, Duarte, lost even more influence as it was not present at the negotiating table.
In any case, the FMLN and the CD plan on concluding an agreement for the second round.
In this electoral battle, the Front should be able to count on the
Democratic Convergence (DC)
and on the Union for National
Democracy (UDN), former legal branch of the Salvadoran
Communist Party.!!
For its part, ARENA is counting on a victory in the first round thanks to an alliance with
Solidaridad, a new party based on evangelist sects that enjoys a large audience. 12
But a thoroughgoing electoral reform is needed before
1994. There have never been
"clean" elections in El Salvador, and the electoral registers have only 600,000 names out of a population of more than 6 million people.
Likewise, 90% of the inhabitants in the zones controlled by the FMLN have neither identity papers nor voting cards, which is also the case of many exiles who came back to the country at the end of the 1980s.
Issuing identity papers to the entire population would require large funds and above all a real will on the part of the government. FMLN representatives have already demanded that the elections take place under the surveillance of international bodies. With its strategy of conquering a number of municipal governments, the
FMLN hopes to create alternative economic poles of development in these zones which will serve as an example for the rest of the population.
Self-sufficiency prioritized
The economic projects that have been put forward in this framework, although hazy, seem to prioritize food self-sufficiency, involving the development of agro-industry and profitable projects
(fishing, fish-breeding, conservatories, and so on; but such projects pose many problems, particularly in a overpopulated country like El Salvador (249 inhabitants per square kilometer), without primary resources and with a ravaged environment
(forests destroyed by extensive agriculture, war, the exhaustion of the soil, lack of water and so on).
In such a situation, the FMLN has prioritized forms of collective organization
(production and service cooperatives)
which have already been set up in com-
EL SALVADOR munities of returned exiles, even if it is true that the opening permitted by the cease fire has unleashed tendencies towards turning inwards towards the family hearth and the abandonment of collective structures.
The Front supports reconstruction aid that allows communities to collectively purchase land that they occupy, including instances where the peasants decide to work their land individually. This solution will prevent a rapid reconcentration of land by the large land owners due to the credit squeeze.
The setting up of these different models of social development is marked by the different characteristics of the parties that make up the FMLN.
For one member of the central committee of the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC), the existence of different components of the FMLN, which couid seem to be a weakness, in fact reflects the opposite: "this has allowed the FMLN to wage the war in different ways and it will now help it bring about peace with the same diversity. This is a strong
The FMLN holds that it is neither more
11. The Democratic Convergence, whose principal leader is the Social Democrat Ruben Zamora (leader of the Social Christian Popular Movement) obtained
12.6% of the votes in the legislative elections of
March 1991.
12. As elsewhere in Central and Latin America, the evangelist sects are currently growing in El Salvador, with the blessing of the United States, which sees them as a good means of countering the "subversive" ideology of the liberation theologians.
propaganda coup
International Viewpoint # 235 • September 28, 1992