EL SALVADOR / PERU nor less divided than it was during the armed conflict. As before, each experiments in "its" zones with its own development projects - which is certainly a source of richness, but will not help in elaborating an alternative national project. But during negotiations with the government, the Front will speak with AS the economic situation in Peru worsens following the only one voice, which will be defined by April coup carried out by President Fujimori, the arrest of intense internal discussions. the Maoist Sendero Luminoso guerrilla movement leader
The unified leadership of the front Abimael Gúzman Renoso is a major propaganda boost for however, has decided that during the propaganda campaigns in the regions where it is barely present, its militants will present themselves as members of the FMLN and not of this or that party.
However, in the field there have been attempts at raiding between the different currents. This was seen in Usulutan where communities tied to the FMLN current dominant in the zone opened negotiations with municipal governments without consulting other communities that were linked to other FMLN currents.
There has also been competition over obtaining loans from international organisms and governments. These funds are then distributed to the communities on the basis of the political positions of each communities.
Cleavages at all levels
These cleavages are found at all levels of political and social life including women's organizations, student, agricultural and industrial unions, and so on.
In the July 22, issue of Diario Latino, commander Leonel Gonzalez claimed that at a meeting of 176 members of the FPL central committee, it was decided that the five organizations of the FMLN should dissolve and "build a sole structure for the 1994 electoral campaign" in order to win a maximum number of votes.
This perspective, which would transform the Front into one sole party with various currents within it, was immediately contested by the other forces who held that in the current situation such a development is not on the order of the day. The five parties who make up the FMLN are currently preparing their respective congresses and documents.
Despite these divisions, the FMLN is today more than a simple political party; it represents an undeniably strong economic and social force.
In spite of a regional and international context which is hardly favorable to revolutionaries, the choices made up until now by the FMLN and the level of social mobilization leave the situation open. After a war resulting in a "draw", the ball 24 is in the camp of the mass movement. * his government.
ROLAND WOOD
W hile one of the reasons
given for the coup was the need for a free hand to take on Sendero!, the arrest is probably the first - and certainly the most important - tangible result there
In a television broadcast on September
13 Fujimori described Gúzman as a
"devilish genius" who had amassed a huge personal fortune from the drugs traf-
There is indeed clear evidence that Sendero levies taxes upon the narcotraficantes in the areas where they have some control, but their general involvement in the drugs traffic is really quite small in comparison with the military and a whole host of individual politicians, past and
The hypocrisy involved here will not go unnoticed and there can be little doubt that Fujimori knows that this is not the main issue. Of far more importance is the psychological effect that Gúzman's arrest, alongside eight other Central Committee members, will have on Sendero as a whole.
### Solid events
In a recent statement Gúzman, under his more favoured pen name of Presidente Gonzalos, said that "the masses must be taught with solid events, so that ideas are bludgeoned into them".
The arrest of Gúzman is one "solid event" which Sendero is unlikely to have foreseen. It is far too early to say whether they will be paralyzed or galvanized. It is a question of whether their strengths or their weaknesses come to the fore now that Gúzman is no longer at their head.
Sendero has thrived in the post-coup environment of tension and violence. Increasing numbers — not just the poor 1. Independent analysts estimate that overlapping membership of the Communist Party of Peru and the Popular Guerilla Army (EGP), which makes up Sendero, is about 5,000. The highest figure estimated for the organization's immediate periphery is 100, 000. Financial Times, September 14, 1992.
but some leftist intellectuals - saw them as the only effective form of opposition.
With the subsequent rise in repression,
Sendero were better placed than any other organization to respond.
In contrast, the mass Peasant Confederation (CCP) and the General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (CGTP) who were forced underground following attacks on their headquarters by the military, have nowhere near the same experience as Sendero in clandestine operations. The same point could be made for much of the Peruvian left.
Having increased their presence in the towns and cities, particularly in Lima,
Sendero now believe they are on the threshold of the "strategic offensive for taking power".
This, they claim, corresponds with the fifth and final stage through which the Peruvian revolution must pass. In a document published in 1984 Sendero described this stage as full-scale civil war in which the people's army will move in from the countryside to surround the cities. There will be an urban insurrection to complement the noose drawn around the cities from the countryside.
### Pol Potist activities
Initially, Sendero's violence was directed at corrupt elements in the countryside, families that had often ruthlessly dominated whole communities for centuries. This won them support.But as Sendero activities increased, many in the Peruvian left began to characterize them not so much as Maoist but as Pol Potist. The reason? Sendero began to attack opponents on the left as much as the right.
They have been responsible for the "execution" of important and respected community, trade union and peasant leaders.
One of their most recent victims was Maria Elena Moyano, a popular leader of the women's movement in the Villa El Salvador slum, in the outskirts of Lima. Not satisfied with having shot her, Sende-
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Fujimori's
September 28, 1992 ro blew her body apart with dynamite.
This is the kind of "solid event"
with which Abimael
Gúzman would prefer to "bludgeon" the masses.
Indeed, human rights groups believe that, with the escalation in Lima of their often indiscriminate bombing campaign, Sendero is now responsible for most
In the meantime, the economic situation continues to dete-
In Lima, 80% of the workforce is said to eke out a living in the "informal sector".
street peddling goods from small, unsafe workshops, or touting dollars from street corners.
The existence of this informal sector is nothing new but it now contributes over 40% of the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while the traders themselves are lucky to make much more than
President Alberto Fujimori's two-year old austerity programme has increased the numbers in
"critical poverty" by another seven million, bringing the total to more than half the country's
23 million population.
The signs of a country in decline
In Lima's city centre rubbish piles up.
Days without electricity, owing to drought affecting hydro-electric plants, add to the sense of a city and a country in
A worsening economic crisis has been accompanied by years of increasing militarization, beginning under former President Alan Garcia.
Like other Latin American countries during the period of so-called "democratic opening" in the early 1980s, the military retained significant influence in the state
The Fujimori government's links with the military, and in particular with the army, have been one of the pillars of its
Fujimori merely took this relationship one step further - the coup earlier this year — as a way of re-assuring the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank that their neo-liberal diktats
Over half the country is now, nominally, under some form of military control or administration. Nominally, because in many areas the state's writ has simply
One explanation for this state of affairs has been put forward by a human rights organization, the Andean Commission of Jurists. A spokesperson recently described the military as largely incompetent -leading, in the first instance, to the death of many innocent victims.
Attempts to stabilize the situation have had little effect. Fujimori has formally announced that elections to a new "democratic constitutional congress" will take place on November 22nd. This announcement follows a pledge to the Organization of American States (OAS) in May.
The proposed congress is to have a
- due to last until the end of Fujimori's term in July 1995 — to write a new constitution and oversee government
Veneer for continued dictatorship
But it is unclear how many of Peru's opposition parties are willing to take part in the elections. The congress will have only 80 members, a third the size of the pre-coup parliament. It is increasingly being seen as a veneer for continued dictatorship. The aim is to have sanctions lifted and external aid restored without having to make any real political changes.
The announcement of elections came a day after Fujimori said he would modify his economic policy by injecting $300m of accumulated government savings into
PERU public works and bad debt relief for banks.
The IMF has been honest enough to point out that this will do little to ease the effects of the recession. In fact, the IMF has even gone so far as to say that Fujimori's government went too far,
Squeezed between the violence of the military and Sendero are the poor and the democratic workers and peasants' organizations.
Their immediate response has been one of self-defence, but the form and role this
What has been critical in every instance is their independence from both the military and Sendero, and the creation of genuine structures of democracy and accountabi-
In areas where the CGTP and the CCP have still been able to function, they have been central to the emergence of defence committees or
"survival organizations", which have often taken over functions that would have been carried out by the state, in particular the distribution of basic food stuffs.
In the countryside, rondas campesinas
(peasant committees) have caused some controversy. Even Fujimori has claimed he supports them; but, as many have asked, which rondas does he mean?
Armed self-defence
In many areas the rondas, often first established in the 1970s, constitute a form of armed self-defence for the masses working under the leadership of local democratic popular organizations. Links are slowly being forged between these rondas and the committees in the towns.
But in other areas the military have been organizing peasants' groups of the same name under the pretext of fighting
Sendero. The reality, however, is that unless the new rondas establish their independence from the military they are merely used as pawns, invariably attacking all those who are opposed to the government's policy.
It is the democratic self-defence organizations that deserve and need our solidarity. Despite a real decline in struggles they have a potential to become centres of an alternative popular power — a third
25 force that in the future will be better placed to assert itself in a chaotic Peru.*