GERMANY / SOUTH AFRICA
That's it, I'm net pushing any more.
Maybe if J release the fand brake?
PANCHO able to inform the Goldstone commission of inquiry that for each worker or almost a month's incorecordings of police messages from Boipatong had, me.
The rest is being met by increasing unfortunately, been wiped. And on September 7 the army of public debt, which will rise by a third betone of apartheid's homelands, Ciskei, massacred several ween 1991 and 1995, from DM1,458bn to
DM2,225bn. Interest rates are rising and therefore rents. This will increase the dozen demonstrators at Bisho.
pressure for a cut in public spending, and PETER BLUMER — September 17, 1992* above all social spending. This will hit hardest in East Germany where the local and regional authorities are able to meet barely a fifth of outgoings from their own income.
A dependent country
East Germany will remain a dependent country and its society will be cut in two between those with jobs and the rest.
This is not only of importance to East Germans. If the transfers constantly rise, the workers will have to pay ever more. If there are five million unemployed in Germany, then the reserve army will weigh far more heavily on the West German labour market than before. This at the very least requires an entirely new policy from the trade unions.
A self-generated recovery is as unlikely as a return to the old GDR. The united Germany has turned out to be something quite other than anyone imagined. Economic and social policies can soften the blows, the share of the burden borne by the West German working class increased and perhaps, after a time, some shift of industry to East Germany be achieved.
The problem of mass unemployment of five million, concentrated in the East, will remain. *
M ANY both in South Africa
and abroad have been satisfied by the current institutional reforms and negotiations. However for millions of Blacks, apartheid continues in their daily misery and oppression. De Klerk, the reformer, is wholly responsible for the recent murders. It is his regime that has continued to prop up puppet regimes such as that in Ciskei, which is supposed to represented the "national" independence of the Xhosa people. It is De Klerk's police who have continued their complicity with Inkatha's murderous campaign. And it is the South African state which he heads that has shown itself incapable of bringing about the slightest improvement in the social conditions in the Black townships.
The negotiations (and in particular the CODESA conference) have not escaped the framework of the old system. At the negotiating table De Klerk's regime sits surrounded by all the inheritors of "separate development" - all the Bantustan chiefs and ethnic parties. The escalation of violence and the deliberate stirring of ethnic tensions by Buthelezi's Inkatha party are all part of a struggle to influence the balance of forces at the negotiating table. They are not some remnant of the past, but one of the ways in which the regime is trying to limit the scope of reforms.
Hard core of the system
The aim is to ensure that universal suffrage and the formal ending of discrimination do not go so far as to threaten to the hard core of the system, its social relations of exploitation. To maintain the "gains" of apartheid, the De Klerk regime has thus tried to push the negotiations in the direction of a federalist blueprint. The regions this would create would, the regime calculates, maintain and reinforce ethnic fragmentation among Blacks and favour coalitions and collaborationism in local institutions.
In order to get his way De Klerk must build the Bantustans and ethnic prejudices into the new system. Insofar as Inkatha violence or the Bisho massacre force the Afri* Since this article was written ANC/government talks have resumed and the rapid formation of an interim government promised. Bantustan leaders have declared that they will not be bound by these agreements. A. CODESA — Convention for a Democratic 1 5 South Africa.
International Viewpoint # 236• October 12, 1992
SOUTH AFRICA can National Congress (ANC) to accept a federalist compromise that will lastingly weaken the struggle for a non-racial society, they serve De Klerk's policy.
The size of the country, regional social, economic and historic differences would seem to speak in favour of some form of federalism. The regime well understands how to use such a "commonsense" argument - flourishing at various times the Swiss, Nigerian or Yugoslav examples. However, all this is to overlook the fact that in the South African case there has always been racial oppression exercised by a white minority.
Reinforced federalism will therefore not address the basic democratic issue; on the contrary it will tend to further fragment and therefore weaken, the collective strength of the Black masses. Such a federalism would not mean a decentralization of power in order to ensure better social control to the Black population but would merely be a way of preserving the political weight of the white elites and owning classes under a new form.
### Talks broken off
The decision by the ANC on June 21 to break off the CODESA negotiations was the sign of deep disillusionment, as the ANC leadership realized that these discussions were leading to no reduction whatever in the level of violence directed against its own activists and supporters. They found out that each apparent retreat by the regime on this or that point was each time anticipated by a new offensive on some other terrain of the
This was what happened when the government came up with its proposals for a second chamber while the ANC was putting all its energies into pursuing the question of an interim government. Nelson Mandela's movement thus found himself systematically dragged along in the wake of De Klerk's initiatives, as the latter bit by bit revealed new elements in a coherent constitutional
This could be seen at the time of the whites-only referendum of March 17, 1992. After some 69% voted "yes" to De Klerk's proposals, Mandela declared: "we hope that National Party leaders will stop regarding themselves as leaders of an ethnic group but that they will regard themselves now as part of the leadership of the total population" (Saturday Star, March 21, 1992).
De Klerk had certainly explained two days before that he considered himself "bound by his mandate (The Citizen, March 19, 1992). But the mandate in question had equally clearly been given on the basis of a dozen "bottom line principles" which, taken together, amounted to a barricade of safe16 The referendum had, without doubt, a guards for keeping the white minority veto.
contradictory impact on the ANC's strategy, but Mandela's ambiguities, as shown in his above-quoted remark, also smoothed the way for the regime's attack.
There was growing discontent in the ANC, in particular among its intermediary cadres and inside the COSATU union confederation. Above all, the rank-and-file lost patience and confidence and the moment was approaching when the leadership risked repudiation. The CODESA trap was closing, gravely endangering the unity of the anti-apartheid movement. If the negotiations were to be continued then at least the rules had to be changed.
The mass campaign announced by the ANC/Communist Party/COSATU coalition, which was said to be aimed at bringing down the government and imposing a constituent assembly, led to the general strike of August 3 and 4. Other mass actions were planned such as the September 7 demonstration at Bisho and others subse-
Nonetheless, the ANC's basic perspective remains that of negotiations. It felt the need to make up lost ground, increase its ability to bring pressure and respond to the exasperation of the rank-and-file. Discussions with the government could only be resumed if they were seen to represent a new "stage" in the introduction of a "post-apartheid" society.
### Behind the scenes
An editorialist on the South Africa Labour Bulletin provides a good summary of the behind-the-scenes debates in the ANC, the Communist Party and the union confederation: "There is every indication that the tripartite alliance, or at least COSATU, and the militant wing of the ANC and the SACP, have done a fundamental rethink on negotiation. They intend the campaign to have such an impact on the balance of forces that it results in a new negotiating forum and a new negotiating agenda. If the campaign is successful, its leaders will probably demand a negotiating forum that reflects the role of mass organizations such as COSATU and the civics movement, in the process of political change" (SALB, July 1992).
It is necessary to underline the impatience of sections of the population radicalized by two years of negotiations and waiting. Each day the television told them of the great changes, while daily life was getting worse. Thus wages have lost ground against inflation of around 16%. However, the cost of a shopping basket of food for a family has risen by 28% and vegetables by 80%. The mines have seen 3,000 redundancies a month. The textile workers' union (SACTWU) has stated that 20,000 of its members have lost their jobs. In metal and engineering, 35,000 jobs went in 1991 and a further 13,000 in the first six months of this year.
Despite a rather disappointing turnout for May Day this year, there has been a sharp rise in union actions and strikes in recent months. One of the most significant was by healthworkers in June and July which affected 59 hospitals throughout the country in support of a rise in the minimum wage, an across-the-board 15.3% wage rise and security for long term "temporary" workers.
### August general strike
The general strike in August thus showed that, despite the weakening of organized social movements, popular combativity remains high. The strike was massively observed as broad sections of the Black population showed their continuing readiness to respond to calls for mobilization and action. This indicates a questioning amongst the most militant sectors: negotiate, of course, but with what attention to the social struggles and the balance of forces on the
This problem is illustrated by an episode from the inner life of the engineering union. In May, the NUMSA leadership organized the distribution of a leaflet entitled "prepare the war" against redundancies and wage restrictions. Then came the success of August 3 and 4. On August 8, the union leadership met and proposed to the branches a compromise with the bosses which included the abandonment of the demand for a moratorium on redundancies, its replacement by the negotiation of various forms of shorttime working, temporary plant closures and early retirement, or, simply, payment for 15 weeks of retraining after being made redun-
Thus, in a few weeks, the union had passed from conducting a "war" against redundancies to a proposal for managing enterprise reform — despite a massive general strike. On August 11 the regional leadership in eastern Witwatersrand responded: "the proposals from the NEC are substantively unacceptable. Our members have consistently demanded... serious protection against daily threat of retrenchment. That is why we, as a union, put forward the demand for a moratorium... Our strike is supposed to threaten the bosses. It seems that, with this approach, we are more scared of our strike than they are... It is our members who are being tear-gassed by the police and threatened and even killed by Inkatha, risking their jobs and even their lives. More than 20,000 are on strike in this region alone. We therefore strongly believe that it must be those very members who must take any decision on a compromise"
This dispute is between a large regional branch of one of the main COSATU unions; thus this is an important affair, involving
In a general sense we have seen in recent months a union strategy centred on the search for compromise with the bosses and on
Nelson Mandela on the future of negotiations
I THINK that in spite of the fact that we came very near to a disaster (after the Bisho massacre) the move that we have now jointly made - myself and Mr. De Klerk - has saved the country from
SOUTH AFRICA However, in the present period in South Africa, the bosses take from these plans only what suits them from the point of view of tying in the unions. They make almost no concessions on social demands and pursue the restructuring of enterprises in their own way.
I am saying therefore that it is urgent that the government makes some visible practical move to restore the credibility of negotiations. And once the government does that, by moving just on these three things [the hostels, political prisoners and dangerous weapons], we are prepared to reconsider the whole question of having pulled out of negotiations...
[Then] I will be able to go back to my people and say look, he has met us. Let us meet him. We would then be able to ask ourselves the question whether in that particular atmosphere, we should continue with mass action...
If at CODESA 2 in May the government had agreed that an interim government of national unity had to be introduced say within six or 12 months... there would have been no need for mass
An interim government is going to represent us all, and the ANC is not going to have mass action against itself... There will be no question of sanctions, no question of sanctions. There will be no question of isolating South Africa...
All that will remain are the arms and oil embargoes, to be lifted as soon as a democratic constitution is accepted. But even on that there can be compromise...
We want to break the deadlock because if we don't | fear that the economy is going to be so destroyed that when a democratic government comes into power it will not be able to solve it...
I think business has generally responded very responsibly during the period of mass action. I have thanked them for that and I have told my own supporters this view....
..You must understand that what happened in Bisho has not been the pattern of mass action. On August 5 | led a march in Pretoria. It was disciplined and the police said the crowd behaved magnificently.
That was the position throughout the country generally, although there were exceptions where there was intimidation and looting. When this was drawn to my attention I actually went to these areas to see businessmen and apologize...
If we cannot secure free (political activity) I am going to face a situation in which it becomes increasingly difficult to resist the demands of my own people to arm and defend themselves.
You know, when I went to Boipatong, I was met with placards "Mandela give us guns". And these were not coming from the youth, but elderly people, members of the branch.
Then I went to the rally and I went round as I normally do to greet people. And the song they were singing was "Mandela, you behave like a lamb while we are being killed"...
Now if we don't do something visible to show that we are fighting against oppression, those who are demanding resumption of the armed struggle are going to prevail.
Mass action is actually a peaceful form of channelling the anger of the people.
(Extracts from an interview in The Argus, September 15, 1992) * the working out of reorganization plans for specific branches of industry. This is in line with the spirit of the CODESA negotiations, but above all it corresponds to the ideas in the union leaderships on the means to employ to overcome the crisis, revive production and build a "post-apartheid" society.
This is essentially a neo-Keynesian conception based on the negotiation of a new distribution of income and the search for new ways of being internationally competitive. Thus the miners' union (NUM) has presented a programme of measures to meet the crisis in their sector. This was presented as a "co-determination" project at the Mining Summit organized with the Employers' Chamber (Dot Keet, "Negotiation and actions towards the general strike, South Africa Labour Bulletin, July 1992).
### Charter blueprint
We could see the unions' policy at work on the eve of the August strike when COSATU signed a blueprint for a charter with the SACCOLA employers' union.2 The two parties announced that they were going to organize and call together on all South Africans to make August 3 a "day for peace, democracy and economic restructuring" "SACCOLA and COSATU intend to organize assemblies in all the major centres in South Africa together with the churches... (they) call upon employers and trade unions, in both the private sector and public sectors and all other South Africans to do likewise... To ensure success the parties will establish a steering committee to address the issue of adequate resources, planning, logistics and communications, including at the work place"
COSATU's plan was to challenge the employers to shut their enterprises on August 3 and 4. This would turn the general strike into a paid holiday. The South Africa Labour Bulletin modestly explains: "The draft agreement eventually floundered when SACCOLA was unable to win support for it from its constituent business organization".
The peculiar nature of the "leadership" of the employers' union played some role in the production of this document, which amounts to a plea for a negotiated solution to the social crisis and the establishment of a parliamentary democracy. As a statement of general policy it is far removed from the day-to-day approach of employers on such matters as jobs, training or wages.3
But one paragraph in particular highlights current union strategy. The two parties propose "an open and inclusive approach at both national and industry level to economic restructuring and to agreeing on an economic strategy which will deliver high and sustainable levels of growth and development. To this end, to seek to avoid unilateral economic restructuring and to seek consensus between government, labour and business in this regard". Aside from its wholly chimerical view, such a declaration by COSATU is in total contradiction with calls for war on the bosses such as that issued by NUMSA in May. But it is in fact the same leaderships who are responsible for both.
To understand the confusion that such 2. South Africa Labour Bulletin (SALB), September 1992. 3. A good critical analysis of this is given by SAC CAWU's Roseline Nyman in SALE. September 1 7