The shotgun divorce
STŘEONÍ EVROPA? TUDY, PANE!
"Central Europe? It's that way, sir!"
International Viewpoint #243 March 1993
AT the start of this year, federal Czechoslovakia disappeared to be replaced by separate Czech and Slovak states. IV talked to Vratia Votava, a Left Bloc deputy in the Czech parliament and journalist Adam Novak about the split. INTERVIEW -Prague, January 14, 1993
H OW did the separa-
tion come about and who wanted it? Adam: The division of the Czechoslovak state is the result of the different nature of the paths to capitalist restoration taken in the two parts of the federation after November 1989. In the Czech part, owing to the more developed links with the West and social and econo mic specificities the reforms have aroused the hope in considerable sections of the population that they can achieve a "Western living standard". This is why Vaclav Klaus' Civic Democratic Union (ODS) which supports economic shock therapy did so well in the June 1992 elections. In Slovakia Klaus' policies had a negative impact from the outset and this expressed itself in opposition to a policy dictated from the federal capital Prague.
Was it the wish of the majority of the Slovak population that the Czechoslovak federation should be divided?
Vratia: In the June elections, the only party that supported separation, the Slovak National Party (SSN), won only 10% of the votes. The most successful party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia of Vladimir Meciar, proposed a transition from a federation to a confederation which he presented as a free association of two republics. At that time he never mentioned independence. In fact, the Slovak leaders were pushed down the path of separation by the refusal of their Czech counterparts to compromise. From the start of the negotiations, the Czech side insisted that there was only one choice - between a highly centralized federal state or complete sepa-
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CZECH REPUBLIC ration. Since the first option was clearly unacceptable for Meciar, the second was obligatory.
Adam: The majority of the population both in the Czech Lands and Slovakia were against the division. The elites on both sides have concentrated all political power in their hands and created a kind of natio nalist hysteria with the help of the press. They have claimed that there was no alternative and that they had to be given full confidence to undertake the negotiations.
The population has been completely excluded from the decision making process. In the Czech part opposition to the break-up took the form of the demand for a referendum. At first figures such as federal president Vaclav Havel supported this demand, but he dropped it in the hope of becoming Czech president.
Who supported the referendum idea?
Vratia: According to the constitution such a separation could only come about through a referendum. Havel put this to parliament but there was a majority against — in particular the deputies from Klaus party opposed a referendum. The Slovak government continued to support a referendum until December 1992 while the Czech government rejected it straight after the June 1992 elections. In Slovakia, apart from Meciar's party, a referendum was supported by the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH).
In the Czech Lands backing for a referendum was mainly the property of the left and centre left the social democrats and the Left Bloc on the one hand and of the far right Republicans on the other.
However, the Czech left was not able to launch a real mass campaign for a referendum. In particular, the Communist Party (KSCM) which dominates the Left Bloc refused to wage this battle. The party leader Jiri Svoboda never spoke at proreferendum rallies. Basically, the KSCM kept quiet because it did not want direct confrontation with the government. Thus, while such i were called by the Left Bloc they lacked impact owing to the failure of KSCM leaders to take part.
Adam: Apart from the Left Bloc, which organized these demonstrations along with various anarchist groups, all the other parliamentary groups, and in particular the social democrats, refused to take the debate to the streets and refused to act together with the Communists. In parlia ment, Vratia proposed a campaign of civil disobedience that could have taken the form of a symbolic general strike.
Meanwhile, the social democrat deputy Milos Zeman proposed a demonstration under the Czechoslovak flag rather than under the Czech flag, but these two proposals went unheeded.
The main leftwing demonstration in Prague only brought out about 1,000 people. On the other hand the far right Republicans were able to mobilize 10,000, mainly elderly people.
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Internationa/ Viewpoint #243 March 1993
You were present at the congress of the Communist Party in December 1992. Was there any kind of criticism of the party leadership's passivity over this issue? Vratia: The congress accepted the division as a fait accompli. Only a few delegates expressed their regret that there was no referendum.
Adam: The party did not want to be absent at the moment of the creation of the
Czech state. It wanted to look responsible and constructive.
Vratia: This needs to be looked at in a wider context. Currently the KSCM, while reaffirming its socialist outlook does not consider this realizable in the present circumstances. It thus emphasizes the need to counteract the worst effects of the neo-liberal programme — it does not talk of the restoration of capitalism. There are three broad currents in the KSCM: a Stalinist current which was not much in evidence at the congress, a pragmatist majority (including the majority of the party's 33 deputies) who think in terms of a party like the Italian PDS (Democratic Party of the Left - ex-CP) and then there is an
"alternative" left current composed of younger elements grouped in the Young Communists Union. The Democratic Forum of Communists and the Self-Management Club of
Communists are involved in this.
The main discussion at the congress was over changing its name. The proposal to rename it the Democratic Left Party was rejected with a 75% vote against. The underlying issue here was that of the speed of social democratization of the party.
I intervened to say that it would be better to discuss programme rather than the name and that we should take new inspiration from Marxism and return to the struggle for self-management and self-organization. I denounced the fact that the former ruling bureaucracy has reconverted itself into a dynamic and leading element in the restoration of capitalism. I insisted on the need to support all struggles of resistance to develop self-organization to the maximum and make a special effort to communicate with youth.
Will the breakup of the federation lead to a rise in racism?
Vratia: The economic as well as human relations between the Czech and Slovak republics will be a source of tension, the measures having been adopted in a rush. In particular Slovaks living in the Czech republic will face problems. There have been rumours that they will have to return to Slovakia or pay 2,000 crowns (slightly less than 24 the average monthly wage) to get Czech citizenship.
Other rumours have been circulating among the Czechs: that there will be a flood of Slovaks into the Czech Lands, and that many Gypsies will move from Slovakia to the Czech Lands. Many people are racist towards the Gypsies who are accused of being the source of criminality. One far right group, the Club of Committed Non-Party
Members, has called for the arming of civilians against the alleged criminality of Gyp sies. A situation like that in Germany can easily develop here.
Are there any Gypsy deputies? Adam: Only one — Ladislav Bodi on the
Left Bloc slate. The Left Bloc has been alone in including Gypsies on its electoral lists.
Bodi, a deputy in the Czech parliament, was elected as a Czechoslovak citizen although he is officially of Slovak nationality (he left
Slovakia when he was two years old).
This gives you some idea of the complexities facing Gypsies. Two years ago it became possible to declare Gypsy as a nationality but only 5,000 of the estimated 700-
900,000 Gypsies have so declared themselves. According to some sources about a half of Gypsies understand Romany and about one third speak it. The old Stalinist regime pursued a policy of maximizing assimilation of Gypsies into the Czech and Slovak populations. Their oppression was and remains real. for example, nine out of ten Gypsies leave school without any qualifications and less than two out of every 1,000 have a university degree.
Are there other targets of racism?
Adam: Two years ago, Vietnam immigrant workers (some 60,000) and Cubans were the victims of skinhead attacks. The recent upsurge of racism has been marked by anti-semitism.
And the anti-racist mobilizations?
Vratia: We played an active role in the organization of the first anti-racist mobilizations. In April 1990, as the Left Alternative, we organized in collaboration with the anarchists a big anti-racist concert. In 1992, we organized a 2,000 strong demonstration — a real success in current conditions. We also took a delegation to Brussels on October 24. We are currently preparing a big anti-fascist and anti-racist mobilization for March
The aspirations of youth
YOUNG people in the Czech
Republic want freedom and social and job security.
This is the conclusion drawn by
Czech parliamentary deputy and head of the League of Communist Youth, Martin Chudoba - at
24 the youngest member of the
Czech parliament - and Adam
Nezval from a survey based on official materials on youth attitudes to be published in IV's
Czech sister publication
Inprekor.
Some 43% put freedom in general and 28% freedom to travel at the top of their list of what they like most about the new situation.
Of features of the old regime, social security gets 43% and job security 37% of their preferences.
While about half of 17 to 18 year olds are content with the current state of affairs, only 29% of 21-22 year olds are - which the authors consider may have to do with the impact of facing the realities of the job market. At present only 38% feel they suffer from the existence of unemployment, compared to 86% from inflation and 89% from lack of money. More young people find the pre sent regime extremely corrupt (12%) than they do the previous regime (5%) - a view that in some cases leads to acceptance of the catch-all rightwing expla nation that continuing "Commuthe country's current ills. Howe ver, the authors find little evidence of basic sympathy for fascist or authoritarian ideas. As they comment, "the results of the survey are further evidence for the faint-hearted that the concerns of the youth can be articulated in a radical left programme". Indeed, "only 29% of young people think the economic reforms will being a higher standard of living for everyone; 41% think only a small part of the population will benefit".*
The poverty of utopia
International Viewpoint #243 March 1993
JACEK KURON, author of the text excerpted in the following pages, has been one of Poland's most prominent political personalities over the past 30 years. Imprisoned in 1964 for his revolutionary communist ideas he was one of the inspirations of the student and intellectual revolt of 1968. JAN MALEWSKI
N 1976, he was one of the founders of the Workers Defence Committee (KOR) and his strategic thinking played a role in the emergence of the independent workers' movement which finally blossomed into Solidarnosc in 1980. Again in 1987-88 his writings were a major influence in the working out of the so-called round table compromise which ushered in the end of General Jaruzelski's regime. Today he is the minister in charge of labour and social security, in a coalition government in which his current is a junior partner alongside Catholic fundamentalists.
The striking thing about the thoughts expressed in his text is his lucid appreciation of contemporary Polish realities growing social discontent, the acceptance that the new order has done away with social gains and the recognition of the absence of a project by which the new regime can mobilize society and win support and not merely tolerance.
Faced with rising social discontent and split by debates, among the most important being the struggle between supporters of parliamentary democracy and Catholic fundamentalists seeking to impose an authoritarian religious-based moral order, the new rulers of Poland are seeking a second wind. The union support it used to be able to count on from Solidarnosc, even if widened by the social pact signed on February 21, 1993, is not a long-term solution. While tripartite commissions, co-management and coresponsibility may appear as solutions to the union leaders, they have no such credibility for the majority of workers.