Auto-coup - auto-exit
MALCOLM Coad, the British Guardian's chief Latin American correspondent, is an incurable liberal optimist.
He is though, astute. In his report on Jorge Serrano's May 25 "autocoup", he noted that "the new democracies (in Latin America) are
International Viewpoint #247 July 1993 and others, as a "failure". Human rights have remained the stumbling block since the negotiations began in April 1991.
Amnesty International, in a report issued on May 19, noted that "the killings beginning to show serious signs of strain." He feared a return to the bad old days.! This fear is not uncommon. It is a theme that has been taken up as much by the left as by the 'concerned" liberal intelligentsia. ROLAND WOOD — June 16, 1993 war over, America would be able to intervene into the region on the basis of respect for "human rights and a measure of social justice."2
A faint hope indeed, one might have thought. But the situation changed rapidly.
The military, who had clearly encouraged and then supported Serano's initial action, quickly turned against him. Only eight days after he assumed dictatorial powers he had to negotiate his way into exile in El Salvador.
Now, human rights prosecutor, Ramiro de León Carpio, has been elected and sworn in by congress as the new President. An act which is unprecedented in a coun try with such a poor human rights record and a 33-year civil war, the longest in Central America. Indeed, de León was one of Serano's first targets for repression, ordering troops to surround his house. De León escaped over his roof.
So, Guatemala has a human rights activist as head of state and America certainly played a role in the way and pace at which events unfolded. Has Mr Coad's wish fulfillment blossomed into something real? No one should hold their breath.
There is still considerable concern about the military's possible reaction to the choice of de León, who has always been a sharp critic of the security forces for their widespread abuse of human rights. As in other Latin America countries the process of so-called democratisation in the 1980s did not prevent the military from retaining significant power and influence, not just within civil society but within the structures of the state. Moreover, these were structures that were invariably of their own creation. They can threaten to sweep back into the central corridors of power with such apparent ease - because they have never really left them.
The wave of corruption scandals and impeachments in the region have provided much of the impetus and succour to the military's new found confidence. Serano's declaration that there was a need to "purify the state of all its corruption", if necessary with an "iron fist", 4 was greeted by the military with much enthusiasm. However, while Serano, in contrast to Brazil's Fernando Collor de Mello and Venezuala's Carlos Andrés Pérez., appeared, as head of state, to be spearheading the fight against corruption his motives were more than likely self-preservation.
His coup pre-empted the presentation in congress of a petition, bearing 5,000 signatures, for his impeachment on several charges of corruption.
Struggle against austerity
Concurrently, there had been a growth in social struggles. The May 1 march in the capital, Guatemala City, mobilised 50,000. Regular demonstrations against Serano's austerity policies, state privatisations and military repression continued throughout May. In the days leading up to Serano's coup military leaders pressed for a tougher line against the unions and student groups who had been central to the organisation of these demonstrations.
The return of the refugees and the stuttering talks between the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) and the government have also had a considerable impact on the situation.
While at the beginning of March there had appeared to be substantial agreement that progress was being made in the talks, by the end of that month they were being described by the URNG, the official mediator Archbishop Rodolfo Quezada that have plagued Guatemala for decades are still going on despite the promises of the civilian government." The report adds that: "Harassment, intimidation and death threats are on the increase, violators from the past are still walking free and the repressive structures are still in place."
There had even been failure to agree on a name for the commission which would review past human rights violations. Should it be the "Truth Commission' (as in El Salvador) or the 'Commission of the Past'?
"Bilateral" ceasefire?
The prospect of a ceasefire by the end of August seems slim. The government has insisted that the URNG should move into concentration areas to start disarming and demobilising. The URNG's pre-condition for acceptance is that the ceasefire is "bilateral" and that agreement is reached on the "strengthening of civilian power and... (on) ...the role of the army in a democratic society."6 The military will certainly have problems swallowing that.
They have sought to sidestep an official government commitment not to militarise the areas that have been designated for the settlement of refugees returning from Mexico. This has taken two forms.
• Refugee organisations have reported that the military have conducted operations against settlements considered to be supportive of the URNG. Last December defence minister, General José Domingo Garcia Samayoa, said that the military had seized documents that proved the existence of links between the URNG and refugee organisations.
• In other areas the military have attempted to incorporate the returnees into their network of 'civil defence commit-
1. The Guardian, May 27, 1993.
2. Ibid.
3. Latin American Regional Reports, June 17, 1993.
4. International Herald Tribune, May 21, 1993.
5. alai servicio informativo, May 25 1993.
6. Latin American Regional Reports, June 17, 1993. The "Querétaro accord' signed by the government and the URNG back in 1991 called for the "strengthening of a functional and participative democracy", with both sides committing themselves to ensuring the "pre-eminence" of civil society over the military.
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GUATEMALA
International Viewpoint #247 July 1993 tees'. These committees are seen as central to the military's counter-insurgency policy. Comparisons have certainly been made between Serano's coup and that of Alberto Fujimori's in Peru. The military's attempts to incorporate, often very vulnerable sectors of the population into their war against the URNG extends the comparison further. We would not, however, draw any comparison between the URNG and Peru's Sendero Luminoso.?
In each instance the aim of the military has been clear: to reasert their influence and authority in every area of society. So far, they have proved to be more tactically astute than one might have bargained for.
Perhaps the military knew that there was a gamble involved. They were certainly quick off the mark to draw some distance between themselves and Serano immediately following his coup. While on the one hand chief military spokesman, Captain Julio Yon Rivera, said that they supported Serano because he was commander in chief; on the other, he dismissed reports of a military role in the President's decision. The military were more than happy to arm the President; but they preferred that he actually fired the shot himself.
In the days following the coup the military had the necessary flexibility and space within which they could plan their next moves.
Is it so surprising that they chose to side with the business classes and oust Serano?
### Re-thinking aid
The business and political elites had their eye on one thing. International aid. Serano's coup stood in their way.
A number of advantageous financial agreements had recently been reached. Having cleared its arrears with the World Bank new loans totaling US$168 million had been granted. The government has a 15 month standby arrangement with the International Monetary Fund which started last December, although the US$54 million available under the scheme has not, as yet, been touched. All such programmes were immediately thrown into jeopardy. Direct aid packages of US$50 million from America and US$100 from western Europe were frozen within 24 hours.
Given that the major international financial institutions are still entrenched within the framework of American foreign policy it is not difficult to see how America was able to use economic muscle to
7. For an examination of the Peruvian military's counterinsurgency tactics see the author's article, Fuijimori's propaganda coup, International Viewpoint 235, September 28, 1993. 28 influence the course of events. But there are signs that the new Clinton administration is set to rethink traditional aid related policy. This is what worries significant sectors of the Latin American bourgeoisie. The present system of aid is essential for underwriting the process of privatisation (that is demanded by the donor countries or institutions in order to qualify for aid/loans), even though it means remaining within the deep quagmire of the debt cycle. If American priorities shift, even a small amount, and consequently effect the priorities of the international institutions, Latin America's ruling elites will be caught on the hop, even though the warning signs are there.
Washington wants to re-define the role of aid in the cold war era. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the predominant rationale for US foreign policy and aid decisions disappears as well. Tomorrow, the path to growth and development for a region like Latin America will lie in free markets and some reform of state structures. The North American Free Trade Agreement is a sign post to the future. Moreover, when there is a budget deficit to be cut the new free markets will be a significantly cheaper form of imperialism to maintain.
The military in Guatemala was willing to listen to the business classes. They will expect to be listened to in return.
And this is why the choice of Ramiro de León Carpio as the new President may seem so surprising. Gabriel Aguilera, a political analyst in Guatemala, has said that "This is Congress responding to the street." Certainly the mobilisations prior to the coup, as we have noted, and those against the coup itself have been powerful enough to make Congress think. But, again as we have noted, the military will not be happy. The Congress decision seems to based on the premise that, at this stage, a respected human rights leader will be better placed than any other to head off popular dissent. This though, ignores the extent to which demands for human rights and democracy were inter-connected with those against austerity and privatisations. Unless the new President attempts to reverse current policies (which would place him against the grain in Latin America), a rivitalised mass movement could again begin to cause considerable headaches for the government. It is in just such a situation that military fingers could,