Beyond the domesticated left
JULIO Mareneles is one of the "veterans" of the Movimiento de
Liberación Nacional Tupamaros (MLN); a member of its leadership, he is an important spokesman for one of the main forces on the Uruguayan left. Our correspondent, Ernesto Herrera, talked with him about the themes that today are at that top of the political agenda in Uruguay and
International Viewpoint #247 July 1993 circumstances we will raise socialist ideas. However, in daily practice, in contrast to what happened in our country twenty years ago — when it was possible to speak freely of socialism and this was accepted by the people — it is now necessary to look
Latin America as a whole; the changes in the international situation; the relationship between government and real power; the debate around programme versus alliances; and the construction of a collective, radical vanguard, in a period when positivist realism" is gaining more and more very hard for ways which allow us to fly our colours and also to oppose the tremen-
We must, using all possible means, raise issues more subtly, stay with the adherents. INTERVIEW — Montevideo, May 3, 1993*
T is almost inevitable to begin by referring to the new international situation. The collapse of so-called real socialism, the defeat of the Sandinistas, the isolation of Cuba and the uncertainties which have opened around the peace agreement in El Salvador have generated a neglect of strategy on the Latin American Left. Capitalism has assumed a historic victory over Marxism and has unleashed an ideological offensive with few precedents this century. For many comrades there no longer seem to be possibilities for an anti-capitalist alternative and so they are taking up what might be called a left positivist position. What effect is all this having on the
It is a very difficult and complicated situation. The Russian and Chinese revolutions were authentic revolutions, which despite their mistakes and deviations, achieved great transformations and played a progressive role on the international stage. In their own way, they also served as support for third world liberation struggles. For example, despite all the criticisms which can be made of the USSR it was fundamental to the sustainment of the Cuban revolution. With the fall of the socialist camp, revolutionary struggles have suffered. A case in point is Nicaragua, which was able to survive and also confront the counter-revolution thanks to practical and military support from the Soviet Union. All this has gone with the disappearance of the "strategic rearguard", despite all the criticisms which could made of it. Imperialism now has a completely free hand for there is nothing to obstruct it. Accordingly, possibilities for the revolutionary movement seem remote.
In the MLN we have always taken account of the international situation. We do not believe that it should be permitted to adversely affect the revolutionary struggle but we must try to see what the forms of struggle might be at this time. In particular, how do we again unite, for in the face of this great collapse, there are many who have stopped believing in the possibility of revolution and turned to social democracy; and there are others who, without ceasing to believe in the necessity of revolution have become demoralised and will not take up a militant
And there are ourselves, who continue to define ourselves as revolutionary militants but who see how difficult it is to make advances when it is not easy to speak of socialism, because it is looked down upon and the rightwing offensive is so great. This is not to say that we hide the fact that we are socialists, and in certain people and accompany them in their apprenticeship in practical politics. In an interview which you gave some years ago to the French language Inprecor (one of IV's sister publications) you said "Today, as yesterday the issue of power is central to us." A few weeks ago, you stated in the weekly, Búsqueda, that it was illusory to talk of power if there was no control of the fundamental economic mechanisms or of the army. You gave Popular Unity in Chile as a perfect example that government must not be confused with real power.
The Uruguayan left presently faces this problem, because there is the possibility that the Frente Amplio (FA - Broad
Front) will win the 1994 elections. What questions of strategy would such an eventuality pose for the MLN? Is it possible that an FA victory would produce a radical change in the balance of forces which would allow a struggle for hegemony and so for power?
This is a huge issue. We believe that if the FA becomes the government, not very much will change.
We also believe that this must be made clear to the people, first and foremost to the FA rank and file. To not say that if it wins government in 1994, little will change, has been one of the serious mistakes committed by certain leaders of the FA.
*The interview was originally published in Beyond the Possible (Más allá de lo posible) journal of the Socialist Workers' Party (PST - Uruguayan section of the Fourth International).
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International Viewpoint #247 July 1993
What could happen, but this depends on the FA, is the beginning of such a process. There would be an extremely complex situation; it is a subject which we know we must consider in depth more than previously. It must also be seen with what we call the question of the establishment. By this I mean that we realise that if the FA becomes the government, it will not have real power, in short, we will have to exercise government within a system in which the real power is held by our class enemies.
I say enemies because the MLN does hold a definition of class. The FA does not have this and there you have a major problem. Looking at historical events we see that those progressive movements which have arrived at government but have not considered their situation have ended in failure. I always think of the example of what happened to the Bolivian Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, which no one except old people now remember.
When one listened to Paz Estensoro, it was clear that it was a progressive movement; however we know how it ended through lack of self-analysis. Similarly with the Venezuala's Acción Democrática and with the APRA of Haya de la Torre more than fourty years ago. What happened to all these movements? They rotted; they did not examine the political and social processes and made no advance towards the revolution.
So, when we speak of the question of the establishment, it is important to ask how much being the government would mean taking a step towards real power. What we have seen of government within the capitalist system is not encouraging for the revolutionary left. There is the example of what happened with one of our comrades in local government who went to fill a position at the request of the Movimiento de Participación Popular (MPP)! and who we had to expel. What is the solution to a case such as this? How should a revolutionary militant behave within the framework of the system?
We do not believe that it is possible to have one approach outside government and another once inside, for the sake of some supposed political reality. However, we do need to discuss this more, because equally we do not want to remain on the margins. Up to now, no one has found a solution to the problem of participation within the system. I think that there will have to be some serious thinking before it happens.
A debate has begun in the FA around its programme and also its alliances; it seems to appear 30 that the reformist elements are demanding a retreat from the anti-oligarchical and anti-imperialist principles of the programme on which it was found-ed. Their logic appears solid enough: "Even if the FA wins the elections, the left will not gain an absolute majority, therefore power will have to be shared with the traditional parties. The programme should accord with this reality and be based upon broad alliances which will en-sure a parliamentary majority. Further, it must only be an out-line and low-key, so as to avoid any possible confrontations with the ruling class or imperialism. To win government it is necessary to negotiate, make pacts and also, accept the idea of a centre-left government." This view is not only held by some in the FA, but also by members of the Brazilian
Workers' Party (PT), the Nicaraguan FSLN and El Salvador's
FMLN. They say that in the prevailing international situation there is no possibility of there being leftwing governments with radical programme. Is there, in your view, an alternative to this way of thinking?
I believe so. It is all rather like what comes first - the chicken or the egg? If we do become the government, then in order to be successful it is necessary to pare down the programme. However, so that the people actually vote for the FA, it must also reflect their needs. The two things are inextricable. If the FA does not reduce its programme and keeps that of 1971, then less people will vote for it and so the possibility of achieving government will be reduced. But we believe that it should keep the 1971 programme nevertheless.
Even if this places the chance to be the government at risk?
Even then, because what interests us is not achieving government but transforming the country; our aim is a real mass movement; for an FA government will meet such tremendous resistance that there is a real need to work for a politically conscious vote. The most important thing is that the FA should cement its advance and its popular support. We want to keep the 1971 programme, including the part on land reform - which is not spoken of today - but also for it to have convinced and organised support from the people, because it is going to meet with massive resistance from the bourgeoisie. Only the support of the people can keep an FA government in power. If the vote has shallow roots they will not come out to support an FA government should this become necessary.
For this reason we say that any desire to achieve government at any price is completely mistaken. It is not only counterproductive but could also lead to defeats the effects of which could last for decades. If the FA falls we shall all be damaged. So we are opposed to the reduction of the programme for the purpose of making agreements. For us the alternative is clear. The programme must be maintained at all costs.
Recently the problem of the external debt has again been raised. There appear to be voices within the FA which say that it must be paid because the contry has sufficient reserves, that it would not limit social investment in the future and also because non-payment or a moratorium would result in an immediate economic embargo.
Do you still support the original approach, taken in 1985, of non- payment?
The problem of the external debt continues to be fundamental to us to the extent that we will soon be making a fresh analysis, given that our present position is now some years old. However, one thing is clear: if the drain of interest continues in this country - for in reality the debt itself is not being repaid - there will be no money available for investment. It is impossible to take any more money from the people.
If a large part of our money goes abroad, then obviously it will not be available for the investment we need for development. For this reason we agree with the MPP's proposal that there should be a moratorium for three years and then we will see. I think that at best, a further moratorium will then have to be declared.
To those comrades who think that if we declare a moratorium or state that we will not pay there will be reprisals from the
1. The MLN forms part of the MPP; the MPP forms part of the FA.
International Viewpoint #247 July 1993 international banks, I would ask the following: if non-payment of the external debt would have serious consequences for the country, what is payment going to bring? By which I mean, with the huge social deterioration which is happening throughout the country, combined with the effect which the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) is already having, even though not yet in operation, surely it is better to face the possibility of a blockade in case it really does happen. I only say the possibility of a blockade because there is at least a doubt that it would in fact occur - Uruguay is a very small country and its external debt is minimal compared to that which exists internationally. I believe that what could happen if we do not pay has been over estimated. At any rate, we will work on our feeling that the people will stand against the disastrous effects of paying the debt.
Some leaders of the FA, Seregni amongst them, have raised the idea that if it does not win the
1994 elections but becomes the second largest national political force, it is almost inevitable that it will share in government, including in the cabinet What do you think of this?
Comrade Seregni's position is in keeping with particular approach held by others as well as him. In contrast, we believe that it is equally possible to be the opposition. The problem is that due to the multi-class character of the FA, there are a number of comrades who do not hold an anti-capitalist position, which involves believing that this system should be destroyed and replaced by another. We who hold a socialist position are always seeking a comingtogether of forces which will change the system.
Others, who consider themselves progressive, would merely improve things a little. We do not see why the FA must cogovern. Why should it? This attitude of seeking co-government explains certain positions which the FA have taken at various times; we saw one instance when Bush came and they gave him the keys of Montevideo, because in that way they could act as if they were the government. We see it when comrade Tavaré Vázquez says that he is the governor of all the citizens of Montevideo; he forgets that he must govern on the FA programme.
We are in total agreement with what Baille y Ordóñez said about "government by the party", in other words, you must be loyal to to the programme. After all, most of the people who voted for the FA in
Montevideo did so for its programme and for its proposals for local government. This is a matter which needs to be aired in the FA, because there are many comrades with different views.
It is three years since you became the local government in
Montevideo. I remember from an editorial in Tuparamos, that you said that the council (Intendencia) would open up a new front of struggle with the possibility of generating self-organi sation of the masses; and that the area community centres
(CCZ) could become "sources of popular power." What have you achieved?
I would say that we have advanced very little. The experiments being carried out by the CCZ are far from the beginning of a process of popular participation. I would say that this is where the least progress has been made. The FA council has carried out certain works, repaired some streets and so on; but for us, what was most important was to transform council into an experience of participation and political decision making — but this has not been achieved. We in the MLN are also responsible for this as well as the MPP militants. We have not followed through the CCZ into participatory and decision-making organisations. This must also be discussed within the FA, because many of the people now see the council only as a provider of services. This is how comrade Vázquez also sees it.
Do you still think that rather than speaking of a democratic state we should speak of "prevailing legality"?
Yes, because for us democracy cannot be said to exist. For us democracy has three dimensions — political, social and economic. We now have a number of political liberties which cannot be under-rated; things are different than under the military dictatorship. Yet, democracy does not exist. I do not mean this only in political terms. For example, access to the means of mass communication is very difficult for us, for, as we all know they are in the hands of the rich. Sometimes progressive forces are given access (I myself have been able to speak on television for a few minutes) but, in reality, they are not available in the same way.
How then do you explain that the left can govern the capital,
Montevideo, win a referendum against privatisations and possibly become the next national government?
Yet how much do these things affect real power? Has the system been changed in any way? are the rich less rich and the poor less poor? I would say no.
The appearance of change could become useful for bourgeois democracy.
Certainly. Although the left has made headway in the institutions, it is not proposing any drastic change to them. So long as the ruling class do not see their privileges threatened, a domesticated left is an escape valve. The apparent liberty now given by the system has created false illusions amongst sections of the left, but I have no doubt that as soon as the ruling class consider their interests in danger, the same will happen to us as in Chile.
Does your anti-establishment position explain why the Tupamaros are not putting up candidates in the elections? Will you keep to this decision?
Possibly, but it is subject which will be discussed again so that we know what to do in the future. We cannot pretend that the establishment does not exist. We are not on principle opposed to intervention in the institutions.
The MLN is having its sixth
National Congress; within a few months the MPP will have its second Congress. Why is the
MPP not being discussed at the
MLN Congress?
There was already a firm position on the MPP, that it must be an organisation of the masses while the MLN will realise its work for the masses separately from the MPP. By this I mean that our comrades will carry out tasks on different fronts -with workers, with women, in the slums, through the medium of the MPP. This is because we define ourselves as a militant cadre organisation, although this is as yet more an aspiration. Membership of the MLN is selective. There is a need for a political organisation where the masses can build political experience and the MPP is adequate for this. *
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