Pan-Hellenic modernisation?
THE victory of the Greek Socialist Party (PASOK) in the recent elections represents a defensive response by working people hit hard by the crisis and by the ultra-liberal policies of the outgoing New Democracy (ND)
government of Kostas Mitsotakis. But the rightwing parties managed a respectable score (45%) and the Greek social democrats, previously
International Viewpoint #250 November 1993
The visit came at a time of growth of a nationalist and orthodox fundamentalist current which goes beyond the bounds of the ND and has in part destabilised it. The first act of the former king was to pay hommage to Macedonia - Greek land - hounded out of office for corruption, seem tempted by French and
Spanish-style "socialism". The following article — written before the recent elections were called — analyses New Democracy's collapse and the deepgoing crisis into which Greece has been plunged.
ANDREAS SARTZEKIS — Athens, 29 August 1993
RESSURES to bring forward
P the election date, a measure initially opposed by Mitsotakis and the ND, became increasingly strong within the rightwing itself. The right was going through a major crisis with little room for manoeuvre. The choise was between changing the prime minister and bringing forward elections. In choosing the latter path, the right hoped to save face and perhaps capitalise on the opposition's sluggishness.
As such, PASOK has been returned to government essentially thanks to the internal contradictions of the right.
A wealthy layabout
A sign of the ill health of the right was the "private" visit of the former king of
Greece, Constantin Gligsburg. Since the
1974 referendum which ended the monarchist regime and relegated this accomplice of the 1967-1974 dictatorship of the colonels to the dustbin of history, Constantin has been a wealthy layabout. From his gold-plated exile, Constantin, who has never recognised the results of the referendum, has been increasing the number of provocations, demanding, for example, the return of royal properties now in the public domain.
The ex-king landed in Salonica at the beginning of August, taking advantage of the legal confusion regarding his visiting rights, and made a visit as a "simple" citizen with his family.
This excursion gave the monarchist current inside and outside the ND coverage well out of proportion to its threadbare existence: the trip was reported on a major private television network owned by a monarchist; there was a semi-official welcome organised by some ND deputies; and he met with an orthodox current with fascist tendencies.
The government's behaviour had a tragi-comic flavour to it. Constantin was ordered not to make any political declarations (he made several) and not to get off his yacht, going so far as to send two warships to "threaten" him. Nevertheless, he came ashore to the cheers of a nostalgic crowd of reactionaries.
This provocative visit is above all a sign of the right's inability to appear modern and democratic. A number of its deputies openly displayed their support for a personality who remains widely hated for the role he played under the dictatorship. At the same time, the concessions made to these deputies and the ND's inability to expel the former king show that, whatever it may say, it remains organically linked to the most reactionary currents in Greek society.
The ND's attempted ideological reorientation is a total failure. Another consequence of the former king's visit was the impression of powerlessness the
This government, so quick to arrest union and anti-nationalist activists, looked ridiculous during this episode - full of threats yet powerless before the sovereign's haughtiness. This provoked the anger of the president of the Republic, Caramanlis, who even threatened to resign this, from a president who can hardly be suspected of being a leftwinger!
The "king affair" revealed the existence in Greece of a monarchist current, however weak. Certain regions, such as Mani, in lower Peloponnisos, and the island of Spétsai, are its small bastions.
which over the last two years has become the object of a national cult, both opportunist and worrying, against the "pretensions" of the ex-Yugoslav Macedonian Republic (Skopje).
The right implodes
The privatisation of the telephone system (OTE), a profitable firm, provided another opportunity to see the right tear itself apart. The government wanted to sell a part of the OTE to a foreign firm which would de facto get full control over the enterprise in the name of efficiency and modernisation. And this was put forward in the middle of the summer, while most of the workers were on vacation!
Last year the government pulled a similar stunt in the summer when it broke up the last Athens public bus network (EAS), handing a defeat to the workers after a severe struggle which was isolated by the left parties.
All the ingredients had been assembled to make the vote on privatising OTE a mere formality. The demonstrations organised against it (with the support of the banking and electrical workers unions) attracted very few people, although there was growing participation.
But things got more complicated after an unexpected development: the union linked to the government raised a big noise and its leadership opposed the sale of OTE — in the name of defending the national wealth, opposing layoffs, and the fear of having a Turkish company one day control the country's telecommunications network (and perhaps military communications along with it!). This obsessional fear of "the Turkish enemy" is in no way confined to the ranks of the right.
A public debate was then launched, during which forme and current heads of the telephone company demonstrated that, in the course of a few years, OTE had clearly improved its network and that, moreover, even a controlled privatisation - under domestic or foreign control — would not bring any technical improvements. The aim of the whole business, the-
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GREECE
International Viewpoint #250 November 1993 refore, was to fill State coffers — perhaps with some money changing hands under the table, as had already occurred in the
Rightwing deputies decided to refuse to vote for the privatisation, more out of opportunism than disagreement. Mitsotakis had to go to great lengths to secure party discipline on the vote. The deep crisis of the Greek right thus appeared in broad daylight; disagreement was not in relation to the economic programme but on government authority and ideological homogeneity.
Scandals and patronage
The Greek right is seen in the light of its scandals and patronage. PASOK lost the elections in 1989 for lesser crimes than that! At that time, it should be recalled, the Stalinists waged a campaign to explain that the right had reformed and democratised, and that as a result it was necessary to make an alliance with it to get rid of the scandal-ridden PASOK
Nevertheless, the right's electorate has to recognise that "its" government applied its programme, to the great satisfaction of the European bourgeoisie which would like to see things go further still. The Economy Minister Stephanos Manos declared, "During the eighteen months of my time in office, nothing has prevented me from 16 going forward. When I draw the balance sheet of my work, I think it will be a posi-
"Modernisation" has been the battle cry of the right's economic policy. The economy was described as — due to PASOK, the bureaucracy and insufficient insertion into Europe. Hit by PASOK's austerity measures and disoriented, many working people accepted the following equation: PASOK equals no modernisation equals scandals
A rightwing government took power in June 1989 with a wide margin for manoeuvre. From then on attacks in all the different sectors were carried out in the name of "modernisation". These attacks included the closure of firms said to be unprofitable, attacks on the public sector and the sale, often to foreigners, of a part of the public sector in an attempt to cut back the enormous State debt.
In four years the government either sold or attempted to sell a great amount: Athens' buses; islands (!); the telephone system; the part of the Parnassos mountain with the country's major ski centre; the Xenia hotel chain (property of the State tourism authority; and a new airport near Athens. They are planning to sell the national airline, Olympiaki, and privatise the national electricity board, DEI. The list goes on. This full throttle liberalism was accompanied by "inevitable" layoffs, even when, from a capitalist point of view, the sectors involved were profitable.
There have also been enterprise shutdowns, particularly of public firms seen as being unprofitable - the textile industry and shipbuilding (on the island of Syros) have been the hardest hit.
### Pockets of misery
While EEC leaders were congratulating Mitsotakis for his realism, Greece was becoming a real "western" capitalist country. In July, there were officially 900 jobs lossed for every working day. While the official number of unemployed is less than 200,000, other sources place it at more than 400,000 — in a country of ten million
Veritable pockets of misery have appeared. 40% of workers in Syra, the capital of Syros, are unemployed; there are now soup kitchens in Laurion, in the south of Athens. Traditional "hidden work" is no longer sufficient to contain the daily economic difficulties, especially since 1989 as prices have skyrocketed.
Some do not hesitate to say that the country has been sold to foreigners, to make it a tourist reserve. This sentiment, born of the very history of the country, has to be understood by genuinely leftwing activists who have to be able to translate it into mobilisations of international solidarity, into a critical defense of the country's heritage and to protect the environment (an area of struggle that has given rise to a series of impressive united struggles).
Even if tourism remains the main source of foreign exchange, in certain fields Greek capitalism is quite enterprising and competitive. And this was not hindered by eight years of PASOK government; on the contrary, they opened up markets in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans. Greek industrialists quickly understood the role they could play. Even in the new stigmatised State of the ex-republic of Macedonia, Greek enterprises are being set up, and their heads have certainly not been thrown in prison for this!
30 to 40% of the capital of several of the most important Greek corporations is held by foreign companies. The Greek State plays a irreplaceable role in the integration of European and American companies in the Balkans. In return, Greece is given support on the international stage, especially within the EEC where up until now it had been criticised and even
The right seemed to have a number of points in its favour in the run-up to elections, at least in order to present a united
International Viewpoint #250 November 1993 image. But its policies have created their own contradictions. In the eyes of Greek employers, for example, the government has been too timid with anti-inflation measures, in filling State coffers, with the cutting of the public services, and in its assistance to investment and exports.
Fearing the reappearance of traditional clientelist hiring practices in the run-up to the elections, employers have warned the government. This is a good example of the contradictions at work. On the one hand, enterprise heads want a "strict control of State spending," and on the other they want household consumption to increase. They have also criticised the government for going ahead with privatisations that weren't fully in their interests! The policies pursued by the right have not created the conditions for a "modern conservative" project.
While struggles against austerity have been difficult - and never victorious — key events were the mobilisation of high school students in the winter of 1990 and the EAS mobilisation last year. Discontent quickly grew in leaps and bounds.
In the face of a possible defeat, the right has been divided over a classic question: how to save the fort without being in disagreement over essential questions. The government has chosen to make demonstrations of force that give cause for concern and reveal its weakness. A repressive arsenal has been put into place: the police against union activists; trials against anti-nationalist activists; and harassment of anarchists, such as Epaminondas Skeftoulis who was tried, acquitted and then arrested again. There has also been recourse to para-State practices - revealed by the major scandal around the telephone taps on both rightwing and leftwing figures. This has given rise to the reappearance of the trabouki and other Mafia-type
A section of rightwing youth came into conflict with the ND, seen as too authoritarian and which was responsible for an education policy which led to massive protests by high school and college students. Recently, with tremendous media fanfare, a new organisation, "Political Spring", was formed under the auspices of the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonis Samaras, whose only visible quality is that he is in his forties.
The main feature of this movement, described as the political event of the year, is that it is indistinguishable from ND while saying that it is a totally new force. For the moment, it is a refuge for all manner of opportunists, such as the leftwing deputy Lentakis. Given ample coverage by the media and financed by industrialists worried about the discrediting of their traditional party, this movement might play an important transitional role.
For the moment, it is trying to increase its popularity. Two or three deputies, elected on the ND ticket, have rallied to Samaras. The future of this movement will depend above all on the policy pursued by the left, on the concessions it does or does not make to it - especially on the question of nationalism.
The situation appears less "hot" than one year ago, when all anti-nationalist activists who demanded the right of the new Macedonian State from ex-Yugoslavia to choose its name were arrested and imprisoned. It is not so much international protests that calmed things down as Mitsotakis' conviction that in a few years everyone will have forgotten the debates that have shaken up Greece regarding the "threats" from its northern neighbour of 1.5 million inhabitants. The real interest of the Greek bourgeoisie is to establish good relations with the new Macedonian State.
A classic strategy The nationalist policy and repression are part of a classic strategy that turns the population's attention away from the real issues, in a climate of chauvinism and class collaboration. From this point of view, there has been some real success. Many workers and youth have fallen into the trap. But there may be too much success; at a certain point the government had to cool things down in order to guarantee the longer term interests of the Greek bourgeoisie in the region. What's more, the imperialist disorder does not need another conflict in the Balkans.
The slight retreat that followed provided an opportunity to see the extent of the disaster that had been unleashed. Mitsotakis was not only denounced from the right (Samaras resigned), but also accused of capitulation by a part of the left (PASOK). Nearly all political forces were inflexible in their refusal of the "Macedonia" label
Deeper than that, a new aggressive nationalism is now out in the open today, throughout Greek society, taking advantage of the Balkan crisis. Turkey is singled out as the "traditional enemy". While it is true that Turkey is entirely responsible for the impasse in Cyprus, Turkey is blamed for all the problems in the Balkans, whether in Bosnia, Albania, or in Greek Thrace where the Turkish minority officially Muslim) is treated as potentially dangerous and stirred up by agitators in the pay of Ankara. The two Muslim deputies are regularly denounced as Turkish agents, even though they align themselves with the Mitsotakis right.
The second enemy is of course Skopje, the capital of the former Macedonian republic of ex-Yugoslavia, even though there haven't recently been any major mobilisations around this question.
### Crisis in Albania
The crisis in Albania, seen through anti-Turk eyes, has recently taken a turn not necessarily favoured by the Greek bourgeoisie, which should be interested by the fall of the Stalinist regime. The origin
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International Viewpoint #250 November 1993 of current tensions is two-fold and concerns northern Epirus, a region of southern Albania inhabited mostly by Greeks (nobody in Greece calls them an Orthodox minority!).
On the one hand there is the repressive policy of the Albanian president, Sali Berisha, who, unable to formulate a plan for economic development, is himself trying to stir up nationalist sentiments. He accuses Greek agents of provocation (a priest was expelled) and calls for the recognition of the Albanian minority in Gree-
On the Greek side, there is a call for the defense of minority rights (language, religion, housing, and so forth). But while this struggle has been resolutely waged by the Orthodox archdiocese of Tirana, the Greek government itself has fuelled the fires of hatred and division. In reply to Berisha, the Greek government expelled thousands of clandestine Albanian refugees using methods that recall sinister chapters of the region's history.
While there may have been scattered acts of protest, the government relied on the feeling of insecurity to which the presence of these totally uprooted refugees — with no support structures in Greece — has given rise in the population. A few murders led Greeks to see the Albanians as savages that could never be assimilated.
At the same time, a section of the right demanded, in complete contempt of international treaties, autonomy for northern Epirus. They were joined in this by certain PASOK forces — subsequently silenced, for the moment in any event.
With the background of the crisis in the Balkans, a very aggressive nationalism is making itself felt now in Greece. The fascist current has undeniably benefited from this. Neo-Nazi groups participated in the demonstrations for a "Macedonia which has been Greek for 4,000 years" and have been involved in physical attacks. But their influence (which is also present in various groups of sports fans) is for the moment very limited.
What is more worrying is the crossover of two tendencies. On the one hand, there is a worried and aggressive nationalism (the current form of the traditional notion of Hellenism), in whose name thousands of Greeks were "repatriated" from Crimea — where they always lived — to be settled in Thrace alongside the Turkish minority. Foreign journalists are berated for the slightest criticism of "Greece".
On the other hand, the crystallisation of a fundamentalist Christian Orthodox current, personified by the former priest friends of the colonels' junta, which has secured central positions in the religious 18 hierarchy — leading to an open war in its ranks, including slogans, fisticuffs and court cases. This current is rearing its head now as a result of the Balkan crisis and a semi-official offensive which, more than ever, equates nation and religion. A common interpretation of the break-up of Yugoslavia is one which blames joint pressure from the Vatican and Muslims on the Orthodox Church.
This explains near full Greek alignment with Serbian positions This alignment goes from the Communist Party (KKE) which defends, alongside a section of the far-left, Stalinist gains against imperialist aggression, to PASOK and the right who are touched to hear someone like Milosevic defending the Orthodox tradi-
Recently, a report from the secret services was published in the press; it said plain and simply that a genuine Greek citizen could be nothing other than Orthodox and that everyone else was a semi-citizen. The report provoked an emotional response, especially from Catholics (there are many in the Cyclade islands) and the small Jewish community. There are only a few voices, such as a woman leader of a current with origins in the KKE, calling for the immediate separation of Church and
Anti-fascist mobilisation
Two examples demonstrate how Greece is at the crossroads. In June, in Corfu, an island in the Ionian Sea, the French fascist leader Jean Marie Le Pen was silenced by a broad anti-fascist and internationalist mobilisation that brought together Albanian and Polish workers. But in August, the inhabitants of Kefallonia, another Ionian island, invited the Serbian butcher Karadzic and wanted to make him an honorary citizen. How long can such contradictions last? And how will they be resolved?
Since late 1991, the main concern of PASOK leaders has been to avoid any mobilisation which might lead to the early holding of elections. A cold shower awaited the tens of thousands of participants at meetings organised by the social democrats up until that point. The same goes for the EAS (Athens bus system) workers whose determined struggle last year was largely sabotaged by PASOK party leader Andreas Papandreou's calls for calm.
PASOK wanted to re-take power by profiting from the crisis of the right, but certainly not by relying on a powerful wave of mass struggle. To this end, their message, "we have changed!", is both true and deceptive at the same time. But the internal regime has not changed; Papandreou is above criticism, and dissident voices have been silenced. And only the brave come forward with openly social democratic proposals. Indeed, the message is addressed primarily to the European bourgeoisie as if to say, "Don't be afraid. We will no longer dabble in populism; we will be rigorous with our austerity."
A PASOK victory might postpone some of the attacks that would be immediate under a victorious rightwing. But in the absence of significant mass struggles and self-organisation, the situation will surely deteriorate further still. And we can be sure that certain ultra-nationalist PASOK deputies, such as Papathemelis from Salonica, will lead working people into a blind ally.*