A blood-drenched fiasco
THE trial run for large-scale application of the right to humanitarian intervention by an armed force of the United Nations has turned into a blood-drenched fiasco. In the space of a few weeks of conflict with one of the leaders of the Somali factions, General Farah Aïdeed, American
International Viewpoint #250 November 1993 regime survive and denied victory to the guerilla groups. In the end, it was a semispontaneous uprising that did in the Siad
Barre regime.
During the most severe part of the civil forces have killed or injured 1,500 Somali civilians. They have lost one quarter of the 400 Rangers (twelve killed, one taken prisoner, and 75 injured, severely in many cases) rushed to the region to apprehend the
Somali warlord. This is clearly the first time since the Vietnam War that the American army has been humbled in such a way.
FRANCIS CAZALS - 11 October 1993
Nan attempt to get out of this mess,
President Bill Clinton has just announced a strengthening of US military presence in Somalia (3,500 extra troops along with war planes and tanks) and a calendar for the withdrawal of American troops by 31 March
1994. The French and Belgian contingents of ONUSOM 2 are also supposed to leave by the end of the year. Between now and then, American leaders hope to get a political agreement out of the Somali factions, with the objective of achieving a skillful and honorable exit from the conflict.
One year after the arrival of US marines in Mogadishu in the framework of
Operation Restore Hope, in December
1992, things have moved far away from the high principles invoked to justify the intervention. Dressed up in humanitarian clothing, the intervention was meant to appear to international public opinion as a good deed, of a kind that would make people forget the savage "surgical"
demonstration of force by the USA and its allies against Iraq.
Intense ideological campaign
The operation was preceded by an intense ideological campaign. To better justify the military course of action, UN
Secretary General Boutro Boutros-Ghali claimed that 80% of humanitarian aid sent to Somalia was being stolen — a figure that non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) considered highly exaggerated.
Operation Restore Hope was justified with such pious talk that the NGOs that supported it forgot that an armed intervention unleashes a military and police logic contrary to humanitarian objectives. Some
NGO heads are now making this bitter
12 observation. The president of Médecins Sans Frontières-France, Rony Brauman, has recently denounced this military logic in a pamphlet called Le crime humanitaire ("The humanitarian crime").!
After having long supported the dictatorship of President Siad Barre, especially after the war against in Ethiopia in 1977, and after having supplied it with significant subsidies and large quantities of arms, the United States and other Western coun tries gradually lost interest in him. Somalia lost its strategic interest after the fall of the Berlin Wall. One after another, foreign embassies closed their doors in Mogadishu, while the country slid into civil war.
For Italy, the Siad Barre regime served as a pivotal point for redirecting development aid into the accounts of Italian political parties, to the Italian Socialist Party first and foremost. Italy and Egypt tried to the very last to save the Siad Barre regime. They then tried in vain to guarantee a peaceful transfer of power to very recent opponents of Siad Barre - the Manifesto group, in its majority made up of Hawiye traders. This group is now close to the current interim Somali "president", Mohammed Ali Mehdi, who "governs" the northern part of the capital.
In this way, Rome and Cairo were hoping to avoid the violent overthrow of the "friendly" Somali regime at the hands of the three guerilla groups that were fighting it: the Somali National Movement (SNM) of the Issaks of the northwest (who have proclaimed the independence of Somaliland); the United Somali Congress (USC) of the Hawiye-Habr Gedir of General Aïdeed; and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) of Omar Jess (made up of Ogadenis from the south).
Italy and Egypt helped the Siad Barre war and famine that followed, in 1991 and during a good part of 1992, the international community showed no interest whatsoever in Somalia. In a new book, a journalist for the French daily Libération, Stephen Smith, recalls that the Siad Barre regime was overthrown amidst general indifference in January 1991, during the Gulf War. At the time, Smith was the only journalist in Mogadishu and certainly one of the few Westerners there.?
What followed was a power struggle between the two factions of the USC (Aideed's and Ali Mahdi's) and a fight by Aïdeed's partisans against attempts by Siad Barre loyalists to return to power. Together, this plunged the country into famine. According to several NGOs, the most dramatic period of this famine was between the middle of 1992 until the autumn. A gruesome statistic: while remaining high, the mortality rate decreased, but only after the most vulnerable sections of the population were decimated. When the UN began its humanitarian intervention, it was already too late. The worst of the famine had already subsided.
But the reports of CNN and the international media on the famine produced the desired result. On the eve of handing over power to his successor, former US President George Bush decided to send Gls to Somalia within the framework of Operation Restore Hope. Their mandate was to be that of protecting shipments of humani-
Many have wondered as to the real motivations of the United States. To explain this humanitarian military intervention, some have brought to light the American interest in oil exploration and their desire to reactivate their old airbase in Berbera. However, there is no decisive strategic factor worthy enough for the United States in Somalia. Clearly, we have to be satisfied with an explanation that combines a number of factors foreign to Somalia itself: media pressure (the CNN syndrome); an internal political "coup" (George
1. Rony Brauman, 'Le crime humanitaire', Editions Arlea, September 1993.
2. Stephen Smith, 'Somalie: la guerre perdue de l'humanitaire', Calmann-Levy, 1993.
----- pull-quotes on this page -----
SOMALIA
International Viewpoint #250 November 1993
Bush wanting a glorious departure); the desire to inaugurate a new version of US global policing; and as a diversion from pressures to intervene in Bosnia.
Negotiated ahead of time with the two Somali factions in Mogadishu, the landing of US marines for American prime time television in the presence of dozens of journalists was without military risk. Followed by a fictitious reconciliation between Aïdeed and his rival Ali Mehdi — in the Mogadishu headquarters of the American oil company CONOCO -Operation Restore Hope resembled something like a Sunday stroll. But in reality it was the prelude to a a blood-drenched military debacle.
The American schedule was soon upset by the failure of the Aïdeed-Ali Mehdi reconciliation, a failure which was predicted by observers familiar with the Somali political and military puzzle. From then on, the foreign intervention was projected into the long-term. In order to handle the situation, the torch was passed on to the United Nations for the second UN operation in Somalia, called ONUSOM 2: an international contingent under American command given an offensive mandate of "imposing peace".
After a few months, this arrangement improved somewhat the distribution process so vital to the reconstruction of the country. But the national conferences organised by the UN proved futile. One of the local military leaders, General Aïdeed, has endlessly manoeuvred to keep his autonomy in relation to the political initiatives of ONUSOM 2. American leaders soon understood that Aïdeed, unpredictable and authoritarian, had his own agen-
The political impasse of ONUSOM 2 further developed the military logic unleashed by the United States. Yesterday's ally Aïdeed became enemy number one for the USA and UN. Had he agreed to play the game of Somali reconciliation that would let the GIs go home, he would have been the USA's great pal.
But the logic of his role as a military leader and a contender for full control over Somalia led him, among other things, to oppose any reconciliation with the Siad Barre partisans of the Somali National Front (SNF). The SMF is led by Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan", the son-in-law of the deposed dictator, also known as the butcher of Hargeisa, a town in the northwest of the country that he had razed to the ground by the airforce in 1989.
This division led to a rise in tension in the spring of 1993 between Aïdeed's partisans and the UN. The political leaders of ONUSOM 2 put forward the idea of a reconciliation of clan leaders from the centre and south of the country, including Morgan's SNF. But General Aïdeed was opposed to this. Instead of finding himself alone with this position, he was supported by a part of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which regroups many Mejertein and which up until then was opposed to Aïdeed and accepted dialogue. But these talks ejected Morgan and marginalised the UN.
The ONUSOM 2 bureaucrats sabotaged this initiative. It is in this context that the murderous exchange between Aïdeed partisans and Pakistani UN forces took place on 5 June in Mogadishu. This was the pretext Washington used to begin their campaign against the general and his sup-
Progressively, this standoff became an indiscriminate war against Aïdeed's entire clan, the Hebr Gedir, which led to a closing of ranks around him. General Aïdeed also received the support of Islamic groups; he became a symbol of the crystallisation of opposition to the presence of foreign troops. This sentiment spread throughout the population, fuelled by the numerous exactions of the UN troops.
Describing the behaviour of American and Belgian soldiers in Belgium in Kisimayo as that of "roughnecks", Rony Brauman says that, "At least several dozen people have been killed during 'checks' and roadblocks, without for all that provoking any response from the United Nations administration. Sexual aggression and openly racist violence had become the daily fare in Kisimayo under the 'protection' of the "blue helmets' . There is nothing surprising, then, that during the first months of the year more than one third of surgery beds at the hospital were occupied by victims of the blue helmets'." Brauman ends his pamphlet asking, "Who will protect us from such protectors?"
Whatever their mission, UN contingents have always behaved as if they were
3. ONUSOM 2 never really tried to disarm the Somali factions; the "legal" basis for its war against Aïdeed (who is accused of committing crimes against humanity) has been criticised, including by the legal services of the UN. It is difficult to agree with Boutros Ghali when he holds Aïdeed responsible for the death of 350,000 Somalis. On one hand, no one knows if this is how many people actually died as a result of the famine; on the other hand, Aïdeed is not the only one responsible for this. What about General "Morgan" who held Baidoa, Somalia's city of death?
13
International Viewpoint #250 November 1993 in a conquered country. But the difference in Somalia resides in the mandate that gives them the right to use arms to "impose peace". Also, since the beginning suspicious deaths of Somalis have multiplied. We need only recall the French legionnaires who, upon arriving in Mogadishu, killed a half dozen Somalis because their truck did not stop in time at a checkpoint.
In total, these "accidents" have been commonplace and have without doubt claimed hundreds of victims - perhaps more — to be added to the civilians used as targets by the Americans and UN troops in Mogadishu over the last three months. The Belgians are accused of having claimed hundreds of lives in Kisimayo and an internal inquiry is now underway in the Belgian army. The Canadians have acknowledged one murder; Canadian soldiers have been handed court martials and a Somali family has been awarded compen-
The 400 American Rangers alone have been responsible for 1,500 dead and injured over a period of a few weeks. In Mogadishu, hospitals are overflowing with those injured by the UN's "peaceful" force. As such, the city has gone from a state of emergency for food to one for medical material; NGOs have just sent surgical teams.
An irony of history: the racism of UN troops has not only been directed at Somalis. Take, for example, the organisation of UN troops during many of their operations — the Americans are in their armored cars and the Pakistanis are on foot, and thus most exposed to danger. Another revealing anecdote: during an encounter with Aïdeed supporters, the "Pakis" (as they are condescendingly called by American officers) called for reinforcements but the nearest contingent, the Saudis, did not lift a finger. In case we forgot, in the oil kingdom Pakistanis are nothing more than immigrant workers.
However, the human cost of ONUSOM 2 is difficult to determine with precision. The practice of the American High Command has always been to refuse to make any tally of "enemy" and civilian losses. Since the beginning of the manhunt in June, UN troops and US Rangers have carried out a number of operations against civilian targets.
These have been too systematic to be counted as mere accidents. Rather, we are dealing with a gunboat policy. In passing, we can point to the assault on the headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the bombing of a hospital and the attack on a marketplace. More comically, a torturer in the old regime, the former head of police unde Siad 14
Barre, was arrested after a commando operation - the Rangers had confused him with General Aïdeed.
While UN forces control the skies, they do not control the land in the south of Mogadishu, which is in the hands of Aïdeed supporters. This area is in a semiinsurrectional situation. More than once UN troops have been fired upon by local militia who refuse to allow them into their
Having chosen the Habr Gedir (a subclan of the Mawiya) as a target, US militarism implies a logic of ethnic purification Aïdeed supporters are of rural extraction, from the centre of the country. Recruited by the USC, often young, they have separated themselves from their family ties and settled in the city since the fall of Sian Barre. These socio-clan categories have everything to lose in the event of General Aïdeed's marginalisation.
On the other hand, the other Mawiya clan, the Abgals, which supports President Ali Mehdi and the UN intervention, recruits its leaders from the city's commercial bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie never stopped doing business under the old government and was involved in various negotiation attempts with Siad Barre. It was more natural for former Siad Barre dignitaries to be recycled in their ranks.
As a result, the clan polarisation that characterises the Somali conflict - and not only in the capital — compromises any attempted national reconstruction. There is no longer a clan-political force that places its strategy in a genuinely national and cross-clan framework, except perhaps for the Islamic groups. There are at best temporary inter-clan alliances among the local populations, which are usually the work of military leaders and leave no space for autonomous and interclan political and social activity for the local populations. The few spaces for inter-clan exchange, such as the Idaa women's NGO, have experienced tremendous problems since the UN's militarisation of the capital.
The Somali pipe dream
While he may get his support from pauperised layers of the population, General Aïdeed does not represent a popular and inter-clan alternative - far from it. The very reconstruction of the Somali State seems to be a pipe dream. The Somali peoples share a common language and religion, but their lifestyle, agrarian and pastoral, and their many deepgoing clan divisions propel them more towards a kind of regional administration - based on the territorialisation of each clan — than towards a national and centrally administered State.
The Somali State appears to have functioned only to play a coercive, military role, and to manage the unequal distribution of international aid. The functions of the State disappeared as the old regime shrivelled up around the clan of President Siad Barre. When foreign aid started drying up, the centralising role of the administration disappeared along with the Siad Barre regime.
As a result, the reconstruction of a State based on Somalia's borders appears illusory. On the one hand, Somaliland has already seceded in the northwest. At the same time, the territory of the Mejertein, in the northeast, is has a kind of quasi-autonomy. Elsewhere, Somalia has collapsed into feudal forms of political-clan rule, with the resultant ethnic purification based on the relationship of forces — thus upsetting the old division of territory along clan lines. The implosion of Somalia is inescapable — save for an artificial preservation through a long-term UN military presence that would make Somalia a UN protectora-
Somalia is but an extreme case of the social disintegration of the countries of the region. To varying degrees, the political and ethnic equilibria of the other States of the Horn of Africa are also at risk. The domination of an Issa clan in Djibouti provoked an armed Afars rebellion. Daniel Arap Moi's rule, based on a grouping of ethnic minorities, is strongly contested by Kenya's two major ethnic groups, the Kikuyo and Luo. In Ethiopia, administrative regionalisation was the response of the new authorities to the rise of demands for autonomy — yet this is no guarantee that the country will not go through a painful
And beyond, the American war against Aïdeed is seen by Muslim fundamentalists as the first phase of intervention against the Islamic Republic of Sudan. US aggression is stirring up the anti-Western sentiments of the peoples of the region which, given the absence of other radical currents, Will probably benefit the Islamic groups. Every time the Americans suffer a reversal in Somalia, the possibility of American military intervention in southern Sudan is pushed that much further into the future.
In order to secure "humanitarian corridors" for the transport of food aid to southern Sudan, several American leaders had planned such an intervention. Henceforth, they will think twice before making such moves. Indeed, in the light of the Somali experience, American strategists will be re-examining both their use of UN cover and previous approaches to the possibility of intervention in the former Yugoslavia.*