No "great leap forward"
International Viewpoint #256 May 1994
THE mid-1992 awakening of public opinion on the question of the European Union (EU) was a political development of major importance. The Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992 and tailor-made for big capital, was to signal a "great leap forward" in the process of European unification - from the Common Market to political and monetary union. But the ink was barely dry when the Treaty went into crisis. FRANÇOIS VERCAMMEN Brussels, 22 April 1994
T HE Danish referendum of
June 1992 and the French referendum of September 1992 demonstrated the limited legitimacy of the European Community (EC) among the people. Social explosions in Greece in the summer of 1992 and in Italy in October 1992 were the first to come up against the "criteria of convergence" the "norms" contained in the Treaty for inflation, the budgetary deficit, the public debt and long and short-term interest rates — in whose name governments justified their policies of brutal austerity.
In September 1992 the first major crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS) showed how little the European bourgeoisies adhered to the accord that had just been signed. This division within big European capital only confirmed the rivalry which had already led Germany, France and Great Britain to intervene — each in their own way — in crisis-ridden Yugoslavia to increase their sphere of influence. The combination of these three crises created a radical political turning point for the EC (which has since become, and will hereafter be referred to as the European Union, EU).
Since that time, the EU periodically lurches towards catastrophe. Instead of approaching the famous "norms", we are moving away from them. Instead of
### EUROPE convergence, there is a divergence of policies. There is a problem of credibility. Behind all these crises are the fundamental contradictions of the EU, which are aggravated by the long economic depression. But it is above all the voluntarist attempt to go from a free trade zone to political-State union that is the driving force behind the current crisis.
The Single European Act (which was adopted in 1985 and took effect in 1993) put the finishing touches to a large market in which capital, goods and workers would circulate freely. As for the Maastricht Treaty (which was adopted in December 1991, signed in February 1992 and officially applied from November 1993), its goal is the establishment of a political and monetary union.
There seems to be a logical link between the two, with the second flowing from the first. A single currency would be favourable for trade and capital circulation; European citizenship would be favourable for the circulation of the work force; and the centralisation of the police apparatus (through the Schengen component of Maastricht) and the military (with the Western European Union and the Euro-brigade) would provide for the harmonious functioning of European territory.
### Embryo
But this is not what is happening. The Maastricht Treaty puts European unification on another level altogether, that of the creation of the embryo of a "supranational State apparatus". As a result it creates two sources of high tension from on high.
In the first place, it removes a number of prerogatives from the orbit of the national States. National States, although they have lost a lot of their legitimacy, continue to play a decisive role in maintaining social cohesion and reproducing conditions for the proper functioning of capitalism. As such, the European State apparatus seems at the same time to be both indispensable and irresponsible.
In the second place, this contradiction is heightened by the fact that the European proto-State apparatus intervenes with constraints to "harmonise" a number of financial and political conditions in all the member countries of the EU. But these member States are products of a very uneven development, with histories going back two or more centuries, and with very immediate "political" histories. Enormous economic and geopolitical interests are at play.
The explosive character of these inter-imperialist contradictions was demonstrated through the two murderous wars that took place over the period of thirty years earlier this century. These contradictions have not disappeared even if their form may have evolved through the massive interpenetration of the different economies and the Europeanisation of certain sectors of big
As such, the big bourgeoisie's determination to support European unification - including on the supra-national level —runs directly up against the differences in the various countries.
Most British manufacturing exports are now directed to the European continent, even if the majority of profits of British financial and industrial firms still originate outside of the EU. This allows for a fine "free trade" agreement with Germany, which remains a leading exporter of manufactured goods
Weakness
France is a second-rate economic power. It compensates the weakness of "its merchandise" with diplomatic initiatives and a handful of post-colonial wars. Its ability to win a share of the market in the world arena depends — more than for other major EU members — on its specifically political weight (which de Gaulle understood). This is why France insists on a political Europe.
For its part, the German bourgeoisie is not opposed to a political Europe by any stretch of the imagination. It knows that for reasons related to recent history it must imperatively cloak its economic power in the garments of European institutions - including handing over some power to the European parliament.
As such, Germany was forced, by Maastricht and following French pressure, to prove its loyalty to a political Europe. The German mark will anchor the future single currency which will be
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International Viewpoint #256 May 1994 under EU control. But this is only a promise. Germany will not accept the idea of an "automatic" passage to a single currency and bank - even though this is in the Treaty, on condition that "the criteria for convergence are met"
Germany will make a political judgement, because it has its eyes on the East. This is not to torpedo the EU — essential for its foreign trade — but to win the EU to its own perspectives of outflanking the Americans and the Japanese in the scramble for potential new markets, from Prague to Vladivostok. And until further notice, this means fully harnessing of all State and economic mechanisms on the national level.
Many more examples could be cited.
For example, German capitalism had the economic and political strength to integrate its working class movement - which must be the world's largest and best organised - into the State apparatus and even into the enterprises (the mittbestimmung). For its part, the French employers never thought of this idea. And the British ruling class is ready to do anything to protect the "comparative advantage" which it secured following Thatcher's brutal defeat of the trade union movement.
Youth in France showed that victories are possible
But it is definitely around the question of the single currency - both a powerful symbol and a real issue - that the contradictions of European unification are centred at the present time. A single currency would definitely be beneficial for trade and commerce. But it first requires budgetary, tax and financial harmony. And this means that the social and economic policies of EU governments are all up for grabs.
As a result, there is an increasing disparity in the division of money (for example, with regard to pay and welfare benefits) between the social classes and 6 even between different sections of these classes. The living conditions of mil-
One proof that money is not just a "general equivalent" for measuring the "value" of merchandise is to compare prices from one country to the next. It becomes clear that it is a social relationship — that is, a question of the relationship of forces between classes in each country and also between ruling classes within the EU. "Currency building" is a central concern for a State, particularly for a (big) imperialist State. The Brussels summit of December 1993 casually decided to postpone the common currency to the next century.
### Needs
Behind all this there is a major problem - that of political power within the EU. Already, national States no longer fully respond to the needs of multinational European capital. It is urgent for them to create new political-State mechanisms with an international scope. But we are far from the formation of a real European State.
In reality, there is no European nation. The internationalisation of the EU bourgeoisies is a process that goes beyond Europe's borders, and we are not heading towards a unified European bourgeoisie. Moreover, there is not a real European-national sentiment among the people of Europe, even though there may exist a certain embryonic consciousness evolving in this direction. Even this consciousness is primarily through contrast - that is, through furtive comparisons to the Third World, Japan and the "American way of life"
The crisis of political unification, symbolised by the Maastricht Treaty, will last because its contradictions are insurmountable in the short-term.
Maastricht's failings will not automatically lead to a simple return to the Single European Act (1985), the Treaty of Rome (1958) or, worse, to a dislocation of the EU and national protectionism. There is a double brake that goes hand in hand with an overall economic logic of the current period that goes in the direction of regional groupings on a world level.
First, since the end of the Second World War, European unification has from the beginning combined economic and political measures, beginning with the Marshall Plan. There is a tradition of inter-governmental co-ordination with constraining economic implications — but without any transfer of national sovereignty. This tradition is represented by a never-ending series of "European spaces" — which go from large to insignificant depending on the case — which symbolise this idea, groom the political personnel (an "elite") and further this perspective.
The risk of a dislocation of the EU cannot be excluded. An abrupt change in the balance of forces is possible - primarily as a result of uncontrolled social and political forces unleashed by the long depressive wave. But this risk is above all linked to the possibility of an economic or military catastrophe on the international level - or of a social shake-up in one or more EU countries. The interaction of the economies of the countries of the EU has reached a stage where any dislocation in the EU would create dislocation in each component economy of the member countries. For nearly all the countries of the EU - the large (including Britain) as well as the small - the big market is a clear objective necessity. This is why the European Commission and the Council of Ministers have been able to manage a precarious situation with intermediate institutional formulae.
The EU is a complex structure. It is a "free trade zone (highly open to the outside) led by inter-governmental institutions (which constitute its centre of gravity) and the beginnings of a supranational State apparatus."
International Viewpoint #256 May 1994
Within this framework, there are never-ending political debates and struggles.
There are bourgeois political forces that propose a re-organisation of the EU on the basis of a weak confederation between national States and the cancellation of the Maastricht Treaty. But these currents are clearly within a minority in the big bourgeoisie. Even the British ruling class is no longer opposed in principle to the single currency.
The real debate in European most important capitalist circles centres on pragmatic considerations about synchronisation of the establishment of politicoeconomic State institutions and the harmonisation of the real economies of the main countries.
### Precarious
For the time being, this has led to a new consensus - reached in Brussels in December 1993 — which is as precarious as the previous one. The deadlines for the single currency are being put off, with market mechanisms expected to work for a certain period towards the indispensable readjustment of the economic, social and political structures of the main member countries.
This tactical adaptation has implied some distancing between France and Germany (which had already begun with the monetary crisis of the summer of 1993), and a clear rapprochement between Germany and Britain.
Formally, the accords on monetary union have been neither revised nor abrogated. The European bourgeoisies were not prepared to publicly admit their failure. In any event, they wanted to implement the anti-social measures that flow from the Maastricht Treaty.
This new approach will not be without risk for the cohesion of the EU It enlarges the political gap. It will also create — albeit in a more diluted fashion - political tensions between member States, as is already shown by the impasse on the question of the broadening of the EU to include the Scandinavian countries and Austria.
The strangling of the idea of a social Europe will have a major impact on the the relationship between capital and labour in all the countries of the EU.
The different bourgeoisies — supported by their respective governments - can only plan for the short-term. They will not be able to get away from a number of central problems directly linked to the life of the EU - such as the enlargement of the EU and its consequences, links with the ex-USSR and Eastern Europe, the constitutional reorganisation of the EU (1996), and the exact deadlines for the Maastricht Treaty and the various parallel treaties (such as Schengen, the reform of the WEU,
Forced by the topsy-turvy and difficult political period in the world and in each country of the EU, they may decide to dive in head first, even if this involves creating a crisis with the other countries and/or frontally attacking the working class. Outside events may well provide an alibi — the Gulf War (cut short) gave T HE struggle for an alternative involves an ideological, political and organisational struggle against social democracy. It has embraced the policies of severe capitalist austerity, and has not hesitated to inflict defeats on the working class. On the question of Europe, its role has been less brutal but just as pernicious. It has propagated a "Europeanist" ideology in the working class and trade union movement that equates support for the EU with an end to the economic crisis.
These pro-European sentiments emerged following the Second World War. But until the 1970s, they were subordinated to Americanism and "trans-Atlantic solidarity". The weakening of American imperialism on the economic and moral level — since the Vietnam War - and the deepening of the crisis (the 1980-82 recession) led social democracy into a kind of "militant
Social democracy is definitely integrated into the national bourgeois State and linked to "its" bourgeoisie - but at a time of world capitalism it has to rely on the strongest bourgeoisie, the one which is best placed to guarantee peace, democracy and prosperity.
The party of the "American way of life" from the 1920s to the 1970s has become the "all Europe" party. It was at the end of the 1980s that social democracy closely linked its liberal-monetarist policies to the idea of the "external constraint", that of the EEC and now the EU. As a result, it has championed the formidable ideological campaign carried out by the State, political, academic and media elites of the bourgeoisie.
Social democratic ideology stands on two pillars. On the one hand, it sees peace, democracy and humanism as the almost natural offshoots of Europe. This is blatantly contradicted by the stubborn facts of recent history: colonial expeditions and slavery; the two "world" wars; the constant temptation to swing towards authoritarian regimes (such as fascism); the invention of concentration camps (since the end of the 19th century in South Africa); a number of genocides (against Blacks, Native Indians and Jews); anti-semitic and anti-Arab racism; the "modern" suffocation of the Third World; poverty, including under parliamentary democracy; and daily violence inflicted on women and children.
Insofar as Europe has experienced an incontestable advance in the democratic and social spheres, this is related to a centuries-old fight against exploitation and oppression, from peasant uprisings to urban revolts, dissident intellectuals, female "witches" and, for the last 150 years, the conscious struggles for emancipation led by the working class movement, the feminist movement and for peoples fighting for their national and social liberation.
Social democracy also sees European unification as State construction imposed "from above" ', instead of through co-operation between peoples and solidarity between workers, women and citizens "from below" and across
Social roots
The more social democracy loses its original social roots, the more it seeks refuge in bourgeois State institutions — in this case, the EU. But the longer the crisis lasts, the more this European State takes on a despotic and technocratic character. An infernal logic!
"Obliged" to choose between its own social and democratic requirements and the preservation and development of the European proto-State, social democracy has cast aside these requirements on several occasions: on the democraticparliamentary character of the EU; on equal rights for citizens (including nonEU immigrants); on the unifying constraints of a Social Charter; the "temporary" renunciation of a social Europe at Maastricht; the renunciation of a "plan for employment" in the interests of flexibility and social deregulation (the Brussels summit), and so on.
Social democracy has also contributed in a decisive way, in 1989-90, to making sure that a social Europe does not see the light of day. This was a defeat for the European trade union movement, which had gathered for the occasion and went down without a
----- photo credits and running heads -----
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International Viewpoint #256 May 1994 fight.! The pretext for these retreats is always the same — to avoid a crisis in
At the same time, solidarity between the social and working class movements in the EU (and beyond) is not at the heart of social democracy's European policy. Rather, it is solidarity between EU governments. Its slogan, but more Europe!" is actually a war cry addressed to the social movements, meaning "in the name of the [survival of the] EU, align yourselves!"
In spite of the need, and the many opportunities, social democracy made no attempt to advance struggles, demands, solidarity and perspectives on a pan-European level.
But how can social democracy organise solidarity between workers on a pan-European level when it sets about breaking it in each country of the EU?
Paradoxically, the Europeanist ideology - egocentric and competitive by nature — is in no way incompatible to economic and political nationalism. As such, in the name of Europe, we can hear reformist trade union leaders demanding sacrifices, in each country and in each enterprise, to strengthen "our" firm in relation to "the partners"
In France, in September 1992, social democracy did not hesitate to make use of the truncheon-argument for "blocking
German expansionism". In Germany,
Kohl successfully got the Social Democratic Party (SPD) involved in his war against "the laziness of the most privile-
— comparing the lot of German workers to those in Spain. In Spain itself, social democratic leader Felipe
Gonzalez has been crushing labour for ten years in the name of guaranteeing
Spain's place in the front ranks of the
In the pan-European game, the working class movement — kept within the national borders of each country of the
EU by the social democratic apparatuses
— is very much a late-comer in relation to the bourgeoisie.
Problems
The race ahead by social democracy towards the strengthening of the EU's
State institutions in no way resolves the urgent problems of the organised workers movement, even from the reformist point of view of the trade union apparatuses.
The EU is not ready to become a real government. Its institutional structures are only in embryonic form, even though they already have a decisive influence over certain key decisions of the national States. These structures have a despotic character, in that they are outside of all institutional pressure and control.
The absence, on a pan-European the level, of
"modern" institutions of bourgeois parliamentarianism and social consensus-making has cut short the idea of a
European "civil society"
- of a dense and diversified fabric of organisations, movements, associations, and so forth
On the other hand, Americanstyle lobbying in the corridors of Brussels is all the rage.
The end result is that the traditional working class movement is disarmed. The way the
EU is being built today — with the blessing of social democracy - prevents a transfer to the Europe-wide level of the wide array of tactical devices which it has developed on a national level over more than a century.
These devices include: collective agreements in all sectors and on all levels of economic life; broad social legislation and protection, the basis of solidarity in the working class; democratic rights guaranteeing trade union activity in society and in the workplace; indirect participation in the running of the country through a system (different from country to country) of para-State organs of social consultation between trade unions, employers and the government; access to legislative work through the big working class parties, in parliament and in government
Credible
Over time, the combination of the mass roots of the trade union movement and its proximity to State and para-State institutions gave rise to a credible and operational trade union tactic of "negotiation-action-renegotiation-results" (with a more combative version for the trade union left).
This tactic is already worn out on the national level, and due to the crisis of the left Keynesian programme, it is pointless
A reformist pro-European left is trying to provide a response, but its oppositional line is not an alternative, since it accepts the over-riding principle of social democracy: its attachment to EU institutions.2
No doubt, it calls for a break with liberal-monetarist policies and for an economic kick-start on a pan-European level. But from there, they "logically" take on a position of defending Maastricht (with its single bank and currency) and calling for increased budgetary, tax, legislative and financial powers for the Commission.
A catastrophist analysis of the working class movement leads it a classically social democratic conclusion: the strengthening of (bourgeois) State institutions is indispensable for the functioning — or even the survival - of the working class movement.
1. Stephen J. Silvia, The social Charter of the European Community: A Defeat for European Labour, Industrial and Labour Relations Review, vol. 44, no. 4, July 1991.
2. The British left-wing socialist Ken Coates (A Labour Party deputy in the European Parliament) developed this type of political approach into a coherent project. See 'A European Recovery Programme', European Labour Forum, no. 9, Winter 1992-93
International Viewpoint #256 May 1994
Another sector of the European left (of social democratic or Stalinist origin) is opposed to the EU and Maastricht in the name of "left-wing nationalism". One of this current's main representatives is Jean-Pierre Chevènement in France. He pleads the case of national sovereignty. His approach is based on two suppositions: the democratic failure of the EU is total, since it is subject to no control; and the national framework is the best for reviving the economy, even if this means taking measures that are protectionist and for "national preferen-
This is a very contradictory current. On the one hand, it is clearly a break with the dominant Europeanist ideology and political line of the bourgeoisie and of social democracy. Its alternative approach relies on a crisis in the EU, for a break with the monetary union.
But behind this is hidden the illusion of a Keynesian revival on the national level. And linked to this illusion there is a nationalist drift which is barely hidden.
As such, from his idealisation of the "republican" and democratic French
State, Chevènement has gone on to oppose key social demands of the workers movement, including the reduction of the working week.
Behind this trend - behind which already lurks another — there is yet another being born: the idea of a concerted effort by workers and employers for national revival (in the case of France).
While a left nationalist response leads into a pernicious impasse, the
"Europeanist" surge forward is no better. Each in their own way, they call for confidence in State institutions (one on the national and the other on the European level). This ends up by limiting both independent action and the demands of the working class and social
There can be no doubt that any attempt to break with the reigning liberal-monetarist policy would quickly run up against the EU, which is the central organiser of this policy on a European
Taking its position to its logical conclusions, social democracy sealed any possible way out for the working class by imposing the following dilemma: a break with neo-liberalism means a departure from the EU (with all the presumed negative effects). The only choice was that of accepting the EU, in the hope of improving its institutions and policies.
The development of a strategic response that can meet this challenge is vital for getting out of the situation of political impotence that currently paralyses the working class and social movements, particularly their left wing.
No doubt, the absence of such an alternative will not prevent struggles from breaking out, but they will be left without a global political perspective - lacking dynamism, unity and the will to win. This has become a practical question insofar as the EU is going through a very difficult period from which it will not emerge very soon.
Moreover, there is an incontestable social remobilisation that addresses the problem from a leftwing perspective.
This is very important; without a major revival of the activity of the working class and its allies - and without the beginnings of favourable changes in the relationship of forces on the ground, any alternative plan will be a purely abstract construct.
Response
These last few months have provided precious notions of what the beginnings of a political response should look
For the moment, given the absence of a wide-ranging social struggle organised on the pan-European level - by a non-existent pan-European labour movement - and the absence of any perspective of revolutionary confrontations that would quickly flow over the borders of one country, the most realistic hypothesis is the following: that a government of the EU is caught in the grips of a wide-ranging social struggle
(comparable to those that have broken out these last few years in Greece, Italy,
Spain, Belgium and France) and must retreat on an important point of its auste-
Such a retreat would inevitably come into conflict with the institutional regulations and the main policies of the
EU. Past crises (on the question of French fishermen and farmers, for example have demonstrated as much.
The matter would then fall into the tangled web of the EU's institutional framework. Since inter-governmental relations dictate the law within the EU, it would be up to the Council of Ministers to deal with it. Each EU government would then be consulted on the question, and would then have to present it before the public opinion of each of their countries, in particular that of the working class.
From this point onwards, the outline of a left-wing alternative appears, inasmuch as there is a need for a strong European public power — that breaks with the institutions of the EU and its member governments - that takes up social demands that workers struggling in one country bring to the attention of the entire work force of the EU.
Where would the opening of such a political breach lead? That would depend on a number of factors that can't be predicted today.
On the tactical level, three conclusions can already be drawn. First, to rely on the change in the relationship of forces through the activity of "those from below" means taking the social dynamic on a national level as the starting point. Then, we must understand how the political dialectic goes from the
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International Viewpoint #256 May 1994 national to the European level. Finally, we must consider the opening of a crisis in the EU as being an obligatory part of the journey towards a "social Europe"
- on condition that this involves a shake-up of the EU institutions and not their continuity.
This raises a series of tactical problems, both political and programmatic. The real key is that of finding how this political dynamic - unleashed in one country — can be brought into the heart of the EU to shake its political-State structure.
Without getting steeped in political fiction, two variations can be predicted. The government in place (pro-capitalist, whichever party is in power that is forced to retreat is therefore obliged to negotiate in the upper echelons of the EU. Even in this case, the possibility of exercising tremendous political pressure is very real, as past crises have shown.
The other variant is that a left-wing government (a "workers" or "social" government) comes to power following a particular struggle, and is more or less representative of the social movements.
Each of these cases stems from a different relationship of political and social 10 forces in the country. They also point to different potential dynamics.
What is important today is not political fiction, but a response to the politicised section of the trade union and social vanguard that is already calling for some kind of a response to the social democratic trap which says, "if we win a social struggle, this could lead to the isolation of the country, the break-up of the
EU and the rise of nationalism, or even of fascism." This kind of worried reasoning is a function of the relationship of forces between the left and the right in the working class and social movements, and between capital and labour.
### Measures
It should be said that nothing obliges a left-wing government to leave the EU and close its borders. It would need to — in order consolidate itself - take a number of measures favourable to workers, women, youth, immigrants, especially for the most disadvantaged of these sectors. On this basis, proposals can be made to the other peoples of Europe to "short-circuit" the EU, taking these measures as an alternative for the whole EU and for each member coun-
It is clear that the economic and social policy of such a government would be closely linked to the broadening and strengthening of social mobilisations throughout Europe. Instead of getting out of the EU and denouncing the "reactionary treaties" (and satisfying oneself with general propaganda for a socialist Europe, it is necessary to use to the fullest the time and space allowed for by EU institutional mechanisms — to win over the working classes of the EU.
It is not scandalous - if these conditions are met and this strategy is followed - to demand an immediate renegotiation of the treaties. The political axis of the propaganda, the concrete social and economic policies, the manoeuvres and negotiations is for proposing "the re-organisation of the EU on other bases," understood as "a European space unified on the basis of a model of growth based on social needs, full employment, respect for the environment and international cooperation."*3
We would not propose a complete schema (an exercise very popular in the Europeanist left) as an alternative to the EU. However, we could put forward measures which address existing institutions. Instead of "quitting" the single bank (if it exists), we could refuse to submit to its diktat, sticking instead to the local policies applied by a left-wing government. Instead of rejecting the
EMS, we could propose a zone of monetary stability based on economic criteria that break from the neo-liberal logic.
The crisis of the EU, the general toughening of bourgeois policies, the topsyturvy nature of the international situation, growing social tension, and the inevitable periodic adaptations of EU institutions - all these factors can only heighten the autocratic nature of the EU, and expose it in the eyes of public opinion. This is a State that lacks both a Constitution and elected, accountable
This raises a burning question of democracy, which the anti-capitalist left must squarely address. And this can only be done with a radical democratic demand: for a Constituent Assembly based on universal suffrage in all the countries of the EU according to the same system of proportional representation. This call is part of the fight to deepen the crisis of the EU and pave the way towards another kind of Europe. It expresses in organisational terms what should be the central theme of a campaign for political democracy: the peoples of Europe should themselves decide in which society they wish to live together!
### Derailed
As with all partial demands (for the reduction of the working week, for example, this demand can be co-opted and derailed. The key consists of filling the demand with anti-autocratic content and highlighting its social implications. The real potential of this demand lies in the possibility of fusing it with social mobilisations which, if they manage to create a crisis in the EU, will inevitably give rise to the question of how an alternative Europe should be organised.
The call can be used for every future "failing" of the EU: to intervene on the question of the limited legitimacy of the EU, on the scheduled renegotiations with certain member countries, on the anti-social measures decided by the Council of Ministers at every European "summit", on the State-government monopoly over treaty renegotiations and in the implementation of the single currency, and so forth.
The call denounces the pseudodemocracy of referenda ("yes" or "no" on vital questions) and of the European
3. Quotations taken from Henri Wilno's article, 'Échanges internationaux, que ferait un governement de gauche ?', Critique Communiste, winter 1993-1994.
• and Eugenio Preo documents industrial transtormation and the
Available from IMR/PECI, BP 85, 75522 Paris, CEDEX 11, France.
This edition of International Marxist Review will be the last in its current format. A discussion has begun, the aim of which will be to decide on a better format for the presentation of the Fourth
International's theoretical views. Details will be published here in pseudo-parliament. And it lets us move away from the false choice put forward by the left nationalists between the democratic national State and antidemocratic Europe.
Agitation around such a call ("the people should decide!") lets us advance the idea of the "Europe that we want". It also lets us put forward the idea of a new citizenship: the right to vote and to stand in elections for all
The real key is that of finding how this political residents;
EU dynamic — unleashed in one country - can be male-female paribrought into the heart of the European Union to ty among deputies: and a large shake its political-State structure.
Assembly that regularly briefs the population on its work.
Of course, such a proposal raises a number of other problems. The geographic basis would be that of the current EU, but the
Assembly could invite other States and
Out now!
peoples to join.
Democratic
INTERNATIENAL
The Assembly would not be entirely sovereign to impose by majority vote a
Constitution on all today's member
MARXISTREVIEW
States. A democratic mechanism would have to be put in place in each country to see if each population accepts the proposed Constitution, and thus wishes to price: £2.50/$5
Spring 1994 join the new EU.
The election of deputies in the
Constituent Assembly would have to be
Capitalism's new economic order — based on the current States. But this
Restructuring the labour process does not automatically define the organised State framework of the future
Europe, since this question too would be
No. 15
• Maxime Durand introduces the issue with the political economy of part of the deliberation of the Constituent Assembly.
This matter is of special importance
• Claude Gabriel on the European Union and economic "globalisato oppressed nationalities within EU member-States. The Assembly can be a
• Keith Mann explores class struggle, skill and the productive protribune for them to defend their right to self-determination and put forward
• Andy Kilmister describe the British experience with New concrete proposals so they can take their place in the future Europe. *
"Lean Production"
tion"
cess today
Management Techniques employers' offensive in Italy
International Viewpoint. ©
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International Viewpoint #256 May 1994