Ridicule and credibility
International Viewpoint #256 May 1994
"THIS war that we do not wish to wage — we are in the process of losing it." In this way, former French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius summarised the mood of the "big powers" in the face of the offensive by Serb extremists against Gorazde. CATHERINE SAMARY
T is ridicule and the loss of credibility by Western institutions and governments that inexorably force them to take a firmer line and carry out more aggressive interventions. This does not change in any way the fact that their initiatives will fatally end in the same impasse. This is because the idea of "clean" air strikes that don't affect the civilian population, and are not accompanied by a troop offensive on the ground, would either be useless or a myth — and therefore murderous. But it is primarily because the political objectives of the Western powers contradict one another.
The threats of air strikes now aim not only at protecting endangered UN forces but also at defending cities declared "security zones", of which Gorazde was theoretically a part.
However, the general command of the White House and NATO have repeated on several occasions that the idea is not to reconquer territories captured by Serb Chetniks. And the Chetniks know this full well, insofar as the Owen-Stoltenberg plan totally legitimates the cutting up of Bosnia into "ethnic" territories.
The plan's only "fault" is that it creates non-viable States, thus leading to permanent war. Those who believe that such a plan could be a formula for peace - a lesser evil - should open their eyes and see the symbol that is Gorazde, a majority Muslim enclave in the heart of "Serb territory". Indeed, all of Bosnia is made up of "enclaves".
The State attributed to the "Muslims" was even less viable than the others, lacking a rear-guard and continuous territory. It needed access to the sea.
EDITORIAL
As for the "Croatian" Republic of Herceg Bosna (which left out two thirds of Bosnian Croats) it was vital for it to grow and control the electric power plant in Mostar.
The "Serbian Republic" of Bosnia has the largest territory, but since its social base is the peasantry this territory is in the poorest rural zones. To consolidate it means securing control of the more industrialised urban regions and of the main arteries of communication -and above all to ensure links with the "Serbian republics" of Krajna in Croatia and with Serbia itself.
The Bosnian-Croat federation project advanced by the USA posed a threat on a number of levels for the Greater Serbia project. While ambiguous, it hedged against the Owen-Stoltenberg plan
- rendering it null and void one could have hoped — for the ethnic division of Bosnia for several weeks. It threw into question the territorial carve-up while remaining open to negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs.
### Mixed
On 27 March, 500 Bosnian Serbs representing 200,000 Serbs living in "Muslim" territory — in cities with a mixed population — proclaimed a "civilian council" challenging the legitimacy of Bosnian Serb "leader" Radovan American and Russian representatives were present.
This initiative had been encouraged after the Croat extremist leader Mate Boban was cast aside!, at the same time as Croats of central Bosnia created their own "civilian council" and showed their opposition to the "Croat Republic" of Herceg-Bosna.
The split between Serbian President Milosevic and the far-right Serbian Radical Party, the strain in the relationship between Belgrade and the "Serbian Republic" in Croatia?, and finally the Russian presence at the meeting of Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo — all these factors made the idea of a Milosevic split with Karadzic more plausible, especially as Milosevic is seeking to have international sanctions lifted.
The Bosnian "Serbian civilian council" asked to participate in all negotiations, called for a rejection of all ideas of "collective responsibility", and instead wants people to be punished for crimes on the basis of concrete facts. The council called for a Bosnian State based on the citizens, in which the interests of each community would be defended in an equal fashion, within the framework of a "reconciliation conference".
The Bosnian-Croat agreement was amended by the Bosnian Serb civilian assembly to recognise the three communities (which the Bosnian parliament accepted on the following day.
While it could be feared that the plan for a Bosnian-Croat federation be turned into a Greater Croatia, such a plan could also favour a dynamic of "civilian resistance" to ethnic cleansing. In any case, it represented a military and political threat to the Greater Serbia plan.
The offensive by Serbian militia on Gorazde can be interpreted as stemming from a decision by the extremist wing of the Bosnian Serbs for whom the question of Greater Serbia is a question of life or death. For them, a NATO ultimatum is a lesser risk so long as it does not challenge the logic of building a Serbian State on Bosnian territory.
### Zones
Making non-Serbian populations flee from the desired zones is the goal of their offensives. The method is massacre. A cease-fire can be "conceded" under pressure from ultimatums which at best will help in the evacuation of terrorised and injured populations. The arms freed up as a result can then be redeployed to other strategic points.
To divide up the Greater Serbia (and Greater Croatia) forces, to tell the truth about the (minority) force of partisans of a Muslim State, to seek support in cities with the most mixed populations and to held defend them by relying on their traditions of harmonious co-existence -
1. Mate Boban is the leader of the "Croatian Republic" in central Bosnia, and a member of Croatian President Tudjman's party, the HDV.
2. The candidate supported by Belgrade was almost not elected in elections organised in this self-proclaimed "Serbian Republic", never recognised by Belgrade. Recent negotiations suggest that there might be a compromise leaving Croatian territory held by Serb secessionist forces in their hands, giving them autonomy rather than complete independence.
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International Workers' Aid
IT was a harsh winter in the city of Tuzla. It endured a twin embargo, imposed by both Solidarity with Tuzla
International Viewpoint #256 May 1994 rent reactions from the different governments according to the degree of their involvement on the ground. Noisy squabbles are likely - above all between a UN worried about reprisals against its troops and NATO (thanks to a United States worried about polls ques-
Tuzla is an exceptional city from a number of points of view. Since the 1990 elections, Serbian and Croatian troops. The airport remains closed. it has been led by a coalition of non-nationalist parties. It is also one of the only cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina where multi-ethnic coexistence has been maintained since the beginning of the war. However, Muslim nationalist forces have not stopped exercising tremendous pressure inside the city, and moreso in the surrounding villages.
Part of the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being played out in this city and its industrial region. The international network of solidarity, International Workers Aid, wanted to help break the isolation of Tuzla and establish a presence of the European workers movement. The first convoy reached Tuzla in November, after overcoming a number of difficulties. This provided an opportunity for making contacts with the Tuzla municipal government, the miners union and the women's association. It was then decided to organise a bigger convoy for the spring. Its goal was to provide miners and their families with flour, sugar and oil, so that they could make bread, a rare commodity in the region for some time. For months, money was collected across Europe in order to purchase these ingredients, pay for transport and set up an office in Split, a city on the Dalmatian coast from where most humanitarian convoys leave. Fourwheel drive trucks were purchased for the difficult journey from Split to Tuzla. On 16 April, these trucks began to deliver to Tuzla the nearly 150 tonnes of goods that trucks from across Europe had delivered to Split. The first trucks arrived in Tuzla on 18 April. Twelve tonnes of food items and messages of solidarity were handed over to the miners union. The drivers immediately returned, leaving one comrade in Tuzla. They will have to make a number of trips between the Dalmatian coast and Tuzla to deliver all the goods held in a warehouse near Split. It was necessary to buy another fourwheel drive truck. For each trip, a different person accompanies the drivers in order to During the first round, contacts were renewed with the women's and independent establish solidarity links with the Tuzla associations. media associations. There is currently a representative of a Dutch student organisation in Tuzla, who is there to meet university associations and deliver books. Before the departure of the first set of trucks, about 50 Swedes, Danes, Dutch, Germans, Belgians, British, Italians and Spaniards gathered near Split to meet the Croatian representatives and discuss the organisation of the convoy. A decision was taken The next International Workers Aid meeting will be held in Italy at the end of June. to send a delegation to Sarajevo for May Day. Donations to International Workers Aid should be sent to: Den Danske Bank, 2-12 Holmens Kanal, DK-1092 Copenhagen K, Telex 27 000-SSZIFT DABADKKK, tioning its leadership at the head of the "new world order").
But there are also clashes between the official bodies of the UN and governments worried about "sending their troops into the lion's den", as French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé explained when French UN troops did not enter Gorazde as planned.
Speeches can be high and mighty, but any real loss of troops - which would have a dramatic effect on volatile public opinion — will only further expose their hollowness.
And this does not address the real source of disagreement. What are the political objectives in Bosnia and ex-Yugoslavia? How can the American and European plans be reconciled with another. Nothing is stable in this area, given that positions are determined by a "realpolitik" that changes in relation to the relationship of forces on the ground, the various sets of public opinion, and the international stakes for a series of forces.
The Russian question - with all its uncertainties - is not the least of the West's worries. For Moscow's representatives (who do not always say the same thing) the primary objective is that of getting Russia accepted as a great power. That is, Russia is ready to collaborate, but demands the right to have its say - and even exercise a veto - over NATO intervenaccount number 4180862161. O this is the only political line that offers hope for peace.
This is not the approach of the "contact group" representing the European Community, the United Nations, Russia and the United States, set up in London. The "great powers" will bang their desks and try to speak "with one voice" — but to what end?
They first seek to restore their credibility. But the ultimatum concerning Sarajevo only "worked" thanks to a fragile convergence of the interests of the forces present on the ground: respite for the Bosnians; a UN presence with a large Russian representation, which codified the division of Sarajevo for Karadzic's troops who themselves were in a rush to move on to more strategic areas (Bihac, Maglaj, Gorazde); a Serbian withdrawal whose forms calmed the anxiety of a UNPROFOR worried about its ground troops; and a NATO overjoyed to see its role as the UN's strong-arm strengthened, without for all that having to intervene.
### Troops
This configuration of forces is unlikely to appear elsewhere and implies an increased presence of troops on the ground - which in turns means diffetions.
Russia's privileged relations with Serbia are meant to serve this end. But this doesn't mean unconditional support for the policy of the Bosnian Serbs, who are not well-known for their spirit of diplomacy and compromise. *
Cárdenas
We apologise to those readers who were expecting the interview with the
Mexican Presidential candidate,
Cuauhtémac Cárdenas, to appear in this issue. The original interview was given before the assassination of the
PRI's candidate, Luis Donaldo Colosio. In view of this we are expecting to publish a new interview later in the year, but before the elections. C
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