The only real alternative
International Viewpoint #258 July 1994
AT THE end of April the 9th national assembly of the Workers' Party (PT) took place in Brasilia. The meeting adopted "Bases for a programme of government" dealing with popular participation and social control, land reform, the external debt, abortion rights and rights for lesbians and gay men amongst other themes. We publish below the introduction to this document. DOCUMENT São Paulo, April 1994*
B RAZIL has been in an
unstable situation for more than ten years. Workers have achieved a number of victories since the mid-1970s when they took up industrial struggle and then united to end the military regime. The growth in popular organisations, including the PT and the Central Union of Workers (CUT), the campaign for direct presidential elections,' the end of the military dictatorship and the dismissal of Collor are some examples of these.
### BRAZIL
The ruling class have had to retreat on several occasions, since the economic model which underpinned the famous "Brazilian Miracle" ran out of steam. In addition to the presidency of the Republic, they control the vital State and social organs — the National Congress (Parliament), judicial power, the armed forces, the means of production and the major means of communication - and still have powerful agents in the union and popular movements. However, they still do not have a national project to put to society. This explains the rise in estimation of the PT in the eyes of the people during recent years-even if this rise is not reflected in terms of organisation and mobilisation. To overcome our organisational weakness we must look at how PT militants within the social movements act out our Party line, so as to unlock the door of the electoral campaign and of government.
### Great political impact
The mobilisation by militants around the Lula campaign and programme, even if with an electoral objective, had a greater political impact than economic or partial struggles — despite the fact that at times these would be more radical. The principal aim of mobilisation in 1994 must be the struggle for the installation of a democratic popular government capable of enacting the structural reforms and changes which the Brazilian people have demanded for the past twenty years. However, these elections must also be the backdrop for a great campaign of mobilisation for reforms and to give a sense of transformation to both the electoral and political struggles.
This shows both our major weaknesses and the possibilities for consolidating that support which we have received from the most aware and organised workers as well as from youth. It also shows that we can convince, or at least neutralise, the majority of Brazilians. Here, in contrast to Argentina and Chile, the ruling class have not been so successful as they have wished in advancing neo-liberal "reforms". This is thanks to the resistance of the democratic and popular movements. The Lula campaign will take place in a context where, in order to recycle their system, the tenants of capitalism must create a consensus around the idea that economic growth will only be possible through the exclusion of the majority of the population and indeed of whole continents. However, due both to economic circumstance and electoral results world-wide (but in particular in Latin America) there are signs of retreat from the predominant neo-liberal ideology. The São Paulo Forum, the victory of Nelson Mandela in South Africa, the strengthening of the broad left fronts in Uruguay and Argentina, the election victories of the Radical Cause in Venezuela, and the possibility of victory by the Party of Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico are just some examples. It is within this framework that the Lula campaign must serve as a platform for the denunciation of exploitation and oppression and the reflection of democratic and popular victories.
In Brazil, the October 1994 elections could create a new balance of forces in favour of the popular camp. Victory by Lula and his government in favour of democratic and popular reforms will mark a grave defeat for the neo-liberal project and for the hegemony of the ruling class over Brazilian politics. (...)
Only alternative
The neo-liberal offensive, reinforced by the election of Collor de Melo, was sharply checked by his dismissal. Following this it became clearer to Brazilians that only a Lula candidacy can overcome the crisis and lead to renewal with development, through redistribution of income, wealth and power. Aware of this, conservative forces have mobilised since 1992, with the sole objective of preventing us from achieving victory.
This explains why the ruling class wore itself out in their attempt to stop the "Fora Collor" (Collor Out) movement from going beyond ethically-based political demands and also from critici-
* See also International Viewpoint, no. 251, December 1993. A special dossier includes the 'Party's Guiding Principles'.
1. The first democratic legislative elections at the time of the democratic opening-up "controlled" by the military dictatorship were marked by a mass campaign led by opposition parties, from the bourgeois PBDM to the PT, for direct presidential elections. The PBDM finally accepted the principle of indirect elections by an anti-democratic electoral college.
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International Viewpoint #258 July 1994 sing neo-liberalism and the privatisation of the state. It was also for this reason that they attempted to compromise the PT within the Itamar Franco government, with the purpose of damaging its image of opposition, in the name of unity of "pro-dismissal" forces, as if there were between them programmatic affinities justifying a governmental coalition.
Even so, while the ruling class was divided concerning the proposal for a presidential or parliamentary regime, some significant sectors pronounced that they were for parliamentarianism — with the goal of draining any Lula government of power and blocking reforms by way of a Cabinet system where the government would be under the control of Congress. This was one of the reasons why our party rejected the parliamentarist proposal.
Faced with the certainty of electoral defeat in 1994, the leaders of the ruling class called for the Congress elected in 1990 to "revise before the people make reforms". The PT resisted this further attack on democracy and against a future popular government. Despite a lack of understanding, both within society and the Party itself, we were able to do so because we never viewed revision as something to which we had to submit. Despite the majority in favour of revision, the authoritarian regime, the putschist manoeuvring of Humberto Lucena (president of the commission for constitutional revision), the massive support of the media, the millions spent by big business, the weak popular resistance to the "revisional coup d'état"; despite all this revision did not get off the ground. After five months, the only significant decision taken by the commission has been the reduction in the presidential term of office trom tive to four years, proposed by the Commissioner for the Budget, the deputy Genebaldo Correia (of Bahia state's PMDB).
The "toucans" roughout these events - the di ssal movement. namonal unty arou the "Itamar" government, the referendum on the system of government, constitutional revision — our Party did well on the whole, putting either a total or partial halt to the manoeuvres aimed at preventing us from victory or simply obscuring what we stand for, trying to transform us into a left-wing guarantee of the agreement made between the elites. The trajectory of the Brazilian social-democratic party (PSDB) has been completely different.2 Defined by 34 our 8th national assembly as "political terrain on which to fight" the PSDB subsequently made completely opposite choices to those of the PT. We were in opposite camps on the Collor government, in which the "toucans" had ministers. While we opposed the "Itamar" government, the PSD took part, pressing upon him an economic policy in perfect continuity with that of the preceding government. The "toucans" were the principal defenders of the parliamentarist option and of the new electoral law, clearly intended to curry favour with the popular camp. However, it was the parliamentary "toucan" group — with its allies in the Liberal Front Party (PFL) and the PMDB - which was defeated over constitutional revision.3
The trajectory of the PSDB proves that the PT was correct to establish, as a criterion for alliances, the necessity of agreement on a programme of government and support for Lula.
The sensible choice
If we had made any other choice, we would have found ourselves in the demoralising situation of having as an ally a party chosen by the Brazilian ruling class as the main alternative to Lula. The infatuation by big businessmen and conservatives with Fernando Henrique Cardoso, the former Minister for Finance and the favourite candidate of large capital, who followed the economic policy of Collor, is well-known. With his left-wing past, his popularity amongst the middle classes, his aura of honesty and the complicity of Mário Covas (the president of the PSDB) Henrique Cardoso has made a coalition with several conservative parties-including the Brazilian Workers' Party (BWP), the Progressive Party (PP) and especially the PFL — with the goal of defeating Lula a second time.4
The rapprochement between the PSDB and the PFL was not new: in 1989 Mário Covas, then a "toucan" presidential candidate, chose as vice-presidential candidate Roberto Magalhães, the PFL governor of Bahia. When the Collor government showed its neo-liberal and corrupt face, the PSDB debated the possibility of entering. The "toucans" were our principal opponents in the São Paulo municipal administration during Luiza Erundina's period in office between 1989 and 1993. In response to the economic and political commands of the Franco government Henrique Cardoso adopted an anti-popular economic plan, subject to the interests of large capital and the financial system. But Henrique Cardoso's prospects for success, which was conceived as an electoralist ruse, are not great: "favouring the rich" decidely lacks popular legitimacy.
Paulo Maluf - the mayor of São Paulo and leader of the right-wing Progressive Renewal Party (PRP) - the traditional alternative for the most rightwing sectors - has decided not to put himself forward for the presidency. His disastrous administration of São Paulo, his disputes with the vice-president — which did not guarantee him control of the party's electoral machinery after their "divorce" - and his implication in a politico-financial scandal certainly weighed on his decision. (...)
Orestes Quércia, president of the PMDB, and former governor of São Paulo, has also submitted to pressure to withdraw his candidacy from the same sectors which did not wish Maluf to be a candidate. In addition, a minority current within the PMDB threatened not to support him during the electoral campaign. To counter this resistance, Quércia adopted an "anti-elites" approach, constitutional revision, against the economic plan and, of course, the PT. (...)
The difficulty of the conservative sectors in finding even one candidate shows that the ruling class, despite imminent defeat,are still not able to overcome their internal differences. This can equally be seen in the attitude of employers to the economic plan — where success is dependent upon the signing of an agreement between the monopolies to reduce price rises, if only for a few months. However, it is the sinking of the constitutional revision which shows most clearly the gap between the will to fight Lula and the inability to
Confirming the analysis of those of us who never regarded it as a fait accompli, the paralysis of the constitutional revision, when added to the advance of Lula in the opinion polls, leaves an disarmed ruling class. This explains the views expressed by certain layers of the army. Their expression of a real pheno-
2. The PSDB, contrary to what its name suggests, is not linked to the democratic and popular movement. Rather it is situated between social-democracy and traditional liberalism. Its logo is (the bird) the toucan.
3. The PFL is a rightwing party which originated from a split in a party which operated during the dictatorship. It is supported particularly by big business and was the principal supporter of the Collor candidacy.
4. The PTB is a small rightwing party led by José Andrade Vieria, a banker and Minister for Trade and Tourism in the "Itamar" goverment. The rightwing PP has members who are leaders of the union sectors most bitterly opposed to the CUT.
International Viewpoint #258 July 1994 menon - the difficulty of uniting the ruling class against a democratic popular alternative - - with the spectre of the institutional crisis serves to intimidate certain sectors of the left, who have turned to extolling "institutional solutions" even going so far as to try to resuscitate revision in order to exorcise the threat of a coup d'état.
### Reaffirming our profile
In 1994's Brazil, the sole guarantee of institutionality is the Lula candidacy. Our party must bring out all its forces. For this reason we must reaffirm our commitment to socialism and to democratic and popular reforms. (...)
The elections on 3 October, and especially the Presidential elections, will dominate the positions taken by the different political forces. The economic plan evolved with them in view; the rhythm of social struggle depends on them, as does the stance of the municipal, state and federal governments; candidates and alliances can no longer be clearly defined. Finally, constitutional revision still has a place right at the heart of the politico-electoral game. Presented as a reliable weapon of struggle against inflation, the monetarist approach taken by Henrique Cardoso has fallen into the same trap as its predecessors: he has reduced wage-earners' purchasing power, decreased consumption, increased interest rates and freed prices from all effective controls. As was foreseeable, from the first day of March, the introduction of the "unit of real value" (RVU) has aggravated the outward signs of instability while worsening even further the living conditions of most of the population. Inflation in the cruzeiro real has only accelerated, particularly in relation to basic necessities, and day after day workers feel the erosion of their purchasing power. A minimum wage has been fixed provocatively by Henrique Cardoso with the lowest value ever in the history of our country. It is even lower than the value of the minimum wage in countries where conditions of development are worse than in Brazil.
Further, the administration of the economic plan has been disastrous: on the one hand the government has refused to negotiate or to integrate the criticisms and suggestions made by Congress and civil society (notably the union movement) but on the other it has not stopped giving concessions to the monopolies — allowing them complete freedom to fix the price of their products - and to those of private means, through a policy of absurdly high interest rates. These concessions constitute attacks upon national dignity and efforts towards sovereign development in the same way as the recent agreement on renegotiation of the external debt between the Franco government and private creditors. It should be recalled that during the first phase of the economic plan, at the time of the so-called fiscal adjustment, expenditure on health, education and transport were slashed by billions of dollars, causing an already precarious social situation to deteriorate still further. At the same time, the government squandered almost 17 billion dollars in payment of interest and principal of the internal debt, to the benefit of the leaders of the
On the brink of panic
The Henrique Cardoso candidacy is consistent with this setting of irresponsability, social insensitivity and privatisation of the state: As a good adventurer, he abandoned ministerial responsibility not long after having launched his economic plan, to put himself at the service of the reactionary forces, with the aim of avoiding at any cost, as in 1989, a Lula victory. The PT reaffirms that inflation is a serious problem requiring the immediate operation of a programme of stabilisation. Rather than simple fiscal adjustment it must be a programme involving huge structural reforms to the state economy, which lays the basis for a new model of growth, and social develop ment, which will begin a new process of redistribution of wealth, and even a new kind of sovereign intervention on the
The senseless putting into operation of the economic plan has led to a sharp rise in inflation of the UVR. (...) It is this which has caused the conflict between the government and its economic team on the best moment to introduce the real — up until now fixed for July, the latest that the measure can bring forth electoral fruits.
The attitude of the popular and union movement is decisive — not only for the success of the economic plan, but also for the putting into place of conditions allowing the application of a government programme after a popular victory. Some strikes have broken out in the ABCD region of the country but it is still too soon to measure the breadth of the reaction to the erosion of wages. Most likely social struggles will remain at the present level, and even increase in severity during the electoral campaign. We now have the heavy responsibility of achieving a national movement for structural reforms.
The unity of workers
The consolidation of workers' cal and organisational unity and the strengthening of their representative organs, in particular the unions and the cUT, is a task which must be taken up by all those who struggle for a Lula government. The union movement must work to strengthen workers, in consolidating large, powerful and deep-rooted unions in the workplaces. In this way they will play an essential role in a national movement of workers' struggle for immediate victories and for the structural reforms which we propose, and also in the struggle for socialism.
Large sections of the population believe that real improvement in their living standards depends upon the result of the elections on 3 October. Even if that is evidence of support for Lula, a policy of "wait and see" is dangerous. This is why the orientation of the Party and of our union and popular leaders must be towards pushing for mobilisation against the degradation of living standards as a result of Henrique Cardo-
5. The introduction of a new currency, the real, destined to replace in July the present cruzeiro real, has been prepared by the establishment of an index linked to the dollar, the "unit of real value" to which the real should be equal. This is the fifth change in currency in eight years caused by galloping inflation.
6. ABCD designates the industrial belt of São Paulo, which includes the towns of São André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano do Sul, and Diadema.
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