Revolution to parliament
International Viewpoint #258 July 1994
...there has been a painful and regrettable event in the revolutionary camp - the voluntary withdrawal of the
Revolutionary Leader-
- EL SALVADOR!
History is repeating itself. After twelve years of war and two of transition we seem to be returning to 1979-80, in respect of the differences between the various political projects. The election results have
State apparatus. The FMLN was transformed into a legal political force, in return for the inviolability of those principally responsible for the worst crimes against the people. The "Truth Commission"| showed beyond doubt that top military
SERGIO ship (DRU).. the reason RODRIGUEZ
LASCANO not accept decisions should be made by majority. They fought to the last for the DRU to adopt decision-making by consensus. This was unacceptable given that the issue was one of united leadership and not simply of coordination." (communication from the DRU to the Salvadorean people, Septem-
"..we endorse the decision taken by the political commission of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FLN) not to participate in the national assembly's governing body which the governing party, the National Republican Alliance (Arena), has made into an instrument of its hegemony and antidemocratic dictates... ." "Ana Guadalupe Martínez, Eduardo Sancho, Juan Ramón Medrano, Fidel Recinos, Elí Díaz, Sonia Aguiñada, and Francisco Mena Sandoval are accordingly all suspended from the duties placed upon them by the National Council (of the FMLN) (for supporting Arena).." "This also applies to Joaquín Villalobos, who without being a deputy has played a principal role in promoting this conduct." (FMLN National Council, 10 May 1994.) 30 been the catalyst for the crisis. This is not easy to explain when the FMLN reached the second round, coming second in the first round with 24.9 percent of the vote and putting the
Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in third place with only 21 percent. The problem is that it was not so successful as expected.
From revolution to parliament
While the FMLN won twenty-one seats in parliament (having aimed for between eighteen and twenty-two there were disasters in the municipal elections, where it thought it would have most success. While it had hoped to win sixty-two town councils (25 percent of the total of 272), it won only sixteen.
Most significantly, it lost in areas which had formerly been strongholds.
The FML leadership knew that it would be impossible to win the presidential elections. However, to win a large number of the municipalities would not only give flesh to the idea that power is a relationship constructed from below (an idea taken up with enthusiasm by the rank and file) but would also give continuity to political work carried out in areas controlled by the FMLN during the war. However the people did not vote for the FMLN.
They voted for
FMLN the PDC, or worse, for Arena. Or did not vote. Why did this happen?
The peace
FDR accords signed in
Chapultepeo guaranteed a more or
SALVADOR LIBRE peaceful less transition but started from the position of retaining the Arena officials authorised actions against the population, but at the same time there was reference to co-responsibility.
### Complicated transition
In this way was neutralised one of the most complicated aspects of the transition. In contrast, there has not been adherence to the few points contained in the accords. For example, the forum for Economic and Social Reconciliation was ignored by business, to the extent that in 1992 a number of unions held stoppages and strikes with the sole objective of showing the bosses that they should come to the table to make the Forum reality. The bosses responded cunningly by calling on the unions to sign a Pact for Transitional Agreement", in which they set out a number of compromises which workers should make in return for a promise. This was that if for the sake of the reconstruction of the country" workers promised to be efficient and productive, when there was growth and development their living conditions would be re-examined Accordingly workers promised not to organise strike movements. The result was that on 1 May this year the Union federation UNTS could only mobilise 4 thousand people.
This is the sad reality of the democratic revolution (for some the end of the struggle while for others the launch-pad in the struggle for socialism. Some of the FMLN leadership are comparing this stage of the revolution to the conclusion of that which took place in Mexico between 1910 and 1917, when the political system was democratised, there was an (eventual) end to militarism and wealth was redistributed through land reform. However, in relation to this last the end of the Salvadorean revolution bears no comparison. Mexican land reform was far more thorough-going. For example,
1. The "Truth Commission" was established following peace talks - the aim being to investigate past human rights abuses
International Viewpoint #258 July 1994 all land and subsoil was considered the property of the nation and its redistribution smashed the hacienda (large estate) system of ownership. In this country, the fundamental mechanisms of the agroproducing oligarchy still exist. The Salvadorean peasants went to war, gave logistical support to the FMLN and endured siege by the army to finish in the same place from which they started without a scrap of land (or without the economic ability to cultivate it). This lay behind all the problems which confronted the FMLN in the last elections.
On the political terrain, although according to the agreement made in Chapultepeo, 60 percent of the leadership of the new police force was to have been comprised of people with neither army nor FMLN backgrounds, the remaining 40 percent being divided on a 50:50 basis between the FMLN and members of the army not named by the Truth Commission as having violated human rights, the result has been the reverse: thirty members are from the army, thirteen are from the FMLN and 19 are supposedly independent. The new police force has already begun to suppress demonstrations.
Accordingly, just as in the elections held during the war, the abstention rate was high — 55 percent. The Salvadorean people could not see the difference between these elections and those of the 1980s. The abstention rate again reflected rejection of a political system which does not represent the people. The difference now is that whereas before abstentions reflected support for the FMLN the opposite is now the case.
### Swift move
Faced for the first time with the possibility of electoral triumph due to the collapse of neo-liberal policies, the FMLN moved swiftly to the centre. One can partly see the point in this — it is extremely difficult to develop social and economic policies for the people when the global change in the correlation of forces between labour and capital has resulted in the total absence of any alliance which can at least help in this. Capitalist restructuring carried out from the imperialist centres has condemned a large part of the world to even greater poverty. The idea that if a large number of countries and indeed the world population were to disappear the world economy and trade would not be affected is a constant in the theory of "the globalisation of the economy". It would be totally impossible for a country such as
El Salvador to carry out even a moderate autonomous economic project.
However, because the left has not placed itself, as a political force, on the side of the poorest and most exploited, it does not have their trust. At the same time it has not convinced business owners that it is a moderate force; for them the traditional oligarchical parties can better guarantee the gains they have
"There has been a revolution which has expressed itself in the elimination of all components of dictatorial power — dissolution of the National Guard, reduction in the size of the army,and its subjection to civil power. All this has brought about vast democratic change. Perhaps we made concessions in terms of ideas..." (Joaquín Villalobos)
Impossible to win war
Immediately following the impressive but unsuccessful offensive of November 1989 the leadership of the different forces which make up the FMLN began to reach the conclusion that it would be impossible to win the war militarily. This belief became even more firm when the pro-capitalist character of the fall of the bureaucracies in Eastern and Central Europe became clear. There were also four decisive events in Latin America: the defeat of Lula in the 1989 Brazilian elections (although with an impressive second round vote), the invasion of Panama in December of the same year, and, fundamentally, the electoral defeat of the Nicaraguan FSLN in 1990, and the beginning of isolation of the Cuban leadership, as a result of the fall of the Soviet bureaucracy. And then came the war against Iraq.
Political and economically it became more and more difficult for the FMLN to continue the war. Accordingly it chose a more complicated and difficult route than that of maintaining the armed struggle - that of transforming itself into a legal political force.
The FML signed the peace accords in Chapultepeo with the aim of creating a new political framework, in which it was still strong and with social influence, and also able to build legitimate civil power which would gradually challenge the dominance of the Salvadorean oligarchy. This was not a mistaken aim. However there was a problem. There were at least two other visions behind the signing of the accords. On the one hand there was that expressed most clearly by Joaquín Villalobos, who stated that the main objectives for taking up arms in 1980 had been fulfilled, and that the revolution was about to triumph completely, but that it would be a new type of revolution, which would not separate Salvadoreans but unite them -it was the first "civilised" and "negotiated" revolution, which would not end with the destruction of the State-military apparatus but with the fusion of both State and FMLN apparatuses. On the other hand, there were those, such as the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), Communist Party (PCS), and Central American Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC), who felt, albeit in a very unclear and contradictory manner, that this could only come about if there was a change in the correlation of international forces. be formed to justify these changes in position. Once again, it was Villalobos who took the initiative and set out a series of clear and extremely interesting ideas, called "The new concept of power". He began with an arrogant and baseless critique of revolutionary processes in other countries, according to which they always begin from a vanguardist vision which concludes with the taking of power as a result of a "divine leadership" from above which relies on military support. In this way, with one stroke of the pen was crossed out the significance of the workers' councils of Tsarist Russia, the communes during the Chinese revolution, the civil committees in the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions and so on. The revolution was to be understood merely as a modification of the relationship between capital and labour.
### Concrete results
It is correct that power is a social relationship and not simply the taking of the State. The problem is that this social relationship must achieve concrete and specific results, not simply in the form of government but, fundamentally, in the redistribution of wealth.
There was once basic agreement between all the FMLN forces concerning how transition should take place, and in particular how the counter-insurgent State should be transformed into one which was democratic. Their differences more concerned future development, in so much as the FPL, PCS, and PRTC did not abandon the idea of a revolutionary transformation of society. Leonel González, leader of the FPL, put it thus: "Without political power it will be impossible to build a true and stable
31
the objective of the Salvadorean revola-0n.
International Viewpoint #258 July 1994 democracy. For this reason the FMLN and other democratic and revolutionary forces claim political power to guide the nation towards a system of peace, democracy and social justice. From this comes the obligation on the democratic revolutionary movement to guarantee the triumph of the political and social revolution."
It became obvious that the internal differences in the FMLN were going to deepen. Whether these become concrete depends on the degree of social democratic conversion undergone by the RN and People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). The problem with their conception is that it treats El Salvador as if it were Sweden. It has been said that the FMLN colours should be changed from red and black to something more "modern! What some really want is to "modernise" the FMLN. A day after it was made public that the FMLN had expelled the seven deputies who had voted with Arena, Villalobos said: "The ERP, as much as the RN, want to modernise the left with the end of joining the system, so that we can reclaim the logic of contest and confrontation. What has happened is democracy and more democracy." Eduardo Sancho (Fermán Cienfuegos) stated: "For the first time we have shown the nation that we are for democratisation... We cannot show two faces, given the necessity for debate on democratisation and the fulfilling of the peace accords. "2
It is within this framework that the present crisis of the FMLN has erupted. The undisciplined attitude of the seven deputies, from the RN and the ERP, is not just a parliamentary but a political problem. They want to change the FMLN into a force which puts pressure on the present oligarchical system. This requires ceasing to act like guerillas and starting to act like yuppies.
The problem is that the death squads themselves are acting just the same. On 19 May they carried out a second attempt on the life of Nidia Diaz (a PRTC militant) .On this occasion the ex-commander and now deputy said: "They don't like us to call them death squads, because they walk around with ties and briefcases, but they are around; and untouchable."
The squads are known to have operated during the FMLN split, publishing a pamphlet in the name of the "Revolutionary Salvadorean Front" (FRS) which threatened Villalobos, Sancho and Ana Guadalupe. The FRS immediately denied that the threats came from its ranks. However, both Villalobos and Sancho 32 had already made high-flown declarations which inevitably deepened the divisions within the FMLN, Villalobos stating that: "These threats are the result of the polarised and confrontational attitude of the PRTC, FPL and PCs leaderships", while Sancho continued, referring specifically to the FRS, "It is time that these groups ceased to exist."3
The situation within the FMLN could not be any more contradictory. In practice almost all the organisations within it have had a series of splits. Most important is what is happening within the ERP, where a large number of militants have organised themselves as a tendency, for which, although in reality outside this organisation, they have demanded recognition as part of the FMLN. This current has suffered a series of very fierce attacks by the ex-commanders. Although they deride "Marxist-Leninist" authoritarianism and speak of the necessity for an open and participatory society they will not admit the least disagreement within their own ranks.
An anniversary and a conclusion
We did not begin by looking at internal differences in 1980 purely to highlight changes in ERP policy. In any event it has always held a position of preventing an agreed outcome, whatever the cost. As much in the "insurrection" in Mejicanos at the end of 1979, as in its condemnation of the RN in May 1980, it has been the motor for a confrontational line. When the RN separated from the DRu, it did so mainly due to their support for Colonel Majano. Majano, at this time leader of the army, had decided to imprison Daubisson, made a call to the popular forces to isolate the most rightwing sections of the government and proposed the setting-up of a centre-left government. Rn decided to support this and was immediately condemned by the DRU as trying to effect an hegemonic and anti-unitarian coup. The question arises today: "What would have happened had the DRU supported Majano against Daubisson?" Would we have won more than we have now, saving the peace accords so many have said the same that it seems that it should be recorded that this objective which Villalobos now says he had could have been achieved much earlier, with less blood spilt.
Of course, it is clear that this was not tion (the broadest in terms of participation since the Mexican revolution). The social-democratic paradigm can be adopted, in the belief that it still has something to do with a redistributive vision of wealth. This is the central problem. Villalobos and Sancho are referring to a paradigm which no longer exists. Capitalist restructuring did not only apply to those closed societies which existed in Eastern Europe and which they consider "Marxist-Leninist" but also to reformist social-democratic
Tirado López, Sergio Ramírez, Villalobos, Sancho and sections of the right-wing of the Brazilian PT share a common view, that of the Brazilian economist Hélio Jaguaribe: "In these (Latin American) countries the only viable democracy is a mass social democracy. The social-democratic model (...) with a market economy, subject to social programmes or plans of a breadth which will hasten the entry of the broad masses into higher standards of living (...) it is clear that this is the best formula for meeting these countries' needs.4
This model does not exist in France or Spain and has entered into crisis in Sweden. It is completely unable to compete with tougher neo-liberalism and is therefore even less viable in countries such as El Salvador and Nicaragua. There is enormous difficulty in setting out an alternative project, but without doubt it is always preferable to start from the position of trying to solve the greatest problems of the masses.
The globalisation of the economy has not only deregulated the forces of labour, made most of the world even poorer and increased the cynicism of former Marxists and revolutionaries/ It has also clarified the relationship between the tribal problems in Rwanda, the struggle of the indigenous Zapatistas in Mexico, and the prospects for keeping hope alive in El Salvador, Jacques Derrida spoke of a new International (of the poor and the excluded, and so of most of the world), but there will be no new International without struggle by the workers in imperialist countries.
2. La Jorada, 5 May 1994
3. Ibid, 7. May. 1994
4. Cited by J Castenada