Divided movement
International Viewpoint #258 July 1994
SEVEN months after taking power, the "centre-left" coalition government has come up against a wave of social discontent, led by the trade union Solidarity, while the body of affiliated trade unions OPZZ, previously so swift to criticise the misdeeds of the preceding capitalist governments, has maintained a careful reserve. The new government has retreated in the face of the miners' demands, but the strike movement has, above all, once again highlighted divisions in the working class. ZBIGNIEW KOWALEWSKI
F OR four years the leadership
of Solidarity legitimised and protected the anti-worker and pro-capitalist policies of the right-wing governments which succeeded one another after the fall of the bureaucratic regime. This support was probably critical to the success of the "shock therapy", the demolition of workers' social gains and the pursuit of a market economy. However, with the passage of time it became more difficult for the Solidarity leadership to hold an "umbrella" over rightwing socio-economic policies.
In search of a lost basis of support
The working-class base of the union reacted against the rise in unemployment, the slashing of social services and the privatisation of the economy in two ways — both equally undesirable from the point of view of the union bureaucracy. Many simply left Solidarity. Its huge fall in numbers was all the more disturbing for its leadership as union competition was strong, particularly from the national alliance of unions OPZZ (made up of the former official unions), which today is in the majority, but also from the dissident minority union Solidarity '80. Others became radicalised and this was accompanied
### PoLaNd by the calling into question of their leadership. Divisions appeared within the heart of the leadership, as shown by the rivalry between the national president, Marian Krzaklewski, regarded as "soft", and the president of the Warsaw region, Maciej Jankowski, viewed as a "hardliner"
So as to regain legitimacy in the eyes of its rank and file, in 1992 the Solidarity leadership felt obliged to launch warning strikes and on one such action found itself outflanked in spectacular fashion: In December that year a national protest led to a three week-long strike by 100 thousand miners. In June 1993 its motion of censure on the government led by Hanna Suchocka resulted in the Diet (Parliament) dismissing the government and President Lech Walesa dissolving the Diet.2
It is characteristic of the Solidarity leadership that while obliged to distance itself from liberal policies and even to organise protest movements against them, it did not itself move to the left. It sought its references and political solidarity within the radical anti-liberal right - that same right discredited to the point of finding itself (like Solidarity) a loser at the September 1993 elections. One can imagine the confusion which this course provoked amongst the radicalised wing of Solidarity. In any event the Solidarity leadership has produced a true ideological masterstroke: it has persuaded large numbers of its rank and file and militants that the social disaster which has occurred since 1989 is a result of the so-called "post-commune"3 in other words, a political force which throughout the whole period was in opposition!
When a significant number of workers voted for this same "post-commune" the division amongst the working-class became glaringly obvious. During the parliamentary elections last September the Solidarity leadership had threatened that in the event of victory by political forces born of the former regime it would use all legal methods of mass mobilisation to overturn the "post-communist" government. Marian Krzaklewski even accused these forces of representing an "oligarchy of capital" -an example of the ideological masterstroke referred to previously.
Contrary to the views of Krzaklewski and the radical right, the Social Democratic Party of the Republic of Poland (SdRP), which originated from the Polish United Workers' Party (POUP),4 does not politically represent the capital referred to as "nomenklaturist", that is to say capital which was accumulated fraudulently by Stalinist bureaucrats at the end of their power. Primitive private accumulation of capital necessarily passing through the State apparatus, most former bureaucrats who became capitalists rapidly turned away from their former party, and were driven from power and ostracised by the new political elite. Further, capitalists do not just recruit from the old elite, but also from the new.
The trap closes
The coalition Polish Peasants' Party (PSL)-Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) government, led by Waldemar Pawlak, has done everything possible to create favourable conditions for a counter-attack by Solidarity. Despite the SLD making vague electoral promises of a change in favour of workers, absolutely nothing has been done after seven months of government. Immediately after its stunning victory the SLD started referring to "change within continuity". In reality there has been continuity but no change. Continuity means the restoration of capitalism. Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, spokesperson for the SLD, recently made the cynical observation: "Through the will of the electors, the
1. Solidarity, which had almost 10 million supporters in1981 and still 2.5 million at the time it was re-legalised in 1989, today has no more than 1.5 million. By way of comparison, OPZZ claims to have more than 4 million supporters, while Solidarity '80 has around 350,000.
2. See International Viewpoint, nos. 248 & 251, September and December 1993.
3. During the 1980s some of the opposition press adopted the term "komuna" ("commune") to designate the political forces aligned with the regime of General Jaruzelski. It is this term, with its perjorative connotation, that the rightwing in Solidarity now use to describe the left.
4. The POUP (Polish United Workers' Party) was in power from 1948 to 1989. At the beginning of 1990 it dissolved itself, with the majority of its leadership forming a new party, the SDRP.
5. The SLD was formed from the SDRP and twenty other organisations, including the OPZZ. By far the majority of these have their historical roots in the old regime.
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International Viewpoint #258 July 1994
SLD has taken the baton from the former government in the race to a market economy."6 He is perfectly aware that those who gave the SLD victory did so for completely opposite reasons, but this means nothing to him and his colleagues. Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, Prime Minister at the end of the General Jaruzelski regime and the last leader of POUP, has written: "Prime Minister Pawlak and his entourage do not speak of continuity. The leaders of the PS clearly know their base well. They know that on seeing the ruin of his farm the peasant would be angry to hear from the mouths of his leaders that they were thinking of continuing the economic policies of preceding governments."
Since its entry into government the SLD has been concerned solely with appearing credible in the eyes of both the international bourgeoisie and capitalists within Poland. In this it has had some considerable success, even if this is mitigated by the permanent conflict within the coalition and in its relationship with the presidency. Economic policy, including the privatisation of State industries, is entirely decided and carried out by the liberal wing of the SLD. The anti-liberal tendencies of the PSL, corresponding to the interests of its peasant supporters, still present certain obstacles, but are limited by a rather original trade-off. The PSL has given the SLD free rein in exchange for freedom to act as they choose concerning the running of the State apparatus and the treasury. Thus the peasant bureaucrats have achieved their desire: to take root in the upper echelons of the State administration, which deals with huge sums of money.
"Historical paradox"
In his recent public indictment of his comrades Rakowski wrote: "The trade union Solidarity, so its leaders stated, would oppose the exploitation of workers in whatever form. One would like to say: 'What times, that the language of class is over!" But [the truth is that] our social-democrats [choose to] use this no longer. (...) One of the most prominent leaders of the SdRP has declared that the historic task of his party is to form a middle class. (...) The attitude of the SdRP with regard to privatisation of State industry has caused much confusion both amongst the electorate and leftwing sympathisers. A social-democrat minister directs his ministry to transform ownership. That means that the socialdemocrats are actively participating in 28 the building of capitalism in Poland. It is a historical paradox because, in general, until now, the left-wing parties supported restrictions on large-scale private ownership. (...) If to all that we add the agreement of the SLD (including deputies belonging to the SdRP that there should be the right to evict tenants and if we hear ringing cries that We want to join NATO', (...) then the remark made by one of my friends, that our social-democrats wear liberal trousers, could seem justified." Rakowski is also extremely disturbed by the fact that "The social-democrats do not have significant bridgeheads amongst the workers." The only organised workers' base on whom the sdRP can count is the OPZZ. "It seems that the SdRP is becoming an electoralist party, only active during electoral campaigns. The SARP leadership do not appear to realise that if the party claims (in its programme) to draw its inspiration from traditional Polish socialist thought, then who, if not the workers, will form its main base? The semi-mythical middle class, the State bureaucracy, the liberal professions?" For Rakowski, the present course of Polish social-democracy, "closer to a liberal-democratic orientation than a left-wing one", shows that it is only a transitory conversion, and that sooner or later it will be necessary to form a true left-wing party. In his view, an example to follow could be that of the pre-World War II Polish Socialist Party, which was a mass reformist workers' party.
### Clear
Zbigniew Siemiatkowski has replied to Rakowski in very clear terms: *The SaRP is in a very uncomfortable situation. It must participate in the process [of privatisation], partially undermining its credibility. It must take part in forming conditions for the development of a healthy market economy, which will only benefit most wage-earners in the future. (...) To put it bluntly: for there to be a true social-democracy there must be support for the building of a market economy. (...) A middle class is necessary as a stabilising force, one which is invulnerable to any kind of demagogy and open to the world and its experiences. There is no democracy without a strong middle class of this kind. It is what makes civil society. We do not deny our support for the formation of a middle class. On the contrary, it is within that class that we see an important part of our social-democratic electorate. A left-wing position cannot be based upon groups which are pauperised, exasperated and who always lose out. 9
It was precisely one of these groups which in the last elections returned those formerly in the POUP to government, while another has now mobilised behind the Solidarity banner so as to drive them out. Anti-liberal splits within the SLD — several times announced as imminent by numerous political commentators -have not occurred. The liberal elements are still in firm control of the SLD and the OPZZ is not budging. Only four SLD deputies voted against the budget, which made deep cuts to social spending. As a result they were expelled from the parliamentary group. They included three representatives of the small Polish Socialist Party (PSP), including Piotr Ikonowicz and Stanislaw Wisniewski, vice-president of the OPZZ. It is significant that Wisniewski was not followed by any of the sixty SLD deputies who belong to the OPZZ.
### Broad strikes
The Solidarity leadership is politically motivated by right-wing considerations. However, it is a workers' union and its engagment in mass struggle is on the basis of real working-class claims. Abolition of the special tax paid by State
"excessive" increases, reduction in the working week to forty hours (with Saturdays off), reduction in gas and electricity rises, reduction in tax on low income, State social assistance for poor families — these are national claims. Solidarity is also demanding a swift vote in parliament on the group of laws which make up the "social pact on State industries" the distribution of profits made from privatisation for the benefit of workers and the fulfilment of all the agreements made with preceding governments.
The successive phases of the strike movement were planned in a secret, centralised fashion and announced only a short time before being put into effect so as to be a surprise and to avoid dissuasive action by the government. Often those most surprised by an order to go on strike were workers themselves. In any event, during the last ten days of April Solidarity was able to hit hard. It paralysed four lignite (brown coal) mines, on the production of which
6. Gazeta Wyborcza, no. 119, 24 May 1994.
7. Polityka, no. 17, 23 April 1994.
8. Ibid.
9. Polityka, no. 19, 7 May 1994.
struggle, around immediate and class- based demands, is a precondition for the liberation of a true left-wing political alternative. In Poland no such alternative is apparent at either pole of the workers'
International Viewpoint #258 July 1994 depends a third of national energy production. The country found itself on the verge of massive cuts in energy supplies to both homes and industry. Twenty other mines, principally (black) coal mines, also went on strike - which movement. * paradoxically reduced the demand for electricity. According to Solidarity, on 29 April eleven-hundred workplaces took part in a national day of strike action. Even if this figure is exaggerated, there can be no doubt that the movement is very wide-spread. On 6 May (again according to Solidarity's somewhat unreliable figures), 200 thousand workers in 190 businesses stopped work.
### Opportunism
While purporting to support the demands made by Solidarity, the OPZZ leadership stuck behind the government, condemning the strikes as political opportunism. For its part the government made partial concessions. It abandoned its plans to restructure the lignite mines and accepted the social claims of workers in this sector. It also later accepted all the demands put forward by Solidarity on behalf of the miners in black coal mines, save that it refused to pay wages for those days spent on strike. The union strike fund is empty and so could not compensate the workers. The tough stance of the government on this last point hastened the tailing-off of the movement even before the Solidarity leadership decided that national claims should be dealt with by negotiations. Strikes have now been suspended and some differences have arisen concerning where the movement should go now.
At the beginning the right-wing parties believed that they could benefit from a test of strength but later became increasingly worried: in their eyes the strikes blocked their plans for industrial restructuring, re-asserted the social importance of workers in the large-scale State industries and put a brake on pro-capitalist reforms. The pursuit of liberal and restorationist policies has proved more and more difficult, but there is still deep division within the workers' movement. This division is not only on the level of the union leaderships; between the Solidarity leadership which wants to be seen as the right-wing opposition to the centre-left government, and the OPZZ leadership, seeking to support this government in the same way as its "brothers" supported the various right-wing governments. There is also division within the heart of the working-class itself. The re-establishment of unity in
Lech Waleswa in
1980:
would the workers now drive him through the streets - or off them?
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