International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Dossier: Far Right in Europe: Belgium: Three Voices Make Discord

· International Viewpoint No. 259, September 1994 · pp 16-18 · 3,498 words

Three voices make discord

International Viewpoint #259 September 1994

THE RISE of the far right in Belgium is no longer a uniquely Flemish nor a uniquely electoral phenomenon. Since the last European elections the Vlaams Blok has consolidated its position and made breakthroughs in areas where until now it has experienced difficulties in implanting itself (for example in the province of Limbourg). Meanwhile, in Brussels and Wallonie, two other far right formations, the Front National and AGIR, are surging forward. Although this disproves some of the more simplistic analyses and explanations which have been put forward,' the crucial problem remains: how, against a background of social and economic crisis, austerity, spectacular increases in unemployment and political disarray - phenomena which are not going to disappear but will get worse - do we hold back the "brown tide"? We begin by examining what the far right in Belgium represents. VINCENT SCHELTIENS* 24 NOVEMBER

1991, the day of the legislative elections in Flanders, remains marked as "Black Sunday". The Vlaams Blok obtained 10.6% of the vote in Flanders as a whole and 25% in Antwerp, the principal town of the region. With this score the party of Karel Dillen (elected "president for life") and Philip de Winter (the de facto leader of the party) became the biggest electoral formation in Antwerp, surpassing the Social Democrats, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals. Although 12 June 1994 has not been characterised as a 16

BELGIUM second "Black Sunday" (the newspapers are getting used to the situation), the Vlaams Blok again increased its vote to obtain 12.6% and double its representation in the European parliament (from 1 to 2 seats, out of a total of 14).

Still on the electoral plane, the next battle will take place during the local elections, scheduled for 9 October 1994. The morning after "Black Sunday" , the Vlaams Blok announced its intentions; to confirm itself as the strongest party in Antwerp, to take over the government of the town and to win the mayorship. Everything is being thrown into the battle, including the "Führer" himself: de Winter, a native of Bruges, has set up house in downtown Antwerp to take the head of his party's list.

### Breakthroughs

This party is no longer a uniquely electoral phenomenon. The Vlaams Blok has succeeded in the past few years - on the basis of consecutive electoral breakthroughs and through its deputies in the institutions of bourgeois parliamentary democracy — in structuring and implanting itself. In its fiefdom, the province of Antwerp, the Vlaams Blok now has around 20 local sections, which intervene more and more actively in public life, in the neighbourhoods and even at the gates of factories and schools. Its youth organisation, the Vlaams Blok Jongeren, has several thousand adherents, while the circulation of its monthly has risen to 37,000 (plans to launch a daily have foundered up until now). To assess this party and fight it effectively, it is necessary to first distinguish three different levels:

• Its cadres, the political-ideological kernel, which while trying to project a respectable image, which represents the nucleus of a fascist project.

• Its members, found above all among the petty bourgeoisie, but also in the working class.

• Its electorate, containing a high percentage of workers, unemployed, the under-educated and very many youth, all prone to xenophobic prejudice, fundamentally because of the lack of a credible left alternative. It is this third category which is at stake in this battle.

The recipe for its success is well known and does not fundamentally differ from those employed elsewhere in Western Europe: faced with the crisis of capitalism, the social democratic co-management of this crisis, the disappearance of a credible left alternative together with ruptures in the social tissue at the beginning the breakthrough always happens in the traditionally "red" popular neighbourhoods of the big cities), the Vlaams Blok capitalised on popular discontent through presenting a verbally radical alternative with a specific identity (Flemish, anti-Belgian and racist). The zenith of this line was the publication of its *70 point programme to resolve the problem of immigration", which represented a gamble.4 With the increasing influence (some have said the putsch) of the "young wolves" led by de Winter, Van Hedke (a deputy in the European parliament and previously secretary of the far right fraction at Strasbourg), Van Hauthem and others (all aged between 25 and 35), a change of direction took place; the immigrant presence (linked with unemployment and insecurity became the focus of propaganda and agitation, to the detriment of anti-Belgian propaganda for an inde-

* The author is a member of the Socialist Workers' Party (SAP/POS, Belgian section of the Fourth International).

1. Analyses which sought to show that the rise of the far right was linked to the character of Flemish society, as if the rise of Hitler and the Holocaust could be explained by the "character of German society", or other analyses explaining that the rise of the far right had no link with the global crisis of society in which capitalism finds itself.

2. The Viaams Blok today has 18 parliamentary representatives (12 in the chamber of deputies and 6 in the senate) and 36 representatives in the provincial councils. Thanks to its federal deputies the Vlaams Blok received (under the old legislation) 11.2 million Belgian francs in state subsidies in 1992. Under the new law of state subvention of political parties the Vlaams Blok receives, starting from 1993, some 34 million Belgian francs above this amount, or a total of 54.5 million Belgian francs per year. Its participation in the right wing fraction of the European parliament also brings it some millions of Belgian francs.

3. The Vlaams Blok does better electorally among the young members of the two trade union federations (the social democratic ABVV and the Christian Democratic ACV) than it does among the population as a whole Among ABVV members of less than 35 years, 21% vote for the Vlaams Blok (15% in the ACV). Among the members of the socialist trade union federation, the Vlaams Blok is in second place in every age category, behind the Socialist Party!

4. In this programme (drawn up in 1992), which was unanimously condemned for racism and non-respect for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the Flemish regional parliament, the Vlaams Blok proposes, among other things, a system of apartheid in teaching (to prepare immigrants to return to their countries of origin") and in social security.

International Viewpoint #259 September 1994 pendent Flemish state. This was in conjunction with a series of meetings with Le Pen. The fact that the Vlaams Blok defends a "nationalism of the peoples" as opposed to the "state nationalism" of Le Pen's FN did not deter these young convinced fascists, emerging as they did from the most notorious "black" circles such as the high school students' movement, the NJSV, or the NSV student movement, organisations which are not afraid to indulge in militarist provocations (de Winter, who became a parliamentary deputy at the age of 26, was president of the NJSV and vice-president of the NS V).

This does not mean that the Vlaams Blok has not defended racist positions since its foundation. Such positions were to be found in its founding programme, but they were not put forward as the axis of its electoral agitation. Nor does it mean that the Vlaams Blok no longer has a separatist profile. At the same time as it claims to be the only Flemish nationalist party, it fiercely opposes any "proBelgian" sentiments among the public.6 For the Vlaams Blok the two things are linked, and there are no profound divergences among the leadership of the party as to ideology or political pro-

The undeniable strength of this party - and something which is little commented upon in the "left" analyses — is that it has succeeded in fusing two generations. The generation which was active in the 1920s, 30s and 40s, basing itself on the example of Mussolini and later — although partially and with more hesitations - of Hitler (sometimes with active collaboration with the Nazi occupiers, and the sending of young volunteers to the eastern front to combat the "Communist devil") was strongly marginalised and repressed at the end of the war. The small groups — often circles of ex-combatants - living in "the catacombs" succeeded in passing the torch to a new generation, coming into politics against the background of the "betrayal" of the traditional Flemish nationalist party Volksunie (Union of the People), a party which was a constituent of several federal governments, notably to elaborate the different stages of reform of the state. The ideological and political formation of this new generation was rooted in the 1920s and 1930s: Flemish priests and poets working for a "new order", like Cyril Verscaeve, August Borms, Joris Van Severen, Wies Moens, Staf De Clerq, Father Brauns and many others. The political itinerary of all the "young wolves"

include the same organisations; the VNJ scout movement, the two student organisations already mentioned, Voorpost (a Dutch-Flemish organisation which struggles for the unification of "Dietsland"), Were-Di — a club for intellectuals - and VMO (Order of Flemish Militants) — a private militia, condemned as such by a judicial tribunal in 1987.

A second success for the Vlaams Blok has been its ability to conquer hegemony of this entire far right Flemish movement. Following on from this, given its electoral credibility and its presence in the elected institutions, it has been able to draw behind it other Flemish nationalists (who did not originate from the far right) such as the Flemish intellectual Mark Grammens, who not so long ago was still to be seen in some left circles around the Communist Party in Flanders.

### Born leaders

How has the Vlaams Blok imposed itself in such a fashion as the sole and unique political voice for this movement? It has been a real coup. In these milieu there is no shortage of individuals who regard themselves as born leaders. The rare dissidents inside the Vlaams Blok have never succeeded in acquiring any electoral or organisational representation. This is due to the role of its founder, Karel Dillen and the "modus vivendi" which he has found with the youth. Opting for a "parliamentary-respectable" road, he has never denied his collaborationist past and has condemned neither the revisionism of some, nor the militarist actions of others. Other voices on the far right have always received a place in the first rank of the party. Two examples; the ultra-violent ex-leader of the VMO, Xavier Buisseret, is the party's propaganda chief? and currently a deputy in the national parliament. The "ideological guru" of the Flemish far right, Roeland Raes (one of the few who participated in the debates around the "New Right") is vice-president, acknowledged ideologue and deputy in the Belgian senate. During Vlaams Blok para-military groupuscules such as Assaut or Jonge Wacht) participate, it is Philip De Winter himself who directs the contingents. And in this way the Fuhrer indicates to the troops that he has not forgotten.

Throughout the 1980s in Wallonie an important sector of the left (situated principally within or around social democracy) saw in the revival of the far right in Flanders the confirmation of their own well-cultivated myth: Flanders, always right wing and Catholic, formed a "natural" terrain for fascism, particularly since the national question has always been isolated from social emancipation (which is, however, not entirely true).& According to these same sectors, "Red" Wallonie would always be immune against fascism — something which again has not been completely true in the past? — to such a point that some have declared that Wallonie was "the white spot on the map of fascist Europe". 10 Both assertions were caricatures of reality.

The far right in Wallonie lagged behind that of Flanders in making its electoral breakthrough, although the roots of the crisis being even worse than in Flanders, the objective terrain was present. However, in the two years after the 1991 elections, many elements intervened to reinforce a spectacular breakthrough of the Francophone far right. The deep divisions between the small far right groups were gradually resolved, and then came the present offered by social democracy: austerity for the workers, corruption and profitable swindles for the party bigwigs.

Let us examine the depth of this breakthrough. In the European vote, the Front National (FN) and AGIR together received 9.2%: 7.3% for the FN, 1.9% for AGIR (the FN gained 1 seat out of a total of 10). In their respective fiefdoms, the FN scored 11.5% in Brussels city (where it had already had a deputy elected in 1991), while AGIR received 4.7% in Liege. The breakthrough of the FN can be considered general throughout Wallonie: thus the party received 9.5%

5. The founding programme (1979) is entitled "Vlaams Blok. Basic principles. Manifesto of a nationalism of the right"

6. After the death of King Baudouin in August 1993 a real Belgian nationalist fervour emerged. Fiercely republican, the Vlaams Blok declined to comment on the deceased monarch. During the speech to parliament of the new king, Albert II, the Vlaams Blok fraction was absent, leaving a libertarian-populist deputy to mount a sole protest.

7. Buisseret, convicted several times for acts of violence against leftwingers, homosexuals and immigrants, once had the idea of naming this service of propaganda "national secretariat - service of agitation and propaganda". In Dutch its initials read NSDAP.

8. A well known example is that of the priest Daens and his brother who, at the beginning of the century, presented an alternative list to that of the Catholic party, to defend the interests of the workers, a struggle which went hand in hand with the battle for cultural and linguistic emancipation.

9. Just as well known is the example of the fascist Leon Degrelle, who recently died in exile in the Spanish state. Emerging from the reactionary Catholic currents, he made a spectacular breakthrough in the 1930s with his REX party. During the Nazi occupation he formed an SS Wallonie brigade to fight on the eastern front.

10. Unhappily we are obliged to quote our friend, the Walloon republican José Fontaine.

17

International Viewpoint #259 September 1994 in the province of Hainault (capital Charleroi), and 8.5% at Namur. An extrapolation for the legislative elections reveals that the FN would triple its number of seats (from 1 to 3) whereas AGIR would stand a good chance of winning its first seat.

To explain this surge it is first necessary to examine the nature of the crisis in Wallonie. De-industrialisation and massive unemployment (above all among the youth), and this time with the PS in the national, regional and local governments. No excuses then for a PS knee deep in corruption; the "godfather of the PS", the state minister André Cools, was shot in July 1991, the inquest leading to gangster circles around another PS minister; corruption in 1988 during the purchase of the Italian AGUSTA helicopters leading this year to the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of three PS ministers, the "three Guys": Guy Spitaels (former president of the party and president of the Walloon government), Guy Coëme (deputy prime minister in the federal government) and Guy Mathot (minister in the Walloon government).

Given the crisis of credibility of "socialism", the fact that the same PS had just introduced an austerity plan to meet the criteria of convergence for the Maastricht treaty, and the corruption, the only electoral gains would be for the far right. The two right wing parties enjoyed themselves to the hilt, leading an anti-corruption immigrant/asylum-seekers campaign. The votes lost by Francophone social democracy were almost entirely gained by the two far right formations.

an "anti-capitalist" discourse, in common with neo-Nazi currents which advocate the "second revolution" (in the tradition of Rohm, the Strasser brothers, and so on). But these are merely words. AGIR, while fulminating against foreign (above all American) capital, declares that it has no intention of challenging "fundamental ideas like private proper-

What the FN, AGIR and the Vlaams Blok have in common are royalism, authoritarianism, reactionary Catholicism and racism, united in a project to "cleanse" civil society (and above all the workers' movement) in the service of the big bourgeoisie, which - for the moment — does not need this project.

In its Brussels stronghold, the FN built itself through the Committee for the Defence of Social Beneficiaries, distributing hot meals to the poor. The FN too has its "president for life", the doctor Daniel Féret, now a European deputy (although in 1987 he was condemned to a year's imprisonment, fined 60,000 francs and banned from exercising his rights as a citizen for 5 years, for having provided a false alibi for a gangster on the run from the police).

"Pole-position"

The fact that Féret's party has been able to conquer "pole-position" on the Francophone far right is also due to a unification effort. Up until a few years ago battles still raged between the FN and the PFN (Party of New Forces).

Finally, the majority of PFN members entered the FN, except, significantly, in

Blok). Relations between the Vlaams Blok and AGIR, on the other hand, are more cordial. Starting from 1990, AGIR has been regularly invited to Vlaams Blok activities. Thus, in 1990, Destordeur addressed the youth congress of Vlaams Blok and made a speech on the glory of a free Flanders and Wallonie. 12

It is intriguing, if beyond the purposes of this article, to reflect on the influence exercised by these forces on the ideas and practices of bourgeois and social democratic politicians. All are opposed to "fascism", certainly. But some maintain that these are essentially "parties like the others, which should not be isolated or stigmatised, since that would only reinforce their success". 13 Numerous are those who openly take up the themes of these parties in relation to security policy against immigrants and asylum seekers. On the other hand, the law against racist acts has just been reinforced, as have the powers of the centre which combats racist and xenophobic acts. Cadres of the Vlaams Blok, exPFN and others have been put on trial on the basis of their material and propaganda. But it is certainly not by the road of state repression that the influence of these parties (and their ideas) will disappear.

Since "black Sunday" a number of mass anti-racist and anti-fascist initiatives have taken place in Belgium. The results of 12 June demonstrate that it is not enough to mobilise on the basis of anti-racism or anti-fascism. Meanwhile, the austerity policy continues, the trade union mobilisations coming up against the complicity of the national apparatuses with their friends in the govern-

...united in a project

These formations do not have a great deal in to "cleanse" civil

The common.

society (and above

Front

National all the workers' stands for "state nationalism", royalism movement) ...

and Belgian unity. It longs for the "Belgian greatness" of the colonial period. In deference to its pretensions to "Belgicisme", the party's full name is the FN-NF (the same thing, but in Dutch). In fact, it has hardly any

Flemish members but it does have the support of some members of aristocratic families. As to AGIR, its strongest base exists in the region of Liège and Brabant-Wallon (where historically there is a tradition of Francophone fascism).

AGIR is virulently "Walloonist" ("the

Walloons first"), anti-Belgian and more

"militant" than the FN. AGIR employs

18

Liège. After an unsuccessful attempt to seize power, the head of the Liège branch founded his own party, AGIR. Vlaams Blok the Front stake is Brussels, the capital of

Belgium. For the Vlaams Blok, Brussels should be the capital of an independent Flanders, whereas for the FN it represents the capital of a strong, unified, royalist Belgium. The competition between the two formations in Brussels is so strong that the Vlaams Blok distributes bilingual tracts and opens its lists to Francophone candidates! The two formations are also in competition for "official recognition" from their big brother in France (a battle which seems to be largely going the way of Vlaams ment.

Every anti-fascist initiative must be linked to a discourse and a practice of anti-capitalist inspiration. A change of course is needed which gives priority to the social needs of the majority, and it is necessary to create an alternative left political pole to give back credibility and identity to people impoverished by the crisis and the youth who can see no future. Such a movement has to reconquer the big cities, the neighbourhoods... if necessary house by house. The struggle against fascism must be treated as a war.

11. Agir, its programme of action.

12. Quoted in Gwenael Brees, 'L' Affront National, le nouveau visage de l'extreme-droite en Belgique', ed. EPO/REFLEX, 1991.

13. The most notorious mouthpiece for this "tendency" is the current Minister of Defence, the Flemish Christian Democrat Leo Delcroix, right wing heavyweight of the CVP.

← Dossier: Far Right in Europe: Germany: Election Danger · Dossier: Far Right in Europe: France: Courting the Rich and Poor →

Something wrong on this page?